

CINCINNATI

Fire Department




Enhanced Line of Duty Death Report

**Fire Apparatus Operator
Daryl Gordon**

March 26, 2015

Published on May 14, 2016



FAO Daryl Gordon
1960-2015
NEVER FORGET



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SECTION 1

Dedication



Dedication

On March 26, 2015, Daryl Gordon made the ultimate heroic sacrifice. Daryl Gordon died in the line of duty while searching for occupants at an extra alarm fire in the Madisonville neighborhood of Cincinnati. The Cincinnati Fire Department and the Gordon family suffered a tremendous loss. This report is dedicated to Fire Apparatus Operator Daryl Gordon, his wife Angela, his daughters Angelique and Chelsea, his extended family and his brother and sister firefighters within the Cincinnati Fire Department. Daryl will never be forgotten, and, to honor his sacrifice, the Cincinnati Fire Department will share our lessons learned from this tragic day. In sharing these lessons, we hope to ensure that his death was not in vain by keeping similar circumstances from occurring again and enhancing the operations of the Cincinnati Fire Department.

Daryl's contribution as a fire fighter with the Cincinnati Fire Department and a friend to many will never be forgotten. Daryl dedicated his life to serving others and was a role model to many. Those who knew Daryl personally have forever been enriched by his energetic and caring dedication to life, his co-workers and the citizens he served. Firefighters from this point forward will benefit from the knowledge and experience gained as a result of this tragic event. Every fire fighter should feel a sense of pride in believing that Daryl's sacrifice will help prevent others from experiencing this same type of tragic loss - not only in Cincinnati, but nationwide.

The Cincinnati Fire Department extends its sincere thanks to all those who supported and assisted us immediately following this event and during the investigation and recovery phase of preparing this report. The Cincinnati Police Department and the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) completed their own independent investigations of the fire. The International Association of Fire Fighters and the Ohio Association of Professional Fire Fighters assisted with the planning and logistics of the memorial services. Most Cincinnati Fire Department personnel were able to attend the funeral services for Daryl Gordon due to the support from many surrounding Fire Departments.

While there is nothing that can be done to change the outcome of the events on March 26, 2015, we can learn lessons from this horrific day. By accepting the findings of this report and promising to implement recommendations from the lessons learned, the Cincinnati Fire Department will pay the greatest tribute to Daryl by honoring his courage, dedication and sacrifice.





**IN MEMORY AND HONOR OF
DARYL GORDON'S
SERVICE AND SACRIFICE**



SECTION 2

**Executive
Summary**



Executive Summary

On March 26, 2015, Cincinnati Fire Department Fire Apparatus Operator Daryl Gordon died in the line of duty after falling into an open elevator shaft at a 4 Alarm fire in a 5-story, 38 unit apartment building at 6020 Dahlgren St. Seemingly a “routine” alarm, fire companies initially expected to find yet another minor “food-on-the-stove” incident. Even though smoke was not visible upon arrival, a fire had been growing for a significant period of time. Asleep when the fire started, the occupant of Apartment 27 awoke and attempted to fight the fire prior to calling 911. After vacating the apartment, the door remained opened due to a faulty self-closing mechanism, allowing smoke and fire to spread throughout the building. While not reflective of operations at every incident, first-arriving fire companies did have significant fireground operational issues, including crew integrity, hose deployment, ventilation, search, and radio communications. Difficulties with fire control efforts and endangered occupants required Command to request a 2nd Alarm. A total of 21 civilians were rescued from the fire building.

Rescue 14, with FAO Gordon, responded on the 2nd Alarm, arrived on scene thirty minutes after the original 911 call, and was ordered to assist with the primary search of the 5th floor. FAO Gordon, while donning his Self Contained Breathing Apparatus face piece, became separated from his crew. As the remainder of his company searched, they discovered an outward-swinging elevator door with an inoperable interlock mechanism leading to an open elevator shaft. The elevator door opened freely without force, even though the elevator car was not present. Rescue 14 marked the door with a black marker, “Do Not Enter Open Shaft.” Rescue 14 communicated this finding to a District Chief on the 5th Floor, but this information was not broadcast over the radio. Sometime later, while the rest of his crew was searching elsewhere, FAO Gordon opened this elevator door and fell into the elevator shaft, causing his untimely death. It took over ten minutes to realize that FAO Gordon was missing. Once located, he was extricated from the elevator shaft quickly. FAO Gordon succumbed to his injuries at the hospital.

Official Investigation Reports

The Cincinnati Fire Investigation Unit determined the fire to be accidental, caused by food left unattended on the stove in Apartment 27. The Cincinnati Police Department conducted an investigation and found no criminal wrongdoing. City Elevator Inspectors and the Cincinnati Police Department investigated the elevator, elevator door and interlock mechanism for defects or malfunctions, but they could not determine if the elevator door malfunctioned. The Hamilton County Coroner determined the cause of death was accidental; immediate cause was asphyxiation due to compression of the chest with associated fractures, and contributory causes were blunt impact injuries, left pelvic fractures, scalp lacerations and contusions.

Contributing Factors

National Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH) Firefighter Injury and Death Reports analyze fire service incidents and provide valuable lessons learned in the aftermath of tragedy. NIOSH reports have identified several common factors in Line of Duty Deaths, focusing on environmental,



operational, communication, training and staffing issues. The “defective” elevator door was the primary contributing factor at this incident. However, a review of recent NIOSH reports found several typical contributing factors that were also present at the 6020 Dahlgren St. incident. Operational factors included accountability procedures, understanding of modern fire behavior, fire stream tactics, fireground ventilation, and freelancing. Training factors included training division staffing, training plan, forcible entry training, and hose deployment training. Communications factors included human error, radio discipline, knowledge of radio equipment, and radio system template.


Recommendations for Improvement

Stemming from lessons learned at the Dahlgren St. incident, recommendations to improve the Cincinnati Fire Department were developed. Fire prevention recommendations include improving public education efforts on cooking safety, smoke detectors, and immediate 911 notification; identifying building hazards; prioritizing building inspections; and increasing fire prevention bureau staffing. Training recommendations include increasing training bureau staffing; improving structural firefighting training; creating supervisor and above grade assignment training; updating training facilities, and developing training delivery logistics. Operational recommendations include creating a Division Chief rank; increasing the engine company response complement; managing on scene resources; maintaining crew integrity; revising firefighting procedures; and ensuring recognition, communication and mitigation of fireground hazards. Communication recommendations include improving radio communication skills and modifying the radio channel template. Equipment recommendations include evaluating and securing appropriate equipment to assist in firefighter and civilian rescue. These recommendations to improve the Cincinnati Fire Department total approximately \$2.3 million per year.

Conclusion

The Cincinnati Fire Department is neither alone nor unique in our need to implement recommendations and sound training improvements into day-to-day operations. Ensuring proper staffing, proper training and proper equipment to safely operate at any emergency incident should be our top priority. FAO Gordon died while searching in a dark and smoke filled hallway for occupants. Too many firefighters have paid the ultimate price for protecting life and property. The failure of the elevator interlock mechanism was the most significant factor in the death of FAO Gordon. However, the fireground operational issues that occurred are the most concerning to the Cincinnati Fire Department. Clear objectives, focused strategies and proficient tactics at every incident are essential. In each of the last two decades, the Cincinnati Fire Department has experienced the tragic death of a firefighter. We must honor the ultimate sacrifice of FAO Daryl Gordon by taking appropriate corrective actions to prevent similar or more catastrophic incidents.





SECTION 3

FOCUS



Focus

The focus of this report is to document the facts pertaining to the Line of Duty Death of Daryl Gordon and to recommend actions that could reduce the risk of similar events in the future of the Cincinnati Fire Department.

On March 26, 2015, Fire Apparatus Operator Daryl Gordon died in the line of duty after falling into an open elevator shaft at a 4 Alarm fire in a 5-story multiple dwelling at 6020 Dahlgren St. in the Madisonville neighborhood of Cincinnati. The fire started in an apartment on Floor 2 as a result of unattended cooking on the stovetop. The Cincinnati Fire Department had not experienced a line of duty death since March 21, 2003.

Following the fall and Mayday for brother Gordon, all fire department personnel on the scene of the fire performed at exceptional levels. There were numerous exemplary actions demonstrated by members of the fire department during rescue and attempted resuscitation of FAO Gordon. In the days following Daryl's death, fire department members were given the opportunity to visit the fire scene in a controlled setting to visualize the fire building and ask questions about the incident.

Over 90 fire fighters provided post-incident written statements and oral interviews for the NIOSH investigation. These interviews captured their recollections of the events that occurred, and were used in conjunction with radio transcripts to develop a timeline of the events that occurred on March 26, 2015.



This report analyzes the tasks of fire companies and command officers at the incident scene in order to identify lessons learned or reinforced to prevent similar events from occurring again.

The completion of this report signifies the Cincinnati Fire Department's dedication to the prevention of another Line of Duty Death. The committee's recommendations provide a positive plan of action for the Cincinnati Fire Department to proactively follow to achieve this goal. The ultimate tribute to Daryl Gordon and his family would be to learn from the operations on March 26, 2015, and aggressively pursue the recommendations this report has created.

Recommendations, budget implications and an implementation plan have been included to clearly lay the groundwork for safer operations within the Cincinnati Fire Department while providing outstanding service to the City of Cincinnati.



NEVER FORGET



SECTION 4

**Investigation
Team**



Investigation Team

Mission

Following FAO Gordon's funeral, the Cincinnati Fire Department formed a committee to independently investigate the events surrounding FAO Gordon's death. The following mission statement was created and utilized by this committee:

“The focus of this investigation shall be to identify the facts pertaining to the Line of Duty Death of Daryl Gordon and to recommend actions to reduce the risk of similar events.”

The Team

Assistant Chief Ed Dadosky and District Chief Greg Potter chaired the Investigation Team.

The Investigation Team was commissioned by Fire Chief Richard Braun following the incident to complete this comprehensive report. The team coordinated with NIOSH efforts in the early phase of the investigation. This joint effort resulted in a Preliminary Report, released on August 9, 2015, and focused on a timeline of events related directly to FAO Gordon. NIOSH will release their own independent report.

The fire scene was recreated with the assistance of the Cincinnati Fire Department Fire Investigative Unit and the Cincinnati Police Department Homicide Unit. The findings of their investigations provided the team with invaluable information related to the cause of the fire, conditions in the building as a result of the fire, status of the elevator and multiple photographic images.

Following the release of the Preliminary Report, the Investigation Team met frequently to expand upon the findings of the Preliminary Report and create this document. During the investigation process, several subcommittees were formed to develop lessons learned and recommendations for improvement. The subcommittees were tasked with reviewing events or actions directly related to the death of FAO Gordon.

The entire committee met several times to develop Lessons Learned or Reinforced portion of this report (*Section 11*). These Lessons Learned or Reinforced were utilized to compile the Recommendations portion of this report (*Section 12*). There was majority support from committee members for all Recommendations listed.

The committee was comprised of personnel from each Cincinnati Fire Department Bureau and representatives of Cincinnati Fire Fighters IAFF Local 48 Safety Committee.



Investigation Team Members

Chairs

Assistant Chief Ed Dadosky
District Chief Greg Potter

CFD Human Resources / Training
CFD Operations

Team Members

Assistant Chief Anson Turley
District Chief Dan Merz
District Chief Robert McWilliams
District Chief G.S. Frazier
District Chief Sherman Smith
District Chief Cedric Robinson
District Chief Dave Greve
District Chief Fred Prather
Captain Mike Kirby
Captain Curt Goodman
Captain Thomas Chappell
Captain Steve Coldiron
Captain Dave Roberto
Captain Dave Johnson
Captain John Klosterman
Captain Matt Flagler
Lieutenant Bill Lustenberger
Lieutenant Joe Arnold
Lieutenant Doug Baker
Lieutenant Derek Douglas
Fire Apparatus Operator Fidel Akemon
Fire Specialist Jim Hutchings
Fire Specialist Daryl Meadows
Firefighter Mel Walker

CFD Emergency Management / Communications
CFD Operations
CFD Operations
CFD Human Resources / Safety
CFD Human Resources / Training
CFD Operations / Local 48 Safety Committee
CFD Administration / Equipment, Facilities, Purchasing
CFD Fire Prevention
CFD Operations / Local 48 Safety Committee
CFD Operations / Local 48 Safety Committee
CFD Operations / Safety Officer
CFD Fire Prevention
CFD Operations / Local 48 Safety Committee
CFD Fire Investigation
CFD Communications
CFD Operations
CFD Operations / Local 48 Safety Committee
CFD Operations
CFD Operations
CFD Operations / EMS
CFD Operations / Local 48 Safety Committee
CFD Fire Investigation
CFD Fire Prevention
CFD Mask Services Unit

Investigation Subcommittees

Following the initial review of the incident, the creation of a timeline, and the outline of detailed company actions, the committee came up with critical lessons learned from this incident in an effort to reduce the risk of similar events from occurring again. With those lessons learned, we formed recommendations for improvement within the Cincinnati Fire Department. The team's intention is to ensure we look at every possible aspect of the Department that contributed to the death of FAO Gordon.



Subcommittee Groups

Operations Group

District Chief Greg Potter - Chair

District Chiefs - Daniel Merz, Robert McWilliams, G.S. Frazier

Captains - Mike Kirby, Curt Goodman, Tom Chappell, Dave Roberto, John Klosterman

Lieutenants - Joe Arnold, Doug Baker, Bill Lustenberger

Communications Group

Assistant Chief Anson Turley- Chair

District Chiefs - Robert McWilliams, Daniel Merz

Captain - Matt Flagler, Jack Klosterman

Lieutenant - Joe Arnold

Training Group

District Chief Sherman Smith - Chair

Lieutenants - Joe Arnold, Mark Marshall

FAO - Fidel Akemon

EMS Group

District Chief Cedric Robinson - Chair

Lieutenant Derek Douglas

Fire Prevention Group

District Chief Fred Prather - Chair

Captains - Steve Coldiron, Maurice Vassar

Specialists - Daryl Meadows, Al Harden

Fire Investigation Group

Captain Dave Johnson - Chair

Specialists - James Hutchings

Equipment Group

District Chief Dave Greve - Chair

Captain - Dave Roberto

Firefighter - Mel Walker



SECTION 5

**Overview
of the
Cincinnati
Fire Department**



Overview of the Cincinnati Fire Department

The Cincinnati Fire Department is a career fire department with 840 uniformed personnel and 27 civilian personnel.

The Cincinnati Fire Department was founded in 1853 and was the first paid professional fire department in the nation. The Cincinnati Fire Department is rich in history and tradition. Miles Greenwood, co-inventor of the first practical steam fire engine, served as the department's first chief. One of the principal reasons for creation of a professional and fully paid fire department in Cincinnati was a fire that occurred in 1852 at Miles Greenwood's Eagle Ironworks. The fire destroyed much of Greenwood's business, prompting him to seek new and better ways to fight fires. On March 2, 1852, three Cincinnati residents -- Abel Shawk, Alexander Bonner Latta, and Greenwood -- began construction of the world's first practical steam-powered fire engine. Shawk was a locksmith, and Latta was a locomotive builder. Greenwood's Eagle Ironworks manufactured the engines. Earlier inventors had manufactured steam-powered fire engines, but the Cincinnati version proved to be much more practical, as the steam engine could begin pumping water out of a water source in 10 minutes. Earlier engines took significantly longer. After the three men demonstrated their finished engine to the Cincinnati City Council, the Council members contracted for an engine. The fire engine was presented to the Cincinnati Fire Department on Jan. 1, 1853, making Cincinnati the first city in the world to use steam fire engines. This first engine was named "Uncle Joe Ross" after a City Council member. In 1854, Cincinnati residents raised enough funds to allow the Fire Department to purchase a second steam fire engine. This engine was known as "Citizen's Gift." The steam fire engine forever changed firefighting in Cincinnati. Pleased with the engine, local government leaders decided to form a professional fire department rather than relying on volunteers. In addition, Cincinnati was the first fire department to utilize horses to pull fire engines.

In a geographic area of 78.8 square miles, the Department protects a population of 296,943 residents of Cincinnati with a daytime population that swells towards 500,000. The City is located in southwest Ohio within the county of Hamilton. The geographic layout of the City provides a central core on the banks of the Ohio River and branches out 12 miles to the East and West and approximately 10 miles to the North. The Department provides protection to a central business district with high-rise office structures, housing, shopping, convention, entertainment, hotel, and sporting establishments. Throughout the remainder of the City, the Department provides services to four major interstate highway systems, a major rail yard, multiple manufacturing and warehouse occupancies, a moderate size municipal airport, and various residential and commercial properties. Additionally, the Department provides protection to two large universities and several small community colleges. There are several major hospitals located within the City limits.

The Cincinnati Fire Department provides fire protection, emergency medical service, hazmat response/mitigation, technical rescue, fire prevention, and support services. The Fire Department protects the neighborhoods of Cincinnati by staffing 26 Fire Stations with 40 Fire Companies.



The Fire Department staffs the following units daily:


- 26 Engine Companies (*all ALS*)
- 12 Ladder Companies (*2 ALS*)
- 12 Paramedic Transport Units (*all ALS*)
- 2 Heavy Rescue Companies
- 4 District Chiefs – Incident Command Units
- 1 Safety Officer (*Captain*)
- 3 ALS Supervisors (*Lieutenant Paramedic Supervisors*)
- 1 ARFF - Airport Response Truck
- 1 Bomb Disposal Unit (*Staffed by Engine 14*)
- 1 Fire Boat (*Staffed by E3/T3*)
- 4 Zodiac Rescue Boats (*Staffed by R9, R14, T23 and T17*)
- 1 Pontoon Boat (*Staffed by E18*)
- 1 Water Tanker (*Staffed by E18/T18*)
- 2 Foam Units
- 2 Mass Decontamination Units
- 2 Mass Casualty Units



A minimum of 193 firefighters are on duty each day.

RESPONSE TOTALS 2015



In 2015, the Cincinnati Fire Department responded to a total of 71,451 emergency incidents. Of these incidents, 59,182 were medical emergencies, 6,172 were fire emergencies, 4,605 were other non-fire emergencies, and 1,492 were structure fires.



CINCINNATI FIRE STATION LOCATIONS

| Company | Neighborhood | Address |
|--|------------------|--------------------------|
| District 1 | Downtown | 329 East 9th Street |
| Engine 3, Truck 3, Medic 3, Boat 3 | Downtown | 329 East 9th Street |
| Engine 5 | Over the Rhine | 8 East McMicken |
| Engine 14, Rescue 14, Bomb Unit, HazMat 14, SO2, Zodiac 14 | Downtown | 430 Central Avenue |
| Engine 19, Truck 19, Medic 19 | Corryville | 2814 Vine Street |
| Engine 23, Truck 23, Medic 23, Zodiac 23 | Walnut Hills | 1623 Madison Avenue |
| Engine 34, ALS 34 | Clifton | 301 Ludlow |
| District 2 | Lower Price Hill | 2101 West 8th Street |
| Engine 17, Truck 17, Medic 17, Zodiac 17 | Lower Price Hill | 2101 West 8th Street |
| Engine 21, Truck 21 | Fairmount | 2131 State Avenue |
| Engine 24, Truck 24, Medic 24 | Price Hill | 4526 Glenway Avenue |
| Engine 29, Truck 29, Medic 29 | West End | 564 West Liberty Street |
| Engine 37 | Riverside | 310 Lilenthal Street |
| Engine 50 | Saylor Park | 6558 Parkland Avenue |
| District 3 | Northside | 1668 Blue Rock Street |
| Engine 9, Rescue 9, Medic 9, Zodiac 9 | Bond Hill | 4379 Reading Road |
| Engine 12, Medic 12 | Camp Washington | 3001 Spring Grove Avenue |
| Engine 20, Truck 20 | Northside | 1668 Blue Rock Street |
| Engine 32, Truck 32, ALS 32 | Avondale | 650 Forest Avenue |
| Engine 35, Medic 35, ALS 35 | Westwood | 2487 Harrison Avenue |
| Engine 38 | Winton Place | 725 Circle Avenue |
| Engine 51, Medic 51 | College Hill | 5801 Hamilton Avenue |
| District 4 | Oakley | 4401 Marburg Avenue |
| Engine 2, Truck 2, Medic 2 | Hartwell | 18 East Seymour Avenue |
| Engine 7 | Mount Washinton | 2058 Sutton Avenue |
| Engine 8 | Pleasant Ridge | 5901 Montgomery Avenue |
| Engine 18, Truck 18, ARFF 18 | Lunken Airport | 478 Wilmer Avenue |
| Engine 31, Truck 31 | Oakley | 4401 Marburg Avenue |
| Engine 46, Medic 46 | Hyde Park | 2731 Erie Avenue |
| Engine 49 | Madisonville | 5917 Prentice Street |





Engine Company Response Totals 2015

Image #4

Engine Totals

| | ALS | BLS | FIRE | OTHER | Struct | Total |
|----------------------|--------|--------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| <i>Engine Totals</i> | 34,028 | 26,117 | 6,600 | 3,408 | 5,160 | 75,313 |
| <i>E35</i> | 2,688 | 1,760 | 269 | 208 | 231 | 5,156 |
| <i>E24</i> | 2,667 | 1,748 | 243 | 177 | 284 | 5,119 |
| <i>E23</i> | 2,046 | 1,485 | 352 | 158 | 238 | 4,279 |
| <i>E03</i> | 1,488 | 1,649 | 494 | 151 | 191 | 3,973 |
| <i>E02</i> | 1,906 | 1,473 | 283 | 153 | 131 | 3,946 |
| <i>E19</i> | 1,522 | 1,367 | 567 | 129 | 325 | 3,910 |
| <i>E51</i> | 1,963 | 1,275 | 247 | 120 | 127 | 3,732 |
| <i>E12</i> | 1,655 | 1,056 | 308 | 182 | 360 | 3,561 |
| <i>E32</i> | 1,613 | 1,127 | 382 | 130 | 306 | 3,558 |
| <i>E17</i> | 1,523 | 1,222 | 203 | 141 | 272 | 3,361 |
| <i>E20</i> | 1,426 | 1,228 | 260 | 186 | 244 | 3,344 |
| <i>E05</i> | 1,291 | 1,281 | 307 | 154 | 265 | 3,298 |
| <i>E09</i> | 1,419 | 1,015 | 243 | 140 | 239 | 3,056 |
| <i>E21</i> | 1,330 | 911 | 166 | 154 | 381 | 2,942 |
| <i>E14</i> | 944 | 1,074 | 464 | 161 | 166 | 2,809 |
| <i>E29</i> | 1,106 | 1,095 | 269 | 116 | 215 | 2,801 |
| <i>E38</i> | 1,345 | 972 | 193 | 96 | 144 | 2,750 |
| <i>E31</i> | 1,079 | 668 | 189 | 106 | 160 | 2,202 |
| <i>E34</i> | 694 | 622 | 404 | 110 | 250 | 2,080 |
| <i>E08</i> | 996 | 668 | 164 | 111 | 125 | 2,064 |
| <i>E49</i> | 899 | 715 | 119 | 105 | 104 | 1,942 |
| <i>E46</i> | 635 | 461 | 211 | 140 | 184 | 1,631 |
| <i>E07</i> | 800 | 575 | 77 | 99 | 44 | 1,595 |
| <i>E18</i> | 323 | 243 | 98 | 86 | 82 | 832 |
| <i>E37</i> | 352 | 220 | 47 | 57 | 79 | 755 |
| <i>E50</i> | 318 | 207 | 41 | 38 | 13 | 617 |



Truck Company Response Totals 2015

| Image #5 | ALS | BLS | FIRE | OTHER | Struct | Total |
|---------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| Truck Totals | 3,304 | 3,542 | 5,159 | 3,444 | 4,744 | 20,193 |
| T19 | 294 | 329 | 893 | 329 | 592 | 2,437 |
| T24 | 728 | 481 | 214 | 298 | 334 | 2,055 |
| T03 | 220 | 419 | 762 | 337 | 262 | 2,000 |
| T20 | 250 | 307 | 550 | 441 | 416 | 1,964 |
| T23 | 353 | 326 | 368 | 259 | 496 | 1,802 |
| T32 | 265 | 262 | 469 | 260 | 486 | 1,742 |
| T21 | 202 | 228 | 296 | 293 | 641 | 1,660 |
| T02 | 410 | 414 | 341 | 270 | 204 | 1,639 |
| T29 | 132 | 284 | 487 | 245 | 428 | 1,576 |
| T17 | 259 | 262 | 210 | 216 | 448 | 1,395 |
| T31 | 154 | 180 | 422 | 330 | 279 | 1,365 |
| T18 | 37 | 50 | 147 | 166 | 158 | 558 |

Rescue Company Response Totals 2015

| Image #6 | ALS | BLS | FIRE | OTHER | Struct | Total |
|----------------------|-----|-----|------|-------|--------|-------|
| Rescue Totals | 35 | 570 | 124 | 1,085 | 1,581 | 3,395 |
| HR14 | 13 | 302 | 58 | 682 | 891 | 1,946 |
| HR09 | 22 | 268 | 66 | 403 | 690 | 1,449 |

District Chief Response Totals 2015

| Image #7 | ALS | BLS | FIRE | OTHER | Struct | Total |
|------------------------|-----|-----|-------|-------|--------|-------|
| District Totals | 91 | 66 | 1,477 | 1,300 | 3,130 | 6,064 |
| D03 | 29 | 20 | 513 | 426 | 846 | 1,834 |
| D01 | 19 | 14 | 451 | 295 | 973 | 1,752 |
| D02 | 27 | 10 | 217 | 284 | 858 | 1,396 |
| D04 | 16 | 22 | 296 | 295 | 453 | 1,082 |



Medic Unit Response Totals 2015

| Image #8 | ALS | BLS | FIRE | OTHER | Struct | Total |
|---------------------|--------|--------|------|-------|--------|--------|
| <i>Medic Totals</i> | 35,528 | 15,981 | 57 | 792 | 1,910 | 54,268 |
| <i>M12</i> | 3,418 | 1,415 | 2 | 93 | 205 | 5,133 |
| <i>M51</i> | 3,467 | 1,366 | 8 | 92 | 175 | 5,108 |
| <i>M19</i> | 3,184 | 1,570 | 9 | 69 | 216 | 5,048 |
| <i>M23</i> | 3,169 | 1,344 | 3 | 57 | 181 | 4,754 |
| <i>M29</i> | 2,811 | 1,525 | 8 | 88 | 155 | 4,587 |
| <i>M03</i> | 2,604 | 1,587 | 5 | 70 | 128 | 4,394 |
| <i>M24</i> | 2,936 | 1,191 | 2 | 57 | 156 | 4,342 |
| <i>M35</i> | 2,970 | 1,111 | 2 | 58 | 152 | 4,293 |
| <i>M46</i> | 2,830 | 1,222 | 8 | 44 | 148 | 4,252 |
| <i>M17</i> | 2,811 | 1,180 | 1 | 53 | 130 | 4,175 |
| <i>M09</i> | 2,700 | 1,237 | 4 | 52 | 151 | 4,144 |
| <i>M02</i> | 2,628 | 1,233 | 5 | 59 | 113 | 4,038 |

ALS Supervisor Response Totals 2015

| Image #9 | ALS | BLS | FIRE | OTHER | Struct | Total |
|-------------------|-------|-----|------|-------|--------|-------|
| <i>ALS Totals</i> | 4,134 | 808 | 18 | 602 | 1,658 | 7,220 |
| <i>ALS32</i> | 1,426 | 284 | 9 | 218 | 633 | 2,570 |
| <i>ALS34</i> | 1,389 | 311 | 5 | 250 | 597 | 2,552 |
| <i>ALS35</i> | 1,319 | 213 | 4 | 134 | 428 | 2,098 |



SECTION 6

**The
Structure
6020 Dahlgren St**



The Structure

6020 Dahlgren Street, Madisonville

Construction: 5 story, Type II construction, unprotected building, built in 1962. The building is approximately 130 ft x 50 ft and is 60 ft tall. The building has block hallway corridors, steel bar joists with concrete between floors, and regular wood stud with drywall apartment interiors. Individual apartment doors are metal frame with solid wood.

Occupancy: The building is occupied as a multiple family apartment building with 38 individual apartment units. The apartments on each floor vary in size and shape.

Layout: The building has a centrally located lobby area, central hydraulic elevator with elevator shaft, and stairwells at either end of the building. The first floor has six living units, offices, storage space, access to two stairwells and one elevator door. Floors 2 through 5 each have eight living units, a laundry room, an elevator and two stairwells.


Access & Egress: There is a central entrance on the "A" side. This entrance is the main path of access to the building. The stairwells located on the "B" side and "D" side can be accessed from the first floor hallway. The stairwell doors also exit on the "C" side on the landing between Floor 1 and Floor 2. Both stairwells provide access to all floors.

Special Considerations:

The building is built on a grade with ground level access for Floor 1 on the "A" side and ground level access for Floor 2 on the "C" side. The structure is part of a complex of four buildings. 6020 Dahlgren St. is the largest of these buildings and is located in the rear, which limits access to fire apparatus. Limited access makes access to all portions of the building difficult. This building was not equipped with a fire sprinkler or standpipe system.



6020
Dahlgren St
4 Sided View



Fire Building

Aerial View of Complex



Entrance to Complex @ Dahlgren



Looking West From Owasco & Dahlgren



Looking East From Ward & Dahlgren



Image # 15



Image # 16



"A" Side





Image #17

“B” Side Notice Grade Difference



Image #18

“D” Side Notice Grade Difference



Image #19



"C" Side
Taken from "C/D" Corner

"D" Stairwell



FIRE
APARTMENT

"C" Side
Taken from "B/C" Corner



"B" Stairwell

Image #20



**FIRE
APARTMENT**

Image #21



AERIAL VIEW



Floor Layouts

Image #22





Image #23



Floor Layouts (continued)

Image #24




Image #25





Image #26



★
5th Floor
Elevator
Location
Where FAO
Gordon Fell



The Elevator

The elevator is a hydraulic elevator equipped with outward swinging doors similar to doors found in standard doorways of commercial buildings. The doors are equipped with self closing mechanisms, are recessed back more than a normal door, have interlock mechanisms that are designed to keep the door closed when an elevator is not present, have a standard handle, and have windows to allow occupants to see if the elevator is present. In addition, the elevator control panels are to the left of the doorway on each level. A defective elevator door interlock mechanism was the **major** contributing factor leading to the death of FAO Gordon on March 26, 2015. The 5th floor elevator door freely opened with minimal effort at least **four times** by fire personnel during the incident. The **first time** the door was opened was by Rescue 14 FF#2, who was searching the 5th floor. Rescue 14 FF#2 found an outward swinging door, opened it, sounded the floor and realized there was no floor. He determined it was an open shaft, notified his officer (Rescue 14 Acting Officer) and they notified District 3, who was coordinating search efforts inside the building. Rescue 14 FF#2 marked the door with a marker "Open Shaft Do Not Enter." The **second time** the door was opened was by Rescue 14 personnel to show District 3 the shaft. The **third time** the door was opened was by FAO Gordon, who fell into the shaft after opening the door. The **fourth time** the door was opened was by Rescue 14 personnel looking for FAO Gordon after they realized he was missing.

Two Cincinnati Police Detectives, the Fire Investigation Captain and a City Elevator Inspector were on scene later in the day on March 26, 2015, and it was reported that the "the door opened **several times** with minimal effort" and a "slight tug on the handle." It was reported that "the lock was not latching into the door slot to keep the door closed." (See Appendix #4 for complete report) On March 27, 2015, a complete inspection of the elevator was supposed to occur. The Elevator Inspection Office didn't attend the meeting on March 27th; however, "it was later learned that the city had sent inspectors back to Dahlgren Street on the evening of March 26th after arson and police investigators had left the scene." On March 31, 2015, the door was examined by police detectives, fire investigators and the prosecutors office, and "the latch appeared to be fixed as it is now functioning properly." In the post incident report from the City of Cincinnati Elevator Inspectors (Appendix #5), "the door didn't show any signs of forced entry and the interlock mechanisms appeared to be working properly."

Elevator Measurements

| | "A" to "C" Dimension | "B" to "D" Dimension |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Elevator Shaft | 76.5" | 67" |
| Exterior of Elevator Car | 55.5" | 51.25" |
| Interior of Elevator Car | 52.5" | 48" |



**Elevator
Manufacturer**

The elevator was manufactured by the Canton Elevator Company on March 29, 1993. It was installed into 6020 Dahlgren St in March, 1996.



**5th Floor Elevator Door
Where FAO Gordon Fell**

Image #28



**5th Floor Elevator Door
Where FAO Gordon Fell**

Image #29






Image #30

Locking Point

**5th Floor Elevator Door
Where FAO Gordon Fell**



Image #31

**Interlock
Mechanism**




Image #32

**Interlock
Mechanism
Receiver**



**Elevator Shaft - Looking
Down From 5th Floor**

Image #33




**5th Floor Elevator Door
Where FAO Gordon Fell**

Image #34



**Elevator Shaft - Looking
Down From 5th Floor**






Elevator

**5th Floor
Hallway
Looking Toward
"B" Side**

Image # 35



**5th Floor
Hallway
Elevator Door
and Shaft
Looking Toward
"D" Side**

Image # 36





Image #37

Top of Elevator Looking From 3rd Floor
Location Where FAO Gordon Was Wedged




Diagram #38

Elevator Dimensions



Elevator Inspections and Elevator History

Records of elevator inspections acquired by the fire department showed the elevator had been inspected twice per year since 2009. The last inspection on the elevator prior to this incident occurred on November 25, 2014, without violation or concern. *(Note: Copies of the Elevator Inspection History can be acquired by contacting the City of Cincinnati.)*

Statements of Past Elevator Concerns:

The residents of 6020 Dahlgren St. provided the following statements when interviewed by the Cincinnati Police Department Detectives. *(Note: This report can be found in Appendix #4.)*

Many of the people interviewed knew of problems with people getting stuck on the elevator in the building. In the past, a few people had tried to open the elevator door when the elevator was not on their floor. ██████████ tried to open the fourth floor door but was unable. ██████████ tried to open the third floor door but was unable. ██████████ tried to open the second floor door but was unable. ██████████ said he tried to open the fifth floor elevator door before but it wouldn't open.

Several other people, however, knew of problems with the elevator doors opening when the elevator was not on their floor. ██████████ said the first floor elevator door would open when the elevator was not present. This happened to her as recently as January 2015. ██████████ had several incidents where her grandchildren ran down the fifth floor hallway and opened the fifth floor elevator door when the elevator was not present. She said the problem existed for several years. One time, her eight year old grandson was able to open the elevator door. She said she complained to management but nothing was done to fix it. ██████████ is a former resident. He stated the elevator door had been malfunctioning on the fifth floor for years as it opened for him a few times with no elevator present. He told maintenance about the problem but it was never fixed.

Statements From CPD

Investigative Report Reference Elevator



Cincinnati Fire Department Inspection History for 6020 Dahlgren St

Prior to the fire at 6020 Dahlgren St., there was one recorded fire and safety code inspection performed by the Cincinnati Fire Department. Inspections are entered in a computer system that is linked to the Cincinnati Building Department. The computer tracking system is less than 10 years old and prior to that hard copies of inspections were maintained at each companies quarters. Records prior to the implementation of a computer inspection system were not available.

On September 3, 2013, an inspection was performed by Engine 49 with no violations reported.

On March 20, 2015, a detailed D-4 Lieutenant sent an e-mail to the Fire Prevention Bureau indicating the alarm doesn't sound in the structure when it activates and noted problems with the alarm system and elevator recall. The Lieutenant was seeking guidance from the Fire Prevention Bureau on this situation.

On March 25, 2015, a Fire Specialist from the Fire Prevention Bureau went to this address and attempted to verify whether or not the elevator recall and alarm system worked.

(Note: The alarm in this building only serviced the elevator and notified the fire department when the smoke alarm in the elevator was tripped. The alarm did not provide audible warning to occupants of the building.)

From March 26 to March 28, 2015, Fire Prevention and Engine 49 conducted an inspection led by the Fire Prevention Bureau, noting some 60 violations. These violations are being handled by the Fire Prevention Bureau and are being addressed before the building is reoccupied.

The violations found from March 26 to March 28, 2015, predominately focused on fire door defects, door closure defects, smoke detectors defects, minor electrical hazards and cleanliness.

Inspection Record
Post Fire
3/26/2015

Inspection #: F119000889

City of Cincinnati Fire Department
Inspection Form

Engine Co. No. E49 District D-4

Insp Addr 6020 DAHLGREN ST, CINC Structure CONCRETE Floor 5 Unit _____
 Occupant WALLICK COMMUNITIES MGMT. CO./ROWE SHOCI Address _____ Phone 614 562-5631
 Responsible Party TGB CINCINNATI MF LLC Address 95 BERKELEY ST BOSTON MA 02116
 Construction MASONRY Roof composition _____ Stories 5 No. of Tenants 38
 Occupancy Type R-2 - RESI. MULTIFAMILY - APARTMENT BUILDING Location 6020 DAHLGREN ST

| | | | |
|---|--|--|---|
| TYPE OF INSPECTION Regular Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Complaint Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Special Inspection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Life Safety <input type="checkbox"/> | RIGHT TO KNOW Reporting <input type="checkbox"/> Labeling <input type="checkbox"/> Location <input type="checkbox"/> | OK DEF NA <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | Date Inspected <u>03/26/2015</u> Time _____ Status <u>Violation</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Inspector _____ Compliance Due Date <u>05/03/2015</u> |
|---|--|--|---|

| | | | |
|--|--|---|--|
| FIRE HAZARDS Chemicals/Explosives <input type="checkbox"/> Chimneys/Vents <input type="checkbox"/> Electrical <input type="checkbox"/> Flammable/Combustible <input type="checkbox"/> | OK DEF NA <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | DEF NA Heating Systems <input type="checkbox"/> Housekeeping/Rubbish <input type="checkbox"/> Gas Appliances <input type="checkbox"/> Storage <input type="checkbox"/> | Date Reinsp _____ Time _____ Status <u>Violation</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Inspector _____ Compliance Due Date _____ |
|--|--|---|--|

| | | | |
|--|--|--|--|
| FIRE PROTECTION Alarm Systems <input type="checkbox"/> Extinguishers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Smoke Detectors <input type="checkbox"/> Special Ext Equip <input type="checkbox"/> Sprinklers <input type="checkbox"/> Standpipes <input type="checkbox"/> Test Records <input type="checkbox"/> | OK DEF NA <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | DEF NA Fire Doors/Windows <input type="checkbox"/> Openings/Walls <input type="checkbox"/> Aisles <input type="checkbox"/> Exit Doors <input type="checkbox"/> Exit Signs/Lighting <input type="checkbox"/> Fire Escapes <input type="checkbox"/> Evacuation Plan <input type="checkbox"/> Posting Signs <input type="checkbox"/> | Date Reinsp _____ Time _____ Status <u>Violation</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Inspector _____ Compliance Due Date _____ |
|--|--|--|--|

| | | |
|--|----------------|--------------|
| SCOPE OF INSPECTION Area _____ | Location _____ | # Insp _____ |
|--|----------------|--------------|

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1ST, 5TH LAUNDRY ROOM | 1ST, 5TH NEAR ELEVATOR | 2 |
| ELEVATOR EQUIPMENT ROOM | 1ST FLOOR SOUTHEAST THRU FURNANCE | 1 |
| STORAGE ROOM | 1ST FLOOR SOUTHEAST NEAR FURNANCE F | 1 |
| FURNANCE ROOM | 1ST FLOOR SOUTH | 1 |
| 1ST, 3RD, 4TH AND 5TH FLOOR HALLWAYS | 1ST, 3RD, 4TH & 5TH FLOORS | 5 |
| NORTHSOUTH EXIT STAIR HALLS | NORTH EXIT STAIR HALL | 4 |
| APARTMENTS 31, 32, 37, 38 | 3RD FLOOR | 4 |
| LAUNDRY ROOM 5TH FLOOR | 5TH FLOOR CENTRAL EASTSIDE OF BUILDIN | 1 |
| BASEMENT APT. 41, 42, 43, 44, | 4TH FLOOR | 4 |
| ROOF HATCH | 5TH FLOOR NORTHSIDE OF MAIN HALLWAY | 1 |
| APARTMENTS 11, 15, 18, 13, 12 | 1ST FLOOR | 5 |
| RENTAL OFFICE | 1ST FL. SOUTHWEST END | 1 |
| APARTMENTS 24 | 2ND FLOOR | 1 |
| APARTMENTS 51, 52, 56, 57, 58 | 5TH FLOOR | 5 |
| 1ST FLOOR LOBBY | 1ST FLOOR CENTER | 1 |

VIOLATIONS

Sec. 1201-47, Failure To Comply With Orders.
 If, after service of any lawful order from the fire chief, the owner, agent, contractor or other person responsible for the work or violation refuses to comply with such order or does not comply within the period stated in the order or notice, such failure to comply shall constitute a misdemeanor punishable as provided for in this code.
 (C.M.C. 1201-7; ordained by Ord. No. 364-1979, eff. Sept. 6, 1979; repealed and reordained a Sec. 1201-47 by Ord. No. 385-1984, eff. Sept. 6, 1984)
 Analogous to CFPCC 1-13; ordained by Ord. No. 464-1971, eff. Jan. 21, 1972; a. Ord.

(continued on next page)

On orders of the Fire Chief, you are hereby required to correct these conditions on or before 05/03/2015
 Telephone Number (513) 357-7589 Engine _____ Co. No. E49




Cincinnati Fire Department Fire Response History for 6020 Dahlgren St

Since the beginning of 2011, The Cincinnati Fire Department responded to 50 fire responses at 6020 Dahlgren St. Of these responses, there were 37 fire alarm activations, 2 smoke scare incidents, 5 elevator malfunctions and 6 miscellaneous fire runs.

During interviews, personnel from Engine 49 indicated they had made numerous responses to this address for the same type of incident in the past. In 2014 and 2015, the CFD (Engine 49) responded to 6020 Dahlgren St. a total of 6 times for fire alarms or fire incidents.

(Note: During a review of run history for this address, there were no reported "Food on the Stove" or "Actual Fires" recorded.)



**Response History
Since 2011**



SECTION 7

Operations

**Fire Cause, Extent and Location
Suppression Efforts**

**Initial Company Actions - Visual Timeline
Company Response Order, Times and Travel
Distance**

**Initial Apparatus Placement
Critical Benchmarks**



Fire Cause, Extent & Location

FIRE SPREAD AND GROWTH

Fire Location

The fire originated in Apartment 27 on the second floor.

Initial Factors

A female occupant started cooking food on the stovetop and fell asleep. The occupant was awakened by the fire and attempted to fight the fire, delaying notification. *(Note: There was not a working smoke detector in the apartment.)*

Fire Growth

The fire progressed from the stove top and ignited nearby combustibles, including the kitchen cabinets. As the fire continued to grow, the kitchen area became heavily involved in fire, causing a build up of a hot gas layer at the ceiling in the adjacent living room area, leading to a flashover and full involvement of Apartment 27.

Fire Extension

The fire growth and eventual flashover in the living room area of Apartment 27 forced hot gases and flames through the open apartment door into the second floor hallway, causing heavy fire damage. *(Note: The door closure device on the apartment door wasn't working.)* There was minor extension at the floor level in the apartment above.

Smoke Spread

Smoke spread was unimpeded due to the open apartment door, stairwell fire doors being unlatched, and breaches in the structure's ceilings; smoke endangered occupants on floor two and all floors above. Smoke spread throughout the structure, causing smoke damage throughout the entire building.

Cause

The cause of the fire was ruled accidental as "Food Left Unattended on the Stove" by the Cincinnati Fire Investigation Unit. *(Note: See CFD Fire Investigation Report in Appendix #3.)*

Food on the Stove

Sadly, the tragic LODD of Firefighter Oscar Armstrong on March 21, 2003, was also caused by unattended food left on the stove. Statistics in Cincinnati indicate that food left unattended on the stove is the second leading cause of fires from 2011 to 2014.





Image #39

Fire Origin



Kitchen

Image #40



Image #41

Fire Damage





Image #42



Image #44



Image #45



Image #43



Image #46

**Fire Damage
Apartment 27**




2nd Floor Fire & Smoke Spread

Fire
Apartment

Engine 49
Point of Entry

Diagram #47



Fire
Damage
In Hallway
MOST Severe

Fire
Damage
In Hallway
LEAST Severe

Door to Fire
Apartment Burned
Away



SUPPRESSION EFFORTS

Initial Operations

At 05:38 hours, Engine 49 arrived on scene, reporting a six story multi-dwelling with no fire showing. (Note: Building is located on a hillside, which led to the initial size up error reporting 6 stories instead of the actual 5 stories. This had no bearing on the outcome of this incident.) **The detailed actions and comprehensive communications timeline for each company are located in Appendix #1.**

Engine 49 had a crew of four fire fighters, with a senior firefighter riding out of class as the Acting Officer. Engine 49 laid a supply line (leaving FF#2 at the hydrant), continued up the driveway to the complex parking lot, and positioned the apparatus to the left side of the parking lot per a recent pre-plan (see map on page 80). FF#1 (a senior fire fighter from Engine 49) left the Acting Officer and followed a female occupant, who stated she burnt food on her stove, into the building. (Note: During testimony, it was reported that Engine 49 made similar runs for the same type of incidents in the recent past. In 2014 and 2015, the CFD responded six times for fire alarms or similar incidents at 6020 Dahlgren St.) FF#1 went inside with the occupant and encountered smoke on the second floor. FF#1 indicated he had his SCBA hanging on one shoulder and donned his SCBA at this time. FF#1 stated the first door he came to was hot, and he heard the sound of burning materials from the apartment door. FF#1 indicated it was hot and dark in the hallway; when he was looking for the fire apartment, the occupant was right behind him directing him to her apartment. FF#1 told her to leave the hallway. FF#1 found the fire apartment and then retreated to the stairwell. FF#1 never communicated these findings to his Officer or Command and never rejoined his officer or Company. (Note: The door was left open by the female occupant. The door did not have a working door self-closure, and Rescue 9 indicated in statements that they shut the apartment door upon arrival at the hallway on the 2nd floor). After Engine 49 FF#1 left his crew, Engine 49's Acting Officer noticed smoke from the "C" side of the building. Engine 49's splitting of personnel forced the Acting Officer to stretch an attack line on his own, making a moderately difficult stretch an extremely difficult one.

Truck 31 arrived shortly after Engine 49 and positioned their apparatus on the "A" side, which should have afforded access to all "A" side windows/balconies and the roof of the building. Truck 31 crew split into an Inside Team (Truck 31A) and an Outside Team (Truck 31B) per procedures. Truck 31A went through the front door to the "B" side stairwell and encountered heavy smoke and heat in the Floor 2 hallway. On orders of District 4B, Truck 31 FF #1 left the "B" stairwell, went outside to the "C" side, continued to the fire apartment balcony, and broke the glass patio door to the fire apartment. (Note: This action occurred well before a hose line was in place, most likely causing the fire to grow in intensity, and created poor conditions in the hallway on the 2nd floor.) Truck 31A asked for a fire line in the "B" stairwell several times on the radio.

Truck 31B initially began to set up the aerial, but, due to obstructions, the outriggers could not be fully extended, limiting the usefulness of the apparatus. (Note: This has been an issue with the type of apparatus Truck 31 is assigned; Truck 31 is different than most other Truck Companies in our fleet). Truck 31B noticed civilians on a 2nd floor balcony and placed a ground ladder to the Apt 24 balcony ("A" side, near "A/D" corner) to rescue two females (one of which was large and required additional time to rescue).



Engine 31 arrived next and positioned their apparatus in the driveway near the “A/D” corner, laying a supply line from a secondary hydrant. Engine 31 was ordered to back-up Engine 49’s attack line, and they stretched an attack line from Engine 31 to the “D” stairwell on the “C” side (following Engine 49’s hoseline). There was no communication from Engine 49 or Engine 31 during this phase of the fire. Engine 31’s attack line was placed by Engine 31 Acting Officer and FF#1 on the exterior retaining wall outside the “D” stairwell entrance. Engine 31 Acting Officer never responded to repeated requests asking if he was ready for water in the attack line. At 05:50:54 hours, Engine 31 FAO started the water to the attack line on his own, believing Engine 31 was ready for water and needed it.

At 05:51 hours (00:13:31 after Engine 49’s arrival), Engine 49’s attack line was charged and became wedged in the stairwell between the stair tread and the wall, making it impossible to advance (*See image 67 and 68, page 73*). Additionally, the entrance door to the stairwell wasn’t chocked open until later, further impeding the ability to advance either line. Neither Engine 49 Acting Officer, Engine 31 Acting Officer, nor Engine 31 FF#1 communicated to Command or any other company the inability of the attack lines to reach the fire apartment, the inability to advance either attack line, the need for assistance in deploying the attack lines, or the significant delay in getting first water on the fire.

On Going Operations

Rescue 9 was the next Company to reach the 2nd Floor at the “B” stairwell. Truck 31A and Rescue 9 FF#3 remained at the stairwell door awaiting an attack line, while Rescue 9 Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 entered the hallway to conduct a primary search. Heat conditions were intense. Arriving at the fire apartment, Rescue 9 Officer closed the door to the fire apartment. However, the door was partially burned through at the top and still allowed fire to escape into the hallway. Rescue 9 Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 continued down the hallway toward the “D” side, searching as they went. While FF#1 and FF#2 were searching the Laundry Room, Rescue 9 Officer ran into Engine 49 Acting Officer in the hallway near Apt 26 (*see page 65*). Engine 49 Acting Officer told Rescue 9 Officer that the attack line was stalled short and could not be advanced further. At 05:54:25 hours (00:16:35 after Engine 49 arrival), hearing no radio traffic concerning hose deployment issues prior to this, Rescue 9 Officer notified Command that Engine 49’s line was short by 50 to 60 feet, needed to be extended by 100 feet, that another line was needed in the “B” stairwell, and that there was still no water on the fire. Rescue 9 Officer went back to the fire apartment to check fire conditions, but the apartment door was now completely burned off.

Engine 49 FF#2 had now reached the 2nd Floor following laying off and was notified by Engine 49 Acting Officer that the line was short. FF#2 returned to the stairwell to stretch more line, but found the attack line stuck between the stair tread and wall. FF#2 grabbed Engine 31’s attack line, stretched it to the hallway, but it too fell short at the same spot outside Apartment 26. Additionally, the nozzle opened and the hose line broke free from Engine 49’s control, knocking Engine 49 FF#2 face piece loose. After controlling the hose line, Engine 49 Acting Officer and FF#2 exited the hallway due to high heat and perceived flashover. Engine 31 Acting Officer and FF#1 followed Engine 49 from the stairwell to the exterior “C” side. Neither Engine 49 nor Engine 31 notified Command they were out of the building and unable to perform tasks. SO2 reported on the radio that Engine 49 left the building due to a flashover. (*Note: Rescue 9 was in the same hallway and never reported these conditions.*)

Rescue 9 Officer returned from the fire apartment toward the “D” stairwell, ran into Rescue 9 FF#1 and FF#2 outside the laundry room, and all returned to where the attack line was stalled. Upon



reaching the attack line, there were no fire fighters present and a second attack line (from Engine 31) was now lying next to the original line. Rescue 9 Officer flowed Engine 49's attack line down the hallway toward the fire apartment for 20 to 30 seconds to cool the hallway. Rescue 9 then continued to search apartments on the 2nd Floor.

Truck 31B was then assigned by Command to the "C" side exterior to advance an attack line to the rear of the building. At 05:55:54 hrs (00:18:04 from Engine 49's arrival), water was started to the exterior line operated by District 1 and Truck 31B. *(Note: The operation of an attack line from the exterior into the fire apartment was never communicated to Command or interior Companies, and interior Companies stated they were struck by the stream from the exterior at some point while advancing into the fire apartment.)* Engine 46 stretched an attack line from Engine 49 through the front door to the "B" stairwell per Rescue 9 and Truck 31A's directive. At 05:58:22 hrs (00:20:32 from Engine 49's arrival), water was started to the interior attack line operated by Truck 31A, Rescue 9 Fire Fighter #3, and Engine 46 personnel.

*The fire burned for **over 20 minutes after** fire department arrival without water application from the interior. The fire was declared knocked down **26 minutes, 40 seconds** after Engine 49's arrival.*

Extra Alarms and Building Search

At 05:47:02 hours, Command requested a 2nd alarm due to deteriorating fire conditions, no hose line in place and multiple victims presenting on the balconies. *[Note: Rescue 14 (FAO Gordon) was dispatched and responded on the 2nd Alarm.]* Before 2nd Alarm companies arrived, Command assigned Safety Engine 46 and RAT 23 to assist with fire control and rescue efforts. The Safety Engine was never replaced; the RAT truck was never replaced until Truck 19 was dispatched on the 3rd Alarm. *(Note: Truck 19 arrived at 06:14 hours, but was still not at the Command Post at the time of the Mayday.)* Additionally, the MSA SCBA Tracking Computer and Accountability Officer functions normally assigned to the Safety Engine officer and firefighter were not started. *(Note: When FAO Gordon fell, his motion alarm and low air alarm were not detected because the MSA SCBA Tracking Computer and Accountability Officer position were not staffed.)*

After the fire was knocked down, heavy smoke conditions persisted throughout the building (including the 5th floor), requiring a thorough search of the building and all apartments. Freelancing was an issue. Crew integrity was an issue. Multiple Companies searched several floors, and a systematic primary search proved difficult to achieve. A total of 21 civilians were rescued from the fire building, with 3 civilians treated at the scene and 3 civilians transported by CFD Medic Units.

At 06:04 hours, Rescue 14 arrived on the scene and was ordered by Dahlgren Command to search Apt 57, where a woman and child were reportedly trapped on a balcony. Upon arrival at the 5th floor, Rescue 14 personnel indicated there was a moderate smoke condition. During the search of the 5th floor, Rescue 14 personnel became separated. Personnel from Rescue 14 discovered an elevator door with a defective interlock mechanism leading to an open elevator shaft on the 5th floor. Rescue 14 FF#2 notified Rescue 14 Acting Officer, all all members look at the elevator shaft (except FAO Gordon, who was separated from his crew).



Rescue 14 FF#1 marked the door “DO NOT ENTER OPEN SHAFT.” Rescue 14 Acting Officer notified District 3 face-to-face, and District 3 evaluated the door. At some point, while separated from the rest of his crew, FAO Gordon opened the unlatched outward swinging elevator door and fell into the elevator shaft.

Rescue 14 continued searching the 5th floor for approximately 10 minutes. At 06:19:43 hours, Command advised RAT 19 to prepare to conduct a PAR, which prompted Rescue 14 Acting Officer to conduct an internal PAR of his members. He discovered FAO Gordon was missing. Rescue 14 attempted to locate him, retraced their steps, heard a faint low air audi-alarm coming from the elevator shaft, opened the door and discovered a helmet on top of the elevator car.

Mayday

At 06:22:23 hours, Rescue 14 Acting Officer transmitted a MAYDAY.

Elevator doors were opened on the 1st and 4th floors, and it was reported that FAO Gordon was wedged between the elevator car and shaft on the 2nd floor. Members of Rescue 14 went to the 3rd floor and accessed the elevator shaft. Members from Engine and Truck 23 accessed the elevator car on the 2nd floor. Rescue 9 Officer entered the shaft on the 1st floor and expressed concern that FAO Gordon may fall past elevator to 1st floor. Rescue 9 Officer requested equipment to prevent FAO Gordon from falling further. The remaining personnel from Rescue 9 retrieved equipment while Rescue 9 Officer went to 2nd floor to begin extrication. Engine 23 Officer, FAO, and Rescue 14 FF#2 began removing the rear wall of the elevator car. SOC, Rescue 14 FF#1 and Truck 32 FF#1 worked from top of elevator car to secure FAO Gordon with webbing, attempted to free him, but the SCBA harness broke. They utilized additional webbing to secure him in place. Members inside the elevator car continued to remove pieces of wall until specialized tools arrived. The remainder of wall was removed, and FAO Gordon was brought into elevator. It took crews approximately 14 minutes to extricate FAO Gordon from the elevator shaft.

FAO Gordon was placed into a stokes basket, but it became difficult to navigate the stairs. Members decided to conduct a RAT carry to get FAO Gordon to the cot on the first floor.

At 06:47 hours, Medic 19 transported FAO Gordon to University Hospital. At 07:01 hours, Medic 19 arrived at University Hospital.



Image # 49



Looking up
from 1st
Floor

Elevator Rescue

2nd Floor
Elevator
*Note: Wall
Removed to
Remove FAO
Gordon*

Image # 50



Image # 51



Tools
Gathered
for Rescue



Miscellaneous

There was no significant fire extension either vertically or horizontally at this fire. There was smoke and heat damage to the 2nd floor hallway, stairwells and the apartment directly above the fire apartment on the 3rd floor.



**Smoke Damage
Directly Above Fire
Apartment
on the 3rd Floor**




Image # 54



2nd Floor
Hallway View
From Fire
Apartment Door
towards the
"B" Stairwell

Image # 55




2nd Floor
Hallway View
From Fire
Apartment Door
towards the
"D" Stairwell

Elevator Door
2nd Floor

No Fire
Damage



Image #56



**2nd Floor
Hallway
Looking Into
Apartment
Across The Hall
From Fire
Apartment
*Note: No Fire
Damage***

Image #57



**2nd Floor
Hallway View
Looking Into
The Fire
Apartment**






Fire Apartment

**2nd Floor
Hallway View
From Elevator
Looking
Towards "B"
Side**

Image #58



**Hose Line
From "D"
Stairwell**

**2nd Floor
Hallway View
From Door to
Laundry Room
Looking
Towards
"D" Side**

Laundry

Image #59




Image #60




**3rd Floor
Hallway
No Damage
from Smoke**

Image #61



**4th Floor
Hallway
No Damage
from Smoke**





Elevator

**5th Floor
Hallway
Looking Toward
"B" Side
No Damage
from Smoke**

Image # 62




**5th Floor
Hallway
Elevator Door &
Shaft Looking
Toward
"D" Side**

Image # 63



Initial Company Action - Visual Timelines




| Company Assignment Key | |
|--|--|
| ○ E49 Acting Officer | ○ T31 Acting Officer |
| 1 E49 FF1 | 1 T31 FF1 |
| 2 E49 FF2 | Fao T31 FAO |
| Fao E49 FAO | 2 T31 FF2 |
| ○ E31 Acting Officer | ○ E46 Acting Officer |
| 1 E31 FF1 | 1 E46 FF1 |
| 2 E31 FF2 | 2 E46 FF2 |
| ○ R9 Officer | D4 District 4 |
| 1 R9 FF1 | D4b District 4b |
| 2 R9 FF2 | D1 District 1 |
| 3 R9 FF3 | SO2 SO2 |
| Fao R9 FAO | |

05:38 to 05:40

Engine 49 arrives on scene, forward lays a supply line from 5431 Owasco St (FF#2 at hydrant) and positions in the parking lot away from the building per pre-plan. Engine 49 FF#1 leaves the apparatus to follow a female into the building, who stated she burnt food on her stove.






05:41 to 05:44

Engine 49 Acting Officer stretches an 1¾" pre-connect attack line (Chief Nozzle) to the "C" side of the building to the "D" stairwell per pre-plan. Engine 49 FAO connects supply line and assists Engine 49 Acting Officer with the stretch of the attack line. District 4 (and 4B) are now on scene, positions D4 apparatus in northwest corner of the parking lot, assumes Command, reports a light haze of smoke on exterior and requests an **Extra Engine** and an **Extra Truck**. Truck 31 arrives on scene and parks on the "A" side near lobby entrance. Truck 31 A (Lt and FF #1) enter "A" side lobby to "B" stairwell to Floor 2 landing, where Engine 49 FF #1 informs them of a fire in Apt 27. Truck 31 B (FAO and FF #2) can't fully operate the aerial due to short-jacked outriggers, so they place a ground ladder to rescue two civilians from the Apt 24 balcony. Engine 49 Acting Officer reports heavy smoke on "C" side.






| Company Assignment Key | |
|------------------------|--------------------|
| E49 Acting Officer | T31 Acting Officer |
| E49 FF1 | T31 FF1 |
| E49 FF2 | T31 FAO |
| E49 FAO | T31 FF2 |
| E31 Acting Officer | E46 Acting Officer |
| E31 FF1 | E46 FF1 |
| E31 FF2 | E46 FF2 |
| R9 Officer | District 4 |
| R9 FF1 | District 4b |
| R9 FF2 | District 1 |
| R9 FF3 | SO2 |
| R9 FAO | |

05:45 to 05:47

On orders of District 4B, Truck 31 FF #1 breaks the glass patio door to Apt 27 to ventilate the apartment. Truck 31 Officer reports heavy fire on the "C" side. Engine 49 Acting Officer advances attack line into "D" stairwell to Floor 2 hallway. District 4 transmits the **Second Alarm**. Engine 31 arrives on scene, forward lays a supply line from 5423 Ward St (FF #2 at hydrant) and positions the apparatus the parking lot near the "AD" corner.






| Company Assignment Key | | | |
|------------------------|--------------------|--------|-------------|
| E49 Acting Officer | T31 Acting Officer | R9 FF1 | District 4 |
| E49 FF1 | T31 FF1 | R9 FF2 | District 4b |
| E49 FF2 | T31 FAO | R9 FF3 | District 1 |
| E49 FAO | T31 FF2 | R9 FAO | SO2 |
| E31 Acting Officer | E46 Acting Officer | | |
| E31 FF1 | E46 FF1 | | |
| E31 FF2 | E46 FF2 | | |

05:48 to 05:50

Rescue 9 arrives on scene, and Lt, FF #1, FF #2, and FF #3 enter the “A” side lobby, where Engine 49 FF #1 directs them to the “B” stairwell to the Floor 2 landing. Engine 31 stretches a 1¾” pre-connect attack line (Vindicator Nozzle) to the “C” side of the building to the “D” stairwell to back up Engine 49. Engine 49 FAO states his Acting Officer is alone and needs help stretching the attack line. Engine 31 drops their line on an exterior retaining wall. Truck 31 Lt calls for an attack line in the “B” stairwell to Floor 2. District 4 puts RAT 23 to work as a truck company; RAT Truck was not replaced at this time. District 4 puts Safety Engine 46 to work to stretch a second line off of Engine 49; Safety Engine was never replaced.






| Company Assignment Key | |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| 0 E49 Acting Officer | 0 T31 Acting Officer |
| 1 E49 FF1 | 1 T31 FF1 |
| 2 E49 FF2 | Fao T31 FAO |
| Fao E49 FAO | 2 T31 FF2 |
| 0 E31 Acting Officer | 0 E46 Acting Officer |
| 1 E31 FF1 | 1 E46 FF1 |
| 2 E31 FF2 | 2 E46 FF2 |
| 0 R9 Officer | D4 District 4 |
| 1 R9 FF1 | D4b District 4b |
| 2 R9 FF2 | D1 District 1 |
| 3 R9 FF3 | SO2 SO2 |
| Fao R9 FAO | |

05:51 to 05:52

Engine 31 FAO asks Engine 31 Acting Officer if he is ready to charge the attack line yet; no response from Engine 31 Acting Officer. Engine 31 FAO charges the attack line on his own, believing Engine 31 was ready for water and needed it. Engine 49 FAO asks Engine 49 Acting Officer if he is ready to charge the attack line yet; unintelligible response. District 4 asks Engine 49 to charge the attack line. It becomes wedged in the stairwell between the stair tread and the wall, making it impossible to advance. Rescue 9 Lt, FF #1 and FF #2 enter Floor 2 hallway and attempt to close the door to the fire apartment to control the fire. However, the top third of the door has burned through. Fire extends into the hallway.






Company Assignment Key

| | |
|--------------------|--------------------|
| E49 Acting Officer | T31 Acting Officer |
| E49 FF1 | T31 FF1 |
| E49 FF2 | T31 FAO |
| E49 FAO | T31 FF2 |
| E31 Acting Officer | E46 Acting Officer |
| E31 FF1 | E46 FF1 |
| E31 FF2 | E46 FF2 |
| R9 Officer | District 4 |
| R9 FF1 | District 4b |
| R9 FF2 | District 1 |
| R9 FF3 | SO2 |
| R9 FAO | |

05:55:00

Rescue 9 Lt crawls back to fire apartment to check fire progression; door now completely burned through. Engine 49 FF #2 arrives at Floor 2 from the "D" stairwell to assist with advancing the attack line, but the attack line is still stuck between the stair riser and the wall and cannot be advanced.






Company Assignment Key

| | |
|--------------------|--------------------|
| E49 Acting Officer | T31 Acting Officer |
| E49 FF1 | T31 FF1 |
| E49 FF2 | T31 FAO |
| E49 FAO | T31 FF2 |
| E31 Acting Officer | E46 Acting Officer |
| E31 FF1 | E46 FF1 |
| E31 FF2 | E46 FF2 |
| R9 Officer | District 4 |
| R9 FF1 | District 4b |
| R9 FF2 | District 1 |
| R9 FF3 | SO2 |
| R9 FAO | |

05:55:15

Engine 49 FF #2 retrieves the Engine 31 attack line from the stairwell and advances it into the hallway. Rescue 9 Lt crawls back towards the "D" side; Rescue 9 FF #1 and FF #2 complete the primary search of the Laundry Room. District 4 transmits the **Third Alarm**.






| Company Assignment Key | |
|------------------------|--------------------|
| E49 Acting Officer | T31 Acting Officer |
| E49 FF1 | T31 FF1 |
| E49 FF2 | T31 FAO |
| E49 FAO | T31 FF2 |
| E31 Acting Officer | E46 Acting Officer |
| E31 FF1 | E46 FF1 |
| E31 FF2 | E46 FF2 |
| R9 Officer | District 4 |
| R9 FF1 | District 4b |
| R9 FF2 | District 1 |
| R9 FF3 | S02 |
| R9 FAO | |

05:55:30

Engine 49 FF#2 returns to hallway with the Engine 31 attack line, but it also comes up short. Engine 31's attack line becomes charged again, control of the nozzle is lost, Engine 49 Acting Officer's hand is burned, and FF #2's facepiece is dislodged in the struggle with the open nozzle. Engine 49 Acting Officer, Engine 49 FF #2, Engine 31 Acting Officer and Engine 31 FF #1 bail out of "D" stairwell to "C" side exterior. Rescue 9 Lt meets up with FF #1 and FF #2 in hallway near Laundry Room.






| Company Assignment Key | |
|--|--|
| O E49 Acting Officer | O T31 Acting Officer |
| 1 E49 FF1 | 1 T31 FF1 |
| 2 E49 FF2 | Fao T31 FAO |
| Fao E49 FAO | 2 T31 FF2 |
| O E31 Acting Officer | O E46 Acting Officer |
| 1 E31 FF1 | 1 E46 FF1 |
| 2 E31 FF2 | 2 E46 FF2 |
| O R9 Officer | D4 District 4 |
| 1 R9 FF1 | D4b District 4b |
| 2 R9 FF2 | D1 District 1 |
| 3 R9 FF3 | SO2 SO2 |
| Fao R9 FAO | |

05:55:45

Rescue 9 Lt, FF #1 and FF #2 continue down the hallway and now find two attack lines, but both lines are abandoned. Rescue 9 Lt opens Engine 49's attack line and sprays water toward the fire apartment for 20 to 30 seconds, significantly cooling the hallway. Engine 31 FAO charges the attack line on "C" side exterior at the request of District 1.






Company Assignment Key

| | |
|--------------------|--------------------|
| E49 Acting Officer | T31 Acting Officer |
| E49 FF1 | T31 FF1 |
| E49 FF2 | T31 FAO |
| E49 FAO | T31 FF2 |
| E31 Acting Officer | E46 Acting Officer |
| E31 FF1 | E46 FF1 |
| E31 FF2 | E46 FF2 |
| R9 Officer | District 4 |
| R9 FF1 | District 4b |
| R9 FF2 | District 1 |
| R9 FF3 | S02 |
| R9 FAO | |

05:56 to 05:57

Truck 19 (Third Alarm) is assigned as RAT Truck. Rescue 9 Lt, FF #1 and FF #2 continue to search apartments on Floor 2. District 1 and Truck 31 B operate attack line from the exterior into fire apartment. Engine 46 advances an attack line from Engine 49 through the "A" lobby entrance to the "B" stairwell. Rescue 9 FAO and Engine 49 FF #1 place a ground ladder to Apt 46 balcony to help evacuate two civilians from Apt 56 balcony.





| Company Assignment Key | |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| ○ E49 Acting Officer | ○ T31 Acting Officer |
| 1 E49 FF1 | 1 T31 FF1 |
| 2 E49 FF2 | Fao T31 FAO |
| Fao E49 FAO | 2 T31 FF2 |
| ○ E31 Acting Officer | ○ E46 Acting Officer |
| 1 E31 FF1 | 1 E46 FF1 |
| 2 E31 FF2 | 2 E46 FF2 |
| ○ R9 Officer | D4 District 4 |
| 1 R9 FF1 | D4b District 4b |
| 2 R9 FF2 | D1 District 1 |
| 3 R9 FF3 | S02 S02 |
| Fao R9 FAO | |

05:58 to 06:00

Engine 46 attack line to the “B” stairwell is charged. Truck 31 A, Rescue 9 FF #3, and Engine 46 FF #1 advance the attack line to the fire apartment. SO2 reports that Engine 49 and Engine 31 have evacuated the building due to perceived “flashover.” Rescue 9 Lt advises water is being put on the fire now and the hallway is safe. Fire is knocked down. District 4 places the Third Alarm Companies into staging three blocks away.





Image # 64

**"C" Side Rear
Patio Door to Fire
Apartment**

**Vented by Truck 31B
on orders of District 4B**



Image # 65



Image # 66





Image #67

**Riser from Exterior Door to 2nd Floor Stairwell Door Where Engine 49's line became wedged as it was charged
(NOTE: small gap between tread and wall)**

NOTE:
Initial Hose Line From Engine 49 Was Removed Prior to Photographs Being Taken

Image #68

**NOT FROM ACTUAL INCIDENT
SIMULATED IN SAME STAIR
DURING INVESTIGATION**



**NOT ACTUAL
PHOTO FROM
INCIDENT
VISUAL OF A
DIFFERENT HOSE PUT
IN THE STAIRS TO
SIMULATE WHAT
HAPPENED TO Engine
49's HOSE LINE**



Middle of Hallway (Elevator)

Image #69



Apt 26

Apt 23



Image #70



Apt 24

Stairwell

Location in 2nd floor hallway where lines became stalled on initial attack efforts (NOTE: Apt 26 to right in image)

E-31 Line From "D" Stairwell and entering long hallway on 2nd floor (NOTE: Apt 24 in image)





Image #71

Line Stretched by Engine 46 via "B" Stairwell directly to fire apartment



Company Response Order, Times and Travel Distance

| | Company | Assignment | Alarm Level | Dispatch Time | Arrival Time | Response Time | Distance from Scene |
|---|--------------|--------------------|-------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|---------------------|
| Fire Alarm Assignment | Engine 49 | 1st Engine | Fire Alarm | 05:31 | 05:38 | 7 min | 0.6 miles |
| | Truck 31 | 1st Truck | Fire Alarm | 05:31 | 05:41 | 10 min | 2.5 miles |
| | District 4 | Command | Fire Alarm | 05:31 | 05:40 | 9 min | 2.5 miles |
| 1 Alarm Balance With Reported Fire | Engine 31 | 2nd Engine | 1 Alarm | 05:34 | 05:47 | 13 min | 2.5 miles |
| | Engine 46 | Safety Engine | 1 Alarm | 05:34 | 05:50 | 16 min | 4.1 miles |
| | Truck 18 | 2nd Truck | 1 Alarm | 05:34 | 05:50 | 16 min | 5.3 miles |
| | Truck 23 | Rapid Intervention | 1 Alarm | 05:34 | 05:49 | 15 min | 6.2 miles |
| | Rescue 9 | Heavy Rescue | 1 Alarm | 05:34 | 05:48 | 14 min | 5.6 miles |
| | District 1 | Command | 1 Alarm | 05:34 | unknown | unknown | 9.8 miles |
| | SO-2 | Safety Officer | 1 Alarm | 05:34 | 05:53 | 19 min | 10.4 miles |
| | Medic 46 | EMS | 1 Alarm | 05:34 | 05:47 | 13 min | 4.1 miles |
| | ALS 32 | EMS Command | 1 Alarm | 05:34 | 05:53 | 19 min | 7.2 miles |
| Extra Companies | Engine 18 | Engine | 1 Alarm + | 05:42 | 05:50 | 8 min | 5.3 miles |
| | Truck 32 | Truck | 1 Alarm + | 05:42 | 05:55 | 13 min | 7.2 miles |
| 2nd Alarm* | Engine 8 | Engine | 2nd Alarm | 05:47 | 05:59 | 12 min | 4.0 miles |
| | Rescue 14 | 2nd Heavy Rescue | 2nd Alarm | 05:47 | 06:04 | 17 min | 10.4 miles |
| | District 3** | 3rd District Chief | 2nd Alarm | 05:47 | 06:03 | 16 min | 10.6 miles |

** Balanced out with Extra Company request at 05:42 hours*

*** Dispatch CAD error - normally do not send third District Chief*



| | Company | Assignment | Alarm Level | Dispatch Time | Arrival Time | Response Time | Distance from Scene |
|------------------|-----------|--------------------|-------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|---------------------|
| 3rd Alarm | Engine 23 | Engine | 3rd Alarm | 05:55 | unknown | unknown | 6.2 miles |
| | Engine 7 | Engine | 3rd Alarm | 05:55 | 06:15 | 20 min | 6.8 miles |
| | Truck 19 | Rapid Intervention | 3rd Alarm | 05:55 | 06:14 | 19 min | 10.6 miles |
| | Car 1 | Command | 3rd Alarm | 05:55 | 06:03 | 8 min | 5.1 miles |
| | Car 3 | Command Support | 3rd Alarm | 05:57 | 06:21 | 24 min | unknown |
| | Car 5 | Command Support | 3rd Alarm | 05:55 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
| | Car 301 | Command Support | 3rd Alarm | 05:59 | 06:15 | 16 min | 12.0 miles |
| | SO-1 | Command Support | 3rd Alarm | 05:55 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
| | SOC | Command Support | 3rd Alarm | 05:55 | 06:03 | 8 min | unknown |

| | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|------------|--------|-----------|-------|-------|--------|-----------|
| 4th Alarm* | Engine 32* | Engine | 4th Alarm | 06:23 | 06:41 | 18 min | 7.2 miles |
| | Engine 9* | Engine | 4th Alarm | 06:23 | 06:36 | 13 min | 5.6 miles |
| | Medic 29* | EMS | 4th Alarm | 06:23 | 06:46 | 23 min | |

**SENT PER PROCEDURE ON "MAYDAY"*


| | | |
|--|----------|---|
| Additional EMS Companies Dispatched | Medic 23 | Working Fire Medic Unit |
| | Medic 19 | Extra Medic Unit Requested by D4 |
| | Medic 2 | Extra Medic Unit Requested by D4 |
| | Medic 9 | Dispatched by ALS 32 for Multiple Victims |
| | Medic 3 | Dispatched by ALS 32 for Multiple Victims |
| | ALS 34 | Dispatched by ALS 32 for Multiple Victims |
| | ALS 35 | Dispatched at request of Command |



Fire Location and Responding Company Location 1st to 4th Alarms at 6020 Dahlgren St

All companies were in quarters at the time of dispatch. Refer to the mileage traveled on page 76 and 77 for actual estimated distances.

**6020 Dahlgren St.
Location**




Initial Apparatus Placement



APPARATUS PLACEMENT NOTES:

- Engine 49 placed their apparatus based on recent pre-planning, leaving the front of the building open for a truck company.
- District 4 entered the drive before Truck 31 and parked past the building on the "A/B" corner.
- Truck 31 was able to obtain a position on the "A" side of the building.
- Engine 31 was able to lay a supply line up the drive and had to stop short of the building.
- Due to the drive being narrow and (2) five inch supply lines laid criss-crossed in the drive, no other apparatus were able to get close to the fire building.
- Terrain and access issues from adjacent addresses prohibited gaining access from those locations as well.



CRITICAL INCIDENT BENCHMARKS

| Time Actual | Elapsed Time From E-49 Arrival (min:sec) | CRITICAL BENCHMARK |
|-------------|--|--|
| 05:37:50 | 00:00 | Engine 49 on scene. Reports a "six story brick multi-dwelling nothing showing." |
| 05:39:33 | 01:43 | Dispatch advises "Caller is stating the fire is on the second story of the D building. Per the Alarm Company, the 3rd Floor and 5th Floor Smoke Detectors are now sounding." (Note: Balance of 1 Alarm complement had been dispatched at 0534 hrs) |
| 05:41:34 | 03:44 | District 4 requests an "Extra Engine and Extra Truck Company" (Engine 18 and Truck 32 are dispatched.) |
| 05:41:44 | 03:54 | District 4 confirms a working fire with medium smoke and the building being evacuated. |
| 05:43:56 | 06:06 | Engine 49 reports, "I'm on the C side of the building, Got heavy smoke on this side. I'm trying to advance to the second floor." |
| 05:44:00 | 06:10 | District 4-B orders Truck 31 to ventilate glass patio door. (Note: There is no water on the fire at this time.) |
| 05:45:55 | 08:05 | Truck 31 reports window has been opened and heavy fire is coming out the C side. |
| 05:47:02 | 09:12 | District 4 requests the Second Alarm . (Engine 8, Heavy Rescue 14 and District 3 are dispatched.) |
| 05:49:44 | 11:54 | RAT 23 arrives On Scene, and District 4 puts them to work as a Truck Company. (Note: RAT Truck is not replaced at this time.) |
| 05:49:50 | 12:00 | District 4 puts Safety Engine 46 to work to advance a line from Engine 49 to the 2nd Floor. (Note: Safety Engine is never replaced.) |
| 05:50:35 | 12:45 | Engine 31 FAO asks if Engine 31 is ready for water in their attack line. After no response from Engine 31 Acting Officer, the FAO starts the water to Engine 31's attack line 30 seconds later. |
| 05:51:26 | 13:36 | Engine 49 FAO asks if Engine 49 is ready for water in their attack line. Unintelligible response (later determined to be from Engine 49 Acting Officer). District 4 orders the water started to Engine 49's attack line. |
| 05:51:48 | 13:58 | Heavy Rescue 9 reports that the fire has extended into the 2nd Floor hallway and no hoseline is in operation yet. |
| 05:52:59 | 15:09 | District 4 requests Engine 46 and Engine 18 to lay a backup line to the fire apartment on the 2nd Floor. |



| Time Actual | Elapsed Time From E-49 Arrival (min:sec) | CRITICAL BENCHMARK |
|-------------|--|---|
| 05:54:25 | 16:35 | Heavy Rescue 9 reports that Engine 49's attack line is short by 50 - 60 feet and needs to be extended by 100 feet. Still no water on the fire. |
| 05:55:22 | 17:32 | District 4 requests the Third Alarm . (Engine 23, Engine 7 and Truck 19 are dispatched.) |
| 05:55:54 | 18:04 | Engine 31 FAO starts the water to an attack line operated from the C side exterior by District 1 and Truck 31-B. (Note: Probable first water on fire.) |
| 05:56 | 18 min (approx.) | Engine 49 and Engine 31 leave the building |
| 05:56:10 | 18:20 | District 4 assigns Truck 19 as RAT Company. |
| 05:58:22 | 20:32 | Engine 46 asks Engine 49 FAO to start the water to an attack line operated on the 2nd Floor interior by Engine 46 and Truck 31-A. |
| 05:59:36 | 21:46 | SO2 reports that Engine 49 and Engine 31 have evacuated the structure due to a perceived "flashover" on the second floor. |
| 06:00:18 | 22:28 | Heavy Rescue 9 reports that water is being put on the fire and the hallway is safe. |
| 06:04:30 | 26:40 | SO2 reports from the C side exterior that the fire has been Knocked Down but heavy smoke conditions remain throughout. |
| 06:04 | 26 min (approx.) | Heavy Rescue 14 (FAO Gordon) arrives On Scene. |
| 06:09:35 | 31:45 | Search and Rescue Sector (District 3) assigns Heavy Rescue 14 to search Apt 557 (report from Dispatch of woman on her balcony in distress). |
| Unknown | Unknown | Heavy Rescue 14 members become separated searching apartments on the 5th Floor. HR-14 FF #1 finds an outward swinging door (different from the other inward swinging apartment doors) that is unlocked and opens easily. FF #1 sounds the floor and discovers it is an open elevator shaft. HR-14 Acting Officer and FF #2 come across FF #1, and they mark the outside of the elevator door " <i>DO NOT ENTER, OPEN SHAFT.</i> " FAO Gordon is not with the other members of Heavy Rescue 14 at this time. |
| Unknown | Unknown | Heavy Rescue 14 Acting Officer advises of and shows District 3 the open elevator shaft. Nearby companies hear the conversation. The information about the open elevator shaft is not relayed over the radio to Command. |



| Time Actual | Elapsed Time From E-49 Arrival (min:sec) | CRITICAL BENCHMARK |
|-------------|--|---|
| 06:12 | 34 min (approx.) | FAO Gordon falls down the elevator shaft. (Note: Time is based on SCBA ICM Data.) |
| 06:13 | 35 min (approx.) | SCBA ICM Motion Alarm Activated for FAO Gordon (Note: Due to damage to SCBA harness, wiring and ICM, no motion activation alarm was audible; however, it was stored in the ICM computer). See Appendix #2 for ICM data |
| 06:15:02 | 37:12 | District 3 reports an All Clear on Floor 3 and 4, still working on Floor 5 |
| 06:15:36 | 37:46 | Heavy Rescue 14 Acting Officer reports an All Clear on Floor 5. |
| 06:15:53 | 38:03 | Truck 23 reports an All Clear on Floor 2 |
| 06:19:43 | 41:53 | District 4 advises RAT 19 to prepare to conduct a PAR. RAT 19 advises that they are not on scene yet. |
| 06:21 | 43 min (approx.) | Rescue 14 hears the low air alarm and looks into the elevator shaft from the 5th floor. |
| 06:22:23 | 44:33 | Heavy Rescue 14 Acting Officer activates EMERGENCY button and broadcast "MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY." |
| 06:25:33 | 47:43 | District 4B conducts first PAR request, but only gets through one company (Engine 31) due to MayDay radio traffic. |
| 06:31:41 | 53:51 | Command again orders RAT 19 to get a PAR established, but RAT 19 is unable to get through the balance of the 1st Alarm companies prior to extrication of FAO Gordon due to MayDay radio traffic. |
| 06:36:23 | 58:33 | Extrication Sector (Special Operations Chief) reports that FAO Gordon has been extricated from the elevator shaft. |
| 06:47 | 69 min (approx.) | Medic 19 transports FAO Gordon to University Hospital |
| 07:01 | 83 min (approx.) | Medic 19 arrives at University Hospital |



SECTION 8

Communications



Communications

Introduction

The Cincinnati Fire Department utilizes a digital trunked radio system with ten (10) tower sites for signal reception and transmission. This is a 20 channel Motorola Astro 25 digital simulcast system. This system is used by the Cincinnati Fire Department, the Cincinnati Police Department, and several other city agencies. Each fire apparatus is equipped with a mobile radio. Portable radios are assigned to every on-duty fire fighter, including both company officers and command officers. All fire fighters at the Dahlgren St. fire were equipped with portable radios. The Cincinnati Fire Department utilizes the Motorola APX 6000XE portable radio. This radio is designed for use by fire fighters. All portable radios are equipped with remote speaker microphones that each firefighter wears clipped to the front of their fire coat. Command officers and Fire Apparatus Operators are issued headphones in order to monitor radio transmissions.

Trunked Radio Systems

The radio system used by the Cincinnati Fire Department is an 800 MHz trunked radio system – a repeater-based radio communications system composed of multiple radio frequencies controlled by a central system computer. Trunked radio systems assign a frequency pair as needed rather than permanently dedicating a frequency pair for each “channel,” thus reducing the number of radio frequencies needed to operate a system while increasing the utilization of each frequency. In non-trunked radio systems, a frequency pair is reserved for the exclusive use of one channel. For all trunked fire service radio communication systems, every radio channel on the radio uses two radio frequencies to communicate. The user sends information to the radio system on one frequency, and the radio system repeats the transmission back to the radios on that channel through another frequency. Trunking assigns frequencies as needed, while non-trunked radio systems reserve frequencies for the use of one channel.

Trunked radio systems use the term “talkgroup” to replace the term “channel” as the frequency pair assigned to a work group. The Cincinnati Fire Department designates a separate talkgroup for dispatching units called “CF MAIN.” Every working fire is assigned its own talkgroup and its own zone. The talkgroup for the Dahlgren fire was “Command D,” indicating this is the command channel in radio zone D. The Incident Commander has full discretion to assign additional talkgroups within that incident’s assigned zone as the incident expands. *(NOTE: The “Command D” talkgroup is the channel position D2 on all CFD portable radios; this talkgroup is described as simply “D2” in all incident recordings and associated documents.)*

In a trunked radio system, a fire fighter presses the push-to-talk button on the portable radio to transmit on a talkgroup, sending a request to the radio system on the control channel. The control channel essentially listens for radios that want to transmit, and then tells all of the radios that are on the same talkgroup which frequency pair will be used. This action happens instantaneously.

Once assigned to a frequency pair, the fire fighter transmits a voice message to the system on one of the two assigned frequencies. The radio system repeats the voice transmission back to all other radios



on the same talkgroup through the second assigned frequency, and the voice message is heard by everyone on the same talkgroup.

Cincinnati Fire Department Radio System Configuration

The Cincinnati Fire Department's radio system allows one radio transmission at a time on a talkgroup. The first fire fighter to press the push to talk button on the radio begins a "New Call." A talkgroup busy tone will sound if a fire fighter presses the push to talk button while another radio is transmitting – this tone is commonly referred to as a "bonk." (*Note: A "bonk" is a feature that indicates the message has not been delivered; this is a critical safety feature*). The fire dispatch console operates in duplex mode, allowing dispatchers to send and receive radio transmissions at the same time (dispatch can transmit at the same time another radio is transmitting – this happened several times at the Dahlgren St fire).

System Activity Logging

The Motorola Astro 25 Type II radio system logs all activity on the trunking system with a computerized logging application.

This log contains an activity time stamp, the identity of the radio making the request for transmission, the talkgroup, the type of transmission, the physical repeater channel assigned and the duration of the transmission. The system logs other activity such as radio power on/off, talkgroup (channel) changes, as well as other system activity. Emergency Alarm activations, Emergency Call activations, and radio console resets of the alarms are also logged. This system data is the basis for analysis throughout this report.

Voice Logging Recorder

The Cincinnati Fire Department dispatch center also uses a voice logging recorder to record voice transmissions handled by the trunked radio system. These voice recordings are the basis for the transcription generated for this report.

System Emergency Features

All transmissions on the radio system are shown on the dispatcher's console with the identity of the last several radio transmitters displayed. Cincinnati Fire Dispatch uses a radio alias database system, which works like the contact list on a cell phone. When a radio transmits, the dispatcher sees the member's rank and company name – not the six (6) digit radio ID. This same alias is displayed on all other CFD radio displays, as long as the radios are on the same talkgroup. The dispatcher can glance at this rolling log if he or she misses the identity of a transmitter. As additional transmissions are received, the oldest transmitter identification scrolls off of the screen. The data for this listing is from the same source as the data that is recorded by the radio log.

The trunked radio system is designed to handle Emergency Alarm activations. An alarm message is captured by the system when the orange emergency button on a portable radio is pressed. The message is transmitted over the control channel, not the assigned voice channel, so it can be activated even though there is voice activity on the talkgroup selected on the radio.



When the Emergency Alarm is received by the system it activates an audible alarm and displays the identity of the unit that activated the alarm at the radio console position in the dispatch center and on all other CFD radios on the same talkgroup. The fire fighter activating the emergency alarm is given talkgroup priority, allowing the fire fighter to transmit their emergency. At the Dahlgren St fire, Heavy Rescue 14 Acting Officer attempted to transmit a Mayday but was “bonked” (talkgroup busy). A “New Call” started seconds before by a Truck 23 Fire Fighter had priority on the Command D (D2) talkgroup. Heavy Rescue 14 Acting Officer pressed the orange emergency button and was given talkgroup priority. The Mayday was successfully transmitted. The system worked as designed.

Cincinnati Fire Department Dispatch

Cincinnati Fire Department Dispatch is co-located with Cincinnati Police dispatch in the City of Cincinnati / Hamilton County Regional Emergency Operation Center. 911 callers speak first with an “E911” call taker. Calls for the Fire Department are transferred to a Fire Department dispatcher. Fire dispatch maintains a minimum staff of three dispatchers. All fire department incidents are dispatched on the “CF MAIN” talkgroup. Once companies are dispatched, they are assigned a fireground talkgroup based on the incident type. The Dahlgren St fire was initially assigned radio talkgroup “Fire Alarm” (D8), reserved for fire alarm incident types. When the incident was upgraded by Fire Dispatch to a structure fire (received multiple call reporting smoke in the building), the fireground talkgroup was changed to “Command D” (D2). *(NOTE: The practice of assigning the “Fire Alarm” talkgroup for a fire alarm incident and the practice of reassigning firegrounds while companies are responding to an incident caused confusion and has been discontinued. All fire alarm incidents are now assigned a Command talkgroup in an incident zone.)* When Dahlgren St was confirmed as a working fire, a dispatcher was assigned to monitor the fireground radio channel. This dispatcher, now fully dedicated to the incident, works under the Incident Commander. All radio transmissions to dispatch and to on scene companies are now handled on the fireground radio talkgroup instead of “CF Main.”

Radio Talkgroup Selection

During the Dahlgren fire, numerous fire fighters were on the wrong radio channel, including Engine 31’s Acting Officer and District 1. The Acting Officer of Engine 31 was repeatedly ordered by the Command to advance a backup line, but he was on the wrong radio channel and never responded to Command. District 1 took greater than 16 minutes to select the correct talkgroup after dispatch, and his request for resources was not acknowledged by Command because District 1 was on the wrong channel. Command did not receive vital information from these units in a timely manner. In total, 57% of fire fighters were not on the correct fireground ten minutes after dispatch. Two factors contributed to fire fighters selecting the wrong radio channel - a lack of company level training and a complex radio template. Training records show that company level drills on portable radio operation are in need of improvement. Additionally, the current Cincinnati Fire Department radio template is massive, spanning 26 zones in total. The first ten zones are used for incidents, and each zone contains 16 channels. Fire fighters must have the ability to navigate through 10 radio zones of 16 channels each in order to locate the talkgroup assigned at dispatch. Hands on training and simplifying the radio template are strongly recommended by the Communication Subcommittee.



SECTION 9

**Fire
Training**



Fire Training

Training on the basics of fire fighting is essential for every Cincinnati Fire Department member. Each fire fighter must be properly trained and qualified to perform their assigned duties, including above grade assignments. Engine Companies should train frequently to master water supply, hose deployment and fire attack. Truck Companies should train frequently to master forcible entry, search, rescue, and ventilation. Heavy Rescue Companies should train frequently to master technical rescue, hazardous materials, structural fire fighting, and skills at entrapments. Medic Companies should train frequently to master emergency medical services. District Chiefs should train frequently to master incident strategies, operational tactics, and command systems. Fire fighters who are authorized to work in above grade assignments must be trained and evaluated in performing those duties and periodically reevaluated to ensure that they are capable of performing their assigned duties safely and effectively.

Collectively, we must all yearn for knowledge, skills and training to earn the right to be called professional fire fighters. The art and science of fire fighting is predicated on the elementary understanding that realistic, hands-on training, progressive skill development and continuing scientific education improves our fundamentals, improves our strategies, and improves our tactics to safely perform life-saving rescues and extinguish fires in ever-changing, hostile environments. Training and skills development are paramount to limiting injury and death to fire fighters and civilians. Firefighters should aspire for perfection and mediocrity is unacceptable.

At the Dahlgren St fire, operational deficiencies were noted in the following areas:

1. Crew Integrity
2. Engine Company primary attack line deployment
3. Engine Company backup attack line deployment
4. Problem Identification, Communication and Problem Solving
5. Controlling the Flow path of fire
6. Coordinated horizontal ventilation
7. Coordinated fire attack strategy
8. Coordinated primary search
9. Coordinated secondary search
10. Rescue strategies
11. Radio communications and operation
12. Accountability Officer duties
13. Operation of the MSA SCBA Accountability System computer
14. Apparatus operation



These are many of the same operational deficiencies that were noted in the Oscar Armstrong III Line of Duty Death Enhanced Report. Training and skill development are paramount to limiting injury and death to fire fighters and civilians. In the couple of years following Oscar Armstrong's death in 2003, the Cincinnati Fire Department detailed five personnel to training from Operations. Because these were not permanent positions and budget issues that arose a couple of years later, these positions were moved back to Operations. Any improvement made in incumbent fire training immediately after the death of Oscar Armstrong has greatly diminished.

Current Training Bureau Staff


The Cincinnati Fire Department Training Bureau is currently staffed by one District Chief, one Fire Captain, two Fire Lieutenants (Training), one Fire Lieutenant (Recruiter), one Audio-Video Technician, one civilian EMS Coordinator and one civilian administrative technician. The five uniformed personnel shall, per (*CFD Procedures Manual 102.13.C Human Resources Division*), coordinate the following for 850 Cincinnati fire fighters:

- a. Training of fire recruits for the department
- b. Continuing education of all members of the department.
- c. Research and testing new equipment and writing procedures for the proper use of department equipment
- d. Observing and correcting the work of fire companies at fires, or other emergencies when deviations from standard practice or improper, unsafe methods are observed
- e. Maintaining an effective drill program for the Fire Department.
- f. Supervision of courses of instruction to members in all phases of Fire Department operations.
- g. Periodic examination of members to determine any weaknesses in the training program or in the members themselves.

The Training Bureau is currently significantly understaffed. Its sole focus in the past few years has been the hiring and training of recruits, testing of probationary firefighters, assisting with promotional exams, coordination of EMS continuing education, and the delivery of the CFD in-house Paramedic training program.



Current Training Staff Organization



Current Training and Recertification

A review of CFD training shows that fundamental incumbent training is deficient. In order to track individual fire fighter training, the “Drill Application Program” was developed in 2008. *Ohio Administrative Code 4765-20-07 Renewal of Fire Fighter Certificate* requires “fire fighters certified in the State of Ohio to complete fifty-four hours of continuing education that is related to the fire service and approved by the applicant’s fire chief or program director of a chartered program over a three year certification period.” In its simplest form, the Drill Application Program was built as a tool for both the individual fire fighter to track the number of continuing education hours attained for State of Ohio Fire Fighter Recertification and for Company Officers to develop a structured company level training program covering the wide range of basic fire fighting skills. These categories have not significantly changed since its inception.




For the period from March 26, 2012 to March 25, 2015, data was collected for each fire fighter who responded to the 1st Alarm and Heavy Rescue 14 at the Dahlgren St. fire. Specifically, the number of training hours documented in the Drill Application Program per fire fighter per topic were recorded.

| Training Hours (Fire ONLY) per Drill Application Tracking - 3 Year Period from 3/25/2012 to 3/25/2016 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|--------------|---------------------|----------------|
| Company | ICS | Ops Proc | Radios | Pre Plans | PPE | Safety | RAT | Hose Deploy | Force Entry | Ladder | Search | Ventilation | Driver App Ops | In Service | Other | Total Hours (3 yrs) | Hours per YEAR |
| Engine 49 Acting Officer | 0.0 | 5.0 | 8.0 | 6.3 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 5.0 | 8.0 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 7.5 | 0.0 | 33.0 | 89.8 | 29.9 |
| Engine 49 FAO | 1.0 | 6.0 | 12.0 | 8.0 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 8.5 | 6.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 33.0 | 96.5 | 32.2 |
| Engine 49 FF #1 | 2.0 | 6.5 | 6.0 | 7.3 | 1.0 | 7.5 | 7.0 | 8.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 0.0 | 37.0 | 95.3 | 31.8 |
| Engine 49 FF #2 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 5.5 | 0.0 | 8.5 | 9.0 | 6.3 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 4.5 | 10.5 | 0.0 | 16.5 | 70.8 | 23.6 |
| Truck 31 Officer | 8.0 | 11.0 | 5.0 | 6.5 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 6.5 | 5.0 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 0.0 | 49.0 | 112.0 | 37.3 |
| Truck 31 FAO | 5.5 | 2.5 | 6.0 | 3.5 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 18.0 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 43.0 | 103.0 | 34.3 |
| Truck 31 FF #1 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 4.5 | 1.0 | 6.0 | 2.0 | 7.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 58.5 | 19.5 |
| Truck 31 FF #2 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 10.5 | 6.5 | 11.5 | 7.0 | 1.0 | 5.0 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 34.5 | 95.5 | 31.8 |
| Engine 31 Acting Officer | 3.0 | 1.5 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 8.0 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 33.5 | 79.0 | 26.3 |
| Engine 31 FAO | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 11.0 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 9.5 | 13.5 | 2.0 | 12.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 11.5 | 0.0 | 27.5 | 107.0 | 35.7 |
| Engine 31 FF #1 | 3.5 | 12.5 | 3.0 | 4.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.5 | 7.5 | 6.0 | 11.0 | 1.0 | 6.0 | 8.0 | 0.0 | 35.0 | 117.5 | 39.2 |
| Engine 31 FF #2 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 11.5 | 3.8 |
| Truck 18 Officer | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17.5 | 29.0 | 9.7 |
| Truck 18 FAO | 0.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 34.8 | 65.8 | 21.9 |
| Truck 18 FF #1 | 3.5 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 0.5 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 4.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 45.8 | 73.6 | 24.5 |
| Truck 18 FF #2 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 4.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 47.8 | 72.6 | 24.2 |
| Engine 46 Officer | 1.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 9.5 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 7.0 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 5.5 | 0.0 | 33.5 | 77.0 | 25.7 |
| Engine 46 FAO | 3.5 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 11.5 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 5.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 5.5 | 0.0 | 32.5 | 76.0 | 25.3 |
| Engine 46 FF #1 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 8.5 | 3.5 | 1.0 | 6.5 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 7.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 24.0 | 67.0 | 22.3 |
| Engine 46 FF #2 | 1.0 | 7.5 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 11.5 | 8.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 22.5 | 70.0 | 23.3 |
| Truck 23 Officer | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 4.5 | 0.0 | 4.5 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 29.5 | 9.8 |
| Truck 23 FAO | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 9.0 | 1.0 | 6.0 | 1.5 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 23.5 | 64.0 | 21.3 |
| Truck 23 FF #1 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 8.5 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 7.5 | 1.5 | 5.0 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 21.0 | 62.5 | 20.8 |
| Truck 23 FF #2 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 7.5 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 21.0 | 1.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 23.2 | 75.7 | 25.2 |
| Rescue 9 Officer | 2.0 | 10.5 | 6.0 | 10.0 | 3.0 | 17.0 | 79.0 | 6.0 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 7.0 | 0.0 | 31.0 | 494.0 | 653.5 | 217.8 |
| Rescue 9 FAO | 1.0 | 16.0 | 7.5 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 16.0 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 3.0 | 6.0 | 4.5 | 0.0 | 69.0 | 145.0 | 48.3 |
| Rescue 9 FF #1 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 1.5 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 22.0 | 69.5 | 0.0 | 7.5 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 7.0 | 0.0 | 26.5 | 364.5 | 497.0 | 165.7 |
| Rescue 9 FF #2 | 9.0 | 5.0 | 8.0 | 19.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 5.0 | 25.5 | 1.0 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 85.5 | 179.0 | 59.7 |
| Rescue 9 FF #3 | 3.0 | 32.5 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 2.0 | 12.5 | 85.0 | 0.0 | 7.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.5 | 1.0 | 13.5 | 430.5 | 596.0 | 198.7 |
| Rescue 14 Acting Officer | 3.5 | 11.0 | 1.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 13.5 | 3.0 | 7.5 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 155.0 | 208.0 | 69.3 |
| Rescue 14 FF #1 | 7.0 | 16.0 | 6.0 | 7.0 | 5.5 | 0.0 | 37.5 | 6.5 | 7.8 | 7.0 | 8.5 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 11.0 | 319.0 | 429.8 | 143.3 |
| Rescue 14 FF #2 | 3.0 | 25.0 | 7.5 | 23.5 | 13.0 | 2.0 | 62.0 | 3.0 | 8.5 | 4.5 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 588.5 | 746.5 | 248.8 |
| Rescue 14 FAO | 5.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 6.0 | 14.5 | 16.5 | 2.0 | 6.0 | 3.0 | 7.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 66.5 | 144.5 | 48.2 |
| District 4 DC | 178.0 | 20.0 | 8.0 | 7.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 8.0 | 0.0 | 17.5 | 250.5 | 83.5 |
| District 4B Capt | 5.5 | 15.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 26.0 | 57.0 | 19.0 |
| District 1 DC | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 4.5 | 1.5 |
| Average ALL for 3 YEAR: | 2.5 | 6.6 | 3.9 | 6.7 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 15.7 | 6.7 | 3.4 | 4.2 | 2.0 | 3.3 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 98.9 | 163.6 | |
| Average Non-HR for 3 YEA | 2.1 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 5.4 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 5.7 | 6.4 | 2.3 | 4.6 | 1.3 | 3.0 | 4.8 | 0.6 | 28.8 | 75.0 | |
| Average HR for 3 YEAR: | 3.7 | 15.8 | 5.6 | 10.6 | 3.8 | 7.3 | 45.9 | 6.1 | 6.7 | 2.9 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 1.9 | 12.4 | 313.3 | 431.8 | |
| Average ALL per YEAR: | 0.8 | 2.2 | 1.3 | 2.2 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 5.2 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 33.0 | 54.5 | |
| Average Non- HR per YEAR | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 0.8 | 1.5 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 0.2 | 9.6 | 25.0 | |
| Average HR per YEAR: | 1.2 | 5.3 | 1.9 | 3.5 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 15.3 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 0.6 | 4.1 | 104.4 | 143.9 | |



The following chart delineates training hours for Non-Heavy Rescue fire fighters and Heavy Rescue fire fighters: (NOTE: Heavy Rescue fire fighters are used for both training of new fire recruits and In-Service Training of incumbent fire fighters, leading to a high number of training hours.)



An objective analysis shows room for improvement. The total number of drill hours recorded shows the non-Heavy Rescue fire fighter averaged 75.0 hours of training for the same three year period (or 25.0 hours per year) and the Heavy Rescue fire fighter averaged 431.8 hours of training for the three year period (or 143.9 hours per year). Currently, there is no procedure in place at the Company or District level to coordinate company level training for each Unit in each district.



Training Led In Service Training

In order to ensure that each Cincinnati Fire Department member is trained to perform standard company functions consistent with Standard Operating Procedures, the Fire Department should conduct periodic training (In-Service Training) either in the Fire Station or at the Fire Training Center (*Procedures Manual 801.05 In-Service Training*). This training is designed to supplement company level training or to introduce new evolutions, equipment, and procedures.

In 2015, following the Dahlgren St fire, the Training Bureau conducted a Hose Deployment In-Service Training. Prior to that, the last recorded In-Service Trainings (and the percentage of 1st Alarm and Heavy Rescue 14 fire fighters who attended) were:

- 2012 – Water Operations, PFD, Throw Bags (50.0%)
- 2011 – SCBA MSA Firehawk M7 (55.6%)
- 2011 – Nozzles and Hose Advancement (41.7%)
- 2011 – Ground Ladder Raises (36.1%)
- 2010 – Tactical Quick Drill (13.9%)
- 2010 – RAT Refresher (19.4%)
- 2010 – Flashover Training (41.7%)
- 2010 – RAT Refresher (30.6%)
- 2009 – Building Size Up (63.9%)
- 2009 – Standpipe Operations (63.9%)

Again, an objective analysis shows room for improvement. ***For the period from March 26, 2012 to March 25, 2015, there are no recorded In-Service Trainings.*** The Cincinnati Fire Department trained a Fire Recruit Class in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. Due to a limited Training Bureau staff, all In-Service fire training ceases during a Fire Recruit class. While Fire Companies do assist with recruit training on occasion, it is very limited (focused mainly on Heavy Rescue Companies) with no scheduled plan to intermix recruit training with In-Service training.

Currently, there is no Daily Drill Calendar to assist Company Officers in developing structured training on focused, operational topics throughout the calendar year. Most Company Level training is done by the simplest method, “What do you want to drill on today?” District Level Training rarely occurs. Again, an objective analysis shows room for improvement.



SECTION 10

**Investigation
Reports**



Hamilton County Coroner Report

The Hamilton County Coroner reported that the cause of death was accidental and immediate cause was Asphyxiation due to compression of the chest with associated fractures. Additionally, they indicated the contributory causes of death were from blunt impact injuries with left pelvic fractures and scalp lacerations and contusions. *(Note: due to the sensitive nature of this report and personal information, it will not be included in this document. The importance of indicating the cause of FAO Daryl Gordon's death is to collaborate the findings of the report and recommendations herein related to his injuries, time missing and extrication).*

SCBA Report

The report from the Cincinnati Fire Department Mask Services Unit (MSU) is included in *Appendix 2* of this report. There were no failures to FAO Gordon's SCBA. The unit was severely damaged and did transmit messages to the MSA Accountability System.

Fire Investigation Report

The Cincinnati Fire Investigation Unit report outlining the cause of the fire is located in *Appendix 3* of this document.

Cincinnati Police Investigation Report

The Cincinnati Police Investigation Unit report outlining their findings as a result of this fire and death of FAO Gordon for this fire is located in *Appendix 4* of this document.

NIOSH SCBA Report

The NIOSH report on FAO Gordon's SCBA is located in *Appendix 6*.



Cincinnati Fire Department Administration Bureau (Central Stores) PPE Assessment

The attached photos show damage to the face piece and helmet of Truck 31 Officer who was initially in the hallway near the fire apartment. No other PPE (with the exception of FAO Gordon's) was inspected or damaged as a result of this fire. Other firefighters received minor burns, but their PPE was not a factor. PPE performed as designed at this incident, limiting injuries to firefighters exposed to high heat on the 2nd Floor hallway.



SECTION 11

**Lessons
Learned
or
Reinforced**



Lessons Learned or Reinforced

The defective interlock mechanism on the elevator door was the primary factor in the Line of Duty Death of FAO Daryl Gordon.

On March 26, 2015, tragic lessons were learned and reinforced at 6020 Dahlgren St. The basic skills of fire fighting are critical to effective and efficient fireground operations. When fire fighters are fully prepared and trained to a level where practical skills required to force entry, stretch attack lines, raise ladders, search buildings, rescue occupants and extinguish fires are second nature, tasks performed at emergency incidents are more likely performed in a safe and effective manner.

At nearly every incident, problems arise on the fireground due to unpredictable circumstances, human error, complacency, or the ever-changing hostile environments that lead to a decline in effective operations. This is when solid and realistic training are paramount to overcoming any adversity. When fire fighters are unable to resolve issues on the fireground in a timely manner, communication to the Incident Commander will be critical to developing a successful recovery strategy. Yet there are times in the Fire Service, fire fighters are unable to recover. A staggering chain of events begins a domino effect that can end in tragedy.

Basic skills, tasks, functions, and operations are key to fire fighter safety and survival, should be reinforced at all levels of the organization, and frequently reviewed. To enact a positive change, the Cincinnati Fire Department needs to implement an enhanced approach to training.

These are the critical lessons learned or reinforced as a result of the fire at 6020 Dahlgren St. on March 26, 2015 and the Line of Duty Death of FAO Daryl Gordon.

The most important Lesson Learned or Reinforced is:

**TRAINING AND SKILL DEVELOPMENT ARE
PARAMOUNT TO LIMITING INJURY AND DEATH TO
FIRE FIGHTERS AND CIVILIANS.**



Operations

Lessons Learned or Reinforced

Most lessons learned at this incident were directly related to fireground operations, standard operating procedures and conditions encountered at an incident. Effective operations aim to improve safety while fulfilling our mission of protecting life and property. When operations fail, we must learn from these lessons and make every effort possible to improve future operations.

The following categories contain the Lessons Learned or Reinforced on March 26, 2015.

1. Complacency
2. Hose Deployment
3. Crew Integrity
4. Coordinated Ventilation
5. Simultaneous Offensive and Defensive Strategy
6. Apparatus Placement
7. Dangerous Conditions and Emergency Radio Traffic
8. Rapid Assistance Teams (RAT)
9. Safety Engine Company
10. Mayday Operations and Mayday Channel
11. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
12. Primary Search
13. Secondary Search
14. Stairwell Search and Control
15. Elevator Search and Control
16. Rescue Strategy
17. Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV)
18. Size Up and 360 Survey
19. Rescue Company Operations
20. Incident Benchmarks
21. Medical Branch
22. Incident Command



Lesson #1 Complacency

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

When certain types of incidents occur on a frequent basis with a predictable nuisance outcome, human nature can cause fire fighters to become complacent. Just another food on the stove sometimes are actual fires and can lead to tragedy. Complacency can be a fire fighter's worst enemy. Firefighters MUST remain diligent to professionally prepare for every incident and respond with a heightened level of awareness to effectively react to tactical challenges faced at every incident, even the most mundane.

Specific Examples From 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **At this incident, based on numerous statements from responding individuals, initial companies thought this was going to be another routine call to this address; in the fire service there are no routine calls.**
2. **This incident was upgraded soon after dispatch to a full One Alarm due to multiple reports of smoke in the building and people jumping off of balconies. Responding Companies should have had a high suspicion that this was now a working fire.**



Lesson #2 Hose Deployment

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Proper hose deployment is crucial to saving lives, protecting occupants, protecting fire fighters, and, ultimately, fire control.

“A well-placed, appropriately staffed hose line putting water on the fire saves more lives than any other action performed by the fire department.”

CFD Standard Operating Procedures for structure fires are detailed in *Operations Manual 203.01 Structure Fires*. The CFD dispatches two (2) Engine Companies as “working” companies on the majority of 1-Alarm responses in the city. For High Hazard structures or occupancies, a third Engine Company is added to the complement. Multiple buildings, like 6020 Dahlgren St, exist citywide which are not targeted for a three engine response. The first-due Engine Company must advance the initial attack line to the seat of the fire. The second-due Engine Company must ensure the efficient stretch and proper deployment of the first attack line and then deploy a backup line (from an independent source of water). The third-due Engine Company, if dispatched, should deploy a backup line (if not done so already) and then place a third attack line where needed.

The April 2010 National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) Technical Note 1661 - “Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments” outlined the following information on crew size and effectiveness of fireground operations:

1. Overall Effectiveness - The four-person crews operating on a low-hazard structure fire completed all the tasks on the fireground (on average) seven minutes faster — nearly 30 % — than the two-person crews. The four-person crews completed the same number of fireground tasks (on average) 5.1 minutes faster — nearly 25 % — than the three-person crew. It should be noted that the benefit of five-person crews has been documented in other evaluations to be significant for medium- and high-hazard structures, particularly in urban settings, and should be addressed according to industry standards.
2. Water on the Fire - There was a nearly 10 % difference in the “water on fire time” between the two and three-person crews and an additional 6 % difference in the “water on fire time” between the three- and four-person crews (i.e., 16 % difference between the four and two-person crews). There was an additional 6 % difference in the “water on fire” time between the four- and five-person crews (i.e., 22 % difference between the five and two-person crews).
3. Stretching a Hose Line - In comparing four- and five-person crews to two and three-person crews collectively, the time difference to stretch a line was 76 seconds. In conducting more specific analysis comparing all crew sizes to a two-person crew, the differences are more distinct. A two-person crew took 57 seconds longer than a three-person crew to stretch a line. A two-person crew took 87 seconds longer than a four-person crew to complete the same tasks. Finally, the most notable comparison was between a two-person crew and a five-person crew — more than 2 minutes (122 seconds) difference in task completion time.



Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. First-due Engine 49 was unable to deploy the initial attack line to the seat of the fire.

- a. Engine 49 had significant issues deploying the primary attack line and never made it to the fire apartment.
- b. Faced with a moderately difficult stretch (that became extremely difficult for the Acting Officer operating alone due to a lack of crew integrity), both first-due Engine 49 and second-due Engine 31 should have worked together to ensure the efficient and timely stretch of the first attack line.
- c. Engine 49's attack line wedged in the stairwell between the stair tread and the wall, impeding the ability to advance the attack line to the seat of the fire.
- d. Engine 49 did not communicate hose deployment issues or the delay in getting water on the fire to Command or other responding companies.
- e. Crew integrity and control of personnel are crucial to ensuring that there is enough support to properly deploy and advance an attack line. Engine 49 FF#1 left his officer, did not communicate his actions, did not communicate the location of the fire, and did not rejoin his company.
- f. Engine 49's attack line stopped at Apartment 26 and did not reach the fire apartment. The fire continued to burn uncontrolled for over 20 minutes after the fire department's arrival, increasing the spread of heat and smoke to the rest of the building. *(see image to right)*
- g. Fire fighters must deploy and operate attack lines; company officers should assist while assessing conditions, supervising personnel, communicating to Command, recognizing issues and directing all other actions. Engine 49 Acting Officer was forced to deploy the initial attack line by himself. Traditionally, CFD Engine Companies start their hose stretch and operation with (1) firefighter and (1) officer (*the other firefighter secures a water supply and the 4th firefighter is the Driver/Operator*).



2. **Second-due Engine 31 did not ensure the efficient and timely stretch of Engine 49's attack line.**
 - a. Engine 31 was not successful in assisting the first-due engine with their hose advancement or ensuring the attack line was operational.
 - b. Engine 31 did not communicate primary attack line deployment issues or the delay in getting water on the fire to Command or other responding Companies.
3. **Second-due Engine 31 did not deploy a backup line to the seat of the fire when Engine 49's line became wedged in the stairwell.**
 - a. Engine 31 did stretch a backup line to the "C/D" side, but the backup line was dropped in a bundle onto the exterior retaining wall.
 - b. When Engine 49's attack line became wedged between the stair tread and wall, members were not able to deploy Engine 31's backup line to the seat of the fire due to tangles and kinks. It too progressed no farther in the hallway than Apartment 26.
 - c. Engine 31 did not communicate backup line deployment issues or the delay in getting water on the fire to Command or other responding companies.
4. **Engine 49 and Engine 31 did not recognize or overcome hose deployment issues (an "engine company emergency").**
 - a. In order to overcome a hose deployment issue or an "engine company emergency," someone first must recognize the problem exists.
 - i. Engine 49 Acting Officer did not recognize the attack line was stuck.
 - ii. Engine 31 did recognize Engine 49's line was wedged, but did not communicate the issue to Command or Engine 49. Engine 31 was unable to free the wedged line.
 - iii. Engine 49 FF#2 recognized the line was wedged, but was unable to free the wedged line.
 - iv. Engine 49 FF#2 attempted to deploy Engine 31's line, but it was tangled and kinked.
 - b. Engine 49's Acting Officer, by himself to this point, had prolonged exposure to intense heat conditions in the hallway and had to eventually exit the building.
 - i. Engine 49 Acting Officer didn't flow water down the hallway to cool the environment. Engine 49 Acting Officer stated in testimony "We don't spray water into smoke."
 - c. Engine 49 FF#1 left his officer, forcing the Engine 49 Acting Officer to deploy the attack line by himself. This action caused Engine 49 Acting Officer to concentrate on tasks functions versus supervisory functions. The key to overcoming a hose deployment issue is to focus on recognizing, communicating, and solving the problem.
 - d. Engine 31 was unable to free the hose wedged in the small space between the stair tread and wall. There was no attempt to add additional hose to the attack line or appropriately deploy the backup line.
5. **The placement of Engine 49's attack line through the "C" side to the "D" stairwell was the route with longest hallway exposure to reach the fire apartment.**



- a. This action was based on Engine 49's building preplan. Companies should use caution to avoid a single entrance point in a building such as this for all operations.
- b. From where Engine 49 was positioned, the quickest route to the fire was through the main entrance door on the first floor, to the "B" stairwell and directly to the fire apartment.
(NOTE: This was the route taken to reach the fire by Engine 49 FF#1, Truck 31 A, Rescue 9 and Engine 46.) This route lessens the distance operating in a hostile hallway.

6. The "C" side entrance door to the "D" stairwell was not initially chocked open.

- a. Engine 49 Acting Officer was not able to chock the outside entrance door.
- b. Engine 31 did not have door chocks and were looking for items to chock the door open.
- c. Engine 49 FF#2 chocked the door, but this was late in the hose deployment evolution.
- d. Doors in these occupancies should be chocked open to ensure good hose deployment (hose getting stuck beneath a door) and movement (between the door and the door frame).

Deployment of the primary attack line and the back-up attack line capable of putting water on the fire did not occur at this incident.



Image #67

**Riser from Exterior Door to 2nd Floor Stairwell Door Where Engine 49's line became wedged as it was charged
(note: small gap between tread and wall)**

NOTE:
Initial Hose Line From Engine 49 Was Removed Prior to Photographs Being Taken



Lesson #3 Crew Integrity

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Crews must stay together and work together to operate effectively at an incident and ensure the safety of all personnel. Freelancing is “a dangerous situation at an incident where an individual carries out tasks alone, without being assigned, or without the express knowledge or consent of an officer or the Incident Commander.” When freelancing, fire fighters do what they want to do, when they want to do it. Far too often, freelancing results in a failure to effectively complete pre-assigned tasks, disrupts the tactical plan of Command and breaks down personnel accountability. CFD *Operations Manual 203.01.G.3 Safety* requires all units to work together under the direction of Command to ensure the safety of personnel.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **Nine of eleven crews on the 1st and 2nd Alarm failed to maintain crew integrity during this incident.**
 - a. Engines 49, 31, 18 and 8
 - b. Trucks 23, 18 and 32
 - c. Rescues 9 and 14
2. **Essential fireground tasks were not completed due to a lack of crew integrity and personnel were exposed to a greater risk of injury.**
 - a. Hose Deployment – Engine 49’s initial attack line was not deployed correctly and never reached the seat of the fire due to Engine 49’s crew being separated.
 - b. Primary Search – Truck 18 Officer left the building to retrieve equipment, but Truck 18 FF #1 continued into the structure alone to conduct a primary search in a hostile environment.
 - c. Civilian Rescue – Rescue 9 FAO and Engine 49 FF #1, without direct supervision or direction, performed a dangerous civilian rescue on the “C” side of the building.
3. **Fire fighters WILL NOT enter an Immediately Dangerous to Life (IDLH) atmosphere unless at least two fire fighters, using a buddy system, enter and remain in visual and voice contact with each other at all times.**
 - a. Engine 49 – FF #1 entered an IDLH atmosphere with a civilian but without another fire fighter to search for the seat of the fire and never rejoined his company.
 - b. Engine 49 - FF#2 reentered the building in an IDLH atmosphere to retrieve her helmet and other equipment after her Acting Officer exited the building due to high heat conditions.



- c. Heavy Rescue 14 – the crew split during their search of Floor 5, resulting in FAO Gordon not being present when the malfunctioning elevator door was found and marked.
- d. Engine 31 – FF #2 (a probationary fire fighter) somehow joined up with another lone fire fighter (Truck 18 FF#1) to conduct primary searches on multiple floors.
- e. Truck 18 - FF#1 was by himself at multiple times during the incident performing search and rescue functions.



Lesson #4 Coordinated Ventilation

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Ventilation must be coordinated with fire attack and hose line placement. Communication must occur between the ventilation crew and the fire attack line to ensure water is ready to be flowed on the fire prior to the ventilation occurring. Horizontal ventilation openings should be made in the fire area. Horizontal ventilation that is not coordinated or occurs too early will cause an increase in fire intensity and fire spread and a decrease in the time to flashover. *CFD Operations 203.01* addresses ventilation and coordination of ventilation efforts, or “controlling the flow path of the fire.”

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. Truck 31A ventilated the “C” side sliding glass patio door to the fire apartment very early in the fire operations at the direction of District 4B, causing an increase in fire intensity and a worsening of conditions in the second floor hallway, hampering the ability of Companies to deploy the initial attack line to the seat of the fire and conduct a primary search.



- a. This action occurred without verification that an attack line was in place or that water was ready to be flowed on the fire.
- b. This action was not coordinated with Command or other interior Companies.




Lesson #5 Simultaneous Offensive and Defensive Strategy

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Avoid simultaneous Offensive and Defensive attack lines into the same fire area. A “Transitional Attack” may be necessary to knock down or control heavy fire from the outside before an interior attack can be made. This must be communicated to and coordinated through Command to ensure all Companies are aware of this tactic and protected from the dangers of exterior streams. CFD *Operations Manual 203.01.C.6.d Offensive Strategy* allows for an aggressive interior attack to begin with a stream operating from the exterior of the building prior to an attack line entering, but this tactic is normally reserved for the same attack line moving from the exterior to the interior.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **District 1 (second-due District Chief) operated a hose line from the exterior of the building into the fire apartment through the previously broken sliding glass patio door on the “C” side. District 1 was relieved on this hose line by Truck 31B who continued to operate the hose line from the exterior.**
 - a. These actions were never communicated to interior companies or Command.
 - b. This occurred while companies were in the hallway and an interior attack line was being deployed into the fire apartment by Engine 46, Truck 31A and Rescue 9 FF#3.
 - c. The exterior line was shut down AFTER crews on the inside, being struck by the exterior stream, told crews to shut down the exterior attack line.



Lesson #6 Apparatus Placement

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

First-arriving companies at a structure fire should effectively position apparatus to maximize fireground operations. *CFD Operations Manual 203.01.T Structure Fire - Apparatus Placement* states that effective placement should begin with the arrival of the first units, based on initial size up, pre fire plans, and general conditions upon arrival. Engines Companies should not be placed in front of the fire building, unless the layout of the street or parking areas allows for easy access of Truck Companies. Consideration should be taken when laying supply lines to not block access for other apparatus if possible; the first in Engine Company should generally pull past the structure. The first arriving Truck Company should generally position the apparatus in the front of the fire building or in a position to take greatest advantage of the aerial ladder for rescue, ventilation or eventual ladder pipe operations. The second arriving truck company shall place the apparatus in the best position to utilize the aerial ladder for rescue or as a secondary exit from the roof. The District vehicle shall be placed as close to the fire building as possible without impeding the placement of the first arriving Engine or Truck. First arriving companies should approach in a manner to allow visualization of at least two sides of the building.

Specific Examples From 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **At this incident, Engine 49, District 4, Truck 31, and Engine 31 were the only apparatus able to position themselves in the parking lot of the complex.**
 - a. Engine 49 laid a supply line from 5431 Owasco St. and proceeded down Dahlgren St. from the east, into the parking lot, and then west away from the building toward a nearby dumpster (away from the "A/D" corner).
 - b. District 4 entered the parking lot and pulled completely past the building, out of the way, and proceeded to the northwest end of the parking lot (away from the "AB" corner).
 - c. Truck 31 entered the parking lot (prior to Engine 49 charging their 5" supply line) and stopped just short of the lobby entrance on the "A" side of the building.
 - d. Engine 31 laid a supply line from 5423 Ward St. and proceeded down Dahlgren St. from the west, into the parking lot (prior to Engine 49 charging their 5" supply line) and stopped just short of the "AD" corner on the east end of the parking lot.
 - e. Due to charged 5" supply lines blocking the driveway, Truck 18, Rescue 9, RAT 23 and Engine 46 were not able to access the parking lot.
 - f. Medic Units need to be cognizant of where they park so they are not blocked in by charged supply lines or other fire apparatus. Consideration should be given to the need for rapid evacuation from the scene of critically injured firefighters and civilians.

2. **The supply lines laid from Engine 49 and Engine 31 crisscrossed the driveway to the parking lot of the complex, completely sealing off further access to the parking lot for other responding apparatus.**



- a. Engine Companies should use good judgment when laying a supply line to not block access for other apparatus. An Engine Company Officer should envision the direction of travel, the pathway from the hydrant, and the final destination at the structure.
- b. Engine 49, traveling from the east, could have stayed to the east side of the complex (instead of traveling to the west side), pulled completely past the structure to the far “B” side, and allowed continued access to the parking lot without crossing the entrance to the parking lot with charged 5” supply line.
- c. Engine 31, traveling from the west, could have stayed to the west side of the complex (instead of traveling to the east side), pulled toward the dumpster on the west side (where Engine 49 actually parked), and allowed continued access to the parking lot without crossing the entrance to the parking lot with charged 5” supply line.
- d. Engine Company Officers should consider “positioning” their 5” supply lines into the entrance of a parking lot in a parallel fashion. Crisscrossing 5” supply line should be avoided at all costs. Once a 5” supply line is charged, no apparatus can proceed past – especially if the 5” supply lines crisscross the only entrance to the area.



3. **Truck 31 stopped short of the lobby entrance on the “A” side of the building, with their rear mounted aerial closest to the “AD” corner. Truck 31 was the only aerial ladder with access to the building, limiting the ability to conduct exterior rescues via aerial ladders. Access to balconies near the “B” side proved challenging due to their position of the turntable near the “AD” corner.**
 - a. Truck 31 could have traveled along the “A” side toward the “A/B” corner, leaving its rear mounted aerial near the lobby at the center of the building to provide easier access to all balconies on the “A” side.
 - b. Truck 18, had Engine 49 and Engine 31 properly laid their supply lines to the sides of the drive, could have accessed the parking lot to the “A” side near the “D” corner or backed their apparatus up the parking lot to the “A/D” corner to provide the most optimal rear mounted aerial ladder access.



- c. "Channeling" of supply lines may have also allowed Rescue 9 (with specialized tools and equipment), RAT 23 (with RAT equipment) and, potentially, a Medic Unit (for rapid egress path) access to the parking lot.
- d. Positioning in the aforementioned manner would have permitted effective viewing and operation on three sides of this structure.



- 4. Multiple persons responding after the first arriving companies indicated that apparatus were parked in the middle of Ward Street. This limited access for other apparatus, requiring personnel to walk a long distance to the scene. Ladder 19 FAO indicated he tried to move some of the apparatus into open spots on the side of the street upon arrival to allow access for EMS resources.



Lesson #7 Dangerous Conditions and Emergency Radio Traffic

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

All personnel operating at a structure fire must be made aware of dangerous conditions that exist or may occur during the incident. Any firefighter who witnesses signs of these events shall notify their supervisor immediately. Supervisors shall notify Command and take appropriate action to protect personnel. Transmissions involving critical events would fall under “Emergency” communications. The Incident Commander, upon hearing the “Emergency” declaration, shall immediately repeat the “Emergency” traffic and issue orders to rectify or retreat from the situation. *CFD Operations Manual 203.01.G.5.a Structure Fire Safety* and *202.08.D Emergency Condition* detail specific situations where Emergency Traffic radio transmissions are required.

Personnel should be aware of specific building features that might indicate a dangerous condition or non-ordinary situation when performing operations in limited visibility. If you say to yourself, “This doesn’t seem right,” or, “This is different,” exercise additional caution and notify your supervisor immediately.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.


1. Rescue 14 FF #2 opened an outward-swinging door with a diamond-shaped window and “D” handle on the 5th floor. Rescue 14 FF #2 realized this door was different than the other doors, so he sounded the floor ahead with his tool after opening the door, finding NO floor. The door led to an open elevator shaft; the interlocking mechanism was not working correctly. The fire fighter notified his Acting Officer face-to-face and, collectively, they notified District 3 (Search & Rescue Branch) face-to-face. Members were concerned about the danger of the open shaft and marked on the door “DO NOT ENTER OPEN SHAFT.” There was never an “Emergency” radio transmission to Command about the hazard (or any radio transmission). (see image to right)



- a. Command should have been notified of the dangerous condition, and “Emergency” traffic should have been broadcast notifying all personnel on the scene of the hazardous condition.



- b. Personnel did mark the door to the elevator shaft, but there were no other efforts to secure the door.
2. In multiple dwelling units like this, doors that open towards the fire fighter (outward swinging) are not stairwell or living units doors. These are generally doors to utility rooms, laundry rooms, equipment rooms, garbage chutes or elevator shafts. Doors with different layouts, such as larger door jambs, lack of standard locking mechanisms, irregular windows or different handles, should be considered something out of the ordinary, and fire fighters should use caution.
3. At this incident, the smoke conditions were reported to be moderate on Floor 5, with visibility of a few feet. Firefighters from Heavy Rescue 14, Engine 8 and Truck 32 were on air as they operated on the 5th floor. It may have been difficult to read the warning marked on the elevator door. When dangerous conditions are found in a limited visibility environment, it is imperative to communicate these hazards to the Incident Commander, post a guard if conditions allow, attempt to render the hazard safe, and await further orders from the Incident Commander.



5th Floor
Elevator



3rd Floor
Elevator



5th Floor
Elevator



Lesson # 8 Rapid Assistance Team (RAT)

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

A Rapid Assistance Team (RAT) must be assigned at structure fires to create a proactive team to prevent the necessity of a firefighter rescue by removing all barriers to egress and allowing firefighters to self-rescue. On initial dispatch, the third closest available Truck Company shall be designated as the RAT Truck. *CFD Operations Manual 202.09 Rapid Assistance Teams* details specific actions to be performed at a structure fire by the RAT Truck, including the formation of the 6-member team [with the addition of two (2) fire fighters from the Safety Engine], staging RAT equipment, “softening the target,” and Mayday responsibilities.

At times, it may be necessary for the Incident Commander to utilize the RAT Truck for fire fighting tasks. However, the RAT Truck must be replaced IMMEDIATELY, either with another responding Truck Company or by requesting another Truck Company from Dispatch.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **Due to deteriorating fire conditions, Command reassigned RAT 23 upon arrival at 05:49 hours to perform search and rescue operations. However, a RAT Truck was not immediately dispatched to replace RAT 23.**
 - a. At 05:56 hours, following the transmission of the 3rd Alarm, Truck 19 was assigned RAT duties – seven (7) minutes after putting RAT 23 to work.
 - b. At 06:00 hours, Command advised all 3rd Alarm companies to stage 3 blocks away.
 - c. At 06:13 hours, Command requested RAT 19 to conduct a PAR - however they were not on scene at that time.
 - d. At 06:14 hours, RAT 19 arrived on the scene, but was staged several blocks away.
 - e. At 06:20 hours, Command advised RAT 19 to prepare to conduct a PAR Report, but RAT 19 Officer advised Command that RAT 19 was still not to the Command vehicle yet.
 - f. At 06:22 hours, Rescue 14 declares a Mayday.
 - g. RAT 19 was utilized for Safety Engine duties (Accountability) instead of RAT duties.
 - h. It is extremely important to have a working RAT Truck on the scene for fire fighter safety – there was a 31 minute gap without a working RAT Truck.
2. **Important RAT Duties were never performed at this incident.**
 - a. Window bars to the fire apartment were never removed (*see image page #116*)



Window Bars on Fire Apartment



- b. Rescue ladders to the upper floors were never deployed (*see images below*).
- c. A crew was not assembled and available for rescue efforts when the Mayday was transmitted.
- d. No RAT equipment was staged.
- e. No one performed a RAT 360 assessment or “softened” the building.



No Exterior Ground Ladders for FF Egress



Lesson #9 Safety Engine

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

A Safety Engine must be assigned at a structure fire to establish Accountability and assist with RAT Operations. On initial dispatch, the third available Engine Company (or fourth for high hazard box alarms) shall be designated as the Safety Engine. *CFD Operations Manual 203.01.R Safety Engine, 202.07 Fire Fighter Accountability and 202.09.A Rapid Assistance Team* all detail pre-assigned actions for the Safety Engine, including the Officer assuming the duties of the Accountability Officer to set up the Accountability Board and the Tactron Incident Management Board, a fire fighter operating the MSA SCBA Accountability System, assigning two (2) firefighters to the RAT Truck [which now becomes a six (6) person RAT company], and conducting Personnel Accountability Reports (PAR) as required or requested.

At times, it may be necessary for the Incident Commander to utilize the Safety Engine for fire fighting tasks at an incident. However, the Safety Engine must be replaced immediately, either with another responding Engine Company or by requesting another Engine Company from Dispatch.

Incident Command must ensure that an Accountability Officer has been assigned early on at an incident for the safety of all fire fighters on the scene. The Accountability Officer shall monitor and track the location of Companies based on tactical assignments, functions, and locations on the fireground, and a Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) must be completed as required or requested to account for all members working at the scene of an incident.

Incident Command must ensure that a fire fighter has been assigned early on at an incident to set up and operate the MSA SCBA Accountability System; it is an essential tool to be utilized at all hazardous incidents to assist in identifying the possibility of a fire fighter in distress, low on air, or operating in high heat environments.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **Due to deteriorating fire conditions, Command reassigned Safety Engine 46 upon arrival at 05:49 hours to perform hose deployment and fire control. (NOTE: The attack line deployed by Engine 46 and Ladder 23 was the only interior line to reach the fire apartment and extinguish the fire.)**
 - a. The Safety Engine was never replaced at any point in this incident.
 - b. Occupancies such as 6020 Dahlgren St sometimes require more than one Engine Company to get a fire line into operation. The failure of the first two Engine Companies in task performance necessitated the need for use of Engine 46 to deploy a hose line at this fire.



2. **The Accountability Officer position was not staffed by Command until the arrival of RAT 19 following the 3rd Alarm, and the RAT 19 Officer was not even on scene at the Command Post at 0620 hrs – just two minutes prior to the Mayday.**
 - a. Upon returning from the “C” side, District 4B was told to prepare for a PAR by District 4. At 06:05 hours, District 4B requested a run-down of companies from Dispatch. A PAR or the Accountability function were never started.
 - b. When an incident escalates, requiring more companies to respond and operate in multiple areas of a building as large as 6020 Dahlgren St, it is necessary to have an Accountability Officer assigned to track movement and location of Companies.
 - c. Company Officers failed to notify Command of location changes on the fireground per current CFD *Operations Manual 202.07.C.1.d Fire Fighter Accountability*. Several companies operated in multiple locations on multiple floors at this incident and did not communicate movements or location changes to Command.

3. **The Incident Commander attempted to perform a PAR several times during the incident, but there was no Accountability Officer assigned to carry out the request. A complete PAR was never successfully performed.**
 - a. At 06:19 hours, Command asked RAT 19 to get ready to conduct a PAR. However, RAT 19 advised they were not to the command vehicle yet.
 - b. At 06:25 hours (3 min post-Mayday), District 4B attempted to conduct a PAR on FireGround “Command D,” but only got through one (1) Company – Engine 31. [NOTE: *Command never ordered Companies to switch their radios to the Mayday channel (“Mayday D”) for routine fireground communications following the Mayday Declaration.*]
 - c. At 06:32 hours, RAT 19 Officer attempted to conduct a PAR on Fire Ground Command D, but it took nine (9) minutes to get through only four additional Companies – Engine 49, Engine 46, Engine 18 and Truck 31.
 - d. The PAR was significantly hindered by voluminous radio traffic involving the Mayday (see Lesson Learned #10.)

4. **The MSA SCBA Accountability System was not turned on until the arrival of RAT 19 at the Command Post after the Mayday.**
 - a. When the MSA SCBA Accountability System was finally turned on by RAT 19, FAO Gordon’s SCBA Integrated Control Module (ICM) Motion Alarm and Low Air Pressure Alarm were immediately recognized by the firefighter operating the computer.
 - i. At 06:12 hours, FAO Gordon’s SCBA ICM recorded a Motion Alarm.
 - ii. At 06:21 hours, FAO Gordon’s SCBA ICM recorded a Low Air Pressure Alarm.
 - iii. At 06:31 hours, FAO Gordon’s SCBA ICM recorded a Radio Link with the MSA SCBA Accountability System.
 - iv. FAO Gordon’s ICM did not sound an audible motion alarm heard by interior company’s due to severe damage from the fall; however, both still transmitted alarms to the MSA Accountability System. (NOTE: *FAO Gordon’s low air alarm bell was sounding until air was depleted; this is what Rescue 14 FF#1 heard from the 5th floor.*)



- b. These alarms were not relayed to the Incident Commander in a timely manner simply because the MSA SCBA Accountability System computer was not turned on and monitored until after the Mayday.



Example of MSA SCBA Accountability and Tracking System used by CFD



Lesson #10 Mayday Operations and Mayday Channel

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

CFD *Operations Manual 202.08.C Mayday* details actions to be taken during Emergency Conditions and Mayday Declaration. The term “Mayday” is to be used when a fire fighter is in danger. Once a Mayday has been declared, the Incident Commander SHALL order all Companies operating at the incident to switch their radios to the Mayday Channel for routine fireground communications, leaving the original fireground channel for the exclusive use of fire fighter(s) involved in the Mayday, RAT Chief, Rapid Assistance Teams and RAT Assist Teams. Usually the designated RAT Chief manages the MAYDAY effort and extrication, while Command runs the entire incident, ensures other tasks are completed and appropriate resources are assigned to the Mayday. Additionally, the Accountability Officer shall immediately initiate a Personnel Accountability Report (PAR).

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **Command never ordered companies to switch their radios to the Mayday Channel “Mayday D” for routine fireground communications following the Mayday declaration.**
 - a. Some fire companies did switch to a Mayday Channel without the direction of Command.
 - i. From 06:23 hours until 06:44 hours, a total of seven radios switched to “Mayday D” – three from Truck 23 and four from Engine 32 (*dispatched on the Mayday 4th Alarm*)
 - ii. From 06:30 hours until 06:31 hours, two radios switched to “Mayday B” – one from Medic 29 and one from Truck 23
 - b. Command and Accountability Officer were unaware that some fire companies had switched to a Mayday Channel.
 - c. Companies should only switch to the Mayday Channel on orders from Command – do not switch on your own.

2. **Although the fire was out at the time of the Mayday, Command still should have ordered all Companies not involved in the Mayday extrication to switch to the Mayday Channel. The sheer volume of radio traffic necessitated it.**
 - a. Use of “Mayday D” would have reduced radio traffic on fireground “Command D” during the extrication and facilitated the completion of a PAR.
 - b. The Mayday declaration occurred at 06:22 hours; FAO Gordon was extricated from the elevator at 06:36 hours.
 - i. From 06:22 hours to 06:36 hours, there were 103 documented “Radio Status Traffic – Subscriber Rejected” or “bonks,” indicating a talk group busy tone (a firefighter was unable to transmit a message) - that equates to 1 “bonk” every 8 seconds.
 - ii. From 06:22 hours to 06:36 hours, there were 89 radio transmissions from 24 separate radios – that equates to 1 transmission (of varying length) every 9 seconds.
 - iii. During the time it took to extricate FAO Gordon from the elevator shaft, more radio transmissions were blocked or rejected than actually got through.



- c. A Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) must be initiated immediately following a Mayday CFD *Operations Manual 202.07.C.2.e Personnel Accountability Report*.
 - i. At 06:25 hours, Command ordered RAT 19 to conduct a PAR. RAT 19 was not to the Command Post yet, so District 4B started a PAR; District 4B was only able to contact Engine 31 before Mayday extrication radio traffic took priority.
 - ii. At 06:30 hours, RAT Chief/Extrication Sector (SOC) requested a PAR to assist in identifying the missing fire fighter.
 - iii. At 06:31 hours, Command ordered RAT 19 to again conduct a PAR.
 - iv. From 06:32 hours until 06:41 hours, RAT 19 was able to contact Engine 49 (2 unaccounted for), Engine 46 (PAR OK), Engine 18 (2 members unaccounted for, but later found), and Truck 31 (PAR OK). (NOTE: There were 33 non-PAR related radio transmissions during this time period.)
 - v. At 06:36 hours, FAO Gordon was extricated from the elevator car.
 - vi. The following companies on the 1st and 2nd Alarms were never contacted for a PAR during the first hour on scene – Truck 23, Heavy Rescue 9, District 4, District 1, Safety Officer 2, Truck 32, Engine 8, Heavy Rescue 14, District 3, ALS 34, Medic 46, Medic 23, Medic 19, Medic 2.
- 3. **Equipment for special rescue of fire fighters must be staged and readily available with a RAT team at every incident, including RAT packs, air, search ropes and any specialized rescue tools deemed appropriate on size-up. At the time of the Mayday, there was no RAT Company or RAT equipment available for use. RAT 19 was being utilized as Accountability. (See Lesson #8)**
- 4. **In addition to removing a downed firefighter from a position where they are trapped, consideration must be given on how to remove the firefighter once freed from the entrapment. This should be coordinated from personnel involved in the extrication through the RAT Chief.**
 - a. All personnel need to be familiar with all methods available to move a downed firefighter once free from entrapment:
 - i. Regular FF Drags using SCBA, coat collar, rescue harness or webbing.
 - ii. Stokes basket
 - iii. Sked stretcher
 - iv. Mega Mover Tarp
 - b. Members must ensure the method used to move the firefighter is appropriate for the conditions and building to facilitate a quick removal
 - i. A stokes basket was requested to remove FAO Gordon. FAO Gordon was moved in a tight hallway with turns and a narrow return-type stairwell.
 - ii. If a device such as a stokes basket is used and is going to be tilted, lifted turned or carried, time needs to be taken to secure the victim.



Lesson #11 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

All Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), including SCBA, fire helmet, protective hood, bunker coat, bunker pants, protective boots, and protective gloves, shall be donned prior to entering an Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) environment and properly worn at all times (including securing of the helmet strap beneath your chin to keep your helmet from falling off or being knocked off). SCBA shall be donned until the “All Clear – Remove SCBA” benchmark has been announced on the fireground channel by the Incident Commander, signaling air monitoring has been completed and it is now safe to remove SCBA.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St

1. Engine 49 Acting Officer received minor burns to his face and his left hand as a result of extreme heat and fire conditions in the 2nd floor hallway from the “D” stairwell. Engine 49 Acting Officer lost his glove wrestling with both stalled attack lines; the glove was later retrieved by Engine 49 FF #2 near the first corner of the 2nd floor hallway just off the “D” stairwell.
2. Truck 31 Officer received minor burns to his face and ears as a result of extreme heat and fire conditions in the Floor 2 hallway when he entered from the “B” Stairwell.
 - a. Truck 31 Officer’s helmet was severely damaged by fire, his ear flaps were burned through, and his SCBA face piece suffered heat damage to the lens.
 - b. His PPE was donned and properly worn, thus limiting his exposure to the heat and greatly lessening the thermal injuries he suffered. (NOTE: It was reported in testimony that Truck 31 Officer’s helmet was “on fire” while standing in the hallway off the “B” stairwell. Firefighters should stay low in high heat conditions.)



3. **At least two personnel lost their helmets during fire fighting operations.**
 - a. Engine 49 FF #2 lost her helmet while attempting to control the hose line in the hallway and also received smoke inhalation injuries when her SCBA face piece became dislodged by her helmet in the struggle with the attack line.
 - b. FAO Gordon lost his helmet when he fell into the elevator shaft.
4. **Search and Rescue Branch (District 3), removed his SCBA face piece while operating on Floor 5 with Heavy Rescue 14. Air monitoring had not been completed, and an "All Clear-Remove SCBA" benchmark was never given by Command.**
5. **Our current PPE ensemble (SCBA, coat, pants, boots, helmet, hoods and gloves) protected the firefighters who were exposed to heat events as designed.**



Lesson #12 Primary Search

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Coordination of search and rescue operations at an incident optimizes the use of personnel. Ensuring all areas of a structure are systematically searched eliminates the duplication of efforts and the wasting of manpower, greatly reducing the time it takes to find victims desperately needing assistance. *CFD Operations Manual 203.01.I Search* calls for companies to conduct a Primary Search quickly, working through all affected areas to verify the removal and safety of all occupants. Time is the critical factor in the Primary Search process. Danger to occupants is most acute on the fire floor, the floor immediately above the fire, the top floor, and then intermediate floors, in that order. Companies assigned to Primary Search operations should report their progress to Command (*CFD Operation Manual 203.01.D Benchmarks*). The formation of a Search and Rescue Branch within the Incident Command System may be warranted in high hazard occupancies.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **During the initial stages of this incident, there was no coordination of Primary Search efforts.**
 - a. Multiple companies conducted a Primary Search of the same floor, multiple personnel reported searching sporadic areas of floors (one or two apartments only), and still others did not even know which floor they were searching on.
 - b. Statements have indicated that the following floors were searched by members of the following companies:
 - i. Floor 2 – Heavy Rescue 9, Truck 23, Truck 18, Engine 31, and Engine 18
 - ii. Floor 3 – Heavy Rescue 9, Truck 23, Truck 32, Truck 18, Engine 31 and Engine 18
 - iii. Floor 4 – Heavy Rescue 9, Truck 32, Truck 18, and Engine 8,
 - iv. Floor 5 – Heavy Rescue 14, Truck 32, and Engine 8
2. **Companies must report to Command when the Primary Search of a floor is complete.**
 - a. While some companies did notify Command when a primary search of a floor was complete, most did not, thus creating an inefficient operation and a duplication of search efforts.
 - b. When occupants were found, Companies did not identify the apartments from which they were evacuated.
3. **There was confusion and hesitance by personnel to force doors to gain access to apartments despite smoke being present in hallways throughout the building.**
 - a. Apartments needed to be searched and victims either sheltered-in-place or removed.
 - b. Better coordination and execution of an interior search may have eliminated the need for exterior rescues via ladders.



4. Personnel reported “kicking in” doors to search. This action during search may damage the door or frame, cause the inability to close the door tightly, and possibly expose the occupants to smoke from the hallway.
5. A Search and Rescue Branch was not formed until the arrival of District 3 on the 2nd Alarm, over 30 minutes after the initial alarm. The Search and Rescue Branch provided needed organization to the Primary Search effort and vital communication to Command.



Lesson #13 Secondary Search

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

A Secondary Search is used to locate victims not discovered during the primary search. CFD *Operations Manual 203.01.1 Search* calls for Companies to conduct a second, very thorough search of the entire structure after initial fire control and ventilation activities have been completed. A Secondary Search should preferably be conducted by different companies than those involved in primary search activities. Thoroughness, rather than time, is the critical factor in secondary search. Companies assigned to Secondary Search operations should report their progress to Command (CFD *Operation Manual 203.01.D Benchmarks*).

Specific Examples From 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **There was no Secondary Search completed at this incident.**
 - a. At 06:16 hours, Command assigned Truck 23 to conduct a Secondary Search of Floor 3, but there was no progress reported to Command.
 - b. There were no other Companies assigned to complete a Secondary Search on any other floor.



Lesson #14 Stairwell Search and Control

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Occupants exiting their apartments and entering the stairwell can immediately be overcome by smoke and other products of combustion (dangerous fire gases). Unconscious victims on the stairs or landings may go unnoticed until these important areas are searched. First, search efforts must be systematic and include a complete primary search of the fire floor and floors above the fire. When searching above the fire, it is important to check the status of all stairwells. Are people in the stairwell? Are any stairwells filled with smoke? A stairwell door that is wedged open with a hose line will stay open. All products of combustion from the fire will enter that stairwell, making it untenable above the fire and spreads smoke to other areas of the building more rapidly.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. Companies did not clear either stairwell early in the incident. Companies should have searched both the "B" stairwell and "D" stairwell, from Floor 1 up to Floor 5.
2. No Company reported clearing the stairwell at any point in the incident, even though multiple Companies traversed both stairwells throughout the incident. A Primary Search of the Stairwell is a benchmark that should be communicated to Command (CFD *Operation Manual 203.01.D Benchmarks*).
3. An attack stairwell and an evacuation stairwell were never identified at this incident to limit the spread of smoke. Both the "B" stairwell and the "D" stairwell were used for fire attack with attack lines entering the Floor 2 hallway, allowing the unimpeded extension of smoke to upper floors.



Lesson #15 Elevator Search and Control

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

The Incident Commander should be notified immediately when an elevator is found in a building. It is important for companies and Command to realize the presence of an elevator to ensure it is controlled, searched, and, if hazardous, appropriate emergency notifications are made. Command should assign a Company to Lobby Control and take control of the use of the elevator. Even if the elevator is not going to be used to transport firefighters or equipment, it should still be recalled to ensure its not used by occupants and its clear of occupants.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **No Company notified Command of the presence of an elevator at this incident.**
2. **No Company searched the elevator car or elevator shaft at this incident prior to the Mayday.**
 - a. Rescue 14 notified District 3 of the defective elevator door on Floor 5 via face-to-face communication.
 - b. This conversation prompted District 3 to have the elevator searched for occupants.
 - c. District 3 then moved to Floor 4 and had face-to-face communication with Rescue 9 to ascertain if the elevator had been cleared of occupants.
 - d. Following the face-to-face communication with District 3, Rescue 9 attempted to force open the elevator door on Floor 4 to determine the location of the elevator car.
 - e. At 06:21:50 hours (44 minutes after the arrival of Engine 49), District 3 requested Rescue 9 to respond to the lobby to force open the elevator door.
 - f. At 06:22:23 hours, The Mayday was broadcast by Rescue 14 Acting Officer. (*NOTE: Rescue 9 was able to force the 4th floor elevator door open just prior to the Mayday being transmitted.*)
 - g. At 06:23:29 hours, District 3 advised Command the Floor 1 elevator door was open and the elevator car was located on Floor 2.
 - h. At 06:23:46 hours, Rescue 9 went back to the 4th floor elevator door then notified Command that the elevator door was open on Floor 4 and the elevator car was located on Floor 2.
3. **No Company ever took control of the operation of the elevator in this building.**



Lesson #16 Rescue Strategy

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Important factors in determining proper rescue strategies include building construction, current fire location, and potential fire extension. In large, Type II construction buildings, fire spread can be easily contained by controlling doors. Fire fighters must constantly evaluate the rescue “risk-versus-reward.” Considering the decreased risk of fire spread in these types of buildings (Type I or Type II), a “shelter-in-place” strategy may be the best and safest way to prevent civilian and fire fighter injuries, but must be communicated by Command to Companies. (NOTE: At 06:07 hours, Command notified Dispatch during Progress Report #2 that Companies were “attempting to shelter-in-place at this time,” but that strategy was never communicated to the Companies.) The use of interior stairs is the second choice in rescue strategy. The use of ladders is the least-preferred option due to the potential risk to civilians and fire fighters.

CFD Operations Manual 203.01.H Rescue states normal means of interior access should be used to remove victims whenever possible. However, there are times when exterior rescue operations are necessary, either by aerial ladder or by ground ladder. When performing rescue operations using ground ladders, it is imperative to select the correct ladder size for the task in order to reach certain aspects of standard buildings. As a guide, the CFD Fire Training Supplement Drill Book provides height estimates for ground ladders reach: 2nd floor window – 12 feet; 3rd floor – 21 feet; 4th floor window – 30 feet; and 5th floor window – 39 feet (unable to be reached by a CFD ground ladder). Available CFD ground ladder options include a 10’, 14’ and 16’ adjustable hook ladder, a 24’ extension ladder, a 28’ extension ladder and a 35’ extension ladder.


Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **Companies rescued multiple occupants on multiple floors in moderate smoke conditions through interior stairs, including Floor 2, Floor 3, and Floor 5.**
 - a. Stairwells were charged with smoke due to lack of control of the stairs and identification of Attack and Rescue stairwells.
 - b. Sheltering a majority of these occupants in place may have been a better use of resources.
2. **Truck 31 was the only aerial apparatus with direct access to the building. Truck 31’s aerial ladder was eventually used to rescue multiple occupants from multiple balconies on the “A” side of the building.**
 - a. While setting the apparatus, victims presented on a 2nd floor balcony with smoke conditions. Truck 31 FAO and FF#2 opted to use a 28’ ground ladder for victim removal.
 - b. There were operational issues with Truck 31’s aerial later in the fire by an FAO from another company due to lack of familiarity with the apparatus.
3. **Heavy Rescue 9 FAO noticed occupants on the “C” side of the building near the “D” corner presenting on balconies and chose ground ladders to attempt to access balconies.**



[NOTE: There was an in-grade difference of a half (1/2) story between the "A" (front) side and the "C" (rear) side of the building.]

- a. First, Rescue 9 FAO placed a 14' straight ladder from Engine 31's apparatus to assist an occupant from a Floor 3 balcony. Then, with the assistance of Engine 49 FF #1, he selected a 24' extension ladder from Engine 31's apparatus in an attempt to reach occupants on a Floor 5 balcony. However, the 24' extension ladder was too short and only reached the Floor 4 balcony. (NOTE: Engine 49 FF#1 stated he was going to get a hose line to take to the "B" stairwell when asked to help Rescue 9 FAO)
- b. If exterior rescue was necessary, a 35' extension ladder from Truck 31 would have been a more appropriate selection and provided direct access to the Floor 5 balcony.



Lesson #17 Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV)

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

In large buildings, especially Type I and Type II construction, positive pressure ventilation (PPV) can assist both search and rescue efforts and controlling the flow path of fire. Removal of smoke and gases improves search efficiency, limits occupant's exposure to deadly smoke, and makes shelter-in-place more practical. First-arriving companies should designate an attack stairwell and an evacuation stairwell; pressurization of the evacuation stairwell with PPV should be maintained for life safety purposes (CFD Drill Book Section 3, Topic 34 Standpipe Operations). Pressurizing the stairwells forces clear air into the egress passage, forces clear air into the hallways, helps move smoke and toxic gases out of the building, and clears smoke from the search areas. Additionally, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has conducted PPV studies that indicate, *"If the static pressure created by the fan is greater than the pressure created by the fire, then no smoke will flow into the stairwell."* PPV must be coordinated through Command and fire attack team(s).

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. The first-arriving truck companies did not set up PPV or pressurize stairwells.
2. First-arriving companies did not designate an attack stairwell or an evacuation stairwell. Attack lines were placed in both the "D" stairwell and the "B" stairwell, causing smoke to spread into both stairwells and throughout the building.
3. PPV at this incident was set up by 3rd Alarm companies, well after the Mayday occurred and extrication efforts were underway.



Lesson #18 Size Up and 360 Survey

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

The Fire Fighting Formula is used to provide direction to fire fighters, company officers and chief officers as to the priorities and operational principles used in the Cincinnati Fire Department during structural fire fighting operations (*CFD Drill Book Section 1, Topic 15 Fire Fighting Formula*). The very first step in the formula is to conduct a Size Up – a 360 degree walk around survey to visualize all four sides of a structure to gain valuable information about hazards, conditions, fire location, endangered occupants, egress points, and other unusual situations. Conditions that exist at each incident must be estimated and analyzed in order to determine the best course of action. Situations may change rapidly. Size Up will be an ongoing process. All members responding on an alarm should conduct their own Size Up, regardless of rank or assignment. Each member should use his or her own personal Size Up to guide them as they perform their assigned tasks, or as they direct others to perform tasks; however, this should not lead to freelancing.

The first-arriving company should take the Size Up information and communicate findings to all other arriving companies. This will create the basis for the Size Up conducted by the firefighters who arrive after you do. Additionally, per *CFD Operations Manual 203.01.N Structure Fire - District Chief*, the first arriving District Chief should perform a Size Up, including a 360 degree survey of building if possible.

Specific Examples From 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **At this incident, first arriving Companies failed to conduct a proper 360 degree Size Up upon arrival to determine the location and extent of the fire.**
 - a. Valuable information about fire location, endangered occupants, egress points, and the most direct route for attack line deployment was not available to guide them as they performed their assigned tasks.
 - b. The only initial Company Size Up report was from Engine 49 at 05:37 hours (arrival on scene), reporting “Engine 49 on scene, six story brick, multi-dwelling, nothing showing.”

2. **District 4, positioned on the northwest corner of the complex near the “A/B” corner, assigned both District 4B and District 1 to conduct a 360 degree Size Up of the structure and report back.**
 - a. District 4B conducted his Size Up by going clockwise from the “A/B” corner to the “C” side; District 4B reported findings to Command via face-to-face (no radio transmission for other Companies to hear).
 - b. District 1 conducted his Size Up by going counter clockwise from the “A/D” corner to the “C” side; District 1 eventually reported findings to Command via face-to-face. (*NOTE: District 1 did attempt to contact District 4 several times on the radio from the “C” side of the building, but District 1 was on incorrect fireground channels “Command B” and “Command C.” District 4 was not able to receive any of the radio reports.*)



- c. The only Command Size Up report was from District 4 at 05:40 hours (arrival at scene), reporting, "I got a 6 story multi-dwelling; companies are investigating at this time. I have people evacuating the building. I have a light haze of smoke on the exterior. I will be establishing Dahlgren command; will advise."
3. **At 05:43 hours, Engine 49 Acting Officer reports "C side heavy smoke." At 05:45 hours, Truck 31 Officer relayed Size Up information to Command via radio that "the window has been opened; heavy fire coming on the 2nd Floor 'C' side." Companies on the scene were able to hear this information, and this was the only report of fire location and conditions early in the incident.**



Lesson #19 Rescue Company Operations

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

The CFD has two (2) specialized Rescue Companies to respond to incidents throughout the City of Cincinnati, including structure fires, hazardous material incidents, technical rescue incidents, and auto entrapments. One Rescue Company is dispatched on every 1-alarm fire. The second Rescue Company is dispatched to every 2 Alarm or greater fire. These fire fighters are some of the most highly-trained fire fighters in the CFD. *CFD Operations Manual 203.01.L Heavy Rescue Company Operation* details the pre-assigned action of each responding Rescue Company for 1 Alarm and 2 Alarm or greater fires. Specifically, the first responding Rescue Company reports to Command for assignment, primarily for search and rescue, building integrity and structural stability, deployment of an attack line, control of utilities, and, specifically, NOT assigned as the Rapid Assistance Team. However, the second Rescue Company responding to an incident SHOULD be utilized as a RAT Assist Team on the exterior of the building, if at all possible, leaving both its apparatus and its equipment available to facilitate a rapid exit from the scene should another response in the city become necessary.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **Both Rescue Companies were used inside the structure during interior operations.**
 - a. Rescue 9 was dispatched on the 1st Alarm and assisted in locating the fire on Floor 2, search and rescue operations on Floor 2, 3 and 4, and was the only company to notify Command about hose deployment issues with Engine 49's initial attack line. Further, Rescue 9 flowed Engine 49's stalled line into the hallway corridor toward the fire apartment to significantly cool the interior and allow the eventual advancement of an attack line into the fire apartment.
 - b. Rescue 14 was dispatched on the 2nd Alarm and assisted in searching Floor 5. At the time of Rescue 14's arrival, five (5) Engine Companies, four (4) Truck Companies and one (1) Rescue Company were already "at work" inside the structure.
2. **Command did not utilize Rescue 14 as the RAT Assist Team, even though there was NO RAT Company and NO Safety Engine currently assigned at this incident – both RAT 23 and Safety Engine 46 were quickly "put to work" to assist with fire control and search and rescue operations and not replaced.**
 - a. Other potential staffing options should be explored prior to committing both specialized resources to the interior of a structure.
 - b. The personnel from Rescue 14 arrived ten minutes before RAT 19 and could have been used as the RAT team.
 - c. Because Rescue 14 was not assigned as the RAT Assist Team, Rescue 9 had to leave the fire building in order to retrieve specialized tools and equipment.



3. **During the Mayday extrication, Search and Rescue Branch (District 3) requested a Company to respond to the elevator penthouse to cut the power to the elevator car immediately (de-energize).**
 - a. Command asked Heavy Rescue 9 Officer if he had a Heavy Rescue 9 fire fighter available to go with a Truck Company to perform that task. However, Extrication Branch/RAT Chief (SOC) immediately denied the request, stating that all Rescue 9 fire fighters were needed to breach the elevator walls.
 - b. It is unknown if the power to the elevator car was ever disconnected during the Mayday.



Lesson #20 Incident Benchmarks

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

The Incident Commander is responsible for determining the appropriate fireground strategy. Once the appropriate strategy is initiated, it becomes the Incident Commander's job to ensure that all personnel are operating within that strategy. By controlling the fireground strategy, the Incident Commander is providing overall incident scene safety. Radio communication is paramount to ensuring that all personnel on scene are operating safely within the appropriate fireground strategy established by Command to effectively and efficiently save lives and extinguish the fire. Without communication, chaos ensues and fire fighters are placed in jeopardy. A primary use of the radio is to relay vital information, including incident benchmarks to Command and all other Companies on the scene.

Benchmarks, both Time Elapsed and Tactical, are vital to an Incident Commander to determine if a change in strategy is needed to improve the outcome of the incident and ensure the safety of all fire fighters. In accordance with *CFD Operations 203.01D - Benchmarks*, Command should receive Time Elapsed Benchmarks at least every 20 minutes. Command or Dispatch should also receive the following Tactical Benchmarks:

1. On Scene (from every Company)
2. Lightweight Construction or Dimensional Lumber (from first Rescue)
3. Water on the Fire (from first Engine applying water)
4. Primary Search – All Clear (from each Company for each area and from Command to Dispatch)
5. Fire Under Control (from Engine and from Command to Dispatch)
6. Secondary Search – All Clear (from each Company for each area and from Command to Dispatch)
7. Fire Out (from Command to Dispatch)
8. PAR (from each Company)
9. All Clear – Remove SCBA (from Command or SO2)

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **At this incident, there were no Time Elapsed Benchmarks relayed to Command**
 - a. Command had no reference for the total time operating.
 - b. These benchmarks allow Command to determine fire progress, company air consumption and working time, and assist in evaluating effectiveness of operations.
 - c. NFPA 1500 recommends that Time Elapsed Benchmarks should start from initial dispatch and occur every 10 minutes until the fire is declared under control by the Incident Commander.



2. At this incident, the following Tactical Benchmarks were relayed to Command:

a. On Scene

- i. Only Engine 49, District 4, Heavy Rescue 9, and Truck 23 reported On Scene on Command D

b. Lightweight Construction or Dimensional Lumber

- i. No report

c. Water on the Fire

- i. No report of first water on fire from the exterior (at 05:56 hours by District 1/Truck 31B) or from the interior (at 05:58 hours Truck 31A/Engine 46).
- ii. At 06:00 hours, Rescue 9 reported to Command that companies were putting water on the fire from the interior.

d. Primary Search All Clear

- i. At 06:15:02 hours, District 3 reports All Clear on Floor 3 and Floor 4.
- ii. At 06:15:36 hours, Heavy Rescue 14 reports All Clear on Floor 5.
- iii. At 06:15:53, Truck 23 reports All Clear on Floor 2.
- iv. At 06:18:03 hours, District 3 reports an All Clear on Floor 5

e. Fire Under Control

- i. At 06:02:16 hours, Command reports Fire Under Control.
- ii. At 06:03:03 hours, SO2 reports that the fire is not Under Control.
- iii. At 06:07:04 hours, Command again reports Fire Under Control.

f. Secondary Search All Clear

- i. No Secondary Search completed.

g. Fire Out

- i. At 06:11:29 hours, Command reports Fire Out.

h. PAR

- i. No complete report communicated (see Lessons 8, 9 and 10)

i. All Clear Remove SCBA

- i. No report communicated and air monitoring was never completed.



Lesson #21 Medical Branch

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Dependent upon the size of the incident or the number of injuries (fire fighter or civilian), the establishment of a Medical Branch within the Incident Command System may prove an invaluable organizational option. Under *CFD Operations Manual 203.01.P Structure Fire*, the ALS Supervisor is responsible for forming the Medical Branch under the Operations Section or Incident Commander. The ALS Supervisor shall be responsible for the overall medical treatment and transport of all medical injuries on the fireground, communicate with responding Medic Units, establish a treatment area, establish a Rehab area, log injuries (fire fighter and civilian), and record the number and locations of all incident injuries requiring transportation from the scene. Command must be updated with pertinent Medical Branch information.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **There was no Medical Branch established by ALS 32. Due to the significant number of fire fighter and civilian injuries, a Medical Branch was required.**
2. **The number of responding EMS Units exceeded the recommended span of control. The formation of a Triage Group and a Treatment Group under the Medical Branch was warranted. Responding EMS Units included:**
 - a. ALS 32, ALS 34 and ALS 35
 - b. Medic 2, Medic 3, Medic 9, Medic 19, Medic 23, Medic 29 and Medic 46
3. **Documentation was lacking at this incident, and a patient treatment log must be kept for incidents of this scale.**
 - a. There were numerous civilian and fire fighter injuries, but the documentation of those injuries has been difficult to track.
 - b. There was no patient log kept for this incident, and sparse information is available via transcripts and Safety Pad ePCR's.
 - c. Documentation recorded at this incident included: one LODD transport, two civilian transports, and three civilian refusal of transport (two other fire fighters were transported, but no documentation or ePCR has been found).
 - d. Other civilians were known to have been treated, but no documentation has been found.
4. **At this incident, there was no egress path established early on for EMS rapid transport. Consideration should be given to the location of an EMS Staging area for on scene Medic Units, especially when faced with multiple fire fighter or civilian injuries from a multi-story residential complex.**



5. **There was no Rehab Sector established at any point in the incident. ALS Supervisors should ensure a Rehab Sector is established and available at lengthy multiple alarm incidents.**

6. **Medic Units and on scene medical personnel failed to maintain crew integrity at this incident.**
 - a. FAO Gordon was transported to University Hospital by Medic 19 with Medic 3 FF-EMT driving, and ALS 32 Lt Paramedic, Medic 19 FF-Paramedic, Medic 19 FF-EMT, Medic 46 FF-Paramedic, Medic 9 FF-Paramedic, and Engine 7 FF-Paramedic all in the back of the medic unit rendering care.
 - b. Medic 46 transported injured Engine 49 Acting Officer to Good Sam Hospital with Medic 46 FF-EMT driving and Medic 23 FF-Paramedic in the back of the medic unit rendering care.
 - c. Medic 23 transported two injured civilians to Good Sam Hospital with Medic 23 FF-EMT driving and Engine 8 FAO-Paramedic in the back of the medic unit rendering care.
 - d. Medic 3 transported an injured civilian to Childrens Hospital with and a FF-EMT driving (NOT Medic 3 FF-EMT) and Medic 3 FF-Paramedic in the back of the medic unit rendering care.
 - e. Of the four Medic Units that transported patients to hospitals, none maintained crew integrity.

7. **The number of EMS resources was not increased as the number of alarms escalated and more personnel were operating at the scene. Fire resources increase dramatically; however, EMS resources stay the same unless specially called by Command.**



Lesson #22 Incident Command

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Command must be maintained throughout the incident in accordance with *CFD Operations Manual 202.01 Incident Command System*. The Fire Chief, or the highest ranking fire officer on the scene will assume the duties of Incident Commander and cannot permit a lower ranking Officer to retain Command while he is on the scene. Command transfer to subsequent arriving Command Staff Officers should be performed according to procedure. As higher-ranking Chief Officers arrive, they will assign the previous Incident Commanders and other Chief Officers to positions within the Incident Command System. The separation of the Incident Commander and Operations Section Commander allows the highest ranking Chief Officer to retain ultimate authority while lower ranking officers can coordinate and control operating forces.

The Operations Assistant Chief (during normal business hours) or the on-call Assistant Chief (“Duty Chief” after normal business hours), will be notified to respond to all 2-Alarm Fire or at the request of the Incident Commander. On all 3-Alarm or greater fires, the “All Call” personnel will be notified and can respond, including the Fire Chief, the remaining Assistant Chiefs, and several other pre-assigned support bureau District Chiefs and Captains. Once additional Command Staff arrives on the scene, they will be assigned appropriate support duties expanding the Incident Command System (ICS).

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **Support Staff is required to assist the Incident Commander with size-up, safety, communications, accountability, maintaining control of resources, and all other necessary functions within the ICS as dictated by the incident. The Support Staff at this incident was District 1, District 4B Captain, District 3, SOC, Car 3 and Car 301.**
 - a. The Accountability Officer position was not properly staffed at the time of the Mayday. (See Lesson #9.)
 - b. District 3 (Search and Rescue Branch), and SOC (Extrication Branch), were formally assigned positions within the ICS.
 - c. District 1, District 4B, Car 3 and Car 301 were never assigned a position in the ICS. (NOTE: After the Mayday, Car 301 was unofficially assigned Logistics to ensure delivery of requested equipment to the Extrication Branch.)
2. **Car 2 was assigned as the “Duty Chief” beginning at 16:00 hours on March 25, 2015, until 07:00 hours on March 26, 2015. Car 2 never responded to the scene at this incident.**
3. **When Car 1 arrived on the scene, he received a status report and communicated with District 4 (IC) at the Command Post; however, he did not formally assume duties of Incident Commander.**



4. The initial Incident Commander can function as the Operations Section Commander and continue to run the incident functions, while the higher ranking officer acts as the Incident Commander overseeing the overall operations at the incident scene.



Location of
Command Post



Communications

Lessons Learned or Reinforced

There were significant lessons learned at this incident that were directly related to how we communicate at emergency incidents. Effective communications aim to improve safety while fulfilling our mission of protecting life and property. When communications fail, we often fail. We must learn from these lessons and make every effort possible for improvement moving forward.

The following categories contain the Lessons Learned or Reinforced on March 26, 2015.

- 23. Essential Communications
- 24. Standardized Communications
- 25. Personnel Accountability Report (PAR)
- 26. Radio Template
- 27. Radio Training
- 28. Dispatch Center Operations
- 29. Nonessential Communications
- 30. Extra Alarm Complement



Lesson #23 Essential Communications

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Radios are a critical safety tool that must be in the hands of every fire fighter at every emergency scene. A radio is your lifeline to help. Radio communication is paramount to ensuring that all personnel on scene are operating safely within the appropriate fire ground strategy established by Command to effectively and efficiently save lives and extinguish the fire. Without communication, chaos ensues and fire fighters are placed in jeopardy. A primary use of the radio is to relay vital information, including incident benchmarks, to Command and all other Companies on the scene. Officers **MUST** assure that **ALL** members responding to an incident are aware of the proper fireground channel and each member's radio is on the correct fireground channel prior to getting off the apparatus.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St

1. **Engine 49 was first on scene and communication between company personnel did not occur.**
 - a. A resident escorted Engine 49 Fire Fighter #1 to the apartment on fire. Simultaneously, the Acting Officer dismounted the pumper and deployed an attack line.
 - b. Engine 49 Fire Fighter #1 located the fire within minutes of arrival, but neither communicated this vital information over the radio to Command nor advised his Acting Officer where to bring the attack line.
 - c. As a result, the Engine 49 Acting Officer chose a less than optimal route to the fire and was unable to advance the attack line to the fire apartment.
2. **Many companies did not provide Command with the progress of their assigned tasks. Both Engine 49 and Engine 31 had problems advancing their initial attack lines, but this vital information was never reported to Command by either Acting Officer.**
3. **While assigned to Search and Rescue, Rescue 14 found an outward swinging elevator door with a defective locking mechanism, leading to an open elevator shaft. Rescue 14 marked the door and physically showed it to the District Chief supervising the Search and Rescue Group, but no one transmitted this hazard via the radio to all personnel on scene.**
4. **District 1 operated a hose line from the exterior into the fire apartment while companies were operating on the interior. This vital information was never relayed to Command or any other responding companies.**



Lesson #24 Standardized Communications

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Radio transmissions at this incident were not standardized. As a result, radio transmissions often resembled a phone conversation, taking up valuable airtime. The lack of standardization caused numerous repeats of transmissions and confusion about assignments on the incident scene. Once a message has been transmitted, the recipient must acknowledge the same.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St

1. In the three minutes prior to the Mayday transmission, there were 17 separate radio transmissions. Of those transmissions, none followed the same format. The last group of these transmissions blocked the original Mayday message from Rescue 14 Acting Officer, forcing him to use his emergency button to gain priority on the command talkgroup.
2. Recipients of radio transmissions must acknowledge them. At the Dahlgren incident, several orders from Command to companies were missed, or carried out differently than requested. These discrepancies were often traced back to the lack of acknowledgement of the original radio transmission request. Lack of acknowledgement of message is especially important while managing critical events, such as a Mayday.
3. Units transmitting messages do not need to await acknowledgement to transmit their message. This method of communications doubles the number of radio transmissions needed to relay a message and wastes valuable airspace.

For example:

“Engine 49 to Command”
“Command go ahead Engine 49”
“We need assistance with our line.”

Should be replaced with:

“Engine 49 to Command, we need assistance with our line”



Lesson # 25 Personnel Accountability Report (PAR)

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

The Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) is one of the most critical fireground communications. A PAR is a coordinated and systematic check, via radio, by the Accountability Officer to all companies operating on the incident scene. The PAR includes the company staffing and location. Once the PAR has been completed, there should be no doubt that all fire fighters have been accounted for and their current location at the incident.

Appropriate and timely use of a PAR can serve to enhance crew integrity, and can confirm exactly which members may be in need of assistance during a critical event such as a Mayday.

Personnel Accountability Reports (PAR) were not conducted at proper intervals, nor were they conducted according to current Cincinnati Fire Department Procedure.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St

1. **According to the radio transcripts of the incident, the Incident Commander does not call for a PAR to be conducted until 36 minutes after the arrival of the first company. After the Mayday was declared, District 4B started a PAR 47 minutes after the arrival of the first company, but only contacted Engine 31. Another PAR was started 54 minutes after the arrival of the first company. A full PAR was not completed due to the priority given to radio traffic regarding the rescue of FAO Gordon.**
2. **Of the few PAR reports that were transmitted to the Accountability Officer, some were not made in the format described in the CFD Procedures Manual.**
 - a. The PAR should include all companies operating in the hazard zone. If possible the PAR should expand to account for all members operating on the entire incident scene.
 - b. If all members cannot be accounted for visually, this should be noted in the report and, if not located by other companies following additional attempts, a Mayday shall be declared.



Lesson #26 Radio Template

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

For decades, the Cincinnati Fire Department has utilized portable radios for fireground communications. For more than 10 years, each member on duty has carried his or her own portable radio. These tools have proven their value in increasing situational awareness and enhancing communication on the incident scene. However, these tools can increase confusion when configured improperly or they are placed in the hands of inexperienced users.

Nearly three years ago, the Cincinnati Fire Department changed the channel layout and design in our radio system. While the previous configuration of CFD radios provided two zones of 16 talkgroups (one of which was assigned by dispatch regardless of incident type), the new configuration provides 10 zones of 16 talkgroups each - a five-fold increase in available channels. The goal of this change was to pre-designate the purpose of talkgroups and name them accordingly. These specifically named talkgroups are then placed in identical zones, and one zone is assigned to each fire incident. The Incident Commander is then empowered to assign these 16 talkgroups on the incident scene however he or she sees fit.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St

1. Because the original dispatch to 6020 Dahlgren Street was for a Fire Alarm, the initial assigned units (Engine 49, Truck 31 and District 4) were assigned to the "Fire Alarm" talkgroup, positioned in Zone D Channel 8 of CFD radios. This talkgroup is referred to as D8 in transcripts and recordings. When the incident was upgraded, all units dispatched, including the initial responding companies, were re-assigned to "Command D" talkgroup. While this is in the same zone as the original talkgroup, it was an entirely different channel, positioned in Zone D Channel 2 of CFD radios. This talkgroup is referred to as D2 in transcripts and recordings. *(NOTE: This practice was discontinued by a procedure revision shortly after this incident. Having initial companies change channels in the early stages of the incident proved confusing and likely contributed to several of the radios issued to first-alarm company members being on the wrong talkgroup.)*
2. All CFD members have received training in the correct operation of the Motorola APX 6000xe portable radio. The current CFD radio template must be simplified in order to facilitate ease of operation at the incident scene. Changing fireground channels while en route to an incident or use of an overcomplicated radio template confuses fire fighters and makes it difficult or impossible to effectively communicate.
3. Communication problems and deficiencies played a significant role at this incident. *(See Lesson #27.)*





Lesson #27 Radio Training

Lesson Learned or Reinforced



The ability of Firefighters, Company Officers and Command Officers to use the portable radio was a notable deficiency at this incident. Some members of the Cincinnati Fire Department are unfamiliar with the basic operation of our portable radios.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St

1. The following charts depict the number of portable radios on a specific channel at the specified time.





At 0541 hrs - 10 min post Dispatch
 57.1% of Radios on scene not on correct FG Channel (20 of 35)





At 0547 hrs - 1 min before 2nd Alarm (16 min post Dispatch)
 29.5% of Radios on scene not on correct FG Channel (13 of 44)







At 0554 hrs - 1 min before 3rd Alarm (23 min post Dispatch)
 26.4% of Radios on scene not on correct FG Channel (14 of 53)




At 0605 hrs - 10 min post 3rd Alarm (34 min post Dispatch)
 16.9% of Radios on scene not on correct FG Channel (11 of 65)



At 06:22:23 hrs - at time of MayDay (51 min post Dispatch)
 7.7% of Radios on scene not on correct FG Channel (5 of 65)



- While the majority of the radios on scene ended up on the correct talkgroup channel, it took many users several tries to locate the correct fireground channel in their radio



How each Radio got to FireGround Command D (D2)

35.1% of Radios took 3 or more channel changes (Most channel changes to D2 - 24)

39.0% of Radios took longer than 2 min (Longest time to D2 - 1:00:08)

- Data was collected for each firefighter who responded on the 1st Alarm and Rescue 14 at the Dahlgren St. fire. Records indicate that these firefighters drilled an average of 1.3 hours per year on radios. The collective data gathered surrounding communications at this incident indicates that some members of the Cincinnati Fire Department are clearly not at the mastery level in use of the portable radio, especially in fireground conditions.



Lesson #28 Dispatch Center Operations

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

For many years, Fire Dispatchers only communicated with Incident Commanders via the Main Dispatch channel and normally did not monitor fireground radio traffic. This communication style required the Incident Commander to carry two radios - one for the fireground and one to communicate with dispatch. This also created a disconnect at the Dispatch Center, where dispatchers were often unaware of the status of incidents until directly informed by the IC on the Main Dispatch channel. However, in the year prior to the Dahlgren St. fire, the procedure had been changed, and a dispatcher is designated to monitor the fireground radio channel.

Since the inception of this procedure, the CFD has reaped benefits of streamlined communications and ease of operation for all involved. Assigning a dispatcher to switch to the fireground channel integrates the communications center into the overall response, which increases situational awareness and efficiency. However, when there are requests for multiple resources by Command or lengthy or unnecessary situation reports, often repeated by Dispatch, the main fireground channel can be tied up with unnecessary radio communications.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St

1. **Lengthy incident updates and communications with Dispatch from Command tied up the fireground channel and prohibited other potentially critical communications.**
 - a. There were at least four separate lengthy communication cycles between Command and Dispatch each taking: 49 seconds, 35 seconds, 38 seconds and 33 seconds to complete all transmissions. *(NOTE: Since this incident, dispatch center procedures have changed so that the dispatcher now simply provides a simple acknowledgement or a truncated response to size up and progress reports from command.)*
2. **The dispatcher assigned to the fireground channel was the Shift Supervisor and the most senior dispatcher on the shift. His efforts improved the flow of information, and all procedures in place at the time were followed by dispatch.**
3. **By remaining on the fireground talkgroup, requests for additional resources such as additional alarms or additional medic units were relayed quickly, and were heard by all companies on scene, which increased situational awareness.**
4. **By monitoring the fireground talkgroup, the dispatch center directly copied the Mayday message, and initiated the necessary procedures on their end.**



Lesson #29 Nonessential Communications

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Unnecessary communications must be eliminated on the fireground channel. Think before you transmit. Radio messages should only be used to give an assignment, report the status of an assigned task, request resources, or report a safety issue. When using the radio, clearly identify your company and the company you are calling before beginning your message. Combine messages if possible. When calling Command or Dispatch, do not wait for permission to proceed – make your request with the initial transmission.

Current procedures have all communication with Fire Dispatch on the fireground channel, including size-up by the first-due company upon arrival, size up by Command upon arrival, condition or status update reports to Command, resource requests by Command, benchmarks from Companies to Command and from Command to Dispatch, and other necessary traffic.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

The Dahlgren St. fire was negatively impacted by the failure to provide vital information to Command or other responding companies. The incident was also negatively impacted by some users transmitting too much information or transmitting information that did not impact management of the incident.

1. **Lengthy incident updates and communications with Dispatch from Command tied up the fireground channel and prohibited other potentially critical communications.**
 - a. There were at least four separate lengthy communication cycles between Command and Dispatch each taking: 49 seconds, 35 seconds, 38 seconds and 33 seconds to complete all transmissions. *(NOTE: Since this incident, dispatch center procedures have changed so that the dispatcher now simply provides a simple acknowledgement or a truncated response to size up and progress reports from command.)*
2. **Firefighters should utilize proper discipline to eliminate unnecessary radio traffic which ties up the radio and the dispatcher. It was difficult for personnel to communicate at this incident due to excessive radio traffic on the fireground channel.**
3. **There were several instances of messages transmitted that were incomplete, or which would have been better served by face-to-face communications.**



Lesson # 30 Extra Alarm Complement

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

CFD Procedures Manual 703.29.A Dispatch Procedures lists the resources dispatched to Extra Alarm Responses. For a standard structural response, the following resources are dispatched on subsequent alarms:

2nd Alarm two (2) Engines, one (1) Truck and one (1) Heavy Rescue

3rd Alarm two (2) Engines, one (1) Truck

4th Alarm two (2) Engines

5th Alarm two (2) Engines

Each additional Alarm should be two (2) Engines.

Mayday Declaration - Dispatch to immediately dispatch the next Alarm Level, plus (1) RAT Truck and (1) District Chief.

The Incident Commander maintains the authority to request additional Companies as needed, independent of the Extra Alarm configuration. If an additional Engine Company, Truck Company or both is needed, the Incident Commander can simply request the additional resource(s). However, when the Incident Commander requests an additional Alarm, he should receive a FULL additional Alarm compliment – unless he specifically requests just the balance or remainder of the compliment.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **The 2nd Alarm assignment was less than needed or anticipated due to CAD issues at Dispatch for this incident.**
 - a. At 0541 hrs, Command requested an extra Engine Company and an extra Truck Company – Engine 18 and Truck 32 were dispatched.
 - b. At 0547, Command requested the 2nd Alarm – only Engine 8, Heavy Rescue 14 and District 3 were dispatched.
 - i. Had Command requested the balance of the 2nd Alarm or stated “give me the remainder of the 2nd Alarm,” the dispatch compliment would have been correct.
 - ii. Command requested the 2nd Alarm, so he should have received two (2) Engine Companies, one (1) Ladder Company, and one (1) Heavy Rescue Company.
 - c. Engine 8, Engine 23, Truck 19, and Heavy Rescue 14 should have been dispatched on the 2nd Alarm.
 - d. District 3 should not have been dispatched on the 2nd Alarm; however, District 3 would have been dispatched at 0623 hrs with the Mayday 4th Alarm.
 - e. The 3rd Alarm (Engine 23, Engine 7, and Truck 19) were dispatched correctly.
 - f. The 4th Alarm assignment (Engine 32, Engine 9 and Medic 29), automatically transmitted by Dispatch with the Mayday declaration, should have included a RAT Truck (*CFD Operations Manual 202*)



Training

Lessons Learned or Reinforced

There were significant lessons learned at this incident which directly related to Training, how we train, and how we prepare personnel to operate at emergency incidents. Effective training should aim to improve safety while fulfilling our mission of protecting life and property. When our training fails, we often fail because we are not prepared. Training that is relevant, realistic and focused on development of sound muscle memory will improve operations and assist in limiting the dangerous domino effect of errors that occurred at this fire. We must learn from these lessons and make every effort possible to improve moving forward.

The following categories contain the Lessons Learned or Reinforced on March 26, 2015.

31. Acting Officers
32. Probationary or Inexperienced Firefighter Supervision
33. Incumbent Fire Training
34. District Level Training for Fire Companies
35. Captain Training with District Chief
36. Command Officer Training
37. Company Officer Training
38. Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) Training
39. Standard Operating Procedures
40. Modern Fireground Science



Lesson #31 Acting Officers

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Crews must be supervised by a Company Officer. Company Officers need to be the eyes and ears of the Company in hostile environments, recognizing hazardous or changing conditions, recognizing problems, overcoming problems, communicating needs or problems, and directing the actions of personnel to ensure tasks are completed. Company Officers properly supervising fire fighters during operations are the key to achieving the mission of the Fire Department and adhering to Fire Department Procedures. Without appropriate supervision from a Company Officer, inappropriate decision making or freelancing may occur.

Currently, there is no Procedure in place to re-evaluate the ability of a fire fighter to function as an Acting Officer. A fire fighter could pass a promotional test or be cleared 20 years prior and still be able to function as an Acting Officer (or an Acting FAO) without any additional training or fitness to supervise evaluation. Fire fighters working in an out of classification assignment, riding above grade as an Acting Officer (or an Acting FAO), without adequate refresher training or recertification is ineffective and unsafe.

Currently, there is no Procedure in place to limit the number of Acting Officers per shift or evenly distribute the number of Acting Officers per District. Efficient supervisory staffing of Fire Companies is an important factor in fire fighter safety, fireground efficiency, and overall fireground success. District Chiefs should consider surrounding companies and other Officer vacancies within their District when assigning Acting Officers.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **At this incident, multiple Fire Companies had Acting Officers for the tour of duty.**
 - a. Engine 49 (first-due Engine), Engine 31 (second-due Engine), Heavy Rescue 14 (2nd Alarm), and Engine 7 (3rd Alarm)
 - b. A total of 28.6% of the Companies responding on the 1st Alarm, 2nd Alarm and 3rd Alarm
2. **Once a company officer becomes directly involved in task level functions, he simply becomes just another fire fighter operating without supervision or looking at the bigger picture. These circumstances led to the following:**
 - a. Engine 49 Acting Officer had to serve in the role of sole fire fighter and officer when Engine 49 FF #1 left his company to freelance. Engine 49 Acting Officer did not recognize, communicate or overcome the problem of the attack line wedged between the stair tread and wall.
 - b. Engine 49 Acting Officer did not ensure that all members of his Company were aware of the proper fireground channel or that each member's radio was on the correct fireground channel prior to getting off the apparatus.
 - i. It took Engine 49 FF #1 over 23 minutes to find the correct fireground channel (switched to Command D at 05:59:07 hrs).



- ii. Engine 49 FF #2 was never on the correct fireground channel.
 - b. Engine 31 Acting Officer did not assist, recognize, communicate or overcome the problem of Engine 49's attack line wedged between the stair tread and wall.
 - c. Engine 31 Acting Officer did not complete the assigned task of deploying a backup line to the fire apartment.
 - d. Engine 31 Acting Officer did not properly supervise a probationary Fire Fighter under his command and had zero accountability for the location of the probationary fire fighter throughout the entirety of this incident.
 - e. Engine 31 Acting Officer did not ensure that all members of his Company were aware of the proper fireground channel or that each member's radio was on the correct fireground channel prior to getting off the apparatus.
 - i. It took Engine 31 Officer over 25 minutes to find the correct fireground channel (switched to Command D at 06:09:21 hrs).
 - ii. It took Engine 31 FF #2 over 19 minutes to find the correct fireground channel (switched to Command D at 05:59:50 hrs).
 - iii. Engine 31 Acting Officer transmitted three times on the incorrect fireground Command C.
 - iv. Engine 31 FF #2 transmitted five times on the incorrect fireground Main Dispatch.
 - v. Engine 31 Officer and Engine 31 FF #2 were not on the correct fireground channel at the time of the 3rd Alarm.
 - vi. Despite repeated attempts with urgent fireground requests, Command was not able to communicate via radio with Engine 31 Acting Officer at all.
- 3. Acting Officers function in the role of firefighter for the majority of their time with the Company and are placed in supervisory roles sparingly. Limited experience, training or qualifications for this supervisory role may potentially lead to poor decisions, tunnel vision or loss of control of personnel. Without appropriate supervision from a Company Officer, freelancing may occur.**
- a. Freelancing occurred by Engine 49 FF #1, Engine 31 FF #2, Truck 18 FF #1, Heavy Rescue 14 FAO (FAO Gordon) and Heavy Rescue 9 FAO.
- 4. There are little records kept to document when a firefighter became approved as an Acting Officer, how often they acted in that capacity, or what continued education training they received to act in a supervisory role.**
- a. The duration, frequency and training of the Acting Officers at this incident are unknown.
 - b. Firefighters who are qualified to ride above grade as either an Acting Officer or an Acting FAO need periodic refresher training to ensure continual competency.
- 5. Per the Form 208 Manpower Report for March 25, 2015, Acting Officer assignments were not spread evenly amongst the Districts.**
- a. District 1 had one Fire Company with an Acting Officer – Rescue 14
 - b. District 2 had no Fire Company with an Acting Officer
 - c. District 3 had one Fire Company with an Acting Officer – Engine 20



- d. District 4 had three Fire Companies with an Acting Officer – Engine 7, Engine 31 and Engine 49.

- 6. **Currently there are forty (40) Fire Companies in the Cincinnati Fire Department, but there is no minimum number of Company Officers required to be on duty on a given tour. Operations Bureau should consider staffing at least eighty (80) percent of Fire Companies with promoted Company Officers [a minimum of thirty-two (32) Company Officers on duty on a given tour]. Consideration should be given to neighboring Fire Companies responding together when assigning Acting Officers.**
 - a. At this incident, both Engine Companies on the 1st Alarm (Engine 49 and Engine 31) were staffed with Acting Officers.
 - b. At the time of this fire, there were no procedures or standards regarding the number or location of Fire Companies that could have fire fighters working out of class as an Acting Officer (or Acting FAO).



Lesson #32 Probationary or Inexperienced Fire Fighter Supervision

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Probationary or inexperienced fire fighters should be under the direct supervision of a Company Officer at all times on the fireground. Fire fighters need supervision and direction to ensure their safety and the completion of essential tasks on the fireground – especially probationary or inexperienced fire fighters. Even more importantly, the newest fire fighters with the least experience and training should never operate on the fireground under the supervision of an Acting Officer. Most often, peer pressure and pride place firefighters in dangerous situations. A Company Officer correctly supervising inexperienced fire fighters could stop this from occurring. Two probationary or inexperienced fire fighters should not be placed on the same Fire Company unless supervised by a senior Company Officer.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **At this incident, Engine 49 FF #2 (inexperienced) and Engine 31 FF #2 (probationary) were placed with Acting Officers for the day – the first two Engine Companies on the scene.**
 - a. Both of these fire fighters performed in dangerous situations without the direct supervision of their Acting Officer.
 - i. Engine 49 FF #2 went back into the fire floor hallway by herself to retrieve her helmet and her Acting Officer's glove after leaving a few moments earlier due to high heat conditions.
 - ii. Engine 31 FF #2 entered Floor 2 by himself without protection of a hose line, ended up conducting search and rescue with freelancing, lone Truck 18 FF#1, and eventually operated completely alone.
2. **Both of these fire fighters had significant radio communications problems and deficiencies, including selecting the wrong radio channel and broadcasting on the wrong radio channel.**
 - a. Engine 49 FF #2 was dropped at the hydrant to layoff, but did not hear the FAO's radio transmission to start the water at the hydrant because she was on the wrong radio channel. The signal had to be given face-to-face.
 - b. Engine 31 FF #2 was dropped at the hydrant to layoff, but did not hear the FAO's radio transmission to start the water at the hydrant because he was on the wrong radio channel. The signal had to be given face-to-face.
 - c. Engine 49 FF #2 never switched to the correct Command D radio channel.
 - d. Engine 31 FF #2 took 19 minutes and 45 seconds to switch to the correct Command D radio channel.
 - e. Engine 49 FF #2 transmitted three times on Main Dispatch radio channel and 13 times on the B TAC 2 radio channel.
 - f. Engine 31 FF #2 transmitted four times on Main Dispatch radio channel.



Lesson #33 Incumbent Fire Training

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Training on the basics of fire fighting is essential for every Cincinnati Fire Department member. Each fire fighter must be properly trained and qualified to perform their assigned duties, including above grade assignments. Engine Companies should train frequently to master water supply, hose deployment and fire attack. Truck Companies should train frequently to master forcible entry, search, rescue, and ventilation. Heavy Rescue Companies should train frequently to master technical rescue, hazardous materials, structural fire fighting, and skills at entrapments. Medic Companies should train frequently to master emergency medical services. District Chiefs should train frequently to master incident strategies, operational tactics, and command systems.

Fire fighters who are authorized to work in above grade assignments must be trained and evaluated in performing those duties and periodically reevaluated to ensure that they are capable of performing their assigned duties safely and effectively.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **The basic skills of fire fighting are critical to effective and efficient fire ground operations. At the Dahlgren St fire, operational deficiencies were noted in the following areas:**
 - a. Crew Integrity
 - b. Engine Company primary attack line deployment
 - c. Engine Company backup attack line deployment
 - d. Problem Identification, Communication and Problem Solving
 - e. Controlling the Flow path of fire
 - f. Coordinated horizontal ventilation
 - g. Coordinated fire attack strategy
 - h. Coordinated primary search
 - i. Coordinated secondary search
 - j. Rescue strategies
 - k. Radio communications and operation
 - l. Accountability Officer duties
 - m. Operation of the MSA SCBA Accountability System computer
 - n. Apparatus operation



Lesson #34 District Level Training For Fire Companies

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

District Chiefs must take an active role in District Level Training exercises on a regular basis. Fire fighting skills reinforcement and evaluation should be included in District Level Training and Minimum Company Standards Performance Evaluation.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **At this incident, a lack of proficiency was demonstrated by improper hose deployment, ineffective search and rescue techniques, inability to operate portable radios and a lack of crew integrity. Fire fighters must train on basic fire fighting evolutions continually to maintain proficiency.**
 - a. District Chiefs must monitor company drills on a regular basis to verify proficiency in high risk / low frequency fire fighting tasks.
 - i. District Chiefs must have regular access to CFD training facilities to support company level training.
 - b. At this incident, some Companies did not work together to effectively complete tasks, recognize hazardous or changing conditions, recognize problems, overcome problems, or communicate needs or problems.
 - i. District Chiefs must schedule and manage multi-company drills for their District on a periodic basis to ensure proficiency working as a team.
 - c. Currently, due to response workloads and non-emergency task assignments, this training does not occur with consistent frequency, if it occurs at all.



Lesson #35 Captain Training With District Chief

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Currently, there are no Standard Operating Procedures in place to address the duties of either a Captain riding with a District Chief for training purposes or a Chief's Aide position. If a Captain is riding with a District Chief for Above Grade training, the Captain should stay at the Command Post to assist Command with monitoring radio communication, to track Company operations, to track Company locations, to document completion of tactical benchmarks, to start Accountability and MSA SCBA Accountability Software (if not already initiated), and to learn from the actions of Command in managing an incident. If surplus staffing results in a Chief's Aide riding with a District Chief, similar support duties would assist Command and significantly enhance the overall management of the incident.

Procedures for both Captain Above Grade Training and Chief's Aide position should be established.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **At this incident, District 4 had a Captain riding with him during the tour of duty for training purposes.**
 - a. Captains riding above grade are supposed to support the Incident Commander and perform as the Incident Commander under direction of the permanent District Chief.
 - b. On arrival, the Captain (District 4B), performed a 360 degree assessment of the structure.
 - c. District 4B ordered pre-mature ventilation of the fire apartment by Truck 31 "A" Team without coordination with the fire line placement or Command.
 - d. After that, duties were unclear.
 - e. A Captain was removed from his company to ride with the District Chief in District 4. It should be noted that the following companies in District 4 had an Acting Officer for the tour of duty. Each of these companies operated at the incident and two of them were on the first alarm.
 - i. Engine 7
 - ii. Engine 49
 - iii. Engine 31
2. **When both the RAT Truck and Safety Engine were "put to work," District 4B could have staffed the Accountability Officer position or operated the MSA SCBA Accountability Software.**
 - a. Both positions were needed at this incident.
 - b. Neither position was correctly staffed at the time of the Mayday, nearly 45 minutes after Engine 49 arrived on scene.



Lesson #36 Command Officer Training

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Command Officer training, development and evaluation are crucial to ensure tactical objectives and fire fighter safety is maintained throughout the Command process.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **Command Officer incident management, personnel accountability, and continual operational evaluation played an important role at this incident.**
 - a. CFD Command Officer should receive initial and periodic command simulation training.
 - b. CFD Command Officers should be trained prior to or shortly after promotion.
 - c. Command Officers should be trained to recognize, deal with and manage unusual or difficult situations that may occur at an incident.

2. **NFPA 1561 *Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety* teaches Initial Size-Up, Initial Risk Assessment, Command Structure, Incident Action Plan (IAP), Standard Geographic and Functional Designations, and Safety.**
 - a. Command Officers should be realistically trained to focus on the following:
 - i. Incident management
 - ii. Safety
 - iii. Accountability
 - iv. Continual Operational Evaluation
 - v. Determine Offensive & Defensive Strategies
 - vi. Assigning Tasks & Monitoring Progress
 - vii. Recognizing dangerous fire conditions
 - viii. Building construction
 - ix. Management of Mayday Operations
 - x. Management of Emergencies on the fireground
 - xi. Apparatus placement
 - xii. Effective communications on the fireground
 - xiii. Recognizing and solving problems that occur
 - xiv. Dealing with extreme stress and quick decision making skills necessary on the fireground



Lesson #37 Company Officer Training

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Company Officer training, development and evaluation are critical to the overall success of the Fire Department.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **Company Officer supervision and direction of personnel played an important role at this incident.**
 - a. CFD Company Officers should be trained prior to or shortly after promotion.
 - b. Company Officers should be trained to recognize and deal with unusual or difficult situations that may occur at an incident.

2. **NFPA 1021 *Standard for Fire Officer Professional Qualifications* teaches basic management, evaluation of personnel, reports, training, budgeting, pre-planning, inspections and non-emergency functions.**
 - a. Unfortunately, this standard does not prepare Company Officers to efficiently function on the fireground. Realistic training for the Company Officer must focus on the following (*at a minimum*):
 - i. How to develop and run a company training session
 - ii. How to Size-up a fire
 - iii. Accountability
 - iv. Building Construction
 - v. Determining offensive or defensive strategies
 - vi. Recognizing the need for additional resources
 - vii. Apparatus placement
 - viii. Effective communications on the fireground
 - ix. Determining hose line size and placement at a fire and directing these functions
 - x. Determining which areas need searched and directing these functions
 - xi. Determining when, where and how to ventilate and directing these functions
 - xii. Determining when, where and how to force entry and directing these functions
 - xiii. Recognizing and solving problems that occur
 - xiv. Dealing with extreme stress and quick decision making skills necessary on the fireground



Lesson #38 Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) Training

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) training, development and evaluation are critical to ensure proper apparatus placement, pump operations, and aerial ladder operations.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **Apparatus placement, pump operations, and aerial ladder operations played an important role at this incident.**
 - a. CFD Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO's) should be trained prior to or shortly after promotion.
 - b. FAO's should be trained appropriately to recognize and deal with unusual or difficult situations that may occur at an incident.

2. **There are a variety of different types of fire apparatus in the CFD. Continual evaluation and training is needed to keep all FAO's proficient in the operation of all apparatus.**
 - a. At this incident, it was difficult to operate Truck 31's aerial due to unfamiliarity, placement, switch positions and ladder jacks.
 - b. Eventually, three FAO's (Ladder 18, Engine 31 and Engine 46) worked together to operate the override settings on Truck 31 to effectively use the aerial ladder to perform multiple rescues of multiple civilians off of multiple balconies.



Lesson # 39 Standard Operating Procedures

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) should be reviewed and updated annually to ensure they are consistent with the changes in the fire service and our internal operations. Outdated SOP's should be discarded and new SOP's developed. The annual scheduled review of the Procedures Manual, Report manual and General Orders is January 1st through March 1st of each year. (CFD *Procedures Manual Section 103 Preparation of Policies*) When new Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) are developed and implemented, personnel should be thoroughly trained relative to their impact on emergency operations.

Specific Examples from 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **At this incident, some fire fighters were unaware of recent changes to CFD Operations Manual 203.01 Structure Fires.**
 - a. Adequate training on SOP changes should ensure that fire fighters are prepared to operate in accordance with procedures at emergency incidents.
 - b. Often adequate training requires face time and the ability to answer questions directly to ensure competency, especially for operationally important procedures.

2. **Our current system relies on a computer program to basically "check a box" and assume everyone understands and knows how to function in a new procedure on the fireground.**
 - a. Often adequate training requires face time and the ability to answer questions directly to ensure competency, especially for operationally important procedures.




Lesson #40 Modern Fireground Science

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

It is a fact that the fires of today are not the same as the fires from 30 years ago. Fires burn faster, hotter, and are more dangerous than ever. As fire fighters, we must find a balance between the art and science of fire fighting and effective fireground tactics. Even though the number of structure fire incidents has decreased over the past several decades, the rate of fire fighter injuries and deaths per structure fire incident has increased.

In the recent NFPA study “U.S. Fire Service Fatalities in Structure Fires,” Rita F. Fahy, Ph.D. states, “There is a growing concern in the fire service related to whether firefighters and fire officers receive the degree of training and experience necessary to properly assess the risks on the fire ground. One area that had shown marked increases over the period is the rate of deaths due to traumatic injuries while operating inside structures (Figure 4). Are firefighters putting themselves at greater risk while operating at fires inside structures? Do firefighters think modern protective equipment provides a higher level of protection but do not realize the limitations of that equipment or are ignoring those limitations? Have some aspects of modern building construction or changes in the burning properties of today’s contents and furnishings changed the way fires develop? Were adequate resources available on scene to deal with the various demands presented?”



Further, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Underwriters Laboratory (UL) and the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) all provide valuable research on Modern Fireground Science. Daniel Madrzykowski, Fire Protection Engineer, NIOSH, states, “Fire dynamics can provide a fire officer or a firefighter with means to understand how a fire will grow and spread within a structure and how best to control that growth. Researchers have generated



experimental results and computer models to explain how fire dynamics taken at the most basic level, the fire triangle, applies to the fireground.”

Fire fighters should be trained in Modern Fire Science and adapt tactics to respond to the challenges of today’s fireground. Firefighting continuing education **MUST** be required for FF's as we do with EMS continuing education for EMT's and Paramedics. We require extensive con-ed for high frequency - low risk activities like EMS, but not for low frequency -high risk firefighting evolutions.


Specific Examples From 6020 Dahlgren St.

- 1. It would have been appropriate for Engine 49’s Acting Officer to operate the attack line down the Floor 2 hallway toward the fire apartment to flow water and cool the environment (or “spray smoke”), even though the attack line was stalled well short of the fire apartment.**
 - a. Engine 49’s Acting Officer indicated “you know we don’t spray water into smoke.” This cooling of the thermal layer in the hallway may have provided valuable time in more-tenable conditions for Engine 49’s Acting Officer to appropriately assess the problems with the deployment of the attack line and develop effective solutions to overcoming those problems.
 - b. When Heavy Rescue 9’s Officer operated Engine 49’s attack line (after Engine 49 had left the hallway) down the Floor 2 hallway toward the fire apartment, conditions in the hallway dramatically improved.
 - c. It’s okay to spray water into smoke when you must cool the environment.

- 2. The venting of the glass patio door to the fire apartment without prior verification of an attack line in place or communication to Command intensified the fire.**
 - a. NIST provides that, “As the oxygen level within the structure is depleted, the fire decays, the heat release from the fire decreases and as a result the temperature decreases.
 - b. When a vent is opened, such as when the fire department enters a door, oxygen is introduced. The oxygen mixes with the heated gases in the structure and the energy level / rate of heat release begins to increase.
 - c. This change in ventilation can result in a rapid increase in fire growth potentially leading to a flashover (fully developed compartment fire) condition.”



3. **Fire fighters are cautioned to consider the Flow Path and the result of introducing air and needed oxygen to a fire.**
 - a. Think and communicate before you vent that window – do I have an attack line in place, where is the fire going, and can I control it.
 - b. Fire will travel from a place of higher pressure to a place of lower pressure, and increase in intensity the entire time.



4. **Neither stairwell was pressurized by PPV.**
 - a. The use of PPV to pressurize stairwells can greatly improve condition in both the evacuation stairwell and the attack stairwell.
 - b. Additionally, the NIST has conducted PPV studies that indicate, "If the static pressure created by the fan is greater than the pressure created by the fire, then no smoke will flow into the stairwell."
 - c. PPV must be coordinated through Command and fire attack team(s).



Fire Prevention & Fire Investigation Lessons Learned or Reinforced

There were some important and significant lessons learned at this incident which were directly related to Fire Prevention, Public Education, Code Enforcement and Fire Investigation.

The following categories contain the Lessons Learned or Reinforced on March 26, 2015.

41. Scene Preservation and Evidence Collection
42. Fire Prevention and Inspection Concerns
43. Preplanning
44. Premise History



Lesson #41 Scene Preservation and Evidence Collection

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

When a fire investigator is called to the scene and the incident is considered a crime scene, Companies and Command should treat it as such and attempt to preserve the scene for the investigation, until told otherwise by a Fire Investigator.

Specific Examples From 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. Fire companies must secure the scene and fire area to ensure any evidence as to the cause and origin of the fire, injury or death is not disturbed.
2. Upon completion of the incident, all responding companies must complete an incident statement and submit it to the Fire Investigation Unit.
3. Any equipment, apparatus, PPE or other items used at an incident involving a serious injury or death of a firefighter shall be left in place or appropriately collected to ensure proper chain of custody and subsequent investigation.
 - a. PPE from all firefighters who suffer injury shall be examined, photographed and secured as evidence.
 - i. Truck 31's Officer was injured in the fire. He did not realize the injuries until returning to quarters.
 - 1) Helmet was severely damaged due to fire exposure early in the incident.
 - 2) PPE was not collected after this incident and pictures and formal evaluation of damage didn't occur.
 - 3) SCBA facepiece was also damaged by heat and he continued to use it for several weeks after the fire.
 - ii. Engine 49 Acting Officer suffered a burn to his hand and face. His PPE was not collected or examined after the incident.
 - iii. Rescue 9 operated in the same hallway where members were exposed to reported high heat conditions, and their PPE should have been evaluated for any damage.
 - b. Any hose lines, ladders, tools or equipment used shall be left in place until the investigation is complete.
 - i. The initial hose line stretched by Engine 49, which became wedged in the stairwell, was removed prior to investigation efforts.



Lesson #42 Fire Prevention and Fire Inspection Concerns

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

There are several lessons related to inspection, code enforcement and public education that can be applied to 6020 Dahlgren St.

Specific Examples From 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **Citizens shall not make or render smoke alarms inoperable.**
 - a. The occupant of Apartment 27 removed the smoke alarm from its installed location.
 - b. As a result of not having a smoke detector, no early warning was provided within the apartment after the fire began.
 - c. This delay slowed notification and response of the fire department.
 - d. This also resulted in a delayed notification to building occupants, which could have allowed for a safer evacuation of the building.

2. **Citizens should be educated on the importance of calling 911 as soon as a fire is discovered.**
 - a. After being alerted of the fire, the occupant of apartment 27 left the apartment, searched for a fire extinguisher to fight the fire, and then attempted to fight the fire instead of calling 911 immediately.
 - b. This delay slowed notification and response of the fire department.

3. **Property Owners are to adhere to the fire codes by maintaining their properties in accordance with both State of Ohio Fire Codes and City of Cincinnati Fire Prevention Code.**
 - a. The spread of the fire could have been prevented if the property owner ensured that the required door closing hardware was in place or working on the door.
 - i. When the occupant opened Apartment 27's door, it did not close behind her.
 - ii. The apartment door was left opened, enabling fire and smoke to enter the second floor hallway.
 - iii. The smoke then spread throughout the building freely because of breaches in the ceiling spaces on the 2nd floor.

4. **Citizens should report defects such as elevator issues, fire code violation and building code violation to the City of Cincinnati and its various Departments.**
 - a. Reports surfaced that the occupants of 6020 Dahlgren St. were aware of the defective 5th floor elevator door, and may have reported such to the property owner.



Many of the people interviewed knew of problems with people getting stuck on the elevator in the building. In the past, a few people had tried to open the elevator door when the elevator was not on their floor. ██████ tried to open the fourth floor door but was unable. ██████ tried to open the third floor door but was unable. ██████ tried to open the second floor door but was unable. ██████ said he tried to open the fifth floor elevator door before but it wouldn't open.

Several other people, however, knew of problems with the elevator doors opening when the elevator was not on their floor. ██████ said the first floor elevator door would open when the elevator was not present. This happened to her as recently as January 2015. ██████ had several incidents where her grandchildren ran down the fifth floor hallway and opened the fifth floor elevator door when the elevator was not present. She said the problem existed for several years. One time, her eight year old grandson was able to open the elevator door. She said she complained to management but nothing was done to fix it. ██████ is a former resident. He stated the elevator door had been malfunctioning on the fifth floor for years as it opened for him a few times with no elevator present. He told maintenance about the problem but it was never fixed.

Statements From CPD

Investigative Report Reference Elevator

5. **Property Owners are to adhere to the elevator requirements by maintaining their elevators in accordance with City of Cincinnati Elevator Requirements.**
6. **Cincinnati Fire Inspectors are to adhere to the Cincinnati Fire Department Policy and Procedures sections 1001 *Conducting Fire Prevention Inspections*, 1002 *Inspection Categories* and 1003 *Violations and Referrals*.**
 - a. The last documented fire inspection for 6020 Dahlgren St. occurred in 2013. No other inspection reports were located for this address.
 - b. Fire inspectors began an inspection of the premises in March 2015 but did not complete it due to fire code questions submitted to the Fire Prevention Bureau.
7. **Public education efforts need to be expanded to include how to prevent fires, the importance of smoke detectors, when to call 911 and what to do in the event of a fire.**



Lesson #43 Preplanning

Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Preplanning of special or high hazard properties is extremely important to the success of firefighting operations. Preplanning must happen before a fire occurs.

Specific Examples From 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **6020 Dahlgren St. would be considered a “special” or “high hazard” property.**
 - a. This property has limited access for apparatus due to the configuration of the access street and driveway.
 - b. Long supply hose lays that potentially block access for other companies due to the building layout or location of fire hydrants should be considered.
 - c. This building has difficult stairwells to reach upper floors. These stairs are return stairs which are fairly narrow with open treads and gaps between the tread and the wall. There is also no “well-hole” in the stairwell, which necessitates extra hose to reach the top floor.
 - d. This building has different elevators than normally encountered in other buildings. The swing door, single car elevator is not a normal elevator configuration and should have been noted.

2. **The property was informally preplanned by the fire company a few weeks prior to the fire. This preplan may have been inappropriately conducted and wasn’t communicated with other responding resources.**
 - a. The location of Engine 49’s apparatus placement and initial hose deployment was dictated by this preplan.
 - b. This placement resulted in a longer hose stretch to reach the fire apartment by committing to the same door for all stretches.
 - c. This placement blocked access for other apparatus by having 5” hose cross the driveway.
 - d. There was no involvement of other companies or the District Chief in preplanning functions for this property.
 - e. Preplanning should ultimately lead to the creation of a Premise History (Lesson #44)



Lesson #44 Premise History


Lesson Learned or Reinforced

Premise history entries alert fire companies to special conditions or hazards in a building. Premise histories need to be verbally communicated to all responding Companies by Fire Dispatch. The current system of retrieving premise histories from the PMDC is neither timely nor easily accessible.

Specific Examples From 6020 Dahlgren St.

1. **The elevator car configuration and dangers needed to be preplanned and announced to companies during dispatch and response.**
 - a. No formal premise history existed for 6020 Dahlgren St.
 - b. No responding company was notified of any hazard during dispatch or response.
 - c. The command officers didn't know about the elevator or its potential hazards due to lack of premise history.
 - d. Premise history entries may have called for additional resources to be dispatched based on building layout, access issues and life hazard.





SECTION 12

Recommendations



FIRE DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations were compiled during the investigation and subcommittee research process. A thorough review of all Cincinnati Fire Department training, operations, EMS, equipment, communications and fire prevention functions occurred. This review, directly related to the actions at 6020 Dahlgren St., were used to formulate recommendations for improvement.

Each subcommittee analyzed the Lessons Learned or Reinforced from Section #11 to develop recommendations. Recommendations were developed by the following subcommittees.

- Training
- Operations & Response Enhancements
- EMS
- Equipment
- Communications
- Fire Prevention
- Fire Investigation

The committee recommends the following actions be implemented to reduce the likelihood of a similar occurrence in the future. Actions performed on March 26, 2015, were a direct result of our accepted method of operations, and personnel involved cannot be directly faulted for actions performed. Each and every day, firefighters in the City of Cincinnati perform in the same manner as firefighters did on March 26, 2015, all while risking their lives protecting lives and property. It is extremely unfortunate when these actions result in the untimely death of one of our own. We must learn from our past and take action to ensure our firefighters are fully prepared, fully trained, fully staffed and fully equipped to handle all emergencies.

Each of the recommendations listed were carefully analyzed to ensure the implementation would have a positive impact on operations within the Cincinnati Fire Department. Our goal is to reduce the likelihood of an additional tragedy from occurring while adhering to the mission of this report:

“The focus of this investigation shall be to identify the facts pertaining to the Line of Duty Death of Daryl Gordon and to recommend actions to reduce the risk of similar events.”



Recommendation Outline

1. **Training Staff Enhancements** - to accomplish the above programs, an increase in staffing to provide Training is needed. In addition, a method to enable District Chiefs to be involved in Company Training should be developed.

- A. Training Staff Additions

- i. 2 Captains
 - a. Incumbent Firefighter Training
 - b. Command / Officer Training
- ii. 4 Lieutenants
 - a. Incumbent Firefighter Training
 - b. Command / Officer Training
 - c. Minimum Company Standards & Proficiency Training
 - d. Simulation & Command Training
- iii. 1 Fire Apparatus Operator
- iv. 4 District Training Supervisors
 - a. Fire District Training, Hands-On Training, District Drills, Company Drills

2. **Training Enhancements and Development of Training Programs**

- A. Incumbent Fire Training

- i. Basic Fire Training Skill Development and Reinforcement
- ii. Minimum Company Standards Proficiency Training and Testing
- iii. Standard Operating Procedures Training
- iv. Previously Identified Training Priorities - Live-fire Exercises, Survival, Fire Behavior, Flashover and RAT Training

- B. Company Officer and Command Officer Training

- i. Command Officer Simulation Training

- C. Driver Training

- D. Training for Out of Classification Assignments

- E. Monthly Training Supplements and Drill Lesson Plans

- F. Communications and Radio Training

3. **Shift Commander / Division Chief Position Creation**

4. **Fire Response Enhancements**

- A. One Alarm Response Enhancements - 3rd Engine

- B. Extra Alarm Response Enhancements - Response Assignments



- C. Acting Officers
 - D. Rescue Companies
5. **Procedure Enhancements** - Reinforcement and Revision of procedures currently in place.
6. **Equipment Enhancements**
- A. Door Marking Equipment
 - B. Door Chocks
 - C. Stokes Quick Release Straps
 - D. Tubular Webbing
 - E. Mega Mover / Rescue Sked
7. **Communications Enhancements**
- A. Simplification of the Radio Template
 - B. Standardize Communications
 - C. Radio Training
 - D. Reinforcement of PAR communication procedures
 - E. Reinforcement of Mayday communication procedures
8. **Fire Prevention Enhancements**
- A. Increase personnel to assist fire companies with high priority inspections
 - i. 4 Fire Lieutenant Positions - 1 per Fire District
 - B. Increase public education efforts
 - C. Increase fire inspection training
 - D. Evaluate and update preplanning and premise history procedures



Recommendation #1


Training Staff Enhancements

Current Training Bureau Staff

The Cincinnati Fire Department Training Bureau is currently staffed by one District Chief, one Fire Captain, two Fire Lieutenants (Training), one Fire Lieutenant (Recruiter), one Audio-Video Technician, one civilian EMS Coordinator and one civilian administrative technician. The five uniformed personnel shall, per *CFD Procedures Manual 102.13.C Human Resources Division*, coordinate the following for 850 Cincinnati fire fighters:

- a. Training of the fire recruits for the department
- b. Continuing education of all members of the department.
- c. Testing new equipment and writing procedures for the proper use of department equipment
- d. Observing and correcting the work of fire companies at fires, or other emergencies when deviations from standard practice or improper, unsafe methods are observed
- e. Maintaining an effective drill program for the Fire Department.
- f. Supervision of courses of instruction to members in all phases of Fire Department operations.
- g. Periodic examination of members to determine any weaknesses in the training program or in the members themselves.

Current Training Staff Organization



The Training Bureau is currently significantly understaffed and its sole focus in the past few years has been the hiring and training of recruits, testing of probationary firefighters, assisting with promotional exams, coordination of EMS continuing education, and the delivery of the CFD in-house Paramedic training program.

1. Training Staff Improvements

After drill school, fire fighting skills are not formally taught, reinforced or evaluated by fire department instructors. Company officers, not trained in proper instruction techniques, are required to teach company drill each day. This is usually accomplished through utilization of a drill outline produced by the training staff. Fire fighters need to receive frequent training in basic fire fighting skills and these skills need to be evaluated and reinforced through a formal evaluation process as is outlined in *NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Safety and Health Programs, sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.7* and *NFPA 1410, Standard on Training for Initial Scene Operations*.

As outlined in Section #9 "Fire Training" there are many deficiencies in training for all ranks within Cincinnati Fire Department. The following recommendations for improvement focus on enhancing training for Firefighters, Company Officers, Command Officers, Fire Apparatus Operators, Acting Officers and Acting Fire Apparatus Operators.

The following are recommendations for improving training.

Training Staff Additions


Improvements in staff, working closely with Operations will greatly enhance the training and preparedness of firefighters in the Cincinnati Fire Department. In order to enhance basic training for incumbent firefighters, ensure continual training of all personnel, develop new training programs, manage records, develop and deliver training to Company Officers, Command Officers and Drivers, the following staff enhancements are needed:

- 2 Fire Captains (FTE)
- 4 Fire Lieutenants (FTE)
- 1 FAO (FTE)
- 4 District Training Officers (FTE)

These (11) staff positions are proposed in addition to the current existing staff at Training. The Human Resources training staff manages recruiting, EMS training and recruit training. The main reason the Cincinnati Fire Department has had significant deficiencies in training incumbent personnel is the lack of personnel to focus on incumbent, fire company and officer training.



Proposed Incumbent Training Staff Organization



Position Descriptions and Duties:

| New Position | Assignment | Reports To | Supervises | Duties |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|--|---|
| Captain | Incumbent Fire Training | District Chief | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lieutenant - Company Standards • Lieutenant - Incumbent Training • 4 District Training Officers • FAO Driver Training | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scheduling of all Inservice Incumbent Fire Training • Delivery of all Inservice Incumbent Fire Training • Company Monthly Drill Outline • District Level Multi-Company Drills • District Level Live Fire Burn Days • RAT Refresher • Fire Behavior Refresher • Supervision of Proficiency and Company Standards Training • Quarterly Training Notes • New Equipment Training • New Procedures Training • New Driver Training • Above Grade Driver Training • Driver Continuing Education |

| New Position | Assignment | Reports To | Duties |
|---------------------|---|-------------------------------|---|
| Lieutenant | Company Standards and Proficiency Training | Captain of Incumbent Training | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of Proficiency Training and Testing in accordance with CFD Drill manual on NFPA 1410 recommendations • Delivery of Proficiency Testing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>GOAL</u>: Every company tested 4 times per year to start • Submit results of testing to Supervisors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommendations for remedial training • Recommendations for improvement • Safety Concerns • Major Deficiencies • Send standard report weekly to Captain |



| New Position | Assignment | Reports To | Supervises | Duties |
|--------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|---|
| Lieutenant | Incumbent Fire Training | Captain of Incumbent Training | • District Training Officers | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination and Delivery of all Hands-On Training <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Works with District Training Officers • District Multi-Company Drills • District Live Fire Burn Days • RAT Refreshers • Fire Behavior Refreshers • Facilitate and manage acquired structure usage by fire companies • Works with Fire Districts to deliver any needed training based on previous incident needs or operational objectives • Coordinates with Rescue Companies as needed for assistance |

| New Position | Quantity | Rank | Assignment | Reports To | Duties |
|----------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| District Training Officers | 1 Per District <u>TOTAL</u> : 4 | Any rank - Fire Instructor required | District Level Training | Lieutenant of Incumbent Training | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delivery of all In Service Training in assigned District <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • District Multi-Company Drills • District Live Fire Burn Days • Coordinate with District Chiefs to train on special requests (past fires, issues or operational objectives) • Assist fire companies with routine daily drill • Delivery of any training as needed or required • Assist with department wide training as required |

| New Position | Assignment | Reports To | Duties |
|------------------------------------|------------------------|------------|---|
| FAO Fire Apparatus Operator | Driver Training | Captain | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New Driver Training • Coordination of Above Grade Driver Training and On-Going Training <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clears FF's to drive in above grade role • Periodic Testing and Training • Existing Driver Training |



| New Position | Assignment | Reports To | Supervises | Duties |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------|---|--|
| Captain | Officer & Command Training | District Chief | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lieutenant - Company Officer Training • Lieutenant - Command and Simulation Training | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scheduling of all Command and Officer Training • Delivery of all Command and Officer Training • New Company Officer School • Coordination of Above Grade Officer Certification and Continuing Education <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clears FF's to ride above grade • Periodic Testing and Training • Training of Existing Officers in Tactics • Coordination of Simulation Training <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Command Training Lab Operations • Command Simulation Certification • Command Recertification • Development and delivery of Quarterly Company Officer Training Newsletter • Coordination of Monthly Simulation Training Exercises for all officers |

| New Position | Assignment | Reports To | Duties |
|---------------------|--|-------------------|--|
| Lieutenant | Simulation & Command Training | Captain | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assists with delivery of all Officer Training as required • Assist with New Company Officer School • Coordination of Simulation Training • Management of Command Simulation Training • Assistance with Monthly Officer Simulation Training Exercises |

| New Position | Assignment | Reports To | Duties |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------|---|
| Lieutenant | Officer & Command Training | Captain | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deliver of all Command and Officer Training • New Company Officer School • Coordination of Above Grade Officer Certification and Continuing Education <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clears FF's to ride above grade • Periodic Testing and Training • Training of Existing Officers in Tactics |



Training Staff Budget Implications

Manpower Requirements

11 Positions

2 - Captains (FTE) 40 hour schedule (Incumbent Training & Officer Training)

4 - Lieutenants (FTE) 40 hour schedule (Incumbent, Proficiency, Officer and Simulation Training)

1 - FAO (FTE) 40 hour schedule (Driver Training)

4 - District Training Officers (FTE) 40 hour schedule (Incumbent training at District Level)

BUDGET IMPLICATIONS

| Position | Salary | Benefits | Certification Pay | Total Per Position | Positions Requested | Total Budget |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Captain | \$81,952.00 | \$46,713.00 | \$2,436.00 | \$131,101.00 | 2 | \$262,202.00 |
| Lieutenant | \$70,649.00 | \$40,270.00 | \$2,436.00 | \$113,355.00 | 4 | \$453,420.00 |
| FAO | \$65,776.00 | \$37,492.00 | \$2,436.00 | \$105,704.00 | 1 | \$105,704.00 |
| District Training Officer (based on Lt. Pay) | \$70,649.00 | \$40,270.00 | \$2,436.00 | \$113,355.00 | 4 | \$453,420.00 |
| | | | | | TOTAL | \$1,274,782.00 |



Recommendation #2

Training Enhancements and Development of Training Programs

Training on the basics of fire fighting is essential for every Cincinnati Fire Department member. Each fire fighter must be properly trained and qualified to perform their assigned duties, including above grade assignments. Engine Companies should train frequently to master water supply, hose deployment and fire attack. Truck Companies should train frequently to master forcible entry, search, rescue, and ventilation. Heavy Rescue Companies should train frequently to master technical rescue skills, mitigation of hazardous materials emergencies, structural fire fighting and extrication techniques. Medic Companies should train frequently to master emergency medical services. District Chiefs should train frequently to master incident strategies, operational tactics, and command systems.

Fire fighters who are authorized to work in above grade assignments must be trained and evaluated in performing those duties and periodically reevaluated to ensure that they are capable of performing their assigned duties safely and effectively.

As outlined in Section #9 "Fire Training", there are many deficiencies in training for all ranks within the Cincinnati Fire Department. The following recommendations for improvement focus on enhancing training for Firefighters, Company Officers, Command Officers, Fire Apparatus Operators, Acting Officers and Acting Fire Apparatus Operators. The following are recommendations for improving training. *Any reference to training staff duties, responsibilities or assignments are outlined in Recommendation #2.*

TRAINING ENHANCEMENTS & DEVELOPMENT OF TRAINING PROGRAMS

1. INCUMBENT FIRE TRAINING

A. "Back to Basics" Training

The Cincinnati Fire Department must develop a plan for repetitive hands-on training that has the sole focus of improving basic firefighting skills. This training should be conducted at the Company and District level, to develop and fine tune skills. The development of skills should be evaluated periodically through Minimum Company Standards Training, Training Staff evaluation or District Level evaluation. While conducting this training at the Company and District Level, firefighters should be provided the opportunity to practice and fine-tune skills in realistic environments or conditions through use of CFD training facilities, props, burn buildings or acquired structures.



A "Back to Basics" training program would focus on the following:

1. Engine Company Operations

- a. Selecting, Deploying and Operating 1-¾" Hose Lines
- b. Selecting, Deploying and Operating 2-½" Hose Lines
- c. Fire Control and Extinguishment
- d. Engine Company Emergencies (Loss of Water, Burst Hose, Hose Caught or Wedged, Rapid Fire Events, Short Stretches)
- e. Non-routine operations (Long hose stretches, master streams, standpipe operations, ladder and rope stretches)

2. Truck Company Operations

- a. Forcible Entry
- b. Search
- c. Rescue
- d. Horizontal and Vertical Ventilation
- e. Ladder Selection and Placement
- f. Aerial Ladder Operations
- g. Overhaul
- h. Salvage

B. Minimum Company Standards Proficiency Training and Testing

Minimum Company Standards Training, Individualized Basic Training Reinforcement, and Fire Company Training. *NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Safety and Health Programs, section 5.3 and NFPA 1410, Standard on Training for Initial Scene Operations.*

1. This training needs to be performed to reinforce the basic skills and tactics necessary to improve effectiveness and limit injury and death during emergency operations. Currently, company training is performed by the company officer, most of whom are not qualified instructors, on a daily basis during shift work. This training is non-structured and can be ineffective for required skill reinforcement and fire fighter safety.
2. Each company will be required to perform drill training as directed by the drill outline issued by the Fire Training Bureau. Formal evaluation on the practical evolutions will be performed on those skills required under NFPA 1410, Standard on Training for Initial Scene Operations, either as an entire company or as an individual pertaining to functions assigned to a member of a company. Companies will demonstrate proficiency in:
 - a. Supply Line and Attack Line Deployment (company task) a. Standard and Complicated Stretches



- b. Master Stream Deployment (apparatus and portable mounted) (company task)
- c. Elevated Master Stream Deployment (company task)
- d. Sprinkler / Standpipe Supply and Operation (company task)
- e. Ground Ladder Deployment (company task)
- f. Knots Tying (individual task)
- g. Personal Protective Gear Donning (PPE and SCBA) (individual task)
- h. Generator and Lights (individual task)
- i. Positive Pressure Fans (individual task)
- j. Power Saws (individual task)
- k. Thermal Imaging Camera (individual task)
- l. Foam Operations (company operations)
- m. Stokes Basket Rescue (company operations)
- n. CPR, AED, and Bag-Valve Mask (individual tasks)
- o. Other CFD specific “individual” or “company” drills as implemented

C. Standard Operating Procedures Training

NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Safety and Health, Section 5.3.3, 5.3.7 and 5.1.6

New and continual training on Standard Operating Procedures needs to be completed to ensure knowledge and proficiency in operating safely in the emergency operations of the department. No operational procedure should be implemented without sufficient training to ensure understanding and compliance.

D. Previously Identified In-Service Training Priorities

The Cincinnati Fire Department must develop a scheduled plan for In-Service Training that is topic based. In-Service Training must be hands-on and include a mix of live-fire, flashover, RAT, hose deployment, forcible entry, search and rescue and other operational skills. The Training Bureau, as currently staffed, is not capable of conducting this training for all fire fighters. The goal should be to conduct a full in-service training on an operational topic on a quarterly basis, including at least one live-fire training exercise per year for all firefighters.

NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Safety and Health Program, Sections 5.1, 5.3 and NFPA 1410, Standard on Training for Initial Scene Operations, and NFPA 1001, Standard on Professional Qualifications for Fire Fighter.

1. **RAT Training** The last RAT Refresher was over five years ago. Changes to RAT Trucks and Safety Engine response configurations, standard operating procedures, equipment, tactics and techniques necessitates training be conducted at the earliest possible convenience. Earlier in this report, we identified the MSA SCBA Tracking, Accountability, assignment of RAT Truck by the IC and Safety Engine procedures as areas needing revision or reinforcement.



2. **Fire Behavior and Flashover Simulator Training** The last Fire Behavior and Flashover Simulator Training was over five years ago. It was noted in testimony that “we don’t spray water into smoke” when high heat conditions were encountered in the hallway on the 2nd floor. The cognitive phase of this training can take place at fire companies or via the internet, while hands on training will need to be done in the flashover simulator. Facilities, props and simulators should be evaluated and updates considered to handle the repeated use of live fire training evolutions.
3. **Live Fire Training** For far too many Cincinnati fire fighters, the last Live-Fire Training was during their recruit training. Firefighters need to be exposed to realistic, hands-on training evolutions under live-fire conditions. Facilities, props and simulators should be evaluated and updates considered to handle the repeated use of live fire training evolutions. Ideally, each firefighter will participate in one live fire training per calendar year. This will be performed in scheduled “District Live Fire Burn Days”.
4. **Modern Fire Behavior Training** Fire departments should integrate current fire behavior research findings developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL) into operational procedures by developing standard operating procedures, conducting live fire training, and revising fireground tactics if necessary. The fires of today do not burn the same as the fires of yesterday. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Underwriters Laboratory (UL) has produced outstanding instructional videos for the fire service on the importance of controlling the flow path of fire, wind driven fires, the effects of horizontal and vertical ventilation, and how these factors have played a part in multiple LODD’s. Far too many of our own members fail to realize the incorporation of “Controlling the Flow Path of Fire” within our own Structural Fire Fighting SOP. Training in Modern Fire Behavior, Ventilation, Control of Flow Paths and changes in fire science needs to be performed periodically.
5. **Survival Training** No specific training on safely navigating large buildings, search safety, familiarization with building features, handling of emergencies (short stretch of hose line, loss of water, wedged or pinned lines, burst hose lengths), air management, complicated entanglement, mayday and emergency evacuation has never or rarely been performed by the Cincinnati Fire Department.

E. Drill Application Program & Web Based Training Applications

The current Drill Application Program should be revised completely; or a replacement employed. First, training drop-down topics need to be reorganized into more functional groups for easier selection and planning, including Engine Company Operations, Truck Company Operations, Personal Protective Equipment, RAT Operations, etc. Additionally, technological improvements are needed to enable fire fighters to easily access their recorded training hours and identify areas of weakness. The percentage of Cincinnati Firefighters who can access the current program to identify their total number of fire training hours for specific topics and time periods is drastically low.



Numerous fire departments throughout the country have taken advantage of technology to produce video-based operational training on a wide variety of minimum company level standards. For example, the Los Angeles County Fire Department Training Service Section has developed a “Blackboard Training Schedule” and the “Turnout” website to coordinate all Company Level Training. According to the LACoFD, *“Turnout has worked to bring subject matter experts together in one place creating a thought-provoking environment; our contributors are focused on providing useful information and unique insight to our fire fighters.”* The training videos are professionally produced, are concise, and do an excellent job providing a visual foundation for the practice of fire fighting skills. The CFD currently utilizes “Target Solutions” for web-based training, mainly for Emergency Medical Service continuing education training and internal CFD information and procedure change notification. An in-depth analysis should be performed to compare our current Target Solutions to other successful programs, like “Turnout,” and develop our own enhanced Web-based Training Service to connect fire fighters to information, insight, and tools needed to improve their training experience.

F. Daily Drill Calendar

The development of a Daily Drill Calendar may greatly enhance Company-Level training in conjunction with the Drill Application Program and District Training Officers. The Daily Drill Calendar would contain a simple unit-based calendar that delineates structured training on focused, operational topics included in the Drill Application Program for every month of the calendar year. In addition to the Daily Drill Calendar, the Fire Department should provide a basic outline of objectives and hands-on training scenarios to reinforce any cognitive learning that occurs as a result of a drill outline.

2. COMPANY OFFICER AND COMMAND OFFICER TRAINING

Company Officer and Command Officer Training has been a long standing deficiency within our fire department. This training should include all levels of rank structure as well as members that work temporarily in an officer role without promotion. A goal should be set to ensure members have the ability to obtain the training prior to being promoted to the early levels of supervision. Continued development of these members should be provided to ensure that how they function in their roles meets the demands being placed on them.

NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Safety and Health Program, Section 5.1.2 and NFPA 1021, Standard on Professional Qualifications for Fire Officers.



Lieutenants

1. This training needs to be performed either prior to or immediately following promotion from fire fighter to Lieutenant to ensure adequate knowledge in fire tactics, personnel management, supervision, accountability, and administrative functions. Officer training is vital to the safety of fire fighters.
2. Prior to any promotion on an eligible list, personnel should be placed into an instructional course to meet the requirements of *NFPA 1500 and 1021*.
3. Additionally, this training needs to be provided to function in an above grade position as a company officer.
4. This training needs to be prioritized for implementation. All individuals who expect to be promoted based on retirement projections, all existing officers, and then all persons who can ride in an above grade format should receive instruction to meet the intent of *NFPA 1500 and NFPA 1021*.

Captains and District Chiefs

1. Command officer training is also a vital portion of this training. Captains need to be trained either prior to or immediately following promotion from Captain to District Chief to ensure adequate knowledge of incident command, management of large incidents, personnel safety and accountability, building construction, and various administrative functions. This training is vital to the safety of fire fighters.
2. Prior to any promotion on an eligible list personnel should be placed into an instructional course to meet the requirements of *NFPA 1500 and 1021*.
3. Additionally, this training needs to be provided to function in an above grade position as a District Chief.
4. This training needs to be prioritized for implementation. All individuals who expect to be promoted based on retirement projections, all existing officers, and then all persons who can ride in an above grade format should receive instruction to meet the intent of *NFPA 1500 and NFPA 1021*.

A. **Initial Company Officer Training** should start with newly promoted personnel in a dedicated Officer Training Academy. Personnel should come off shift schedules and receive training prior to assuming the role of Company Officer. A proposed academy would last a 21-day work cycle (3 weeks) and train officers scheduled for promotion or those recently promoted. This academy would include:

1. **New Company Officer Academy**
 - a) NFPA 1001 standards that pertain to the CFD operations for Lieutenant
 - b) How to develop and run a company training session
 - c) How to Size-up a fire
 - d) Accountability
 - e) Building Construction
 - f) Determining offensive or defensive strategies
 - g) Recognizing the need for additional resources
 - h) Apparatus placement



- i) Effective communications on the fireground
- j) Determining hose line size and placement at a fire and directing these functions
- k) Determining which areas need searched and directing these functions
- l) Determining when, where and how to ventilate and directing these functions
- m) Determining when, where and how to force entry and directing these functions
- n) Recognizing and solving problems that occur
- o) Dealing with extreme stress and quick decision making skills necessary on the fireground.

- 2. Firefighters and new officers would be removed from Operations and work a 40-hour schedule for 3 weeks to facilitate this training.
- 3. Ideally this class would be conducted every 2 years to coincide with the expiration of a Fire Lieutenant Promotional Test. However, could be performed as needed based on needs of the fire department. The department may want to deliver a class to its newest Lieutenants once developed before final implementation.

B. **On Going & Existing Company Officer Training** should start with a focus on fireground size-up, communications, tactics, supervision of personnel during emergencies and decision making. Existing company officers should be exposed to training that forces them to react to and make decisions as they would on an incident. All officers need continual training and periodic refresher training to maintain a level of proficiency to effectively supervise firefighters during incidents. This training should focus on cognitive and manipulative skill development.


C. **Monthly Simulation Exercises** are important for developing quick decision making skills necessary for fireground environments. The ability to identify the following (through effective size-up) on the fireground needs to occur hundreds of times to help develop decision making skills necessary to make appropriate decisions rapidly for proficient and safe operations.

- (1) Building type
- (2) Hazards
- (3) Fire extent and location
- (4) Ideal hose line placement
- (5) Ventilation requirements
- (6) Search and rescue needs
- (7) Manpower requirements

Similarly, pilots participate in extensive simulation training in order to effectively react and manage issues in order to avoid disasters. Many studies have proven this same level of preparation is useful to successful decision making training for firefighters.



D. **Quarterly Officer Training Newsletter** previously the Cincinnati Fire Department utilized a Quarterly Officer Training Newsletter to provide articles on leadership, supervision, tactics, building construction and decision making. Each of these newsletters included a simulation exercise and a management exercise. This was stopped in 2009. Reevaluation and implementation of a similar training mechanism related to CFD Operations might prove beneficial.



E. **Command Officer Simulation Lab** A simulation training program that provides Fire Departments with a training and certification system that defines the best Standard Command Practices for common, local, everyday Strategic and Tactical emergency operations conducted on NIMS Type 4 & Type 5 events needs to be evaluated and implemented. This training and certification program produces Incident Commanders that make better decisions that will potentially eliminate the lethal or costly mistakes that cause injury, death, and unnecessary fire losses in the local response area.

The Simulation Based Command Training program is designed to produce safe and effective hazard zone operations. Fire departments routinely operate at the scene of incidents with an IDLH atmosphere (immediately dangerous to life and health) it forces us to simultaneously manage incident command, strategy & tactics and firefighter safety.

The effect of the program is two-fold. First, it develops the personal skills in officers required to supervise and manage incident operations that occur in a hazard zone. The second and more powerful effect is the Simulation Based Command Training Program standardizes incident operations across the entire department. The Simulation Based Command Training Program has standardized operations across different mutual aid boundaries, different battalions, shifts and stations of hundreds of fire departments across the country.



BUDGET IMPLICATIONS

| Description | Total Budget |
|---|--------------------|
| Train CFD Trainers, Initially train all Command Staff, District Chiefs and Fire Captains and Purchase necessary equipment and software to deliver training. | 70,000.00 |
| TOTAL | \$70,000.00 |

- F. **New Command Officer Training** should start with newly promoted personnel in a dedicated Command Officer Training Course. Personnel should come off shift schedules and receive training prior to assuming the role of District Chief. A proposed academy include:
- a. Simulation Based Command Training or Refresher
 - b. Incident management
 - c. Safety
 - d. Accountability
 - e. Continual Operational Evaluation
 - f. Determine Offensive & Defensive Strategies
 - g. Assigning Tasks & Monitoring Progress
 - h. Recognizing dangerous fire conditions
 - i. Building construction
 - j. Management of Mayday Operations Management of Emergencies on the fireground
 - k. Apparatus placement
 - l. Effective communications on the fireground
 - m. Recognizing and solving problems that occur
 - n. Dealing with extreme stress and quick decision making skills necessary on the fireground

3. DRIVER TRAINING

Driver Training has been a long standing deficiency within our fire department. A goal should be set to ensure members have the ability to obtain the training prior to being promoted to the position of Fire Apparatus Operator. Continued development of these members should be provided to ensure that how they function in their roles meets the demands being placed on them. *NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Safety and Health Program, Section 5.2.2 and NFPA 1002, Standard on Professional Qualifications for Fire Apparatus Operator and Ohio Administrative Code 4121-1-21-04.*

- A. This training needs to be performed either prior to or immediately following promotion from fire fighter to Fire Apparatus Operator to ensure adequate knowledge in driving, operating and pumping, fire line deployment, and management. This training is vital to the safety of fire fighters.
- B. Additionally, this training needs to be provided to function in an above grade position as a fire apparatus operator.



- C. Driver/Operators will demonstrate proficiency annually in standard pumping scenarios and driving/maneuvering apparatus. Additionally driver/operators will remain proficient in engine and ladder operation.
- D. This training needs to be prioritized for implementation. All individuals who expect to be promoted based on retirement projections, all existing drivers, and then all persons who can ride in an above grade format should receive instruction to meet the intent of NFPA 1500 and NFPA 1002.
- E. All personnel that currently are responsible for driving fire department apparatus to have ongoing training and evaluation of the nuances of operating fire apparatus to include operation of fire pumps, aerial ladders, all assigned equipment, as well as apparatus placement on the fireground. Personnel operating apparatus need to be familiar with the various types and manufacturers of apparatus in our fleet. This proved to be an issue that was reinforced in Lesson #38 - Fire Apparatus Operator Training.

4. TRAINING FOR OUT OF CLASSIFICATION ASSIGNMENTS - Acting District Chief, Acting Officer and Acting FAO

Training needs to be developed to educate and support those fire fighters acting in an above grade capacity. With additional training, impartial evaluation while performing duties, and periodic reevaluation to ensure their capability to perform the assigned duties, Acting Officers and Acting Drivers would be empowered to confidently, safely and efficiently ride in an above grade capacity. This training will be conducted in coordination with Company Officers and District Chiefs.

5. COMMUNICATIONS AND RADIO TRAINING

Throughout the early periods of the fire attack, members demonstrated a lack of proficiency with the current radios and the template. Simply - multiple firefighters were on the wrong channel for a significant portion of the fire which resulted in poor communications. Continual training including the use of the radio and it's template to ensure members can utilize the radios under emergent conditions. Training should also include addressing best practices in simulations to allow members opportunities to work through potential issues with the radios at real emergencies. Some of this training can be enhanced through the proposed Command Simulation Training program.



The Cincinnati Fire Department Needs to Make Training a Priority

The basic skills of fire fighting are critical to effective and efficient fire ground operations, and those basic skills are developed, strengthened and refined through training. We must do a better job of training at the individual level, at the Company Level, at the District Level and at the Training Bureau In-Service Level. We have a duty to act. We must provide clear goals, clear paths, and clear strategies for training and provide the required equipment, facilities and technologies to make it all possible.

Most of the Lessons Learned or Reinforced can be directly tied to the level in which the Cincinnati Fire Department prioritizes and provides training to personnel in basic firefighting. In addition, the method in which personnel are assigned to work in a promoted or out of classification assignment without appropriate training has been deficient for many years. *With improvements in training programs, development of recommended enhancements, dedication to staff enhancements and training facilities we can improve the safety of our operations at structure fires.*

Reference Lessons Learned or Reinforced:

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| Operations - Lessons | 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,19, 20, 21, 22 |
| Communications - Lessons | 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29 |
| Training - Lessons | 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 |

In order to implement these recommended training programs or enhancements, staff enhancements as outlined in Recommendation #1 need to occur.



TOTAL TRAINING BUDGET IMPLICATIONS

| TOTAL TRAINING BUDGET IMPLICATIONS | | | |
|---|--|----------------|------------------------------|
| Staff | 11 - FTE 2 - Captains 4 - Lieutenants 1 - FAO 4 - District Training Officers | \$1,213,546.00 | <i>Annual Personnel Cost</i> |
| Command Training | Initial Training, Equipment, Command Center & Recertification Cycle Fee | \$70,000.00 | <i>One Time Cost</i> |

Reference Lessons Learned or Reinforced:

Operations - Lessons 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,19, 20, 21, 22

Communications - Lessons 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29

Training - Lessons 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40



Recommendation #3

Division Chief (Shift Commander)

Incident Command System (ICS) models state the manageable span of control of any individual with incident management supervisory responsibility should range from three to seven subordinates, with five subordinates as the accepted optimal number. At the onset of the Dahlgren St Incident, Command directly supervised five (5) fire suppression companies operating on the fireground in an immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) atmosphere (Engine 49, Engine 31, Truck 31, Truck 18, and Rescue 9). However, due to the severity of the incident, fire control issues and life safety concerns, Command put the RAT Truck to work, put the Safety Engine to work, requested an Extra Engine and an Extra Truck, and requested the 2nd Alarm within the first ten minutes of arrival. The ICS span of control quickly grew to ten (10) fire suppression companies (Engine 49, Engine 31, Engine 46, Engine 18, Truck 31, Truck 18, Truck 23, Truck 32, Rescue 9, and Rescue 14) operating in an IDLH atmosphere – greatly exceeding the manageable span of control.

In the Cincinnati Fire Department, an Assistant Chief normally responds to all Extra Alarm fires to provide senior leadership, assume Command and assist with sectoring command functions to maintain a manageable span of control of fire suppression companies within the ICS structure. However, Assistant Chiefs are normally not on duty and their response time is accordingly delayed. At this incident, the Assistant Chief (On-Call Duty Chief) did not respond on the 2nd Alarm. When the incident escalated to a 3 Alarm fire seven minutes later, management of the fire suppression companies under the direct supervision of Command rose to a staggering 13 fire suppression companies operating in an IDLH atmosphere (Engine 49, Engine 31, Engine 46, Engine 18, Engine 23, Engine 7, Truck 31, Truck 18, Truck 23, Truck 32, Truck 19, Rescue 9, and Rescue 14). Operational efficiency was affected.

NIOSH has long cited ineffective Command at incidents as a primary concern. They caution that Fire Departments should ensure that the Incident Commander (IC) establishes a stationary Command post for effective incident management, which includes the use of a tactical worksheet, efficient fireground communications, and a personnel accountability system. Incident commanders must address multiple tasks simultaneously during high stress activities. Incident Commanders can only manage so much information and should divide up functions to make the span of control more manageable. During complex events, the IC should assign other personnel to functions such as accountability, radio communications, incident safety, company tracking, and resident evacuation in order for the IC to effectively focus on fire command. Fire departments should review and follow existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for Incident Commanders to divide up functions during complex incidents.

Throughout the country, numerous fire departments have developed a solution to effective incident management at a large scale incident during high stress activities. A suppression Shift Commander rank of Division Chief (Deputy Chief) within the Fire Department structure between the non-suppression Assistant Chief level and the suppression District Chief (Battalion Chief) level has



proven effective in managing Extra Alarm fires, high rise fires, hazardous material incident, technical rescue incidents, and multi-casualty incidents. Upon arrival of the Division Chief (Deputy Chief) at the incident, the District Chief (Battalion Chief) provides a progress report and summation of the incident, is reassigned to the Operations Section under the ICS, and provides a fresh set of command eyes to clarify strategies that have proven effective, need adjusting, or are currently lacking. This brief pause during the transfer of command provides a moment of reflection and, often, a new clarity for the incident action plan. The response from an on-duty Division Chief provides a timely arrival at an incident when positive change can still be achieved. The repeated response of the Division Chief (Deputy Chief) at large scale incidents during high stress activities provides a familiarity of the abilities of the fire suppression companies operating at the scene.

Non-suppression Assistant Chiefs are far too often hesitant to assume Command from suppression District Chiefs. This occurs do to the lack of comfort with day-to-day fireground operational tactics. A suppression Division Chief (Shift Commander), functioning daily within the tour system at suppression incidents, would provide the familiarity and the expertise to effectively assume Command at large scale incidents and allow the proper sectoring under the Incident Command System to include Operations Section, Fire Control Branch, Search and Rescue Branch, accountability, radio communications, incident safety, company tracking, and resident evacuation.


At the Dahlgren St. Incident, effective sectoring within the Incident Command System was lacking under the District Chief Incident Commander. Accountability, radio communications, incident safety, company tracking, and resident evacuation were significant fireground operational issues. A Division Chief (Shift Commander) responding on the 2nd Alarm to assume Command and the re-assignment of District 4 to Operations Section may have corrected some of the significant operational flaws. A fresh set of “Command Eyes” sometimes provides needed clarity to overcome tunnel vision.

The creation of a Division Chief (Shift Commander) rank would also add far reaching non-operational benefits to the organization as well. The current organizational span of control for the Operations Bureau Assistant Chief is a staggering eighteen (18) District Chiefs, far exceeding any other management span of control within the Fire Department.

With the creation of the Division Chief rank, that span of control would shrink within the ideal range of three to seven. The new span of control would be six (6) – three (1) Division Chiefs (Shift Commander), one (1) Operations District Chief, one (1) EMS District Chief, and one (1) Special Operations District Chief. All facets of operational response would be effectively managed with a significantly improved span of control.



Current Operations Bureau Span of Control




**CURRENT SPAN OF CONTROL FOR
OPERATIONS BUREAU ASSISTANT CHIEF
(CAR 3)**

**(18)
18 - District Chiefs**



Proposed Operations Bureau Span of Control With Creation of Division Chief (Shift Commander) Rank



PROPOSED SPAN OF CONTROL FOR OPERATIONS BUREAU ASSISTANT CHIEF (CAR 3)

**(6)
3 Division Chiefs
3 District Chiefs**



The creation of a shift commander Division Chief (Shift Commander) rank would also allow suppression District Chiefs to take an active role in daily Company Training and District level training exercises, including basic skill development, firefighting skills reinforcement and Minimum Company Standards Performance Evaluation. The Division Chief (Shift Commander) would assume the daily office workload, daily staffing scheduling, daily leave exception scheduling, daily interdepartmental mail distribution, meeting attendance, and other non-emergency duties of each District Chief. The Division Chief (Shift Commander) and corresponding District Chiefs would work closely with the proposed Training Staff to provide incumbent fire training as outlined in Recommendation #2. With the availability, District Chiefs would now be able to monitor company drills within their district on a regular basis to verify proficiency in high risk - low frequency tasks. Line firefighters would be provided a full circle of training support at the company level, at the district level and at the departmental level. The renewed focus on basic firefighting skill development is warranted.

Additional considerations to assist in District Level Training functions:

- Schedule District training days and times at training facilities to allow for realistic training evolutions to be conducted on a more frequent basis.
- Ensure periodic “proficiency” testing on basic skills to ensure competency in accordance with Minimum Company Standards Performance Evaluations as outlined in NFPA 1410.
- Utilize companies to lead and manage task-specific drills.
- Ensure additional staff to develop, schedule, coordinate, deliver and manage Incumbent training to Operations personnel.
- Creating and managing more computerized reporting systems to reduce the amount of department printed mail.

Conclusion

The added layer within the Fire Department operational rank structure has served numerous cities and their citizens well. The addition of a Division Chief (Shift Commander) rank would significantly improve operations of the Cincinnati Fire Department at emergency incidents with enhanced Command support, an added layer of safety and quicker response. In addition, the training of all Cincinnati firefighters has been identified as the #1 recommendation of this report. In order to fulfill this recommendation, the Cincinnati Fire Department needs to have District Chiefs become more involved in training of personnel in their districts. The Division Chief (Shift Commander) will allow some of the manpower and management functions to be removed from the District Chiefs to free non-response time for training.

Staffing Requirements

3 - Division Chief (Shift Commander) *New Position / Rank* assigned to the 24 / 48 hour tour system



Budget Implications

Division Chief (Shift Commander) Rank – above District Chief and below Assistant Chief

Rate of Pay - 10% above District Chief. (NOTE: This percentage is used as a monetary reference for this report. The positions development and rate of pay to be determined with CFD and Local 48 input.)

| Position | Salary | Benefits | Certification Pay | Total Per Position | Positions Requested | Total Budget |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| Division Chief Shift Commander | \$104,572.00 | \$59,606.00 | \$2436.00 | \$166,614.00 | 3 | \$499,842.00 |

Reference Lessons Learned or Reinforced:

Operations - Lessons 10, 18, 20, 21, 22

Communications - Lessons 25, 30

Training - Lessons 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40



Recommendation #4

Fire Response Enhancements

1. Engine Company Response Assignments

6020 Dahlgren St is a fairly common type of occupancy in the City of Cincinnati. There are literally hundreds of similar large multiple dwelling occupancies in each of the City's neighborhoods.

The Cincinnati Fire Department currently distinguishes between "standard" and "high-hazard" fire box assignments. The only difference in the two assignments is the number of Engine Companies assigned. Up until the time of this fire, the Cincinnati Fire Department couldn't distinguish specific addresses that should be considered "high-hazard" and add the third Engine Company to the response assignment. In addition, there are hundreds of other occupancies such as commercial and industrial facilities that fall into the same category where "high-hazard" assignments of a 3rd Engine Company aren't determined and are in need of response assignment improvements.

Getting water on the fire is the most important function the fire department can perform to protect lives and property. The first engine was unable to advance their fire line to the fire apartment by themselves which in turn caused the second engine to assist the first engine. This action left no firefighters to deploy and operate a back-up fire line. As a result, the District Chief assigned the Safety Engine (Engine 46, which is assigned to support RAT functions and establish Accountability) to fire suppression functions and the 3rd Engine Company. This action left the incident without a designated Safety Engine and foreground accountability or SCBA tracking on the MSA computer were not initiated. Engine 46 arrived on scene not anticipating having to extinguish the fire. They parked 4 doors down from the intersection of Dahlgren & Ward Streets and had to walk a great distance to the fire building. Their time to the building was delayed, further delaying water application to the fire as a result of the issue with the first two hose lines. Engine 46 extinguished the fire.

Current CFD Procedures on Structure Fires outline the actions of (3) Engine Companies on a working fire. These procedures need to be followed and assignment of a 3rd working engine to all assignments will assist in ensuring timely line placement in difficult circumstances.

Implementation:

1. The Cincinnati Fire Department should mandate that the 2nd Engine Company always assists the 1st Engine Company until water is flowing on the fire.
2. Response should be standardized to eliminate confusion and variances between occupancies.
 - a. All reports of fire should get the same response level.



- b. By making the response the same to all occupancies, responding firefighters will always know what their assignment is.
3. Unless faced with extreme circumstances, the Incident Commander should not have to reassign vital Safety Resources (RAT and SAFETY ENGINE) of our response to firefighting functions.
 - a. Reassignment of these resources at 6020 Dahlgren St allowed for FAO Daryl Gordon to be trapped and out of air for 10 minutes before being discovered missing by his company.

Current 1-Alarm Response Assignment

PRIMARY FIRE SUPPRESSION UNITS:

(2) Engine Companies, (2) Truck Companies, (1) Rescue Company and (2) District Chiefs

PRIMARY SUPPORT UNITS:

(1) Truck Company (RAT), (1) Engine Company (Safety), SO2, (1) Medic Unit and (1) EMS Supervisor

Recommended 1-Alarm Response Assignment

PRIMARY FIRE SUPPRESSION UNITS:

(3) Engine Companies, (2) Truck Companies, (1) Rescue Company and (2) District Chiefs

PRIMARY SUPPORT UNITS:

Truck Company (RAT), (1) Engine Company (Safety), SO2, (1) Medic Unit and (1) EMS Supervisor

DUTIES AS OUTLINED IN PROCEDURES:

1st Engine:

- Water Supply (FAO & FF)
- Attack Line to Fire (Officer & FF)

2nd Engine:

- Water Supply (FAO & FF)
- Assist First Engine (Officer & FF)
- If help is not required - Deploy Back-Up Line

3rd Engine

- No Water Supply Unless Ordered
- Report to Building - If 2nd Engine helping the 1st Engine, Deploy Back-Up Line (Officer and 2 FF)
- If 2nd Engine has back-up - Stand-by for Assignment

NOTE: The Committee was not unanimous on this recommendation; however the majority was in favor.



2. Extra Alarm Response Levels

There is currently a CAD issue with the upgrade of fires to extra alarms. At 6020 Dahlgren St. the Incident Commander requested an additional Engine and Truck Company early in the incident and then requested a 2nd Alarm shortly thereafter when the fire wasn't being controlled by 1st Alarm companies. Because he requested an extra resource prior to the 2nd Alarm request, the 2nd Alarm complement was reduced to "balance" out the assignment. In order to make operations more streamlined and easier for an Incident Commander during firefighting operations it is recommended that policy be changed to:

1. When an Incident Commander requests an additional alarm level, they get that pre-determined number of resources, regardless of the number of resources requested between Alarm escalations.
2. When the Incident Commander determines he only needs to complete an Alarm Assignment with any additional resources requested, they should request "*The Balance of the XX Alarm*". This would send the rest of the complement.
3. Furthermore, it is recommended that Alarm levels remain consistent as they escalate.
4. Add a 3rd District Chief to all 3 Alarm Responses. (*Note: This recommendation will not be necessary if the Division Chief (Shift Commander) is implemented.*)
 - a. This will provide vital command support quicker than staff officers responding from home. When staff officers are responding, they can be assigned to cover open Fire Districts.
 - b. The Duty Chief didn't respond to this incident to provide Command Support.
5. Increase EMS Response (Medic Units and EMS Supervisors) as a fire escalates past the 1st Alarm. (*Note: 2nd Alarm - add EMS Supervisor and (1) Medic Unit*)
 - a. Better outline duties for EMS responders on stand-by roles, Rehab and Mayday / RAT operations.
 - i. Procedures for RAT support with EMS resources need to be implemented.
 - b. Increase EMS supervisory roles at fires when extra alarms are requested.
 - c. Integrating EMS personnel into procedures with pre-determined assignments can greatly reduce, if not eliminate the tendency to freelance. It is completely understood that during an emotion event everyone wants to help and assist; however, its during these times that assignments need to be disciplined and personnel need to be available for treatment of other personnel and civilians.



3. Acting Officers

Crews must be supervised by a Company Officer. Company Officers need to be the eyes and ears of the Company in hostile environments, recognizing hazardous or changing conditions, recognizing problems, overcoming problems, communicating needs or problems, and directing the actions of personnel to ensure tasks are completed. Company Officers properly supervising fire fighters during operations are the key to achieving the mission of the Fire Department and adhering to Fire Department Procedures. Without appropriate supervision from a Company Officer, inappropriate decision making or freelancing may occur.

In our system, a firefighter can work in an Out of Classification assignment as an Acting Officer. Personnel either have had to pass a promotional test for the rank they will work within or the "In-Charge" process developed by the Training Bureau. Current issues with our Acting Officer process:

1. There is no Procedure in place to limit the number of Acting Officers per shift.
2. There is no Procedure in place to re-evaluate the ability of a fire fighter to function as an Acting Officer. A fire fighter could pass a promotional test or be cleared 20 years prior and still be able to function as an Acting Officer without any additional training or fitness to supervise evaluation.

Actions to be taken:

1. Develop an immediate plan to focus on duties of personnel working in Above Grade / Out of Classification positions. In addition to the current "CFD Acting Officer Training Packet" a plan should focus on duties of personnel and actions at fire incidents to ensure disciplined supervision of personnel; crew integrity; proper communications; management of emergencies; and completion of tasks.
2. This plan should be developed within 30 days of the release of this report.
 - a. All personnel that currently work in Above Grade / Out of Classification positions should be evaluated by their immediate supervisor and current District Chief within 60 days of the release of this report. *Reference Recommendation #2.*
 - b. An ideal plan would involve:
 - i. On-line training on duties and responsibilities as a fireground officer to allow self study in preparation for face-to-face training. Then District Chiefs deliver a face-to-face training session for firefighters who work in the Acting Officer capacity.
 - ii. District Chiefs will provide this training to their personnel and Company Officers, giving final approval.
3. At this incident, the first two Engine Companies had personnel working Out of Classification as Company Officers. Limit the number of personnel in an Out of Classification capacity in the department.
 - a. Currently at the District Chief rank, only 1 of the 4 positions can be staffed by a Captain working Above Grade.



- b. There currently isn't a system to limit Acting Officer Assignments.
 - i. Acting Officer Assignments shall be limited to (8) positions per day and Above Grade Driver shall be limited to (8) positions per day.
 - ii. This would equate to (2) Out of Classifications per district and an all efforts should be taken to avoid (2) Out of Classification assignments in the same fire station or back-to-back companies.

4. Rescue Companies

When personnel are working in Operations and vacancies occur on Rescue Companies, these positions should be filled by qualified Rescue Technicians. Typically there are several CFD Rescue Technicians working on other companies throughout the City; however, contract language only states that the City is required to maintain (3) qualified personnel on each of the Rescue Companies. Aside from all the specialized operations that these personnel are responsible for, they do go to work differently at a fire than typical Engine or Ladder companies. Unfamiliarity with Rescue Company operations, equipment and methods of work at incidents limits the effectiveness of these companies.

- a. FAO Gordon was working on a Rescue Company and wasn't trained as a Rescue Technician. Additionally, after FAO Gordon became trapped in the elevator shaft, the need for trained personnel and specialized resources and equipment was realized.
 - i. When there are qualified CFD Rescue Technicians working in the department, they shall be utilized to completely staff the Rescue Companies with a full complement of Rescue Technicians.
 - (1) Non-trained personnel shall not work on a Rescue Company if there are trained personnel available, unless that person is a permanent assignment to the company and in training.
 - ii. The second Rescue Company responding on an extra alarm shall not be put to work on a routine basis and should remain available as a RAT assist team to assist in rescue of firefighters should an emergency or catastrophic event occur. This doesn't preclude the Incident Commander from utilizing the second Rescue Company for urgent fireground needs or rescues if no other companies are available.

Reference Lessons Learned or Reinforced:

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| Operations - Lessons | 1, 2, 3, 7, 18, 19 |
| Communications - Lessons | 25, 26 |
| Training - Lessons | 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 |



Recommendation #5 Procedure Enhancements

Operating at structure fires requires a coordinated effort of many resources under the command of a command officer. The CFD has operated for years under standardized predetermined response procedures for Engine, Ladder and Rescue Companies. Our procedures for Structure Fires 203.01 were updated a couple years ago and weren't executed in accordance with their intent. The committee believes this was due to lack of familiarity and training when implemented and reverting to prior traditional procedures.

The entire Cincinnati Fire Department Procedures and Operations Manuals that related to the death of FAO Gordon were systematically reviewed to recognize the standard practices that need improvement, revised, implemented or reinforced to help minimize similar circumstances from occurring again.

The reviews resulted in the recommended changes to the Cincinnati Fire Department Procedures.

| Procedure Number | Title | Action | Reference to Lessons Learned or Reinforced |
|------------------|--------------------|--|--|
| 201.01 | Incident Command | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce through training • Revise | 22 - Incident Command 26 - Radio Template |
| 202.02 | Preplanning | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce through training • Revise | 2 - Hose Deployment 6 - Apparatus Placement 15 - Elevator Search & Control 43 - Preplanning 44 - Premise History |
| 202.04 | Fire Investigation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce through training • Revise | 42 - Fire Prevention & Inspection Concerns |
| 202.07 | Accountability | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce through training • Revise | 3 - Crew Integrity 9 - Safety Engine Company |
| 202.08 | Mayday | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce through training • Revise | 7 - Dangerous Conditions and Emergency Traffic 10 - Mayday Operations and Mayday Channel |



| Procedure Number | Title | Action | Reference to Lessons Learned or Reinforced |
|------------------|--|--|--|
| 202.09 | Rapid Assistance Teams (RAT) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce through training Revise | 8 - Rapid Assistance Teams (RAT) 10 - Mayday Operations and Mayday Channel |
| 203.01 | Structure Fires Freelancing | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce through training Revise | 3 - Crew Integrity |
| 203.01 | Structure Fires Critical Events or Dangerous Conditions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce through training Revise | 7 - Dangerous Conditions and Emergency Traffic |
| 203.01 | Structure Fires Rescue | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce through training Revise | 16 - Rescue Strategy |
| 203.01 | Structure Fires Search | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce through training Revise | 12 - Primary Search 13 - Secondary Search 14 - Stairway Search and Control 15 - Elevator Search and Control |
| 203.01 | Structure Fires Engine Company Operations TACTICS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce through training Revise | 2 - Hose Deployment 3 - Crew Integrity 4 - Coordinated Ventilation 5 - Simultaneous Offensive and Defensive Operations 6 - Apparatus Placement |
| 203.01 | Structure Fires Engine Company Operations PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce through training Create | 3 - Crew Integrity |
| 203.01 | Structure Fires Engine Company Operations LINE PLACEMENT | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce through training Create | 2 - Hose Deployment 43 - Preplanning |
| 203.01 | Structure Fires Engine Company Operations ARRIVAL ORDER & ASSIGNMENTS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce through training Create | 2 - Hose Deployment Multiple others (3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 43) |
| 203.01 | Structure Fires Truck Company Operations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforce through training Revise | 3 - Crew Integrity 4 - Coordinated Ventilation 6 - Apparatus Placement 8 - RAT 12 - Primary Search 13 - Secondary Search Multiple Others (14, 15, 16 and 17) |



| Procedure Number | Title | Action | Reference to Lessons Learned or Reinforced |
|-------------------------|---|--|--|
| 203.01 | Structure Fires Heavy Rescue Company Operations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce through training • Revise | 3 - Crew Integrity 16 - Rescue Strategy 19 - Rescue Company Operations |
| 203.01 | Structure Fires Benchmarks | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce through training • Revise | 20 - Incident Benchmarks |
| 203.01 | Structure Fires EMS Assignment & Duties | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce through training • Revise | 21 - Medical Branch |
| 701 | Radio Procedures 701.03 701.19 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce through training • Revise | 23 - Essential Communications 26 - Radio Template 29 - Nonessential Radio Communications |
| 703 | Dispatch Procedures | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce through training • Revise | 20 - Incident Benchmarks 30 - Extra Alarm Complement |
| 202.04 | Fire Investigation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce through training • Revise | 41 - Scene Preservation & Evidence Collection |
| 505 | Investigation of LODD | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce through training • Revise | 41 - Scene Preservation & Evidence Collection |



Recommendation # 6

Equipment Enhancements

The equipment utilized by the Cincinnati Fire Department was not a major contributing factor early in this incident. Several firefighters were exposed to hostile fire conditions on the 2nd floor and only received minor injuries. This can be contributed to the level of protection our current personal protective equipment (PPE) provides.

As a result of the Mayday event, there were some minor recommendations for improvement in equipment to assist firefighters in identifying hazards, marking hazards, rendering hazards safe and moving or assisting downed firefighters.

Equipment Recommendations:

1. Equipping each fire fighter with large markers or chalk to mark hazards such as freely opening elevator doors or shaft way doors.
2. Ensuring door chocks are available to secure freely opening elevator doors or shaft way doors.
3. Developing or purchasing a quick release strap system for existing stokes baskets.
4. Ensuring all department RAT packs have "Mega Mover" tarps as part of their standard equipment.
5. Evaluate and potentially purchase a shorter Rescue Sled, such as the PMI Rite Rescue Sled to assist in moving downed firefighters in tight hallways and stairwells when injured.
6. Ensure all personnel have department issued tubular webbing. *SOC reported during extrication effort of FAO Gordon he asked several firefighters for webbing in the attempt to lift and secure FAO Gordon.*

Manpower Requirements

None

BUDGET IMPLICATIONS

Estimated less than \$25,000.00



Recommendation #7

Communication Enhancements

A primary use of the radio is to relay vital information. There were several failures communicating issues, hazards or critical events at the Dahlgren St fire. In order to enhance communications on the fireground and improve safety, the following actions are recommended.

Essential Communications - Lesson #23

Establish a work group to define vital incident information that must be communicated on the fireground. This vital information should include benchmarks that should be transmitted at all structure fires. Perform after action critiques of all structure fires using radio recordings.

Standardized Messages - Lesson #24

Standardize radio communications on the fireground. Emphasis should be placed on communicating essential information in a concise manner. Make radio communications training a requirement for all Fire Officers.

Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) - Lesson #25

Update the policy and procedure to include specific information to be transmitted during a PAR. This information should include unit id, unit location and number of members visually accounted for. Enforce the PAR procedure with regular training using fire scenarios.

Radio Training - Lesson #27

Create a workgroup to create a set of core radio skills. All members should regularly complete hands on radio training and be tested on these core competency skills annually.

Mayday Radio Procedures - Lesson #10

Mayday procedures must be drilled on regularly. This should be done using fire scenarios which include simulated maydays. This training should be conducted like a tabletop exercise. Company members will use the radio to fight simulated fires. These regular exercises should be recorded and critiqued using current policy and procedure as a guide. Regular mayday training must become an essential part of all officer training.

Dispatch Center Operations - Lesson #28

Assigning a dispatcher to all structure fires is a good idea that should be expanded through continual drill and training. Fire dispatchers should train regularly with Incident Commanders and company officers to enhance fireground operations.



Nonessential Communications - Lesson #29

Radio recordings for all structure fires should be made available to incident commanders and company officers. Critiques of fire recordings should become a regular part of officer training. Non-essential communication should be identified during these critiques and members should be trained in making clear and concise radio transmissions.

Extra Alarm Complement - Lesson #30

Dispatch procedure should be updated to send a full alarm compliment when requested by the incident commander. Also outlined in Recommendation #3.

Radio Template - Lesson #27

Revise the radio template to limit assigned talkgroups for emergency responses to the first three zones on the radio. Simplify the radio template by naming radio talkgroups according to the zone and channel selector on the radio. For example: The talkgroup located in zone A at channel selector 2 will be named "Fire A2". Naming a radio talkgroup according to the designated purpose of the talkgroup should be kept to a minimum

The current template specifies the exact intended use for each talkgroup, the revised template provides a bank of "generic" talkgroups that can be assigned however the needs of the incident, or the Incident Commander, dictate. The talkgroups themselves are named as simply as possible from Fire 2 through Fire 29 , with the talkgroup number corresponding with the channel selector number on our portable radios.

In order to further simplify channel assignments and minimize channel changes, talkgroups will be assigned by the CAD program to specific zones in the radio based on incident type.

- Structure Fires – ZONE A – Fire 02 through Fire 11
- EMS Incidents (including MVC) – ZONE B – Fire 12 through Fire 21
- Special Runs (Haz Mat, etc) Zone C – Fire 22 Through Fire 29

The revised template is also designed to accommodate other communications needs in the first three zones. Each zone has a Mayday talkgroup to follow our current procedures, a unique simplex talkgroup for situations when the radios cannot reach the trunked radio system, and the current high rise repeater channels. Zone C also has other useful talkgroups such as the River Run channel (HCMA 26) to facilitate communications on specialized incidents.



Currently, other zones and talkgroups are being reconfigured to promote communications for special situations. A new SOC zone has been created, featuring to encrypted talkgroups for use by Special Operations personnel as needed. This zone will not be initially assigned on incidents. The training Zone has been changed to include talkgroups for use in district-level training and also has a simplex channel for training in use of this communications mode. Also, the radio software is currently being reconfigured to allow for easier navigation between the zones.

While drastically simplified for daily operations, the new template would continue to include all channels and talkgroups needed to maintain interoperability at the local, state and national level.



Recommendation # 8

Fire Prevention Enhancements

Fire prevention functions in the fire department aide in reducing the likelihood of fires through inspection, code enforcement and public education efforts. The second leading cause of fires in the past few years in Cincinnati has been food left unattended on the stove. Unfortunately this fire cause has been where the “dominos” started falling in the deaths of FAO Gordon (2015) and FF Oscar Armstrong (2003). In order to perform more fire inspections on target hazards, occupancies with frequent incidents, enhance public education efforts and assist with pre-planning for firefighting operations; staff increases are needed in Fire Prevention. Fire companies are going to have an increased focus on fire training moving forward and with continuing increases in run volumes department wide and existing building inspection and hydrant inspection duties; fire companies will need assistance in code enforcement and inspection duties.

The Fire Prevention Bureau identified some concerns related to public education, fire inspection and code enforcement, preplanning and training on fire inspections.

Public Education

The following enhancements and focus on Public Education efforts may assist in limiting the number of fires related to Food on the Stove. In addition, education on the importance of smoke detectors for early warning and 911 notification to aide in a quicker response by the Fire Department.

Public Education Recommendations:

- Cooking Safety Education
- Smoke Alarm Education & Campaign
- Education on the importance of early 911 notification
- Fire Prevention Seminar Development and Delivery
- Fire Specialists added as outlined in Recommendation #3 to assist with Inspections and Public Education.

Inspection

Frequent Inspections of occupancies assist in identifying hazards and conditions that can cause fires or lead to uncontrolled smoke or fire extension once a fire occurs. The Cincinnati Fire Department needs to enhance Fire Inspection & Code Enforcement Efforts.

Inspection Recommendations:

- Target Inspections based on run and fire frequency to reduce fire potential.
- Review inspection frequency by occupancy type and ensure target hazards are inspected frequently.



- Encourage residents to use www.cincycodeenforcement.com to report code violations and concerns related to the occupancy they live or work within.
- The CFD should continue to work with Cincinnati Building Officials to assure that owners are adhering to building and fire codes.
- The CFD should continue to work with City Building Department - Elevator Unit and continue to identify elevators like at Dahlgren.

Inspection Training

Just as outlined for incumbent firefighter training needs, personnel completing fire inspection duties need continual training to ensure proper code enforcement is occurring during inspections.

Inspection Training Recommendations:

- Continue to train on fire codes and code enforcement through periodic training programs and on-line continuing education.
- Formal training program should be developed for fire companies on how to inspect specific occupancies and specific occupancy issues.
- A quality assurance program should be developed to insure that fire safety inspections are high quality and are consistently performed across fire companies.

Preplanning

Use and evaluation of the pre-plan for this location played some part in potential delays of the fire attack at this event. There is no doubt these difficulties could have existed at any similar event.

Reference NFPA 1620 for guidance

Preplanning Recommendations:

- Foster a system to both ensure that pre-plans are developed but also shared and trained on by the companies most likely to respond. The addition of hardware that will simplify the ease of sharing these plans with all companies.
- Collaboration between operations, fire prevention and training would be needed to make this a reality.
- Pre-plans that involve a change in water supply or standard attack operations shall be reviewed by a District Chief.
- Pre-plans need to identify dangerous conditions, open shafts, elevators such as at 6020 Dahlgren St, difficult stairs, long hose lays, poor water supply, weird layouts and occupancies with difficult access for apparatus.

Premise History

Premise history entries and alerts to fire companies should notify companies of special conditions or hazards in a building. Premise histories need to be verbally communicated to all responding Companies by Fire Dispatch. The current system of retrieving premise histories from the PMDC is neither timely nor easily accessible.



Premise History Recommendations:

- Hazards should be identified and entered in a system that notifies responding companies of hazards during response.
- Certain hazards should prompt training and review by fire companies and District Chiefs on a periodic basis to maintain familiarity with conditions even without a notification over the radio when responding.

Fire Inspection Staff Enhancements:

The Cincinnati Fire Department struggles with maintaining adequate code enforcement and public education efforts due to manpower. There are an estimated 127,912 properties requiring inspection in the City. Of these, almost 85,000 are multiple dwellings, which as outlined in this report have been discovered ineffective and in need of focused efforts due to increased occupant load and fire hazards.

The committee recommends a complete evaluation of the Fire Prevention Bureau staffing and improvements to mirror that of the Building Inspections Department to be more effective in code enforcement and public education efforts. The increase in training demands on firefighters as a priority in these recommendations will take additional time away from the ability of Fire Companies to perform code enforcement inspections thus requiring more inspection responsibilities assigned to the Fire Prevention Bureau. Ideally the Fire Prevention Bureau would handle inspections of Hospitals, Nursing Homes, Major Industrial occupancies, Chemical Manufacturing and Storage occupancies, Manufacturing occupancies, High Rise occupancies, New Construction, Large Places of Assembly, Schools, Colleges, Jails, Large Commercial Complexes and Shopping Malls. Fire Companies would focus on all Multiple Family (Greater than 4 Family), Permit Renewals, Life Safety Inspections and Minor-Use Inspections

Manpower Requirements

4 - Fire Lieutenants assigned to the Fire Prevention Bureau

BUDGET IMPLICATIONS

| Position | Salary | Benefits | Certification Pay | Total Per Position | Positions Requested | Total Budget |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| Fire Lieutenant | \$70,649.00 | \$40,270.00 | \$2436.00 | \$113,355.00 | 4 | \$453,420.00 |



TOTAL BUDGET IMPLICATIONS

| BUDGET IMPLICATIONS | |
|---|-----------------------|
| Training Staff Enhancement (2 Captains, 4 Lieutenants, 4 Training Officers and 1 FAO) | 1,274,782.00 |
| Command Officer Simulation & Command Lab Training | \$70,000.00 |
| Shift Commander / Division Chief Rank | \$499,842.00 |
| Fire Prevention Staff Enhancement | \$453,420.00 |
| Equipment Enhancements | \$25,000.00 |
| YEARLY OPERATIONS EXPENSE (PERSONNEL) | \$2,228,044.00 |
| CAPITAL EXPENSE | \$95,000.00 |
| TOTAL | \$2,323,044.00 |



SECTION 13

**Implementation
Strategy**



Implementation Strategy

Implementation Strategy

The focus of the investigation by this Committee was to identify the facts pertaining to the Line of Duty Death of FAO Daryl Gordon and recommend actions to reduce the risk of similar events. The recommendations developed during the investigation and analysis will significantly improve the operations of the Cincinnati Fire Department. Proper staffing, proper training, and proper equipment to safely operate at any emergency incident should be our top priority. To assist with full implementation, a strategy was developed to categorize these recommendations into Immediate Action Plan, Intermediate Action Plan and Long Term Action Plan. The Cincinnati Fire Department's dedication to improvement of operations and training will truly honor the sacrifice of FAO Gordon and the Gordon family.

Implementation Strategy - Immediate Action (Fiscal Year 2016)

The Committee proposes the following actions be initiated immediately, with full completion of the recommendation within 60 days of the release of this report:

1. **Acting Officers:**
 - A. Complete an immediate review of all personnel authorized to work as Acting Officers in an Above Grade or Out of Classification position. This review shall focus on the minimum standards required to perform the duties of an Acting Officer and actions taken at incidents to ensure disciplined supervision of personnel, crew integrity, proper communication, emergency management and task completion. The Acting Officer Minimum Standards shall be developed by the Operations Bureau and Training Bureau within 30 days of the release of this report. All personnel who are currently authorized to work as an Acting Officer shall be evaluated by their immediate supervisor and current District Chief based upon the criteria set forth in the Minimum Acting Officer Standards within 60 days of the release of this report. Those who fail to meet the minimum standards shall not be authorized to work as an Acting Officer and shall be referred for additional training. *Reference Recommendation #1 and #4*
 - B. Develop and implement a plan to limit the number of Acting Officer positions used daily in the department. *Reference Recommendation #4*
2. **Radio Template:** Reformulate the radio template to simplify channel assignment, fireground communications and radio operations by fire fighters. *Reference Recommendation #8*
3. **Company Officer and Command Officer Training Plan:** Develop a plan for all Company Officers and all personnel who function as Incident Commanders to train and reinforce the following operational actions: effective communications, radio usage, coordination of attack, ventilation operations, dangers of simultaneous offensive and defensive operations, personnel



accountability, utilization of resources, strategy, and management of Mayday operations.
Reference Recommendation #2

4. **One Alarm Complement:** Add an additional Engine Company to all “normal hazard” responses to increase the number of working Engine Companies from two to three. A well-placed, appropriately staffed hose line putting water on the fire saves more lives than any other action performed by the fire department. Procedures shall be completed and enforced to focus on getting the first hose line into service quicker. *Reference Recommendation #4*
5. **Extra Alarm Complement:** Adjust the Extra Alarm Complement procedures to standardize requests for additional resources. Increase EMS resources to fire incidents when alarm levels escalate past the 1st Alarm. *Reference Recommendation #4*
6. **Fireground Hazard Identification:** Revised and implement procedures to identify hazards on the fire ground to include how to properly communicate the hazard and, if possible, how to render the hazard safe. *Reference Recommendation #5*
7. **Command Transfer:** Command Staff and District Chiefs should immediately meet to evaluate the most effective method to transfer Command to Assistant Chiefs or the Fire Chief at incidents, with consideration of Incident Commander, Operations Section, and other Command Staff functions. *Reference Recommendation #5*
8. **Daily Staffing of Rescue Companies:** Rescue Companies should be staffed with four qualified and trained Rescue Technicians on each company for each tour, if available. Non-certified personnel (Officers, Fire Apparatus Operators or Fire Fighters) should only work on the Rescue Companies if there are no other qualified members at their respective rank working that day. Detailed Officers or Fire Apparatus Operators should only be assigned to the Rescue Companies if there are no other vacancies available for their respective position on that Unit Day. *Reference Recommendation #4*
9. **Equipment Enhancement:** Ensure equipment enhancements are distributed to all fire fighters by Central Stores. *Reference Recommendation #6*
 - a. Marking devices for hazards (marker, chalk or grease pencil)
 - b. Door chocks
 - c. Tubular webbing (20') for securing, moving or dragging a downed fire fighter.
10. **Daily Drill Calendar:** Distribute a Daily Drill Calendar that all fire companies should follow to conduct topic-based instruction for fire fighters on a daily basis. *Reference Recommendation #2*



Implementation Strategy – Intermediate Action (Fiscal Year 2017)

The Committee proposes the following actions be initiated within 60 days of the release of this report, with full completion of the recommendation within 180 days of the release of this report:

1. **SOP Review:** Evaluation, development and distribution of enhancements to SOP's for Structure Fires, Incident Command, Communications, Preplanning, RAT, Safety Engine, and Accountability. In-Service Training conducted following all changes or updates to ensure compliance and understanding. *Reference Recommendation #5*
2. **Training Staff:** Increase the size of the Training Staff in order to develop and deliver all incumbent training as outlined in *Recommendation #1*.
 - a. 2 Captains and 4 Lieutenants - to develop and implement all training outlined in recommendations
 - b. 4 District Training Officers - to deliver and coordinate training at company and district level, district drills and proficiency
 - c. 1 FAO to develop and deliver driver training

Training Staff (2 Captains FTE and 4 Lieutenants FTE) to begin developing and implementing all training recommendations in this report - \$715,622.00 annual FTE cost

District Training Officers (4 FTE) to finalize process of delivery of training at district level in conjunction with Priority #1 and 4) - \$453,420.00 annual FTE cost

Driver Training Staff - Fire Apparatus Operator (1 FTE) - \$105,704.00 annual cost

3. **Incumbent Training (priorities):** *Reference Recommendation #2*
 - a. Back-to-Basics In-Service Training
 - b. Communications and Radio Training
 - c. Multi-Company Drills
 - d. Drill Calendar with Lesson Plans, Outlines and Testing Process
 - e. Modern Fire Behavior
 - f. Improvements to Daily Drill Application for record keeping and on-line training resources
4. **Company Officer Training (priorities):** *Reference Recommendation #2*
 - a. New Company Officer School
 - b. Company Officer Quarterly Newsletter
 - c. Existing Officer Training
 - d. Monthly Company Officer Simulation Training
 - e. Company Officer Certification



5. **Command Officer Training (priorities):** *Reference Recommendation #2*
 - a. Command Officer Simulation & Certification Training - *may require purchase of a command training program as outlined in recommendation #2.*
 - b. Command Officer Training
 - c. Monthly Simulation Training
 - d. New Command Officer School
 - e. Command Officer Certification

Command Officer Simulation Lab Development and Training - \$70,000.00 Capital

6. **Equipment Enhancement:** Evaluate, purchase and distribute quick release stokes basket straps to enhance RAT Operations. *Reference Recommendation #6*

Equipment Enhancements - \$25,000.00 capital

Implementation Strategy – Long Term Action (Fiscal Year 2017-2018)

The Committee proposes the following actions be initiated within 180 days of the release of this report, with full completion of the recommendation within 540 days of the release of this report:

1. **Shift Commander: Creation of Division Chief (Shift Commander) Position**
Reference Recommendation #3

Shift Commander / Division Chief (3 FTE) to start process of District Chief involvement and coordination of training developed by Priority #1 - \$499,842.00 annual FTE cost

(Note: This is an estimate, actual cost dependent upon an agreement between the City and Local 48)

2. **Fire Prevention Bureau Staff:** Enhancements to staffing of the Fire Prevention Bureau to augment Inspections, Public Education, Preplanning and Training. *Reference Recommendation #6*
3. **Ongoing Incumbent Training (priorities):**
 - a. Flashover Training *Reference Recommendation #2*
 - b. Rat Refresher Training *Reference Recommendation #2*
 - c. Live Fire Training Evolutions *Reference Recommendation #2*
 - d. Driver Training *Reference Recommendation #2*
 - e. Preplanning & Building Survey Training *Reference Recommendation #8*
 - f. Code Enforcement Training *Reference Recommendation #8*



SECTION 14

Conclusion



Conclusion

The Cincinnati Fire Department responded to the fire at 6020 Dahlgren St. on March 26, 2015, as we have to many fires in the past and continue to respond today.

To truly learn from the occurrences on March 26, 2015, the Cincinnati Fire Department must move forward in a progressive manner to lessen the likelihood of another tragic outcome. We must first step back and look at our current practices as outlined in this report and then make a conscious decision to alter and to improve our operations. Only by aggressive pursuit of these recommendations will we improve the Cincinnati Fire Department.

Traditionally, the Cincinnati Fire Department, like most of the fire service, doesn't embrace change very well. Several key components of this report will result in major changes in the Cincinnati Fire Department. These changes need to be embraced by every member of the fire department in order to improve readiness through training and improve operations through dedication to training and proficiency.

The largest and most comprehensive change to face the Cincinnati Fire Department will focus on reinforcement of basic fire fighting skills and our actions during response to Structure Fires. Training will focus on the tasks and skills to be utilized every day to aggressively and safely combat structural fires. No longer will daily drill training by a company officer be sufficient. Fire fighters need to receive more formalized training than they have received most of their career. This training will focus on efficient engine company and ladder company operations. Once those skills are refined, frequent re-evaluation will occur. District Chiefs must play a vital role in company level training. This will be accomplished through training on incident command, scene size-up, fire scene operations, risk management, and forecasting and predicting the outcome of an incident, focusing not only on individual assignments, but other companies assignments as well.

Adequate staffing of fire fighters, Command, and safety positions are necessary on the incident scene.

Company officers must focus on supervision of their company during emergency operations. When a company officer's focus changes from a supervisory role to a position of assisting in the task at hand, the company leader is lost as well as his or her focus on the safety of the fire fighters.


Each year approximately 100 fire fighters die nationally in the line of duty and another 100,000 are injured. Fire fighting is dangerous and sometimes deadly. However, the loss of a fire fighter cannot be accepted as a "casualty of war". The Cincinnati Fire Department must be proactive and learn from the death of Fire Apparatus Operator Daryl Gordon

Improvements already made since March 26, 2015:

1. Eliminated the use of (FG-D8) as the fire alarm radio channel. Every multiple company fire incident gets its own zone in our radio system, starting with B and moving outward to cover multiple incidents. This eliminated the need to change radio channels once an incident was escalated from a routine response to a full 1-alarm.



2. The Fire Prevention Bureau and City of Cincinnati Buildings and Inspections Department has identified buildings with similar elevators and fire companies were ordered to become familiar with these buildings and enter Premise History Reports.
3. Anytime the fire department responds to an address for an elevator malfunction or rescue, the City of Cincinnati Buildings and Inspections Department is notified.
4. 6020 Dahlgren was inspected and ordered to comply with all applicable fire codes before its reoccupied as a multiple dwelling.
5. Fire companies were taken to the Fire Training Center to conduct hose deployment operations. There wasn't any formal training on deployment or operations at fires, but this did allow for companies to "practice" hose evolutions.



“We Will Never Forget”



SECTION 15

Glossary



Glossary

| | |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| A, B, C, D | The Cincinnati Fire Department has adopted the method of using letters to designate the sides of a building, thus eliminating the need to know geographic locations on an emergency scene. The address side of the building is always the A side of the building with B, C, D etc., to follow sequentially, in a clockwise manner. This method allows members to respond to orders given on a scene without having to determine compass directional reference points such as north, south, etc. |
| Accountability | The position assigned in the Incident Command system to keep track of firefighters on an incident. Also the term used to track firefighters at an incident. |
| Acting Officer | A firefighter who is assigned to serve as the Company Officer on a fire company in the absence of a promoted Lieutenant or Captain. |
| ALS (Advanced Life Support) | Emergency medical care that involves procedures above the basic EMS level including: cardiac monitoring, medication administration and advanced airways. Provided by CFD Firefighter / Paramedics. |
| BLS (Basic Life Support) | Emergency medical care that involves procedures at the basic EMS level including: basic airway management, bandaging, etc. Provided by CFD Firefighter / EMT's. |
| Bonked | A term used on our radio system when the user tries to make a radio transmission and receives a busy signal (busy signal is called a "bonk") |
| Branch | A functional division of the incident command system |
| Captain | A mid level supervisory officer in the fire department above the rank of Lieutenant and directly below a District Chief. Can serve as an Acting District Chief. |
| Channelling | The process of laying hose on both sides of the street to allow apparatus to proceed forward towards the scene between the hoses. |
| Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) | Dispatch system that provides data to responding resources |
| Cross Lay | A pre-connected bed of 1 3/4" hose, usually 250' in length that is mounted just behind the cab of the apparatus on an Engine Company. There are two cross lays on each Engine Company in the Cincinnati Fire Department, typically referred to as the front or rear cross lay. |
| Defensive | A method in which a fire is attacked from an "outside" position due to potential hazards at the incident, collapse or large fires. |



| | |
|--|---|
| District Chief (DC) | The City of Cincinnati is divided into 4 fire districts. Each District is normally supervised by a District Chief and are numbered from 1 to 4. A district chief responds in an operationally equipped S.U.V. and is responsible for incident command at an emergency. The street on which an incident occurs is used to identify 'Command' for a respective incident, i.e. Dahlgren Command. |
| Engine (E) | The firefighting resource that carries firefighters, hose and water to extinguish a fire. |
| Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) | The member responsible for operation of the apparatus on a given tour of duty. This person is tasked with driving the apparatus as well as operating the pumps or aerial ladder on the scene of an emergency. |
| Firefighter (FF) | The members assigned to a company at the rank of fire fighter. |
| Hose Line | The term used for the hose deliver system firefighters utilize to extinguish a fire |
| Hydrant | The primary water source for firefighters. |
| Integrated Control Module (ICM) | This device houses the integrated PASS motion sensor and an analog and LCD display that records and provides information such as cylinder pressure, motion, thermal and low pressure alarm status. The ICM records data pertaining to battery status, cylinder pressure, and alarm status. |
| Ladder | Either an extension or aerial ladder used to facilitate access to all areas not accessible by normal means. |
| Medic (M) | A training level in the Cincinnati Fire Department that provides ALS care. |
| NFPA | National Fire Protection Association - develops standards of practice for firefighting activities nationwide. |
| NIOSH | NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SAFETY AND HEALTH - organization that develops recommendations for safer operations and investigates all Line of Duty Deaths nationwide. |
| Offensive | A method in which a fire is attacked from an "inside" position to limit fire spread and protect occupants from fire conditions. |
| Officer in Charge (OIC) | The member responsible for daily and emergency fire company operations on a given tour of duty. |
| Opposing Hoselines | When two or more hose lines are operated towards each other with one of them striking the other crews. Considered a dangerous tactic. |



| | |
|--|---|
| Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) | The gear that firefighters wear to protect themselves while fighting fires. Includes helmet, hood, gloves, coat, pants, boots and SCBA. |
| Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) | A process whereby the Incident Commander, or Accountability Officer, call all Company Officers by radio to confirm that all members are visually accounted for on an incident scene. The PAR is used at various times during an incident. For example, when changing tactics during an incident, at the 20-minute mark of an incident, or after any unexpected occurrence (building collapse, flashover, etc) |
| Rapid Assistance Team (RAT) | A company of members specially trained to rescue fire fighters in peril. A RAT Company is designated upon the dispatch of a one alarm fire. |
| Rescue (R) | A company in the CFD that carries highly trained firefighters and specialized equipment for rescue and special operations |
| Safety Engine | The Engine Company responsible to establish accountability, to operate the SCBA Air Monitoring System, and to assist with RAT Operations. The Safety Engine is designated upon dispatch of a one alarm fire. |
| Section | A functional division of the incident command system |
| Sector | A functional division of the incident command system |
| Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) | A device worn by firefighters to allow them to breathe in smoky environments. |
| SO2 | The on-duty Safety Officer for the department. Rank of Captain or higher. |
| Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) | Procedures utilized to operate the fire department during emergency and non-emergency functions. |
| Strategy | A plan of attack usually developed by the Incident Commander |
| Tactics | The methods or tasks undertaken to implement a Strategy |
| TIC (Thermal Imaging Camera) | A device used that allows firefighters to see in smoky environments. |
| Truck (T) | A company in the CFD that carries firefighters, ladders, aerial ladder and tools needed fire firefighting. |



| | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| Type II, Unprotected | A technical term for the type of construction utilized. Type 2 is usually block / concrete with steel that isn't protected from fire damage. |
| Ventilation | A task used to remove smoke from a building on fire. |



Appendix 1

Company Actions Pre-Mayday Post Mayday and Detailed Timeline of Radio Transmissions



Company Actions

PRE-MAYDAY COMPANY ACTIONS

Engine 49

4 personnel

Dispatched on 1st Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|---|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Regularly assigned Firefighter riding as Acting Officer | 25.5 | |
| DRIVER | Regularly assigned Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) | 23.5 | 16.5 as FAO |
| Firefighter #1 | Regularly Assigned Firefighter | 22 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Detailed Firefighter from Engine 31 | 1.5 | |

- At 05:31 hours, Engine 49 was dispatched for smoke detector activation on (FG-D8) Fire Alarm Fireground.
- At 05:34 hours, fire alarm was upgraded to a full 1-alarm response by Dispatch due to multiple fire alarms and phone calls with a report of smoke in the building. The FG was changed to Command D (FG-D2).
- At 05:37:50 hours, Engine 49 arrives on scene and gives the following size-up: “6 story brick multi dwelling nothing showing”.
- Engine 49 laid supply line from 5431 Owasco and proceeded up driveway and parked in open spot to the left in the parking lot on “A/D” corner. This allowed access for a truck company. (*Note: This was preplanned prior to the incident*)
- Engine 49 FF#2 stayed at hydrant and waited to be told to turn on the hydrant.
- Engine 49 FF#2 was on the wrong fire ground channel and attempted to find correct channel 12 times without success.
- Engine 49 FF#2 walked up the road to the drive where Engine 49 FAO could be seen and made visual contact to start the hydrant.
- Engine 49 FF#2 started the water in the hydrant, walked back up to Engine 49 FAO and asked if there was anything that was needed – nothing needed per Engine 49 FAO.
- Engine 49 FF#2 donned SCBA, grabbed an axe and followed the line along “D” side and going into the “C” side closest to Engine 49 apparatus.
- Engine 49 FF#2 reports smoke was coming from the rear “C/D” door upon arrival at the door.
- Engine 49 FF#2 reports that E31 was at the entry door holding it open and trying to find something to prop it open – Engine 49 FF#2 indicates she got a door chock from her pocket and chocked the door.
- Upon arrival, Engine 49 FF #1 left the jump seat behind the E49 Acting Officer. The occupant of the apartment was out front stating she was cooking and the fire got away from her.



- Engine 49 FF#1 proceeded into the front door “A” side of the building with the occupant of the apartment.
- Engine 49 FF#1 went to the 2nd floor via the front door to the “B/C” stairwell with the occupant and found heavy smoke in the hallway.
- Engine 49 FF#1 indicated he put on his SCBA mask at this time.
- Engine 49 FF#1 indicated the occupant of the apartment followed him into the hallway at this time.
- Engine 49 FF#1 felt an adjacent apartment door which was hot and could hear the fire from that location.
- Engine 49 FF#1 told the occupant to leave.
- Engine 49 FF#1 stated he got to the apartment door, the apartment was involved in fire and he went to one knee because of the heat.
- Engine 49 FF#1 was in stairwell when Truck 31 arrived. Truck 31 Officer told him to get a line. Engine 49 FF#1 went to first floor, met Rescue 9 in the first floor hallway near the “A” side center entrance as they were coming in and pointed to the direction of the stairwell.
- Engine 49 FF#1 was returning to the apparatus to get a hose, didn’t see his crew, was met by Rescue 9 FAO and asked to help with a ground ladder.
- Engine 49 FF#1 helped with the ground ladder, butted the ladder and helped with victim removal on “C” side.
- Engine 49 FF#1 helped remove victims from balconies on “C” side and ended up on the 4th floor balcony.
- Engine 49 FF#1 was low on air while with the Rescue 9 FAO. Engine 49 FF#1 was given an SCBA bottle by Truck 31 FF#2 (*Note: This was Truck 31 FF#2’s personal bottle*).
- Engine 49 Acting Officer indicated they had made numerous runs to this location for the same type of incident in recent months (see run history on page # 43).
 - Engine 49 Acting Officer indicates he noticed smoke on the “C” side that was visible from the “C/D” corner.
 - Engine 49 Acting Officer lays an 1-3/4” from Engine 49 crosslay (250’) along the “D” side to the door on the “C” side by himself.
 - Engine 49 Acting Officer indicates he tried to prop open the stairwell door with objects found near the entrance door on the “C” side.
 - Engine 49 Acting Officer stretches line up ½ flight of stairs to enter the 2nd floor “D” side hallway. Indicates hallway was charged with smoke (*Note: There is a difference in grade from the “A” side of building to the “C” side of building – the “C” entrance door is actually between floors 1 and 2*).
 - Engine 49 FAO asks Engine 49 Acting Officer on radio “Engine 49, do you need water yet”.
 - At 05:51:31 Engine 49 Acting Officer states – please start the water but is unintelligible.
 - District 4 states – “please start the water in Engine 49’s line”
 - Engine 49 Acting Officer indicates he felt resistance on the hose and couldn’t advance further down the hallway.
 - Engine 49 Acting Officer communicates with Rescue 9 Officer and they discuss the fact that they don’t have enough hose. Rescue 9 Officer indicates they are short and need 2 sections added to the attack line to Command.
- Engine 49 FF#2 follows the line up to Engine 49 Acting Officer and told line won’t advance.
- Engine 49 FF#2 returns to stairwell and finds the charged hose line stuck in the stairs and yelled to E49 Acting Officer they had a bad line it was wedged in the stairs (in the space between the riser tread and wall) and couldn’t be advanced any further.



- Engine 49 FF#2 took the second line from the stair landing just inside the door. (Engine 31's line) Indicates the line was uncharged.
- Engine 49 FF#2 takes the 2nd line up the stairs to the 2nd floor and attempts to give it to ENGINE 49's Acting Officer. The fire line became charged before the hand off to the officer, and, due to the open nozzle, water was discharged from the hose. Engine 49 FF#2 wrestled with the line and was able to get it shut down.
- During this process the heat in the hallway got worse. During the struggle to regain control of the open line, FF #2 lost her helmet; additionally, FF #2's face piece began to dislodge due to Engine 49 Acting officers attempt to advance the line. FF #2 indicated that she began to cough from the smoke she inhaled while her face piece was dislodged.
- Engine 49 FF#2 indicated the heat was more intense at this time and forced her to the ground.
- Engine 49 Acting Officer indicated that he was getting burned on his hands at this time and yelled to Engine 49 FF#2 to get out of the hallway and exit the building. Engine 49 Acting Officer was yelling "my hand, my hand" as they exited the "C" side door they came in earlier. When exiting, indicated Engine 31 was standing in the entrance doorway from the outside.
- Engine 49 Acting Officer told Engine 31 that it had flashed in the hallway and Engine 31 relayed this information to SO2.
- Engine 49 FF#2 indicated Engine 49 Acting Officer didn't have a glove on his left hand.
 - Engine 49 FF#2 went back inside at the top of the steps and retrieved a glove and axe.
- Engine 49 Acting Officer and Engine 49 FF#2 exited the building and respond to Engine 49's apparatus location, where Engine 49's Acting Officer received medical treatment and was later transported to the hospital.
- Engine 49 FF#2 re-entered the building, sometime later, to retrieve her helmet. Engine 49 FF#2 exited the building and remained at Engine 49's apparatus, along with Engine 49 FAO, and later with Engine 49 FF #1.

District 4

2 personnel

Dispatched on 1st Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank | Other Time in Rank | Other Time in Rank |
|----------------|---|----------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| District Chief | Detail Chief from Operations Assigned to District 4 | 19.5 | 2 yrs as DC | 8 yrs as Captain | 6 yrs as Lieut. |
| Captain | Detailed from Truck 31 for training as a District Chief | 22 | 2 yrs as Captain | 14.5 yrs as Lieut. | |

- At 05:31 hours, District 4 was dispatched for smoke detector activation on (FG-D8) Fire Alarm Fireground at 05:31 hours.
- At 05:34 hours, fire alarm was upgraded to a full 1-alarm response by Dispatch due to phone calls with a report of smoke in the building. The FG was changed to Command D (FG-D2). District 4 notified Truck 31's OFFICER of the upgraded response prior to both units leaving quarters.
- District 4B changes the two portable radios to FG D2 while enroute to the scene.



- District 4 parked his vehicle in the parking lot across from the “A/B” corner, set up the Command Post at this location and assumes “Command.”
- While exiting the vehicle, both District 4 and District 4B encounters a strong odor of smoke (wood burning smell) in the air.
- District 4 advised Truck 31 to get their apparatus in the driveway to the front of the building before Engine 49 charged their supply line.
- At 05:41:44 hours, District 4 confirms a working fire in a six-story multi-dwelling (*Note: building is actually 5 stories*) and requests an additional Engine and Truck Company.
- A female occupant informs District 4 that the fire is on the second floor. This is confirmed by Truck 31 Officer.
- District 4 tells District 4B to go the “C” side of the building and give him a report.
 - District 4B walks around the “B” side of the building to the “C” side. He witnesses Truck 31 A Team at the “B/C” stairway door. He proceeds to the “C” side and sees heavy fire in an apartment on the second floor adjacent to the “B/C” stairs.
 - District 4B orders Truck 31 A Team to ventilate the glass patio doors to the fire apartment.
 - District 4B then reports back to the Command post to relay this information to District 4 face-to-face.
- District 4 attempts to contact Engine 49 and Engine 31 for a progress report on FG D2 with no response.
 - District 4 witnesses numerous people on front “A” side balconies with heavy smoke over their heads.
 - At 05:46:57, District 4 requests the 2nd Alarm.
 - District 4 tells District 1 face-to-face to perform a 360 of the building and give him a report.
 - District 4 again attempts to contact Engine 49 and Engine 31 with no response.
- District 4 orders District 4B to attempt a PAR, but it was never started.
 - District 4B attempted to track Company locations on a piece of paper; however, this proved difficult due to rainy conditions. Also, the Passports were not collected by District 4B due to distance of co’s away from Command. (RAT company did not collect passports due to a reassignment.)
 - District 4B saw two hose lines going around the “C/D” corner of the building.
- District 4 Requests RAT 23, Safety Engine 46, Engine 18 and Truck 18 to come forward and report for work. Tells them to use tools and hose from the Companies already on the scene and District 4 orders Safety Engine 46 and Engine 18 to advance a hose line off Engine 49’s apparatus to the fire floor.
- At 05:51:35 District 4 orders Engine 49 FAO to start the water in Engine 49’s hose line.
- At 05:52:03 District 4 begins receiving numerous reports from Rescue 9 Officer of the fire location, fire conditions and the progress of search efforts and the fire attack (*Note: See Rescue 9*).
- At 05:55:22, District 4 requests the 3rd Alarm and that Truck 19 becomes the RAT.
- District 4B reports face-to-face to Command and advised him that a fire line has been extended into the “A” side of the building to the “B/C” stairs.
- District 4 acknowledges Safety Officer 2 (SO2) transmission in reference to Engine 49 and Engine 31 “backing out” due to a flashover. (*Note: No other confirmation of a flashover. Rescue 9 and Truck 31 were on the second floor at this time*).
- At 06:02:16, District 4 give Progress Report #1 to Dispatch, reports that the fire has been “knocked down” but that there are still heavy smoke conditions on floors 2-6.
- District 4 attempts to contact District 1 on FG D-2; no response.
- District 4 assigns Truck 32 to search the 3rd floor.



- District 4 assigns Engine 8 to search 4th floor.
- District 4 assigns District 3 as the Search and Rescue Branch.
- District 4 stages the 3rd Alarm Companies 3 blocks away, delaying RAT 19's arrival to the Command Post.
- At 06:07:04, District 4 gives Dispatch Progress Report #2.
- District 4 receives a message from Dispatch that there are people still trapped in apartment #557 (#57).
- District 4 requests two additional Medic Units.
- At 06:13:54, District 4 orders RAT 19 to come forward and perform a PAR.
- District 4 tells Engine 8 not to force doors.
- District 4 orders Engine 23 and Engine 7 to come forward and assigns them positive pressure ventilation.
- District 4 assigns Special Operations Chief (SOC) to assist District 3 with Search and Rescue.
- District 4 orders Truck 23 to perform a secondary search of the 3rd floor.
- District 4 orders Engine 49 to reestablish pressure to the fire line going to the fire apartment (*Note: the fire line that Engine 46 had advanced into the building*).
- At 06:19:43, District 4 - Asks RAT 19 to perform a PAR.

Truck 31

4 personnel

Dispatched on 1st Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|--|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Detail officer assigned to District 4 | 16 | 6 mo |
| DRIVER | Detail Driver (FAO) assigned to District 4 | 16 | 4 |
| Firefighter #1 | Regularly Assigned Firefighter | 16.5 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Regularly Assigned Firefighter | 20.5 | |

- At 05:31 hours, Truck 31 was dispatched for smoke detector activation on (FG-D8) Fire Alarm Fireground.
- At 05:34 hours, fire alarm was upgraded to a full 1-alarm response by Dispatch due to multiple fire alarms and phone calls with reports of smoke in the building. The FG was changed to Command D (FG-D2).
- At 05:41 hours, Truck 31 arrived on scene and positioned the apparatus on "A" side just outside entrance.
- At 05:42:13, Truck 31 Officer and Truck 31 FF #1 enter "A" side to Lobby to "B" stairwell to Floor 2 to conduct Primary Search, where they meet Engine 49 FF #1 on the landing outside the hallway.
- Truck 31 FAO and Truck 31 FF #2 attempt to place the apparatus for optimal aerial use; however, apparatus placement didn't allow full extension of the outriggers due to obstructions.



- Seeing numerous civilians on balconies and unable to fully use aerial, Truck 31 FAO and FF #2 utilize a 28' ground ladder to conduct a rescue of 2 female civilians from Apt #24 balcony on Floor 2 near the A/D corner (*Note: This rescue proved to be lengthy due to the size of the victim*).
- At the request of District 4B, Truck 31 FF #1 exits B Stairwell exterior door to C side and ventilated sliding glass door to fire apartment with an axe from C side exterior. Immediately flames and black smoke came bellowing out. (*Note: No water on the fire at the time of ventilation*)
 - At 05:45:55, from his vantage point on the C side exterior, Truck 31 Officer notified Command that they now had heavy fire coming out the C side.
 - Truck 31 Officer and FF #1 make an attempt to enter Floor 2 hallway from the "B" stairwell landing to conduct primary search, but are driven back by intense heat from the fire apartment.
 - At 05:48:37, Truck 31 Officer notifies Command that an attack line is needed on Floor 2 and should be brought in the A entrance to the B Stairwell to Floor 2. They remain on the landing outside the hallway awaiting an attack line.
- Rescue 9 Officer, FF #1, FF #2, and FF #3 arrive at the "B" stairwell landing on Floor 2.
 - Truck 31 Officer informs Rescue 9 of fire conditions on Floor 2.
 - Rescue 9 Officer, Rescue 9 FF #1 and Rescue 9 FF #2 enter hallway and proceed down Floor 2.
 - Truck 31 Officer attempts to follow Rescue 9, but turns back when he realizes that Truck 31 FF #1 does not follow.
 - Truck 31 Officer indicates it is extremely hot in the hallway. Truck 31 Officers helmet suffers burn damage and his face shield is melted. (photos page #97)
 - Truck 31 Officer, FF #1 and Rescue 9 FF #3 remain on the landing outside the hallway awaiting an attack line.
- At 05:52:59, District 4 assigns Engine 46 to advance an 1 ¾" attack line from Engine 49 into the 2nd floor "B" stairwell from the "A" entrance. Engine 46 advances the line and meets up with Truck 31 Officer, Truck 31 FF #1, and Rescue 9 FF #3 at Floor 2 landing.
- Truck 31 FAO and Truck 31 FF #2 return to the turntable in an attempt to override the aerial, in order to conduct rescues.
 - District 4 assigns Truck 31 FAO and Truck 31 FF#2 to take a 2 ½" attack line from Engine 49 to the "C" side of the structure. Before they get the hose off of Engine 49, District 4 re-assigns them to assist District 1 on the "C" side exterior, who already has an 1 ¾" attack line off of Engine 31 (laid by Engine 31 FAO and Engine 46 FAO in anticipation of need).
 - At 05:55:54, water is started to District 1's attack line on the "C" side exterior.
 - Truck 31 FAO and FF #2 walk to "C" side (passing Engine 49 Acting Officer bailing out from building at "C/D" corner) to the exterior at the fire apartment and relieve District 1 on the attack line.
- At 05:58:22, Engine 46 Officer asks Engine 49 to start the water in the attack line on Floor 2 interior. The charged hose line is advanced down the hallway to the fire apartment, with Truck 31 Officer on the nozzle, followed by Truck 31 FF #1, followed by Rescue 9 FF #3, followed by Engine 46 FF #1. The main body of fire is knocked down.
- At 06:04:30, SO2 notifies Command that the fire has been knocked down.
- At 06:04:57, Truck 31 Officer and Truck 31 FF#1 exit the building to refill bottles.
 - Rescue 9 FF #3 and Engine 46 FF #1 move-up on the line and continue to hit hot spots.
- Truck 31 FAO and FF #2 continue to operate the attack line from the exterior into the fire apartment until they notice an attack line spraying water from inside the fire apartment.
 - Truck 31 FAO and FF #2 communicate with Rescue 9 FF #3 and Engine 46 FF #1 about location of hot spots and confirm there is no further need to remain on the line from the



exterior. (NOTE: Rescue 9 FF #3 and Engine 46 FF #1 state they were struck by the stream from the attack line operating from the exterior but were not injured.)

- The line operating from the exterior “C” side is shut down at this time.
- Truck 31 FAO and FF #2 proceed back toward the “C/D” corner to retrieve ceiling hooks from Truck 31, preparing to enter the fire apartment to pull ceilings.
- While walking to retrieve hooks, Truck 31 FAO & FF#2 are stopped by Engine 49 FF #1 on the “C” side 4th floor balcony, asking for an SCBA bottle. Truck 31 FF #2, having not used his SCBA, ascended the ground ladder to the Floor 4 balcony and exchanged SCBA bottles with Engine 49 FF #1.
- Truck 31 FAO and FF #2 continue toward the “D” side. They pass Engine 31 Acting Officer and Engine 31 FF #1 on the exterior “C” side door to the D Stairwell.
- As Truck 31 FF #2 reaches the “D” side, he believes he hears a Mayday for someone falling down steps, and Truck 31 FAO realizes his radio is not turned on. Upon reaching the A side near Truck 31, FAO and FF #2 confirm the Mayday with other personnel.
- Truck 31 Officer and FF #1 are at Truck 31 changing SCBA bottles at the time of the Mayday.

Engine 31

4 personnel

Dispatched on 1st Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|---|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Regularly assigned Firefighter riding as Acting Officer | 21 | |
| DRIVER | Detail Driver (FAO) assigned to District 2 | 13 | 1.5 |
| Firefighter #1 | Regularly Assigned Firefighter | 25 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Detailed Probationary Firefighter from Engine 23 | 1 | |

- At 05:34 hours, Engine 31 was dispatched on the 1-alarm upgrade.
- At 05:43:16, Command attempts to contact Engine 31. No response. [Note: Engine 31 Acting Officer had his radio on Command C (FG-C2)].
- At 05:47 hours, Engine 31 arrived on scene and laid a 5” supply line from hydrant at 5423 Ward Street up driveway to “A/D” corner of building.
- At 05:47:30, Command assigns Engine 31 to backup Engine 49’s line. No response on the radio from Engine 31.
- At 5:48:17, Engine 31 FAO asks FF #2 to start the hydrant. No response from Engine 31 FF#2. Hydrant is started without incident. (Note: Engine 31 FF #2 radio is on Main Dispatch; FF #2 switches radio to FG-D2 at 06:01:17).
- At 05:48:51, Command assigns Engine 31 to “respond to the radio” and back up Engine 49’s line. No response on the radio from Engine 31 Acting Officer.
- Engine 31 Acting Officer and FF #1 stretch 1 ¾” attack line (blue crosslay) with Vindicator nozzle to “C/D” corner of building.
 - Line is dropped on top of retaining wall at “C” side of building near “D” stairwell exterior access door. Hose is not flaked out at all prior to being charged by E31 FAO.



- Engine 31 Acting Officer and FF#1 encounter Engine 49 FAO who states Engine 49 Acting Officer is inside alone and needs help stretching line. Engine 31 tried to assist Engine 49 with advancing line up steps. Engine 31 Acting Officer goes to Floor 2 hallway and FF #1 remains in stairwell. They are unable to dislodge hose stuck between step and wall in “D” stairwell.
- At 05:50:35, Engine 31 FAO asks if Engine 31’s attack line is ready for water; no response from Engine 31 Acting Officer. FAO starts water to attack line 20 seconds later. [Note: At 05:51:26, Engine 49 FAO asks if Engine 49 Acting Officer is ready for water yet. Engine 49 Acting Officer responds to start the water (but is unintelligible) and Engine 49’s attack line is started].
- At 05:51:00, Engine 31 Acting Officer turns radio to FG-C2 and attempts to transmit twice. Unintelligible. (Note: E31 Acting Officer does not switch his radio to the correct D2 until 06:25:41 - which is post-Mayday.).
- At 05:52:10, FF #1 asks Engine 31 FAO to shut the water off temporarily.
 - Engine 49 FAO responds “OK”, but advised by Command that the message was actually for Engine 31; Engine 31 FAO tries to respond but is “bonked.” Unknown if water is ever shut off.
- Engine 49 FF #2 now enters “D” stairwell and moves up in position between E31 Acting Officer and E49 Acting Officer in Floor 2 hallway.
 - Unable to advance Engine 49’s line, Engine 49 FF #2 returns to stairwell and takes Engine 31 line from landing and proceeds down hallway, passing Engine 31’s Acting Officer.
 - Short of Engine 49 Acting Officer, the Engine 31 line is suddenly charged (with open bail).
 - Engine 49 FF #2 is able to control the line, however the line also comes up a couple feet short of Engine 49’s line. [Note: No testimony as to how line got from exterior wall to interior stairwell landing (possibly by Engine 31 FF #2)].
- At 05:53:29, Engine 31 FF #1 attempts to notify Command about civilians in need of rescue on “C” side, but is “bonked.” No transmission received by Command.
- Engine 31 FF #2 proceeded to “C” side of structure, stated he “untangled hose line on the wall” (believed to be Engine 31 line), entered the building in the “D” stairwell, proceeded to Floor 2, and “ended up” with Truck 18 FF #1 conducting primary search on Floor 2. Engine 31 FF #2 then exits structure and went to Truck 31 aerial to help with victim rescue from Floor 4 exterior.
- Engine 31 Acting Officer and FF #1 evacuate structure with Engine 49 Acting Officer and Engine 49 FF #2 due to high heat conditions.
 - Engine 31 Acting Officer and FF #1 remain on exterior of building until Mayday.
- Engine 31 FAO and Engine 46 FAO lay rear bed 1 ¾” to “C/D” corner. Line is later taken by District 1 and advanced on the exterior “C” side toward fire apartment.
 - At 05:55:54, line is charged and operated into fire apartment from exterior by District 1, Truck 31 FAO and Truck 31 FF #2.
- At 05:59:36, Safety OFFICER 2 transmits “Emergency. I’m on the rear side of the high-rise. I’ve been told by two companies that evacuated, Engine 49, Engine 31, that they said there’s a flashover on the second floor and they evacuated.” SO2 also advises Command that Engine 49 and Engine 31 have backed out of the building and are on the “C” Side exterior.
- At 06:01:17, SO2 advises Command that Engine 31 has re-entered the building on the “C” side. (Note: Testimony from Engine 31 Acting Officer states they remained on the exterior until Mayday).
- Engine 31 FAO self-assigned from location at pump panel to Truck 31 aerial turntable to conduct aerial rescues off of balconies, rescuing one male civilian from Floor 3 balcony.
 - Soon joined by Truck 18 FAO, Truck 18 FF #2, and Engine 46 FAO to rescue 1 male and 2 female civilians from 2 separate balconies.
 - Engine 31 FAO then dismounts turntable and returns to Engine 31 to await orders to charge 1 ¾” crosslay (red) taken by E-18 to the “C” side exterior (never charged).



- Engine 31 Acting Officer and FF #1 were on the exterior “C” side near the retaining wall at the time of the Mayday; Engine 31 FAO was at the pump panel at the time of the Mayday; the location of Engine 31 FF #2 is unknown at the time of the Mayday

Rescue 9

5 personnel

Dispatched on 1st Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|--|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Regular Assigned Lieutenant | 21 | 13 |
| DRIVER | Regular Assigned Rescue Company Detail FAO | 16.5 | 12 |
| Firefighter #1 | Regularly Assigned Firefighter | 14 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Regularly Assigned Firefighter | 9 | |
| Firefighter #3 | Regularly Assigned Firefighter | 25 | |

- At 05:34 hours, Rescue 9 was dispatched to the 1-alarm upgrade.
- Rescue 9 was riding with five fire fighters for this shift (*Note: Regular assignment is 4 firefighters*).
- At 05:48 hours, Rescue 9 arrived on the scene and parked on Dahlgren St. at Owasco St.
- Rescue 9 Officer, FF#1, FF#2 and FF#3 walked up the driveway to the building.
 - Rescue 9 FAO was delayed because he had to finish getting dressed.
- No fire or smoke was visible on “A” side of the building upon Rescue 9 arrival.
- Rescue 9 was notified by Command of a report of people in wheel-chairs on the "C/D" side of the building. (This info was relayed to command by unknown FF).
- Rescue 9 entered the front door on “A” side and had no smoke on Floor 1. Engine 49 FF#1 was on the 1st floor and pointed out the stairwell towards the “B” side
- Rescue 9 went to the “B” side stairwell and encountered light smoke at the first return landing in the stairwell.
- Rescue 9 Officer looked out “B” stairwell door which was open and exits to the “C” side on ½ landing between 1st & 2nd floors and noticed fire venting from the first apartment on the “C” side closest to the stairwell. (*Note: This door was on grade level in the rear of the building due to grade changes*).
- Rescue 9 Officer indicates there were two members of Truck 31 (Officer & FF#1) in the stairwell yelling for a line multiple times.
- Rescue 9 Officer, FF #1, FF #2 and FF #3 entered the 2nd floor hallway. FF #3 remained with Truck 31 members while Rescue 9 Officer, FF #1 and FF #2 continued down hallway. Rescue 9 FF#3 indicated that Truck 31 Officer was concerned for Rescue 9 member’s safety, due to the fire conditions.
 - Rescue 9 FF#1 and FF#2 indicated that one of the Truck 31 firefighters helmet was “burning” when they crawling into the hallway.



- Rescue 9 Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 encountered fire from the first apartment on the left in the hallway venting from the open doorway. Additionally, the floor tiles on the floor were burning and the door across the hall was also on fire.
 - Rescue 9 indicated that the fire conditions were not too severe at this time in the hallway. There was a small amount of fire on the hallway floor and the door across from the fire apartment.
 - At 05:51 hours, the door to the fire apartment was pulled closed by Rescue 9 officer, and he observed the top 1/3rd of the door was burned off.
- Rescue 9 Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 began searching the hallway past the fire apartment towards the "C/D" stairwell.
 - Approximately two apartments away from the fire towards the "D" side, Rescue 9 Officer encountered Engine 49 Acting Officer on a hose line in the hallway and told the Engine 49 Acting Officer that the fire was straight down the hall. Engine 49 Acting Officer stated that the hose line couldn't be moved because they were out of hose.
- At 05:54, Rescue 9 Officer called Command and stated Engine 49's line was short 50-60 feet and needed to be extended by 100". In addition, he stated that another line was needed to come to the "B" side stairwell, for direct access to the fire.
- Rescue 9 Officer crawls back towards fire apartment while FF#1 and FF#2 continue on with their search.
 - Rescue 9 Officer indicates the apartment door is burned away and fire is extending into the hallway.
- Rescue 9 Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 discovered a second charged 1-3/4" line, both unmanned laying about 1-2 feet apart in the hallway.
 - Rescue 9 Officer opened the stalled line towards the fire apartment. The line was sprayed from its stalled location for 10-15 seconds down the hall to cool down the hallway; no fire seen from the nozzle location – just dark smoke and heat; however conditions in the hallway improved.
 - Rescue 9 indicated they never attempted to pull or advance the lines assuming they were short as indicated by the initial talks with Engine 49 in the hallway.
 - Rescue 9 Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 continued to search the 2nd floor.
 - Rescue 9 Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 proceeded to the 3rd floor and observed numerous FF's on the 3rd floor already searching so they went to the 4th floor.
 - Rescue 9 Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 forced doors on the 4th floor.
 - *(Note: Rescue 9 appeared confused as to their location at this time and gave radio transmission they were moving to the 3rd floor and then gave a radio transmission that there was no extension on the floor above – when they were actually 2 floors above the fire).*
- Rescue 9 FF#3 stayed in the stairwell on the second floor with Truck 31 and indicated the heat was intense in the hallway near the stairwell.
 - Rescue 9 FF#3 indicated that Engine 46 brought a line up the "B" side stairwell and it got passed up to Truck 31 Officer and FF#1.
 - Rescue 9 FF#3 and Truck 31 Officer and Truck 31 FF#1 started extinguishing fire in the fire apartment. Truck 31 Officer and FF#1 with Rescue 9 FF#3 was backing them up.
 - While extinguishing the fire, Truck 31 Officer and FF #1 became low on air and exited the building. Rescue 9 FF #3 remained in the fire apartment extinguishing hot-spots.
 - During this attack on the fire, Rescue 9 FF#3 indicates he was getting hit by a hose stream from some other location (Truck 31 FAO and FF#2 were applying water from the outside).
 - Rescue 9 FF#3 left the building, told Rescue 9 Officer via a radio transmission he was leaving and gave the line to Engine 46 personnel.



- Rescue 9 FAO was delayed in entering the fire building because he had to don his PPE after arriving on the scene.
 - Rescue 9 FAO believed he heard someone on the radio when walking up the drive stating they needed trucks on the “C” side.
 - Rescue 9 FAO went to Engine 31 and had the Engine 31 FAO lower the ladder rack and took the first ladder (14’ adjustable hook) and proceeded to the “C” side. The ladder was only able to reach 1 floor up to the 3rd floor balcony and assisted a victim down the ladder. (*due to terrain the 2nd floor was at ground level in the “C” side*)
 - Rescue 9 FAO saw people on the 5th floor “C” side and yelled for them to go back inside and wait for assistance. Rescue 9 FAO was in route to get another ground ladder when he asked Engine 49 FF#1 for assistance. Engine 49 FF#1 and Rescue 9 FAO removed the 24’ ladder from Engine 31 and took it to the “C” side
 - Rescue 9 FAO stated that the 24’ ladder would only reach the 4th floor balcony. He stated that he climbed to the 4th floor balcony to ensure that the victims on the 5th floor did not jump.
 - Rescue 9 FAO stood on a small table on the 4th floor balcony and the balcony railing, he reached up to the next balcony and helped people down from the 5th floor. The civilians had to climb over their railing, hang down to the 4th floor and drop onto the 4th floor balcony. (*Note: First the woman and then the man were assisted to the 4th floor balcony, and then onto the ground ladder*).
 - Rescue 9 FAO, after assisting the civilians, returned up the ladder to search apartments on the 4th floor. Rescue 9 FAO stated the he then searched the 3rd floor and 5th floor, uncertain to exact apartments searched.
- Rescue 9 Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 met with District 3 on the 4th floor and he stated there might be someone in the elevator car. Rescue 9 Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 forced the elevator shaft door on Floor 4 and indicated it had 2 latching mechanisms – 1 at top and bottom and was difficult to force.

Truck 18

4 personnel

Dispatched on 1st Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|--|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Regular Assigned Lieutenant | 29.5 | 22.5 |
| DRIVER | Regular Assigned Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) | 30.5 | 27 |
| Firefighter #1 | Regularly Assigned Firefighter | 25.5 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Regularly Assigned Firefighter | 22 | |

- At 05:34 hours; Truck 18 was dispatched to the 1-Alarm upgrade.
- At 05:50 hours, Truck 18 arrives on scene and is forced to park apparatus on Dahlgren St, west of fire building, due to 5" Supply line blocking the entrance.
- At 05:50:11, Truck 18 Officer notified Command that Truck 18 was walking up to scene (*Note: this was actually Truck 18 A-Team*)



- Truck 18 Officer and FF #1 entered “A” side of structure. Truck 18 FF #1 turned on TIC, however, the battery had lost its charge.. He placed the TIC down near the doorway, out of the way.
- Truck 18 Officer exited the “A” side to retrieve a piece of equipment from Truck 31 (unknown what equipment).
 - Truck 18 Officer re-entered the building and proceeded to the 3rd floor via unknown stairwell and conducts a Primary search. Truck 18 Officer stated he conducted a Primary search on floors 3, 4 and 5 with an unknown fire company.
 - Truck 18 Officer did not re-join FF #1 at any point during operations. Truck 18 Officer exited the building when the low air alarm sounded on his SCBA. *(Note: Only information available is through Incident Statement. Additionally there was no NIOSH Transcript for Officer).*
- Truck 18 FF #1 continued down Floor 1 hallway to “D” side stairwell to Floor 2, where he met up with Engine 31 FF #2. Truck 18 FF #1 and Engine 31 FF #2 conduct a primary search on an apartment on “A/D” corner of Floor 2. Conditions in hallway deteriorated, and Truck 18 FF #1 recalls seeing two members of Engine 49 run out of the hallway to “D” side stairwell. *(Note: no testimony or report about hose deployment issues in the “D” stairwell)*
 - Truck 18 FF #1 and Engine 31 FF #2 proceed to “D” stairwell to Floor 3 to conduct primary search, “mule kicking” several doors to force entry.
 - Truck 18 FF #1 notices a door that is “different” in middle of “C” side, recessed in wall, with a regular door knob and a diamond-shaped glass window and an elevator tag marked “3”. Truck 18 FF#1 stated they did not attempt to open door.
 - Truck 18 FF #1 continued on the Floor 4, but is unsure if Engine 31 FF #2 followed *(or when he separated)*.
 - Truck 18 FF #1 met up with Rescue 9 on Floor 4; Rescue 9 stated Floor 4 search was complete.
 - Truck 18 FF #1 continued on to “B” Stairwell to Floor #5. In Apt #57, found 1 female and 1 infant civilian, who are reluctant to leave apartment but follow Truck 18 FF #1 out into hallway. Truck 18 FF #1 carries infant in arms and is joined by Truck 23 FF #1, who escorts the female. Both civilians are taken outside via “B” stairwell to MEDIC 23 for care.
 - Truck 18 FF #1 recalls seeing Truck 32 FF#1 in “B” stairwell, but does not recall seeing FAO Gordon.
 - Truck 18 FF #1 was at apparatus getting a drink of water when he heard the Mayday.
- Truck 18 FAO and FF #2 attempted to find placement for apparatus near scene to utilize aerial, but were unable.
 - Truck 18 FAO and FF #2 walked up to scene, entered structure on “A” side, proceeded to B side stairwell up to Floor 4, encountered heavy smoke conditions, and decided to focus on exterior access to victims on balconies.
 - Truck 18 FAO and FF #2 decided to perform rescue operations on the “A” side with Truck 31’s aerial. With the assistance of Engine 31 FAO and Engine 46 FAO, Truck 18 FAO operated Truck 31 in “Override” mode due to “short-jacking,” and made numerous rescues off balconies using Truck 31’s aerial.
 - Truck 18 FAO & FF#2 believe they rescued 3 females, 4 males and 1 small child from 4 separate balconies.
 - Truck 18 FAO and FF #2 had just completed final balcony rescue when they heard the Mayday.



District 1

1 personnel

Dispatched on 1st Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank | Other Time in Rank | Other Time in Rank |
|----------------|--|----------------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| District Chief | Regular Assigned District Chief - assigned to District 1 | 26.5 | 4 | 11.5 yrs as Capt | 6 yrs as Lieut. |

- At 05:34 hours, District 1 was dispatched on the 1-Alarm upgrade.
- While responding, listened to radio traffic on FG-D2 and gathered some info from companies on scene. (*Fire on 2nd floor, Engine 49 advancing a line.*)
- Once on scene, District 1 got dressed in Full PPE, turned portable radio on, radio was set to FG-C2. (*Note: The wrong fireground channel*)
- District 1 reported to command (face-to-face,) for assignment and District 1 was assigned to perform a 360 survey of the building.
 - District 1 performed a 360 going counter-clockwise from the "D" side to the "C" side
 - District 1 arrived at the B/C corner and observed "heavy" fire from the fire apartment patio door. (*Note: Patio glass door ventilated by Truck 31 per D4B direct orders before D1 arrival.*)
- At 05:55:35, D1 attempts to contact Command on FG-C2 to request a Fire Company to the "C" side. After four attempted radio transmissions on FG-C2 with no response, District 1 notified Command face-to-face to get Truck 31B to the "C" side to assist with operating a hose line from the exterior into the fire apartment.
 - D1 monitored fire control from the exterior "C" side. D1 then entered the building to get an update on interior conditions. At 06:03:52, D1 attempted to contact Command four times on FG-B2, but was advised by Dispatch that the correct FG was FG-D2.
 - At 06:05:30, D1 switched to FG-C2 and again attempted to contact Command two times, but again was advised by Dispatch that the correct FG was FG- D2. At 06:05:56, D1 switched to the correct FG-D2."
 - District 1 transmitted 9 times on the wrong FG, before switching to FG-D2.
- District 1 obtained a fire line laid at the rear of the building and notified Engine 31 FAO face-to-face to start the water and attempted to extinguish the fire from the exterior. (*Note: No water was being put on the fire at this time from the interior.*)
 - After operating the fire line for an unknown amount of time, District 1 handed off the fire line to Truck 31 FAO and FF #2, who continued extinguishing the fire from the exterior until they noticed members on the interior.
- District 1 proceeded to the fire floor to assess the interior firefighting operations.
- District 1 exited the building and reported face-to-face with command with an update on the fire.
- Command ordered District 1 to supervise companies on ventilation of the building.
- District 1 was at Command Post when mayday occurred.



Engine 46 - Dispatched as Safety Engine

4 personnel

Dispatched on 1st Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|---|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Regular Assigned Lieutenant | 21 | 14 |
| DRIVER | Regular Assigned Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) | 25.5 | 23 |
| Firefighter #1 | Regularly Assigned Firefighter | 8.5 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Firefighter Detailed from Engine 46 (Different Shift) | 1.5 | |

- Company dispatched on 1-alarm upgrade
- At 05:50 hours, Engine 46 parked apparatus on Ward St. approximately 4 houses from the scene.
- 05:49:48 Engine 46 reported on scene by radio to Command and was instructed to “drop” Safety Engine duties and “go to work”, taking 2nd line off Engine 49 and advance to the 2nd floor.
- Engine 46 FF#1 and FF#2 grabbed 1-3/4” line (red cross-lay) off Engine 49 and went toward the “D” side of the building, following the 1st line.
 - During the stretch were redirected by Command and Engine 46 Officer to take line through “A” side lobby door.
 - Engine 46 Officer, FF#1 & FF#2 advanced line around to the “B” side stairwell and up to the 2nd floor. Engine 46 members did not have SCBA Face-piece on at this time. Engine 46 came upon Rescue 9 FF#3, Truck 31 Officer and Truck 31 FF#1 who were “on air” and ready to enter hallway.
- 05:58:22, Engine 46 Officer instructs Engine 49 FAO to “start the red line”.
- Engine 46 company members assisted with advancing line down the hallway and into fire apartment as Truck 31 Officer, FF#1 and Rescue 9 FF#3 extinguish bulk of fire.
- Engine 46 FAO (in fatigues only) remained on the exterior and assisted Engine 31 FAO with flaking / stretching fire lines. Engine 46 FAO states line was being called for on the “C” side of building so he took a 1-3/4” line around “D” side to “C” side and gave it to District 1.
 - 05:55:54 Engine 46 FAO verbalized on radio “water’s coming Chief” and as the line is charged.
 - Engine 46 FAO then returns to “A” side and assists Truck 18 members with rescuing victims off balconies at Truck 31’s aerial turntable.
- Engine 46 FF#1 states water was being sprayed on them from the outside once they were in fire apartment.
- Engine 46 FF#2 states after knocking down fire, company members went outside to the “C” side through the sliding rear door and took a momentary break, then returned to fire apartment.
- All members of Engine 46 report hearing a loud noise (“loud boom”) as they were washing down hot spots



Truck 23 - Dispatched as RAT (Rapid Assistance Team)

4 personnel

Dispatched on 1st Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|--|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Regular Assigned Lieutenant | 20 | 14.5 |
| DRIVER | Regular Assigned Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) | 22 | 17 |
| Firefighter #1 | Regularly Assigned Firefighter | 13 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Firefighter Detailed from Engine 23 | 10 | |

- Company dispatched on 1st Alarm upgrade.
- 05:49:27 hours, RAT 23 arrived on scene and was immediately re-assigned as a Truck company. (No longer the RAT).
- Truck 23 was ordered by Command to assist Engine 46 with deploying a fire line to 2nd floor.
- Truck 23 FF#1 and FF#2 first assisted Truck 31 FAO and Truck 31 FF#2 with ground ladder rescue from "A" side balcony, then assisted Engine 46 with hose stretch through "A" side front door to "B" stairwell.
- Truck 23 members then enter 2nd floor, split up in teams, (Truck 23A and Truck 23B) and conduct primary search of fire floor.
- 06:03:31 hours, Truck 23 Officer advise Command they are assisting a 2nd floor occupant out of the building.
- Truck 23 FAO and FF#2 continued primary search of fire floor, ending search in fire apartment.
- Truck 23 Officer and FF#1 heard a report of two people trapped on 5th floor. Truck 23 Officer and FF#1 return to building and went to 5th floor. Truck 23 Officer and FF#1 were met by Truck 18 FF#1 helping a female and baby exit. Truck 23 FF#1 assisted female resident down and out; Truck 18 FF#1 takes the baby out of the building to a Medic Unit. Truck 23 FF#1 assists the female all the way out of the building and helps her find the Medic Unit to which baby was taken.
- Truck 23 Officer returns to fire floor and at 06:15:53 reports all clear on 2nd floor primary search.
- 06:16:02 hours, Command orders Truck 23 to conduct secondary on 3rd floor.
- 06:17:27 hours, Truck 23 Officer, still on 2nd floor, reports spot fires on fire floor and request recharging of fire line. Truck 23 FAO and FF#2 extinguished hot spots, then go to 3rd floor to conduct search.
- 06:20:46 hours, Truck 23 asks FF#1 to bring the Rabbit Tool up to the third floor, but FF #1 states he is still outside changing out his SCBA bottle. Later, when done changing bottle, FF #1 asked if he still needs the Rabbit Tool, but Officer states Rabbit Tool is no longer needed.
 - This is the last radio transmission prior to Mayday and causes HR14 initial bonk.



ALS-32 (EMS Supervisor)

1 personnel

Dispatched on 1st Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|---------------|
| Lieutenant | Detail Lieutenant from District 3 | 15.5 | 2 |

- At 05:34 hours, ALS 32 was dispatched with the 1-alarm upgrade and arrived on scene at 05:53 hours.
- ALS 32 reported to Command and conducted a 360 walk around to determine the number and severity of civilian injuries.
- At 06:02, ALS 32 reported to Engine 49 to assist with the treatment of Engine 49 Acting Officer and FF #2.
- ALS 32 was approached by a civilian female who had burns on her leg and a civilian male seeking medical attention.
- ALS 32 walked both patients toward Medic 23 for treatment, but found Medic 23 was occupied by Engine 8 FAOp treating 3 additional patients.
- ALS 32 attempted to call Command twice; however was “bonked”.
 - Due to the number of civilians needing immediate medical attention, ALS 32 contacted Main Dispatch and requested 2 additional Medic Units and 1 additional ALS Supervisor (brought the total EMS Units dispatched to 6 Medic Units and 2 ALS Supervisors).
- ALS 32 was at the back of Medic 23 at the time of the MayDay.

MEDIC 46

2 personnel

Dispatched on 1st Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|--|----------------------|---------------|
| Firefighter #1 | Regularly Assigned Firefighter / Paramedic | 26.5 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Detailed Firefighter / EMT from Engine 31 | 16 | |

- At 05:34 hours, dispatched on the 1-alarm upgrade and arrived on scene at 05:47 hours.
- Medic 46 was first arriving medic unit, parked 1 ½ blocks away on Ward St and readied equipment to take up to fire scene.
- At 06:02, Medic 46 and ALS 32 walk to Engine 49 apparatus with cot and equipment to treat injured Engine 49 Acting Officer and Engine 49 FF #2.
- Medic 46 walked Engine 49 Acting Officer back to Medic 46 apparatus to treat injuries. They are in the back of Medic 46 at time of Mayday. (NOTE: Engine 49 FF #2 remained at Engine 49 apparatus)



until relieved at scene, but is later transported to hospital from Engine 49 quarters once symptoms worsened.)

SO-2 - Safety Officer

1 personnel

Dispatched on 1st Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank | Other Time in Rank |
|----------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| Captain | Detailed Captain from Engine 7 | 20.5 | 7.5 | 8.5 years as Lieut |

- At 05:34 hours, SO2 was dispatched on the 1-alarm upgrade.
- SO2 arrived on scene at 05:55 and parked on Ward St., donned PPE, SCBA and took air monitoring equipment to "D" side of building.
- SO2 observed heavy smoke conditions on "C" side.
- SO2 encountered Engine 49 and Engine 31 rapidly exiting the "D" side stairwell stating they were burnt when the 2nd floor flashed over. (*Note: The report of a flashover by Engine 49 and Engine 31 was not confirmed by any other company operating on the 2nd floor.*)
- At 05:59:36 hours, SO2 told Command of above event via radio emergency (*Note: Was "bonked" five times prior to being able to transmit message.*)
- At 06:00:03 hours, SO2 repeated same message to Command that both Companies (Engine 49 AND Engine 31) had retreated.
- SO2 advised Command that a member from Engine 49 was burnt and heading to front of building (Engine 49 Acting Officer).
- At 06:01:17 hours, SO2 advised that Engine 31 was re-entering building (*Note: This contradicts all Engine 31 accounts*).
- At 06:03:03 hours, SO2 moved more towards the "B/C" corner and advised Command that the fire was not knocked down.
- At 06:04:43 hours, SO2 advised Command that the Companies were making progress and almost had it knocked down.
- At 06:04:30 hours, SO2 advised Command that the fire was knocked down but heavy smoke was going to 3rd floor and a primary search was needed.
- At 06:04:43 hours, Command told SO2 to report to his location. SO2 stated "clear".
- At approximately 06:18 hours, SO2 re-entered building on A side to monitor air quality.
- At 06:22:23 hours, SO2 encountered SOC at 1st floor elevator attempting to open it. Seconds later a "MAYDAY" was called.



Medic 23

2 personnel

Dispatched on 1st Alarm - Working Fire Medic

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|---|----------------------|---------------|
| Firefighter #1 | Detailed Firefighter / Paramedic from Engine 46 | 15 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Detailed Firefighter / EMT from Truck 23 | 15 | |

- At 05:41 hours, Medic 23 was dispatched as the second medic for a working fire and arrived on scene at 05:55 hours.
- Second arriving medic unit parked 1 ½ blocks away on Ward St and readied equipment to take up to fire scene.
- At 06:08 hours, Medic 23 is requested to report to Engine 31 to treat a burned civilian. Medic 23 loads civilian onto cot and proceeds back to Medic 23.
- Upon arrival at Medic 23, they find Engine 8 FAO treating 1 civilian and 1 infant in the back of Medic 23. ALS 32 also walks up with 2 additional patients.

Truck 32

4 personnel

Dispatched on Extra Engine / Truck Request from Command

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|--|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Detailed Lieutenant from District 3 | 18 | 3.5 |
| DRIVER | Regularly Assigned Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) | 20 | 16 |
| Firefighter #1 | Regular Assigned Firefighter | 15 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Regular Assigned Firefighter | 25 | |

- At 05:42 hours, Truck 32 dispatched as "Extra Truck" and arrived On Scene at 05:55 hours.
- Truck 32 apparatus parked on Ward St about 1 ½ blocks away.
- Truck 32 Officer and FF#1 was initially assigned to rescue a civilian from a balcony of B side (unknown apartment, but believed to be #28), but T- 23 appeared on balcony from interior and secured civilian.
- Truck 32 Officer and FF#1 took a quick look at the "C" side, saw "white smoke", and then proceeded back to "A" side to report to Command. Assigned by face-to-face to search 3rd Floor.
- Met up with Truck 32 FAO and FF #2, and all 4 members entered 1st Floor A side and entered B stairwell and proceeded to Floor 3.
- At 06:05:30 hours, Command assigns Truck 32 to reposition to Floor 4 to conduct primary search.



- At 06:06:19 hours, Truck 32 Officer advised Command that a Primary Search on the 2nd floor is complete, and they are moving to the 3rd floor.
- At 06:06:36 hours, Command acknowledges Truck 32 going to Floor 3 to conduct primary search.
- Truck 32 FF #1 rescued female civilian from end apartment on the third floor, escorted the civilian outside via B stairwell, and returned to Floor 3.
- Truck 32 FF #2 rescued 1 male and 1 female civilian from balcony of Apt #31, assisted the civilians down Truck 31 aerial, opened the doors and windows in the apartment to ventilate, and then tried to rejoin company.
- At 06:16:29, Truck 32 Officer notified Command that primary search on Floor 3 completed and moved to Floor 4 via B Stairwell. (*NOTE: Truck 32 FF #2 heard this radio traffic and knew to go to Floor 4 to rejoin his company.*)
- On Floor 4, Truck 32 FF #1 entered Apt #48 and heard 2 civilians on balcony above (Apt #58). Truck 32 Officer advised District 3 (Search and Rescue Sector) via face-to-face that Floor 4 was clear and headed to Floor 5.
- Truck 32 FF #1 forced entry into Apt #58 and removed 1 male and 1 female civilian via interior B Stairwell to exterior. **NOTE: While escorting civilians from Apt #58, Truck 32 FF #1 saw FAO Gordon in the hallway on Floor 5 near the B stairwell and had a brief conversation.**
 - Gordon: "Are you Heavy Rescue 14?"
 - Truck 32 FF #1: "No. I'm Truck 32.
 - Truck 32 FF #1: "Who are you?"
 - Gordon: "I'm Daryl Gordon"
 - Truck 32 FF #1: "I don't know where they're at."
- Truck 32 Officer and FAO continued down Floor 5 toward D side searching apartments, forced door to an apartment on D side with Rescue 14 (without FAO Gordon) and Engine 8, then proceeded back down hallway to B stairwell to Floor 4.
 - (*Note: At some point, Truck 32 Officer and FAO heard the communication between Rescue 14 and District 3 about the open elevator shaft*)
- Truck 32 Officer and FAO meet Rescue 9 at elevator door on Floor 4 and assist with forcing entry to elevator door (*Note: Unsuccessful*).
- Truck 32 FF #1 rejoins at some point. Truck 32 Officer, FAO, and FF #1 leave Floor 4 via B Stairwell in an attempt to locate Truck 32 FF #2 and report back to Command. While in B Stairwell, Truck 32 members hear Mayday.
- Truck 32 FF #2, attempting to join Company on Floor 5, could not locate, but ended up assisting 1 male civilian in Apt #51 from balcony onto Truck 31 aerial. He opened doors and windows in that apartment, and, when exiting apartment, heard Mayday call from just down the hallway.



Engine 18

4 personnel

Dispatched on Extra Engine / Truck Request from Command

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|---|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Regularly Assigned Lieutenant | 27.5 | 18.5 |
| DRIVER | Regularly Assigned Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) | 27 | 23 |
| Firefighter #1 | Regular Assigned Firefighter | 26.5 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Detailed FAO - Assigned as a Firefighter from Engine 31 | 18.5 | 14.5 |

- At 05:42 hours, Engine 18 was dispatched as “Extra Engine” and arrived On Scene at 05:50 hours.
- Staged Engine 18 apparatus at 5411 Ward St, about 2 blocks away.
- Engine 18 called Command prior to arrival and asked if a water source (supply) was needed. Command stated “no.”
- Engine 18 was directed to advance a backup line to the 2nd floor by Command. Engine 18 advanced line from Engine 31 to the “C” side exterior, but never charged it.
- Engine 18 then proceeded to search the apartment adjacent to the apartment of origin on the C side. An “all clear” given on the 2nd floor
- Engine 18 Officer & FAO searched the 3rd floor for victims and fire extension, Engine 18 FF#1 & FF#2 remained on the 2nd floor. An “all Clear” given on the 3rd floor.
- E-18 Officer and Engine 18 FAO searched the 4th floor for victims.

Engine 8

4 personnel

Dispatched on 2nd Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|---|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Lieutenant Regularly Assigned to Engine 24 (<i>working a trade</i>) | 28.5 | 15 |
| DRIVER | Detailed FAO from District 1 | 15 | 2.5 |
| Firefighter #1 | Regular Assigned Firefighter | 26 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Regular Assigned Firefighter | 15 | |

- At 05:58 hours, Engine 8 dispatched on 2nd Alarm and arrived on scene at 05:59



- At 05:56:59, Engine 8 Officer switched radio to FG-B2 (Command B) and attempted to contact Command two different times.
- At 05:58:36, Engine 8 Officer switched radio to FG-D2 (Command D) and contacted Command to determine if needed for manpower or to bring water. (NOTE: Engine 8 Officer was "bonked" 3 times prior to getting out).
- Engine 8 parked on Ward about 1 ½ blocks south of Dahlgren
- Engine 8 Officer reports to Command (face to face), is assigned task of Search and Rescue of Floor 4, and advised to not force doors on Floor 4.
- At 06:08:21, Engine 8 Officer and FF #1 enter "A" side and proceed to "D" stairwell to Floor 4, Engine 8 Officer and FF#1 fail to maintain crew integrity with Engine 8 FAO and FF#2, becoming separated before searching the 4th floor.
- Engine 8 FAO and FF #2 notice civilians on balcony on Floor 4, entered "B" stairwell from exterior at C side, met with Truck 23 Officer and advised him of civilians on Floor 4 balcony. Truck 23 Officer stated that Truck 23 would go to Floor 4 for rescue.
- Engine 8 FAO and FF #2 exit the B Stairwell to again survey exterior balconies, and saw civilians in need on Floor 5 on "B" Side (Apt 58).
 - Engine 8 FAO re-entered "B" stairwell, between Floor 2 and Floor 3, met with Truck 18 FF carrying infant down "B" Stairwell.
 - Engine 8 FAO followed Truck 18 FF #1 out of building to render EMS care for infant. Engine 8 FAO walks with Truck 18 FF #1 all the way to MEDIC 23 and begins EMS care to infant and mother.
 - Engine 8 FAO is also brought other civilians in need of treatment as well. (NOTE: Infant is believed to be an occupant of Apt 57 that had passed Rescue 14 between Floor 5 and Floor 4.)
- At 06:12:22, Engine 8 Officer reports to Command that Floor 4 was All Clear and headed to Floor 5.
- Engine 8 FF#2 re-entered building in attempt to meet up with Engine 8 Officer and FF #1. Engine 8 FF #2 reports to Engine 8 Officer on Floor 5 and advised him that Engine 8 FAO is now at Medic 23 rendering civilian patient care.
- Engine 8 Officer meets with Truck 32 and Rescue 14 near the "C/D" corner and discuss whether to force entry to apartments on Floor 5.
 - At 06:13:36, Engine 8 Officer asks Command if he wants to use forcible entry on Floor 5; Command advises to not force entry.
 - All members of Engine 8 were verbally told about Elevator Door and open shaft danger on Floor 5.
- At 06:14:46, Engine 8 FAO attempted to notify Command/ Accountability of his re-location to Medic 23, but was not acknowledged.
- Engine 8 Officer, FF #1, and FF #2 leave Floor 5 via "D" Stairwell and are between Floor 3 and Floor 2 at the time of the Mayday; Engine 8 FAO is in the rear of Medic 23 rendering patient care to 5 civilians at time of Mayday



Rescue 14

4 personnel

Dispatched on 2nd Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|---|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Regularly assigned Firefighter riding as Acting Officer | 8.5 | |
| DRIVER | Detailed FAO from District 1 (FAO GORDON) | 30.5 | 3 |
| Firefighter #1 | Regular Assigned Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) - <i>not working as FAO due to previous Accident Investigation</i> | 22 | 18 |
| Firefighter #2 | Regular Assigned Firefighter | 15.5 | |

- At 05:47 hours, Rescue 14 was dispatched on the 2nd Alarm and arrived on scene at 06:04 hours.
- Rescue 14 parked on Owasco St. at Dahlgren St.
- Rescue 14 Acting Officer reported to Command (face to face) and is assigned to search 5th floor.
- Rescue 14 entered building through "A" side at 06:08 hours. Rescue 14 Acting Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 charge their SCBA when entering through front door. (ICM Data)
- Rescue 14 FF#2 started toward "C/D" stairwell, but is told by a firefighter on the 1st floor to use "B/C" stairs.
- As Rescue 14 FF#2 turned to go toward "B/C" stairs, he ran into Rescue 14 FAO Gordon who was following him.
- Rescue 14 members ascend "B" stairwell; they hear radio traffic of people in Apt. 57.
- Rescue 14 members get to the landing between 4th and 5th floors when victims from Apartment 57 are brought down steps. District 3 reported this to Command at 6:10:15 hours.
- Rescue 14 members go on air before entering 5th floor at 06:10 hours.
 - Rescue 14 FAO Gordon charged his SCBA, donned his face piece and went on air at this time. (Note: Acquired from ICM Data) Rescue 14 FAO Gordon, was slightly behind the other personnel from Rescue 14 at this time.
- Rescue 14 Acting Officer and FF#2 proceed to Apartment 57 and begin search.
- Rescue 14 FF#1 entered Apartment 51 by himself to search.
- Rescue 14 Acting Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 meet up in hallway between Apartment 57 and Apartment 52. Rescue 14 FF#1 and Acting Officer enter Apartment 52 to search. Rescue 14 FF#2 proceeds down hallway. (Note: Rescue 14 Acting Officer believes he is with FF#2 at this point but actually enters apartment with FF#1.)
- Rescue 14 FF#2 finds outward swinging door, opens it, attempts to sound the floor (but finds no floor) and realizes it is an elevator door to an open elevator shaft.
- Rescue 14 Acting Officer and FF#1 arrive and are shown open shaft.
 - Rescue 14 FF#2 marks on door "**Do Not Enter Open Shaft**" with black marker.
- District 3 arrived from "D" end of hallway and is shown elevator, looks inside then continues towards "B/C" stairs.



- Rescue 14 members continue searching toward “D” end of hallway, searching laundry room and second apartment on “C” side.
- Outside Apartment #55 there is a discussion with Engine 8 about forcing the last apartment door. Engine 8 Officer radios out to Command for clarification at 6:13:36 hours.
 - Truck 32 Officer and FAO arrived and Engine 8 Officer radios Command a second time at 6:14:16 hours.
 - Truck 32 Officer forces door to apartment 55 and Rescue 14 Acting Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 go in and search.
 - Rescue 14 Acting Officer gives “All Clear” on 5th floor at 6:15:36.
 - After completing search of last apartment, Rescue 14 Acting Officer took a PAR of his members and noticed Rescue 14 FAO Gordon is absent.
 - Rescue 14 Acting Officer goes to “D” stairwell and yelled down for Rescue 14 FAO Gordon; no reply.
 - At that time Rescue 14 members began re checking apartments back down hallway from “D” side in an attempt to locate FAO Gordon.
 - As Rescue 14 Acting Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 pass the elevator shaft they hear the faint ringing of an SCBA low air alarm bell.
 - Rescue 14 FF#2 opened elevator door and illuminated shaft with flashlight. Rescue 14 members saw reflective tape from Rescue 14 FAO Gordon’s helmet reflecting back.
 - Rescue 14 Acting Officer takes a couple steps back from elevator and attempts to put a MAYDAY out over radio at 6:22:17 and is “bonked”.
 - Rescue 14 FF#2 tells Rescue 14 Acting Officer that his transmission did not go over radio.
 - At 06:22:23 hours, Rescue 14 Acting Officer activates radio emergency button and puts out a mayday.

District 3

1 personnel

Dispatched on 2nd Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank | Other Time In Rank | Other Time In Rank |
|----------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| District Chief | Assigned District Chief - District 3 | 30.5 | 3.5 | 11.5 years as Capt | 11 years as Lieut |

- Dispatched at 05:47 hours on 2nd Alarm. (Note: Normally a third District Chief is not dispatched on a 2nd Alarm; however, there are some “glitches” with dispatching of runs at times.)
- Once on scene, District 3 reported face-to-face with Command and was assigned to “Search & Rescue” Branch.
- District 3 entered the “B” – Stairwell and began observing search and rescue ops on the 2nd floor (Fire Floor.) District 3 did not get past fire apartment, due to congestion in the hallway.
- District 3 moved to the 3rd floor via the “B” – stairwell and walked the entire 3rd floor observing Search and Rescue Operations.



- While going to the 4th floor, District 3 heard a radio transmission of people trapped in an Apartment #57 on the 5th floor, so District 3 continued to the 5th floor without stopping on the 4th floor.
- District 3 observed Rescue 14 in the “B” stairwell on the way to the 5th floor.
 - Rescue 14 communicated that they were on their way up to get the trapped victims.
- Before arriving on the 5th floor, District 3 observed unknown FF bringing out an adult female and a baby. (Later determined that it was a Truck 18 FF#1 and Truck 23 FF#1 who brought out the victims from Apartment #57, 5th floor.)
- Once on 5th floor, District 3 reported smoke conditions were improving, and removed face piece at some point.
- On 5th floor, after hearing a radio transmission from Command to not force any more doors, District 3 advised Rescue 14 Acting Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 to force the remaining doors. District 3 wanted a complete search.
- While on 5th floor, District 3 was notified face-to-face by Rescue 14 that “we’ve got a door here that leads to an open shaft.”
- Rescue 14 immediately showed District 3 the open shaft.
- After observing the open shaft and noticing that the elevator car was below the 5th floor, it occurred to District 3 that no one had cleared the elevator car of occupants.
- District 3 went to a lower floor to ensure elevator car was cleared and stopped on the 4th floor to observe Search and Rescue Operations. (Bypassed 4th floor initially.)
- District 3 met with Rescue 9 face-to-face on Floor 4 and discuss clearing the elevator of civilians.
- District 3 was going to meet with SOC on 1st floor and discuss clearing the elevator car, when the Mayday was declared.

Engine 23

4 personnel

Dispatched on 3rd Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|--|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Regularly Assigned Lieutenant | 14 | 4.5 |
| DRIVER | Regularly Assigned Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) | 18 | 8 |
| Firefighter #1 | Regularly Assigned Probationary Firefighter | 1 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Regular Assigned Firefighter | 2.5 | |

- At 05:55 hours, Engine 23 dispatched on 3rd Alarm
- Engine 23 responded and at 06:00:39 hours, Command advised all 3rd Alarm companies to stage three blocks away.
- At 06:11:26 hours, Engine 23 called to the Command Post by District 4B.
- Engine 23 was directed to set up horizontal ventilation by command. Engine 23 personnel set up positive pressure fan from Truck 31 at the “A” side door.



- Engine 23 personnel then proceeded to second floor to assess ventilation effects via “D” side stairwell.
- Engine 23 members talked with Truck 23 members at the apartment of origin while checking smoke conditions on 2nd floor.

Engine 7

4 personnel

Dispatched on 3rd Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|---|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Regularly assigned Firefighter riding as Acting Officer | 25 | |
| DRIVER | Regularly Assigned Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) | 28 | 22.5 |
| Firefighter #1 | Regular Assigned Firefighter | 18 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Regular Assigned Firefighter | 14 | |

- At 05:55 hours, Engine 7 dispatched on 3rd alarm.
- Engine 7 responded and at 06:00:39 hours, Command advised all 3rd Alarm companies to stage three blocks away.
- At 06:11:26 hours, District 4B requests Engine 7 & Engine 23 to report to Command.

Truck 19

4 personnel

Dispatched on 3rd Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|--|----------------------|---------------|
| OFFICER | Detail Lieutenant from District 1 | 15.5 | 1.5 |
| DRIVER | Regularly Assigned Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) | 21.5 | 16.5 |
| Firefighter #1 | Regular Assigned Firefighter | 25 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Detailed Firefighter from Engine 12 | 1.5 | |

- At 05:55 hours, Dispatched on the 3rd Alarm.
- Truck 19 assigned as RAT Company / Accountability by Dahlgren Command while enroute and at 06:00:39 hours, Command advised all 3rd Alarm companies to stage three blocks away.
- RAT 19 arrived on scene at 06:14 hours.



- Command requested a PAR at 06:19:43; RAT 19 Officer advised they were not at the Command Post yet.

CAR 301 - Operations Bureau Supervision Chief

1 personnel

Responded on 3rd Alarm after Notification via page of 3rd Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank | Other Time In Rank | Other Time In Rank |
|----------------|---|----------------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| District Chief | Regular Assigned District Chief Supervises Operations Bureau | 30.5 | 20 | 3 years as Capt | 4 years as Lieut |

- Car 301 heard initial Alarm Dispatch while driving to work on I-75. Remembers the initial radio talkgroup was on FG D-8.
- Car 301 hear the FG was changed to FG-D2 when the alarm was upgraded to a 1-Alarm.
- Car 301 responded on the 3rd Alarm from Fire Headquarters at 5th and Central.
- Car 301 parked vehicle at the corner of Ward St. and Cornish St.

CAR 1 - Fire Chief

1 personnel

Responded on 3rd Alarm after Notification via page of 3rd Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank | Other Time In Rank |
|------------|-------------|----------------------|---------------|---|
| Fire Chief | Fire Chief | 4 | 4 | Hired from Columbus (OH) FD After 30+ Years |

- Car 1 received notification that there was a 3-Alarm from the Communications Center and responded from his private residence.
- Car 1 arrived on scene and walked to the Command Post with SOC.
- Car 1 received situation update from District 4 - Incident Commander.
 - District 4 stated fire was knocked down, rescues from balconies were underway and crews were finishing primary search of the entire building.
- Car 1 reports everything seemed to be under control at this time and was expecting a situation contained announcement with extra companies released.
- Car 1 was at Command Post discussing best way to relieve companies when Mayday occurred.



CAR 3 - Operations Bureau Assistant Chief

1 personnel

Responded on 3rd Alarm after Notification via page of 3rd Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank | Other Time In Rank | Other Time in Rank | Other Time In Rank |
|-------------|--|----------------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Asst. Chief | Regular Assigned Assistant Chief of Operations | 26.5 | 3.5 | 12 years as DC | 2.5 years as Capt | 3.5 years as Lieut |

- Car 3 responded from home on the 3rd Alarm dispatch; had just arrived on scene and was donning his PPE when the Mayday occurred.

SOC - Special Operations Chief

1 personnel

Responded on 3rd Alarm after Notification via page of 3rd Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank | Other Time In Rank | Other Time In Rank |
|----------------|--|----------------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| District Chief | Regular Assigned District Chief <i>In Charge of Department Special Operations</i> | 26.5 | 15 | 4 years as Capt | 2.5 years as Lieut |

- Notified by page at home at 05:42hrs of a working fire at 6020 Dahlgren St.
- SOC responded from home. Monitored radio traffic en-route and arrived on scene after "Fire Under control" benchmark reached.
- Once on scene, SOC got dressed in Full PPE and reported to Command for assignment.
- Command assigned SOC to assist District 3 with managing secondary search.
- SOC communicated with District 3 face to face and addressed concern of the elevator being checked for occupants.
- While SOC was going to the 2nd floor elevator the mayday was transmitted.
- SOC proceeded to the 1st floor elevator door and had a company force the door. The car was located above them and SOC assumed it was on the second floor.



SO-1 - Department Safety Chief

1 personnel

Responded on 3rd Alarm after Notification via page of 3rd Alarm

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank | Other Time In Rank | Other Time In Rank |
|----------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| District Chief | Safety District Chief | 25.5 | 4.5 | 7 years as Captain | 5.5 years as Lieut |

- SO1 received a text of a working fire as he was preparing to leave home for his regular work day.
- SO1 received text that the fire is now a 3-Alarm, turned radio on to monitor.

MEDIC 19

2 personnel

Responded as Special Request for Additional Medic

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|--|----------------------|---------------|
| Firefighter #1 | Detailed Firefighter / Paramedic from Truck 21 | 6.5 | |
| Firefighter #2 | Detailed Firefighter / EMT from Truck 23 | 8.5 | |

- At 06:10 hours, Medic 19 dispatched as Extra Medic Unit requested by District 4 and was believed to arrive on scene at 06:22 hours just as the MAYDAY occurred.

MEDIC 2

2 personnel

Responded as Special Request for Additional Medic

| Position | Description | Years of CFD Service | Years at Rank |
|----------------|--|----------------------|---------------|
| Firefighter #1 | Regularly Assigned FF / Paramedic Training Officer | 18 | 7 |
| Firefighter #2 | Detailed Firefighter / EMT from Truck 2 | 8.5 | |

- At 06:12 hours, Medic 2 dispatched as 2nd Extra Medic Unit requested by District 4 and arrived on scene at 06:35 hours.



Post Mayday Company Actions



Detailed Company Actions

POST-MAYDAY

Rescue 14 - Post-Mayday

- All three remaining members of Rescue 14 ran down to 3rd floor via “B/C” stairwell.
- Rescue 14 members forced elevator door on 3rd floor.
- Rescue 14 FF#1 and FF#2 entered elevator shaft; Rescue 14 FF#2 attempts to reach FAO Gordon but he is too far down to reach. Rescue 14 FF#2 did notice SCBA bottle had frost on valve.
- Rescue 14 FF#2 removed his SCBA to attempt to get better access between wall and elevator car at 06:24 hours (*Note: Obtained via ICM record.*)
- District 1 arrived around this time and asked what was needed; Rescue 14 Acting Officer told him to get a fan since members were removing their SCBA.
- After being advised by District 1 that the fan was set up, Rescue 14 Acting Officer went down hallway closing doors to assist ventilation.
- When Rescue 14 Acting Officer returned to elevator, SOC is on top of elevator and tells Rescue 14 FF#1 that they need to secure FAO Gordon so he doesn’t slip down any farther.
- Rescue 14 FF#2 requested air chisel and sawzall, Rescue 14 Acting Officer relays to member of Truck 32.
- Rescue 14 FF#2 opened elevator top and dropped into car while FF#1 remained on top of car. Rescue 14 Acting Officer went down to Floor 2 to check on FF#2.
- Rescue 14 FF#2 assisted forcing inner elevator door then explained to Engine 23 Officer and FAO exactly where FAO Gordon was pinned.
- As Rescue 14 Acting Officer reached elevator on 2nd floor, he watched members of Engine 23 and Rescue 14 FF# 2 take first axe swing.
- As Rescue 14 FF#2, Engine 23 Officer and Engine 23 FAO worked inside elevator, Rescue 14 FF#1, SOC and Truck 32 FF#1 sent down webbing to try to secure FAO Gordon in place. Rescue 14 FF#2 attached it to FAO Gordon’s SCBA harness and an attempt is made to lift him. The harness breaks with no movement of FAO Gordon.
- Rescue 14 Acting Officer returns to 3rd floor to check on Rescue 14 FF#1.
- Rescue 14 Acting Officer is told that webbing is secure so he ran back down to 2nd floor to relay that information.
- Rescue 14 Acting Officer returned to 3rd floor to advise Rescue 14 FF#1 that they were getting ready to remove FAO Gordon.
- Rescue 14 FF#2 continued to work inside elevator car with Engine 23 until enough wall was removed to access SCBA facepiece. Rescue 14 FF#2 reached up and removed facepiece but was not able to confirm breathing. Rescue 14 FF#2 noticed a large amount of blood in facepiece.
- Rescue 9 Officer arrived with sawzall and air chisel. Rescue 14 FF#2 exited elevator to allow Rescue 9 Officer room to work.
- Rescue 14 FF#2 stood at elevator door and passed back pieces of wall as it was removed.
- When stokes basket is sent into elevator Rescue 14 FF#2 stepped back out of way.
- Rescue 14 Acting Officer and FF#1 went to 2nd floor to assist but arrived after FAO Gordon had already been taken out. Both members exited “B/C” stairwell side door and walked around to



front of building. Rescue 14 FF#2 joined with company at this time and Rescue 14 Acting Officer reported to Command Post to give accountability of his crew.

District 4 - Post-Mayday

- District 4 acknowledges “Mayday” transmitted by Rescue 14 Acting Officer at 06:22:34.
- District 4 assigns SOC as Extrication Chief.
- District 4 orders RAT 19 to perform PAR (*Note: RAT 19 is not at Command Post yet*)
- Officer of RAT 19 informed District 4B that Rescue 14 FAO had a no motion alarm on the MSA SCBA monitoring computer.
- District 4 requests all Companies that don’t have an assignment to report to Command.
- At 06:31 hours, District 4 orders RAT 19 to perform a PAR for a second time.
- District 4 assigns Car 301 as Equipment Chief (Logistics).
- At 06:34 hours, District 4 gives Dispatch Progress Report #3.
- District 4 reports to Dispatch that the firefighter has been extricated.
- Following a report of the condition of FAO Gordon, District 4 requests “radio silence” on firefighter updates.
- District 4 requests a Police Supervisor to the scene.
- District 4 discussed the proper notifications with Car 1 who was at the Command Post during the Mayday operations.
- Following the transport of FAO Gordon from the scene, District 4 requests all officers to report to the Command Post.
- District 4 relieved of Command by Car 3; SOC becoming Operations Command.

SOC - Post-Mayday

- SOC proceeded to the 3rd floor elevator door after Mayday was transmitted. SOC (6:24:29) radioed in his location on 3rd floor and (6:25:51 hours) identified himself as Extrication command.
- Upon arrival at the elevator, SOC observed a Rescue 14 FF#2 had entered the car through a top hatch and Truck 32 FF#1 was on top of the car.
- Further observation showed FAO Gordon lodged between the car and the rear wall. The face piece and SCBA were in place, with no alarm heard by SOC.
- SOC dropped webbing into the car where firefighters had put a hole in the elevator rear wall.
- SOC instructed the firefighters to secure the webbing around the SCBA. An attempt was made to pull the stuck firefighter out from between the car and wall. This was unsuccessful.
- SOC requested the identity of the fallen from inside the car and he was identified as FAO Gordon.
- SOC next ordered all members from the top of the car due to possible movement. He then moved to the 2nd floor to oversee the extrication of FAO Gordon.
- At 06:36:23 SOC transmitted Rescue was complete and requested a Medic unit to the lobby.
- Upon completion of the extrication, SOC exited the building to update Command of the condition of FAO Gordon.
- SOC was assigned Operations Section Command of the scene when District 4 was relieved of Command by Car 3.



District 3 - Post-Mayday

- District 3, along with SOC, coordinated extrication and rescue operations of FAO Gordon.

District 1 - Post-Mayday

- District 1 entered the building, assisted SOC's operations for the extrication.
- District 1 had Engine 7 Acting Officer move a fan from the 2nd floor to the 3rd floor.

SO-2 - Post-Mayday

- SO-2 responded to the 3rd floor and saw that FAO Gordon was wedged between the top and side of the elevator and the wall on the 2nd floor.
- SO-2 responded to the 2nd floor and assisted in pulling the wall of the elevator to get to FAO Gordon. Took off own SCBA and passed it to front of elevator and told them to make sure he was on air.
- SO-2 advised by SOC that too many people were in elevator and move to hallway.
- SO-2 remained in 2nd floor hallway till FAO Gordon was freed and taken down stairwell to M-19.

Rescue 9 - Post-Mayday

- Rescue 9 Officer, FF#1 and FF#2 are on the 4th floor and hear the mayday called, return to the elevator door, open it and shine lights down the shaft and see a helmet on the shaft and Rescue 9 FF#1 sees a boot wedged between the wall and car
- At 06:23 hours, Rescue 9 Officer indicates on radio that \ the fire fighter was on the 2nd or 3rd floor.
- Rescue 9 assumed FAO Gordon fell through the opening to the bottom of the shaft and proceeded to the 1st floor and entered the pit and could see the fire fighter wedged between the far wall "C" side and the elevator car.
- At 06:26 hours, Rescue 9 Officer states that the firefighter appeared unconscious and was bleeding profusely.
- At 06:27 hours, Rescue 9 Officer sends FF#1 and FF#2 to retrieve tools from Rescue 9 apparatus. Rescue 9 FF#3 hears radio traffic for mayday joins Rescue 9 FF#1 and FF#2 and gets tools from Rescue 9.
- At 06:29 hours, Rescue 9 Officer indicates he needs fire fighters with extend-a-climb or little giant ladders to come to first floor and set up to try to catch FAO Gordon if he were to come loose and fall – because he was still one floor up in the air.
- Rescue 9 Officer helps Engine 23 FAO and others to extricate FAO Gordon from elevator car by removing back wall carefully from around FAO Gordon. Rescue 9 Officer used a reciprocating saw to cut away parts of the elevator wall.
- At 06:36 hours, FAO Gordon is extricated.
- Rescue 9 personnel, at direction of Rescue 9 Officer, stayed at elevator car to secure the elevator and preserved evidence until relieved.



Engine 23 - Post-Mayday

- Engine 23 Officer and Truck 23 FF#1 forced elevator door on 2nd floor.
- Engine 23 Officer looked into elevator, saw nothing, then heard radio traffic that he may be on 1st floor
- Engine 23 Officer proceeded to “B” stairs to get to 1st floor but noticed a large group of firefighters heading downstairs already.
- Engine 23 Officer returned to 2nd floor elevator door, and Engine 23 Officer and FAO reopen the door.
- Having entered the elevator car from the hatch above, Rescue 14 FF#2 is now inside the elevator. Engine 23 Officer and FAO enter the elevator to assist.
- Engine 23 FF#1 and FF#2 remain in hallway and assist with moving debris and tools outside the elevator.
- Rescue 14 FF#2 describes to Engine 23 Officer and FAO the positioning of FAO Gordon outside of elevator car.
- Engine 23 Officer strikes back wall of elevator car with axe once with no effect.
 - Engine 23 Officer strikes a second time and penetrates back wall of car. Three members in elevator car take turns swinging axe and peeling away pieces of back wall.
 - Personnel got the wall opened enough that SCBA bottle falls into car.
 - One member inside car is able to reach in and remove FAO Gordon’s SCBA facepiece.
 - The three members then made attempt to pull FAO Gordon into car with assistance from members on top of elevator car but were unable to move him.
- Engine 23 Officer got down on hands and knees so Engine 23 FAO could get better leverage for a second attempt to pull FAO Gordon out. Second attempt was also unsuccessful.
- Rescue 9 Officer arrives with extrication tools and Rescue 14 FF#2 exits elevator.
- Engine 23 FAO assisted Rescue 9 Officer as he cuts with reciprocating saw.
- Rescue 9 Officer and Engine 23 FAO remove enough wall so that they can then lower FAO Gordon into elevator car.
- Engine 23 Officer and FAO, Rescue 9 Officer and Rescue 9 FF, who enters elevator to assist, place FAO Gordon into stokes basket.

Truck 32 - Post-Mayday

- Truck 32 Officer, FAO and FF #1 continue down “B” stairwell to Floor 1 and force open elevator door. Seeing that the elevator car is above them on Floor 2, Truck 32 Officer, FAO and FF #1 head to Floor 3. *NOTE: Truck 32 Officer reports that SOC was there during the forcing of the elevator door post-Mayday, but SOC reports that the door to elevator was forced BEFORE the Mayday; District 3 states he is unsure who forced the elevator door (possibly forced by a different Company, but cannot find transcribed or radio evidence of another company forcing the elevator door on Floor 1).*
- Truck 32 FF #2, who was still on Floor 5, exits Apt #51 and heads toward elevator on Floor 5, crossing paths with Rescue 14 Acting Officer, FF#1 and FF #2 heading toward the “B” stairwell.
 - At the elevator door, Truck 32 FF #2 shines flashlight into shaft to illuminate area, guards open shaft, and is joined by Engine 49 FF #1.
 - Truck 32 FF #2 remains on Floor 5 for duration of Mayday.
- Truck 32 Officer, FAO and FF #1 reach Floor 3. Elevator door has been forced open by Rescue 14.



- Truck 32 FF #1 jumps on top of elevator car to assist Rescue 14 FF #2 with securing FAO Gordon with webbing and gaining access to elevator car top hatch. Truck 32 FF #1 remains on the top of the elevator car for the duration of the Mayday assisting.
- Truck 32 FAO leaves Floor 3 via "B" Stairwell to Floor 2 to assist Engine 23 with forcing elevator door. Upon completion, Truck 32 FAO leaves Floor 2 via "B" stairwell to return to Floor 1 elevator and finds Rescue 9 Officer.
 - A low air alarm starts to sound on Truck 32 FAO's SCBA, so he goes to exterior to change bottle.
- Truck 32 Officer leaves Floor 3 via "B" stairwell to Floor 2. At 06:30:04, Truck 32 Officer requests that FAO and FF #1 meet him on Floor 2. Truck 32 FF #1 notifies Truck 32 Officer that he is working on Floor 3 elevator. Truck 32 FAO notifies Officer that he is on exterior changing out SCBA bottle.
- Truck 32 Officer assisted with coordination of manpower rotation, gathering tools and equipment, securing and clearing area, and evacuation upon removal of FAO Gordon from elevator car.
- Following the extrication of FAO Gordon, all members assemble on the exterior and then return to Floor 2 to guard fire apartment and elevator until relieved by Unit 2.

CAR 301 - Post-Mayday

- Car 301 reported to the Command Post. Car 1, Car 3 and District 4 (who was still in Command) were at the Command Post.
- District 4 put Car 301 in charge of resource management for the Mayday Operations.
- Following the extrication of FAO Gordon, Car 301 responded to University Hospital to assist the family.
- Car 301 assisted in contacting and arranging the transportation of FAO Gordon's wife from home and FAO Gordon's daughter from Bowling Green University to University Hospital.

Truck 23 - Post-Mayday

- Truck 23 Officer was moving toward exiting the building when the mayday went out.
- Truck 23 FF#1 states he was between 4th and 5th floor with Rabbit Tool when the mayday call was made. He later went outside and prepared RAT equipment after being told Truck 23 would be the backup RAT Company.
- Truck 23 FF#2 states after Mayday, he waited on command to give the order to switch to the mayday channel, but order never came. Truck 23 FF#2 stated he switched channels anyway after a period of time.
- Truck 23 FAO says he switched to Mayday channel also but then went back to fire ground D2 when District 1 told him not to monitor the mayday channel.



Truck 19 (RAT 19) - Post-Mayday

- RAT 19 Officer and FF#1 observed multiple motion and low pressure alarms; RAT 19 Officer attempted to relay the information to Command by radio but was unable to due to radio traffic.
- RAT 19 Officer reported to District 4B and via face-to-face communication relayed the information about the SCBA Alarms, RAT 19 Officer then returned to Accountability.
- Command requested RAT 19 conduct a PAR at 06:31:41.
- At 06:32:01 RAT 19 Officer began to contact companies via radio; unable to complete a PAR due to Radio Traffic.

Engine 49 - Post-Mayday

- Engine 49 Acting Officer is transported to hospital.
- Engine 49 FAO indicates during a PAR that they only have Engine 49 FAO and E49 FF#2.
- Engine 49 FF#1 eventually rejoins Engine 49 FAO and Engine 49 FF#2.
- Engine 49 FF#1 and Engine 49 FF#2 exchange SCBA bottles.
- Engine 49 FF#1 and Engine 49 FF#2 assisted a resident to a medic unit for treatment.

Engine 31 - Post-Mayday

- Engine 31 FAO took EMS equipment (BLS and ALS) off of Engine 49 and proceeded to lobby of Floor 1 to await removal of FAO Gordon.
- Engine 31 Acting Officer and FF #1 returned to Floor 2 to conduct searches of Apartment 23, 24, 25 and 26 and remained on Floor 2 awaiting instruction. Engine 31 FF#2 is still separated from his crew and exact location or actions are unknown.

Truck 31 - Post-Mayday

- Truck 31 Officer, FAO, FF #1 and FF #2 took sawzalls, pneumatic air tools and the Kodiak Stabilization Tool to Floor 1 lobby to assist Rescue 9 Officer.
- Truck 31 remained at the Floor 1 elevator to assist and clear a path for the extrication and removal of FAO Gordon.

Truck 18

- Truck 18 FAO repositioned aerial to roof and ascended to open scuttle hatch in B stairwell.
- Truck 18 FF #1 and FF #2 remained on "A" side to shuttle tools and equipment to the interior as needed.

Engine 8 - Post-Mayday

- Engine 8 Officer, FF #1 and FF #2 proceed to Floor 1 and report to Lobby near elevator door.



- Doors are already open and assigned to assist Truck 31A in securing ladders and tools needed for Mayday rescue.
- Engine 8 remained on Floor 1 for duration of Mayday.
- Engine 8 FAO transports 2 civilians to University Hospital in Medic 23.
 - Engine 8 FAO returns to scene via another Medic Unit, but Engine 8 has already left scene. FAO is then taken to Engine 8's quarters.

Engine 18 - Post-Mayday

- Engine 18 Officer went to the 2nd floor, then exited the building on the "C" side and remained at Command until relieved.
- Engine 18 FAO and FF #1 exited building and reported to Command per his request.
- Engine 18 FAO and FF #1 took stokes basket to second floor to assist with rescue.
- Engine 18 FF #2 was guarding elevator shaft door on the 4th floor and then proceeded down to the 2nd floor and assisted others (including Engine 18 FAO & FF #1) with moving FAO Gordon out of the building.

Engine 7 - Post-Mayday

- Engine 7 members assisted with moving FAO Gordon to Medic 19.
- Engine 7 FF #2 assisted in treating and transporting FAO Gordon in Medic 19 to University Hospital.

Engine 46 - Post-Mayday

- Engine 46 had exited the building and was exchanging SCBA bottles.

MEDIC 46 - Post-Mayday

- Hearing the Mayday, Medic 46 PTO assists Medic 19 and Medic 23 with gathering of EMS equipment and responds to Floor 1 Lobby with ALS-32 to await extrication of FAO Gordon.
- Medic 46 FF-EMT is assigned to maintain a clear path of egress for Medic 19 to ensure rapid transport once extricated. (Concern over rush of media and other vehicles blocking egress path and delaying transport of FAO Gordon.)
 - Engine 49 Acting Officer remained in the back of Medic 46.
- Medic 46 PTO assists with treatment and transport of FAO Gordon in MEDIC 19.
- At 06:54, Medic 46 transports injured Engine 49 Acting Officer to Good Sam Hospital with Medic 46 FF-EMT and Medic 23 FF-P.

ALS 32

- ALS 32 positions the just arriving Medic 19 as close to fire scene as possible, secures Medic 46 FF-EMT to keep egress path clear for Medic 19, instructs Medic 19 FF-P, Medic 19 FF-EMT, Medic 46



FF-P and Medic 23 FF-P to gather cot, backboard and all EMS equipment, and all proceed to Floor 1 Lobby on A side.

- FAO Gordon is brought down the "B" side stairwell and placed onto backboard on cot. FAO Gordon is pulseless and apneic. CPR is initiated during transport to Medic 19.
- FAO Gordon is loaded into Medic 19, and is treated by ALS 32, Medic 19 FF-P, Medic 19 FF-EMT, Medic 46 FF-P, Medic 9 FF-P, and Engine 7 FF-P.
 - ACLS care is rendered per Hamilton County Protocol.
- Command of on scene EMS turned over from ALS 32 to ALS 34.
- At 06:47 hours, Medic 19 transports FAO Gordon to University Hospital and arrives at 07:01 hours.

MEDIC 23 - Post-Mayday

- Medic 23 FF-P assists with gathering of EMS equipment and responds to Floor 1 Lobby with ALS-32 to await extrication of FAO Gordon.
- Medic 23 FF-P assisted with ALS care of FAO Gordon.
- Once FAO Gordon is loaded into Medic 19, Medic 23 FF-P returns to Medic 23.
 - ALS 34 orders Medic 23 FF-P to transport Engine 49 Acting Officer to Good Sam with Medic 46, due to fact that Medic 46 had no paramedic (Medic 46 FF-P assisted with treatment and transport of FAO Gordon in Medic 19).
- At 0654 hours, Medic 23 transports injured civilians to University Hospital with Engine 8 FAO-P and Medic 23 FF-EMT.

MEDIC 19 - Post-Mayday

- Medic 19 apparatus is positioned as close as possible to the scene in order to transport FAO Gordon quickly. ALS 32 coordinates a clear egress for Medic 19.
- FAO Gordon is loaded into M-19, and is treated by ALS 32, Medic 19 FF-P, Medic 19 FF-EMT, Medic 46 PTO, Medic 9 FF-P, and Engine 7 FF#2. FAO Gordon remains pulseless and apneic. ACLS care is rendered per Hamilton County Protocol.
- At 0647 hours, Medic 19 transports FAO Gordon to University Hospital.
- Medic 3 FF-EMT drives Medic 19 to University Hospital with a CPD escort.
- At 0701 hours, Medic 19 arrives at University Hospital.

MEDIC 2 - Post-Mayday

- Per Command Medic 2 is placed in Staging.
- Assisted ALS 34 (Unit 2) with treatment of civilian with chest pain and smoke inhalation. Civilian refused transportation.

ALS 34 - Post-Mayday

- Dispatched as EMS Strike Force along with Medic 9 and Medic 3 requested by ALS-32 at 06:22 and arrived On Scene 06:41.
- Assumed EMS command from ALS 32 when ALS 32 went to the hospital with FAO Gordon.



Engine 32 - Post-Mayday

- Dispatched on 4th Alarm at 06:23 hours.
- Engine 32 parked apparatus on Alpha Ln. off of Owasco.
- Reported to Command and were assigned to guard the elevator shaft doors on third and fifth floors.
- Engine 32 FAO and FF #2 posted and guarded the elevator door on the fifth floor.
- Engine 32 Officer and FF #1 posted and guarded the elevator door on the third floor.
- Relieved and released from the scene at approximately 09:15 hours.

Engine 9 - Post-Mayday

- Dispatched on 4th Alarm at 06:23 hours.
- FAO Gordon was being placed in Medic 19 as Engine 9 approached the scene.
- Staged in front of building for approximately 15 minutes before being released.

SO-1 - Post-Mayday

- Due to the nature of the radio traffic indicating a severe injury, began heading towards University Hospital.
- Received a phone call from Car 3 to respond to the fire scene at 06:54 hours.
- Requested Dispatch to notify Critical Incident Stress Debriefing Team (CISD).
- Met face-to-face with Car 1 at the fire scene.
- Reported to Command Post.
 - Coordinated CISD response.
- Notified Local 48 President about CISD sessions at L-48 and E-14.
- Notified EHS of LODD and 3 additional FF injuries. Also requested EHS to notify City Safety.
- Ensured that FAO Gordon's fire gear was collected and secured including data from the MSA ICM.
- Entered and inspected the accident scene with Car 4 and SOC. Cleared and logged in when they entered the building by CPD.

CAR 1 - Post-Mayday

- Recalled there was some confusion as to which floor the Mayday was on.
- Worked with District 4 to help organize rescue and ensure proper tools and equipment were available.
- Made sure Medic unit was brought to the front of the building.
- Assigned ALS Supervisor to oversee transport and care of FAO Gordon.
- Acquired a Police escort for transport to the hospital.
- Assigned a staff officer to make all necessary city notifications.
- Assembled all officers after FAO Gordon transported.
 - Said a prayer.
 - Informed officers to keep a close watch of their crews mental state.



- Assigned SOC to handle overhaul and scene preservation.
- Reported to University Hospital.

CAR 3 - Post-Mayday

- Was at his car getting dressed when Mayday was declared.
- Reported to Command Post.
- Along with Car 1 and District 4, they discussed the situation.
- Responded to the interior through "A" door to see what resources were needed.
 - Met with Rescue 9 officer on the 1st floor at the elevator door.
 - Went to Floor 2 to oversee Rescue efforts. Witnessed District 3 and SOC managing Rescue efforts.
 - Proceeded to Floor 3 to witness Rescue efforts from the floor above.
 - Proceeded back to Floor 1 after FAO Gordon had been extricated.
 - Cleared all non-essential personnel from the area. Noted that there was a stretcher and several paramedics in the first floor lobby awaiting FAO Gordon after he was extricated.
- Briefed Car 1 and Car 301 on situation.
- Became Dahlgren Command.
 - Assigned SOC to Operations Command
 - Remained on scene for approximately 4 hours.



Detailed Timeline of Radio Transmissions



Detailed Timeline of Radio Transmissions

| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 5:31 | DISPATCH | N/A | Dispatched for an Alarm Activation at 6020 Dahlgren St: E-49, T-31 & D-4 on Fireground Channel (FG) D-8 (Fire Alarm). | | | |
| 5:34 | DISPATCH | N/A | Alarm upgraded to a full One-Alarm Response: E-31, E-46 (Safety), T-18, T-23 (RAT), D-1, SO2, M-46, ALS-34. Fireground Channel was changed to FG D-2 (CMND D). | | | |
| 5:37:50 | Engine 49 OFFICER | 0:00:00 | Engine 49 on scene 6-story brick multi-dwelling nothing showing. | | | |
| 5:38:01 | DISPATCH | 0:00:11 | Clear. Engine 49 on the scene 6-story brick multi-dwelling nothing showing. | | | |
| 5:39:33 | DISPATCH | 0:01:43 | Units responding to the one-alarm, the caller is stating the fire is on the second story of the D building. Per the alarm company the 3rd floor smoke and the 5th floor smoke detectors are now sounding. | | | |
| 5:40:06 | District 4 | 0:02:16 | District 4 to Communications. | | | |
| 5:40:10 | DISPATCH | 0:02:20 | District 4. | | | |
| 5:40:13 | District 4 | 0:02:23 | I got a ah 6-story multi-dwelling, uh Companies are investigating at this time, I have people evacuating the building, I have a light haze of smoke on the exterior, I will be establishing Dahlgren Command, will advise. | | | |
| 5:40:27 | DISPATCH | 0:02:37 | That's clear. | | | |
| 5:40:31 | District 4 | 0:02:41 | Hey, Truck 31 get into the driveway before the 49's charge their 5 inch, so you guys don't get blocked out. | | | |
| 5:41:29 | District 4 | 0:03:39 | District 4 to Communications. | | | |
| 5:41:31 | DISPATCH | 0:03:41 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 5:41:34 | District 4 | 0:03:44 | Start me out an extra Engine, extra Truck. Extra Engine, extra Truck. | | | |
| 5:41:38 | DISPATCH | 0:03:48 | Ok that's clear. | | | |
| 5:41:44 | District 4 | 0:03:54 | Dahlgren Command I'm confirming a working fire in a 6-story type II multi-dwelling. I've got medium smoke I can't determine the floor at this time I do have the building being evacuated. It smells like a "working fire" at this time. | | | |
| 5:42:02 | DISPATCH | 0:04:12 | Ok confirming a working fire type II construction, multi-dwelling, medium smoke showing. | | | |
| 5:42:04 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:04:14 | Start the water at the hydrant (walked on message above). | | | |
| 5:42:13 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 0:04:23 | District 4, Truck 31 we are going to the fire floor and attempt to uh (unintelligible). | | | |
| 5:42:24 | District 4 | 0:04:34 | Repeat Truck 31. | | | |
| 5:42:27 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 0:04:37 | Truck 34, I mean Truck 31 is going to the 2nd floor on the fire floor attempt to get people out. | | | |
| 5:42:38 | Engine 49 FF#2 | 0:04:48 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on MAIN DISP | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 5:42:38 | District 4 | 0:04:48 | Ok Command received your reporting a fire on the second floor and your evacuating the building at this time. Command copy. | | | |
| 5:42:39 | Engine 49 FF#2 | 0:04:49 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on MAIN DISP | | | |
| 5:42:41 | Engine 49 FF#2 | 0:04:51 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on MAIN DISP | | | |
| 5:42:51 | District 4 | 0:05:01 | Command to Communications, you copy that? | | | |
| 5:42:53 | DISPATCH | 0:05:03 | That's' clear. | | | |
| 5:43:16 | District 4 | 0:05:26 | Command to Communi, uh, Command to Engine 31. | | | |
| 5:43:45 | District 4 | 0:05:55 | Command to Engine 49 | | | |
| 5:43:56 | Engine 49 OFFICER | 0:06:06 | Engine 49 to Command; I'm in the, on the "C" side of the building, uh, got heavy smoke on this side I'm trying to advance to the second floor. | | | |
| 5:44:09 | District 4 | 0:06:19 | Ok Command received. | | | |
| 5:45:03 | Engine 49 FF#2 | 0:07:13 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG B-5 (CFD B TAC 2). | | | |
| 5:45:16 | District 4 | 0:07:26 | Dahlgren Command. | | | |
| 5:45:19 | DISPATCH | 0:07:29 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 5:45:22 | District 4 | 0:07:32 | Give me a rundown on my Companies they didn't show up on the PMDC. | | | |
| 5:45:30 | Engine 49 FF#2 | 0:07:40 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG B-5 (CFD B TAC 2). | | | |
| 5:45:30 | DISPATCH | 0:07:40 | We have Engine 31, Engine 46, Truck 18, Truck 23, District 1, Medic, Engine 18, Truck 32, Engine 49 and Truck 31 dispatched originally, | | | |
| 5:45:55 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 0:08:05 | Truck 31 to District 4, the window has been opened, heavy fire coming on the "B" side. | | | |
| 5:46:03 | District 4 | 0:08:13 | Heavy fire on the "C" side; is that on the second floor? | | | |
| 5:46:08 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 0:08:18 | Second floor "C" side. | | | |
| 5:46:12 | District 4 | 0:08:22 | Command received. | | | |
| 5:46:21 | Engine 49 OFFICER | 0:08:31 | Engine 49 to Command. | | | |
| 5:46:30 | District 4 | 0:08:40 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 5:46:36 | District 4 | 0:08:46 | Command to Engine 49 go ahead. | | | |
| 5:46:45 | Engine 49 OFFICER | 0:08:55 | District uh, Command disregard that. | | | |
| 5:46:57 | District 4 | 0:09:07 | Dahlgren Command EMERGENCY! | | | |
| 5:47:00 | DISPATCH | 0:09:10 | Go ahead. | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|---|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 5:47:02 | District 4 | 0:09:12 | Transmit the Second Alarm. | | | |
| 5:47:06 | DISPATCH | 0:09:16 | That's' clear. Second Alarm is in. | | | |
| 5:47:11 | District 4 | 0:09:21 | Okay. Command to Engine 49; I need you guys to make a stretch to the fire apartment and extinguish the fire. Received Engine 49? | | | |
| 5:47:30 | District 4 | 0:09:40 | Command to Engine 31; I need you to backup Engine 49's line. Engine 31 did you receive this message? | | | |
| 5:47:43 | Engine 49 FF#2 | 0:09:53 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG B-5 (CFD B TAC 2). | | | |
| 5:47:54 | District 4 | 0:10:04 | Command to the 3rd arriving Engine Company, Engine 46. | | | |
| 5:48:07 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:10:17 | Rescue 9 is on the scene. | | | |
| 5:48:17 | Engine 31 FAO | 0:10:27 | Go ahead and start the hydrant for Engine 31, " <i>Engine 31 FF#2- Note used first name here</i> ". | | | |
| 5:48:23 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 0:10:33 | Truck 31 to District 4. | | | |
| 5:48:27 | District 4 | 0:10:37 | Command; go ahead Truck 31. | | | |
| 5:48:30 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 0:10:40 | Truck 31; if you could have somebody, uh. | | | |
| 5:48:37 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 0:10:47 | If you could have somebody bring a line to the "A" side go left up the exit on the second floor there is heavy fire and possible people trapped. | | | |
| 5:48:51 | District 4 | 0:11:01 | Command received. You've got heavy fire on the second floor with people trapped we have received that. Command to Engine 31; I need you to respond to the radio and backup Engine 46's line, Engine 49's line. | | | |
| 5:49:27 | RAT 23 OFFICER | 0:11:37 | RAT 23 onscene. | | | |
| 5:49:30 | District 4 | 0:11:40 | Ok RAT 23, it's Command, come forward I'm going to put you guys to work. Use, Truck 31's equipment, do you receive this message Truck 31 is the RAT. | | | |
| 5:49:44 | RAT 23 OFFICER | 0:11:54 | RAT 23 is clear. | | | |
| 5:49:48 | Engine 46 OFFICER | 0:11:58 | Engine 46. | | | |
| 5:49:50 | District 4 | 0:12:00 | Hey " <i>Engine 46 Officer- Note: used first name here</i> " approach the scene, take a second line off of Engine 49's pumper, just come forward take a second line off of Engine 49's pumper and advance to the fire floor, floor number 2 received? | | | |
| 5:50:08 | Engine 46 OFFICER | 0:12:18 | On our way Chief. | | | |
| 5:50:11 | Truck 18 OFFICER | 0:12:21 | Truck 18 to Command; we're not gonna get the truck up here we're just gonna walk up. | | | |
| 5:50:19 | District 4 | 0:12:29 | Ok that's, that's clear go ahead and come forward. | | | |
| 5:50:35 | Engine 31 FAO | 0:12:45 | Engine 31 are you ready for water? | | | |
| 5:50:54 | Engine 31 FAO | 0:13:04 | Engine 31, I'm starting your water. | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 5:51:00 | Engine 31 OFFICER | 0:13:10 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG C-2 (CMND C) | | | |
| 5:51:02 | Engine 31 OFFICER | 0:13:12 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG C-2 (CMND C) | | | |
| 5:51:02 | Engine 18 OFFICER | 0:13:12 | Engine 18 to Command; we will be there in a couple of minutes do you need us to bring water? | | | |
| 5:51:03 | Engine 31 OFFICER | 0:13:13 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG C-2 (CMND C) | | | |
| 5:51:08 | District 4 | 0:13:18 | Negative I need you guys to come forward with your crews, we just need lines established at this time. I need a hoseline established to the fire floor. | | | |
| 5:51:26 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:13:36 | Engine 49 do you need water yet? | | | |
| 5:51:31 | Engine 49 OFFICER | 0:13:41 | (Unintelligible) | | | |
| 5:51:35 | District 4 | 0:13:45 | Please start the water in Engine 49's line, (unintelligible "Engine 49 FAO's first name"). | | | |
| 5:51:41 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:13:51 | Rescue 9 to Command. | | | |
| 5:51:44 | District 4 | 0:13:54 | Go Ahead Rescue Company 9. | | | |
| 5:51:48 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:13:58 | We got fire on the second floor, extended out into the hallway. We have closed the door to the apartment. We have no hoseline in operation yet, we're working our way down the hallway trying to search apartments. | | | |
| 5:52:03 | District 4 | 0:14:13 | Is there any way to control that door to floor number 2 from the fire apartment? | | | |
| 5:52:10 | Engine 31 FF#1 | 0:14:20 | Engine 31 shut that water off momentarily. | | | |
| 5:52:20 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:14:30 | Water's off on Engine 49. | | | |
| 5:52:24 | District 4 | 0:14:34 | That was for Engine 31, <i>Note: Engine 49 FAO's first name used here</i> keep Engine 49's line going | | | |
| 5:52:30 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:14:40 | Engine 49's water's on. | | | |
| 5:52:39 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 0:14:49 | Truck 31 to District 4. | | | |
| 5:52:46 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:14:56 | Heave Rescue 9 to Command; be advised the door to the apartment is burned through. We now have fire extending into the hallway. Still no hose line on the fire. | | | |
| 5:52:59 | District 4 | 0:15:09 | Ok, Command received. Engine 46, Engine 18, Engine 46, Engine 18, get me a line, a backup line established to floor number 2 the fire apartment. Received Engine 46? | | | |
| 5:53:14 | Engine 46 OFFICER | 0:15:24 | Engine 46 received. | | | |
| 5:53:17 | District 4 | 0:15:27 | Engine 18. | | | |
| 5:53:20 | Engine 18 OFFICER | 0:15:30 | Engine 18 is clear going to the second floor. | | | |
| 5:53:25 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 0:15:35 | Truck 31 to District 4; can we get a line on the "C" side and maybe go right here to the second floor, fire is still showing. | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|--|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 5:53:38 | District 4 | 0:15:48 | "Engine 46 Officer- Note: used his first name here" slow down. Give me that one more time where do you want that line to come. | | | |
| 5:53:43 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 0:15:53 | If they can stretch an 1 3/4" on the "C "side on the "C "as in Charlie side. Then if they can advance to the 2nd floor into the fire room | | | |
| 5:53:59 | District 4 | 0:16:09 | Command received. | | | |
| 5:54:17 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:16:27 | Heavy Rescue 9 to Command. | | | |
| 5:54:23 | District 4 | 0:16:33 | Go Ahead Rescue 9. | | | |
| 5:54:25 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:16:35 | Ok, we need the 49's line extended. They are short by about 50-60 feet. They need a hundred feet added to their line. They cannot reach the fire apartment. We need another line to come in the front door, turn left go down the hallway up the steps to the 2nd floor. You'll be right at the fire apartment. Still no water on the fire we're searching second floor. | | | |
| 5:54:49 | District 4 | 0:16:59 | (unintelligible) Command received. | | | |
| 5:55:13 | District 4 | 0:17:23 | Dahlgren Command. | | | |
| 5:55:20 | Dispatch | 0:17:30 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 5:55:22 | District 4 | 0:17:32 | Give me the 3rd Alarm. | | | |
| 5:55:25 | DISPATCH | 0:17:35 | That's clear 3rd Alarm. | | | |
| 5:55:30 | Truck 23 OFFICER | 0:17:40 | Truck 23 to Command, we need our assignment. | | | |
| 5:55:35 | District 1 | 0:17:45 | District 1 to Command I need a line. Give me a Company in the back here, give me a Company in the back. **Note: On FG C-2 (CMND C) | | | |
| 5:55:54 | Engine 46 FAO | 0:18:04 | Water's coming Chief. | | | |
| 5:56:00 | District 4 | 0:18:10 | Dahlgren Command, make the Truck on the 3rd Alarm, make them my RAT Company. Communication Receive? | | | |
| 5:56:09 | District 1 | 0:18:19 | District 1 to Command give me a Fire Company in the back, right now. **Note: On FG C-2 (CMND C) | | | |
| 5:56:10 | DISPATCH | 0:18:20 | That's clear Truck 19 will be the RAT. | | | |
| 5:56:22 | District 4 | 0:18:32 | Command to Rescue 9 you got a line comin' your way. We are gonna reestablish another line and they'll be there in about a couple of seconds. Received? | | | |
| 5:56:31 | District 1 | 0:18:41 | Command do you copy? **Note: On FG C-2 (CMND C) | | | |
| 5:56:34 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:18:44 | Message receive we're still working our way down the hallway checking apartments best we can 2nd floor. | | | |
| 5:56:51 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:19:01 | Unintelligible. **Note: On FG B-2 (CMND B) | | | |
| 5:56:59 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:19:09 | Engine 8 to Command do you need us to bring water? **Note: On FG B-2(CMND B) | | | |
| 5:57:04 | District 1 | 0:19:14 | Command do you copy? ** Note: On FG C-2 (CMND C) | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|---|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 5:58:17 | District 4 | 0:20:27 | Command to Rescue 9. | | | |
| 5:58:22 | Engine 46 OFFICER | 0:20:32 | Engine 46 to Engine 49, start the red line, start the red line. | | | |
| 5:58:36 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:20:46 | Engine 8 to Command do you need us for manpower or do you need us to bring water. | | | |
| 5:58:44 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:20:54 | Red line started. | | | |
| 5:58:48 | District 4 | 0:20:58 | Engine 8, I need you to report to the Command Post for work, no need for water. | | | |
| 5:59:01 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:21:11 | Engine 8, OK on the message. | | | |
| 5:59:17 | Truck 31 FF ?? | 0:21:27 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG A-2 (EMS) | | | |
| 5:59:17 | District 4 | 0:21:27 | Command to Rescue 9, 2nd floor interior, give me a report. | | | |
| 5:59:23 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:21:33 | Be advised sir we are, uh, checking apartments. I'll go back to the fire apartment and see what's going on there. | | | |
| 5:59:31 | District 4 | 0:21:41 | Ok copy that. Command to Engine 46. | | | |
| 5:59:36 | SO2 | 0:21:46 | SO2 EMERGENCY! Uh, I'm on the rear side of the highrise I've been told by 2 Companies that evacuated, Engine 49, Engine 31 that they said there's a flashover, second floor and they evacuated. | | | |
| 5:59:52 | District 4 | 0:22:02 | Ok, we got the 3rd Alarm in, we got a line being stretched, we know about the fire conditions, we are advancing toward the fire apartment. | | | |
| 6:00:03 | SO2 | 0:22:13 | Clear, be advised though Engine 31 and Engine 49 backed out. They uh, they advised me that's the reason they backed out of the building, they're on the rear side. | | | |
| 6:00:12 | District 4 | 0:22:22 | K we got Engine 46 and Engine 18 stretching a 2nd line. | | | |
| 6:00:18 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:22:28 | Rescue 9 to Command. Be advised we're putting water on the fire now. Hallway is safe, we are still checking bedrooms as we go down the hallway. | | | |
| 6:00:31 | District 4 | 0:22:41 | Command received. Command to Communications. | | | |
| 6:00:36 | DISPATCH | 0:22:46 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 6:00:39 | District 4 | 0:22:49 | Stage the 3rd Alarm assignment. I want them to stage exactly, uh, three blocks away from the scene. | | | |
| 6:00:47 | DISPATCH | 0:22:57 | That's clear. | | | |
| 6:00:48 | DISPATCH | 0:22:58 | Ok, 3rd Alarm Companies Engine 23, Engine 7 and Truck 19, stage 3 blocks from the fire scene, stage 3 blocks from the fire scene. | | | |
| 6:01:03 | SO2 | 0:23:13 | SO2 to Command be advised that the officer from Engine 49 says he has been burned and he is heading up towards the front of the building. | | | |
| 6:01:13 | District 4 | 0:23:23 | Ok what about Engine 31. | | | |
| 6:01:17 | SO2 | 0:23:27 | Engine 31 has just re-entered the, uh, building on the rear side. | | | |
| 6:01:25 | District 4 | 0:23:35 | Ok received do you have a visual on Engine 31. | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|---|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 6:01:45 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:23:55 | Rescue 9 to Command; be advised Rescue 9 has moved to the 3rd floor at this time. | | | |
| 6:01:56 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:24:06 | Medic 46 report to the Engine 49, the Engine of 49.. | | | |
| 6:02:03 | Medic 46 FFp | 0:24:13 | That's clear. | | | |
| 6:02:11 | District 4 | 0:24:21 | (Ambient Voice) | | | |
| 6:02:12 | District 4 | 0:24:22 | Command to Communications. | | | |
| 6:02:14 | DISPATCH | 0:24:24 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 6:02:16 | District 4 | 0:24:26 | Ok progress report #1, we've got the fire reported knocked down at this time, I still have heavy smoke conditions on upper floors, people presenting at the windows. We are in the process of conducting primary searches of floors 2-6, uh, my 3rd Alarm Companies will be staged until advised to respond in, and the fire should be; I'm gonna mark this under control we still got pretty good smoke conditions at this time. | | | |
| 6:02:48 | DISPATCH | 0:24:58 | That's clear fire is knocked down heavy smoke on the upper floors with people presenting at the windows, uh, conducting primary search on floors 2-6. 3rd alarm companies are staging until advised. | | | |
| 6:03:03 | SO2 | 0:25:13 | SO2 be advised I see heavy fire on 2nd floor rear it is not knocked down. | | | |
| 6:03:12 | District 4 | 0:25:22 | Ok SO2. Communications I'm getting reports that the fire is not knocked down at this time. I'll give you progress report #2 forthcoming. | | | |
| 6:03:20 | DISPATCH | 0:25:30 | Ok that's clear. | | | |
| 6:03:24 | Truck 23 OFFICER | 0:25:34 | Truck 23 to Command. | | | |
| 6:03:28 | District 4 | 0:25:38 | Go head Truck 23. | | | |
| 6:03:31 | Truck 23 OFFICER | 0:25:41 | We have 2 persons, we're on the 2nd floor "B" side. We're gonna to, uh, gonna to evacuate through the interior so we'll be out on the "A" side. | | | |
| 6:03:43 | District 4 | 0:25:53 | Ok Lieut. if you can get them down without a whole bunch of issues, bring them on out the alpha side. | | | |
| 6:03:50 | District 4 | 0:26:00 | Command to District 1. | | | |
| 6:03:52 | District 1 | 0:26:02 | Yea go ahead Command. **Note: On FG B-2 (CMND B) | | | |
| 6:03:53 | DISPATCH | 0:26:03 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 6:03:56 | District 4 | 0:26:06 | How we lookin' on the Charlie side I'm getting reports of fire still in progress. | | | |
| 6:04:03 | SO2 | 0:26:13 | SO2 to Command I've got a good visual of the fire. They just about knocked it down. I do have a Company there 2nd floor rear but there's still a lot of smoke in the building, but they're making progress. | | | |
| 6:04:07 | District 1 | 0:26:17 | Unintelligible. **Note: On FG B-2 (CMND B) | | | |
| 6:04:18 | District 4 | 0:26:28 | Ok, received. | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|--|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 6:04:30 | SO2 | 0:26:40 | SO2 to Command. The fire has been knocked down from what I can see and I'm right next to the apartment, however there's heavy smoke going to the 2nd and 3rd floor, we need to do some primary searches. | | | |
| 6:04:43 | District 4 | 0:26:53 | We have Companies headed that way for primaries. SO2 I need you to come to my buggy, ok? | | | |
| 6:04:50 | SO2 | 0:27:00 | Clear. | | | |
| 6:04:52 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:27:02 | Rescue 9 to Command. | | | |
| 6:04:54 | District 1 | 0:27:04 | Uh Command, uh District 1 do you copy? **Note: FG B-2 (CMND B) | | | |
| 6:04:55 | District 4 | 0:27:05 | Go ahead "Heavy Rescue 9 Officer." (Note: addressed by first name). | | | |
| 6:04:57 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 0:27:07 | Truck 31A is exiting the building to refill bottles. | | | |
| 6:05:00 | DISPATCH | 0:27:10 | Company on Command B2; the fire ground is Command "D" David 2, that's "D" David 2 (CMND B) **Note: FG B-2 (CMND B) | | | |
| 6:05:04 | District 1 | 0:27:14 | Thank you **Note: FG B-2 (CMND B) | | | |
| 6:05:04 | District 4 | 0:27:14 | Command received for Truck 31 Alpha go ahead Rescue 9. | | | |
| 6:05:09 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:27:19 | Command be advised we are in the apartment above, the fire apartment we have no extension at this time. | | | |
| 6:05:17 | District 4 | 0:27:27 | Command received. | | | |
| 6:05:20 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:27:30 | We also have searched almost every apartment on the, I think it's the 3rd floor, the floor above the fire so far we have found nothing. | | | |
| 6:05:21 | District 4B | 0:27:31 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on MAIN DISP | | | |
| 6:05:30 | District 4 | 0:27:40 | Command that's clear. Command to Truck 32. Reposition yourself to floor #4 to conduct primaries. | | | |
| 6:05:31 | District 1 | 0:27:41 | District 1 to Command. **Note on FG- C-2(CMND C) | | | |
| 6:05:39 | District 1 | 0:27:49 | District 1 to Command. **Note on FG- C-2(CMND C) | | | |
| 6:05:40 | DISPATCH | 0:27:50 | District 1 you are on "C "Charlie 2, Fire ground is "D" David 2. **Note on FG- C-2(CMND C) | | | |
| 6:05:49 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:27:59 | Engine 49 to Medic 46. | | | |
| 6:05:50 | District 1 | 0:28:00 | I got it, thank you. **Note on FG- C-2(CMND C) | | | |
| 6:05:54 | District 4B | | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on MAIN DISP | | | |
| 6:05:54 | Medic 46 FFp | 0:28:04 | Medic 46 go. | | | |
| 6:05:57 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:28:07 | Are you coming up to our pumper just you would be fine. | | | |
| 6:06:03 | Medic 46 FFp | 0:28:13 | No we're bringing our entire stretcher we're about 30 seconds away. | | | |
| 6:06:09 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:28:19 | Affirmative. | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|------------------------|----------------------|--|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 6:06:19 | Truck 32 OFFICER | 0:28:29 | Truck 32 to Command, we've moved from floor 2 (bang bang bang) to floor 3 (Unintelligible) primary search complete. | | | |
| 6:06:32 | District 4 | 0:28:42 | Ok that's clear Truck 32. | | | |
| 6:06:36 | District 4 | 0:28:46 | Your going to floor number 3 to conduct primary was that your message? | | | |
| 6:06:44 | Truck 32 OFFICER | 0:28:54 | Truck 32 affirmative. | | | |
| 6:06:47 | District 4 | 0:28:57 | Ok that's clear. | | | |
| 6:06:59 | District 4 | 0:29:09 | Command to Communications. | | | |
| 6:07:00 | DISPATCH | 0:29:10 | Go ahead sir. | | | |
| 6:07:04 | District 4 | 0:29:14 | Fire is under control floor number 2. We are in the process of checking floors 2 through 6. I got a primary conducted on floor number 2, all clear in the fire apartment and the room across from. Companies are in the process of removing smoke, we still have people at the windows. We're attempting to shelter-in-place at this time. | | | |
| 6:07:25 | DISPATCH | 0:29:35 | Ok sir that's clear. Primary on second floor shows all clear, fire's under control. We have callers in the apartment (walked over) one is at Apartment 527, 527 states she's on her balcony. | | | |
| 6:07:34 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:29:44 | WALKOVER-Engine 49 crew follow me into the building. | | | |
| 6:07:43 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:29:53 | Engine 49's crew follow me into the front of the building | | | |
| 6:07:51 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:30:01 | I'm sorry Engine 8's crew follow me into the front of the building. | | | |
| 6:08:01 | District 4 | 0:30:11 | Command to Communications give me the rundown on all the apartments again reporting smoke. | | | |
| 6:08:04 | DISPATCH | 0:30:14 | Ok, we're on the line with someone in apartment 557. Apartment 557. That's the only one sir. | | | |
| 6:08:21 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:30:31 | FAO & FF#2 follow me to the front of the building, where you at? | | | |
| 6:08:31 | Heavy Rescue 9 FF#3 | 0:30:41 | The line brought in by Engine 46, we're losing pressure on it. It's the red line. We're on the fire floor in the fire apartment, we need pressure back on that line. | | | |
| 6:08:46 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:30:56 | Medic 23 report to Engine 31 please. | | | |
| 6:08:52 | District 4B | 0:31:02 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on MAIN DISP | | | |
| 6:08:53 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 0:31:03 | " Truck 31 FF#1 Note: first name was used here" report to Truck 31. | | | |
| 6:08:57 | Engine 49 FF#2 | 0:31:07 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG B-5 (CFD B TAC 2). | | | |
| 6:09:00 | District 4B | 0:31:10 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on MAIN DISP | | | |
| 6:09:00 | District 4 | 0:31:10 | Ok, Command to all Companies, if you don't have urgent or emergency message stand-by. I need radio silence. Command to Communications. | | | |
| 6:09:02 | Engine 49 FF#2 | 0:31:02 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG B-5 (CFD B TAC 2). | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|--|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 6:09:07 | DISPATCH | 0:31:17 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 6:09:09 | District 4 | 0:31:19 | You say 557 is reporting smoke. | | | |
| 6:09:12 | DISPATCH | 0:31:22 | That's clear, they state they are on their balcony at this time. | | | |
| 6:09:18 | District 4 | 0:31:28 | Ok we have a visual, received thank you. | | | |
| 6:09:20 | DISPATCH | 0:31:30 | Ok. | | | |
| 6:09:20 | District 4 | 0:31:30 | Who do I have that's in Staging, who are my 3rd Alarm Companies that's in Staging? | | | |
| 6:09:25 | DISPATCH | 0:31:35 | Engine 23, Engine 7 and Truck 19 are your 3rd Alarm Companies. | | | |
| 6:09:32 | District 4 | 0:31:42 | Command received. | | | |
| 6:09:35 | District 3 | 0:31:45 | Command this is Search and Rescue I've got Heavy Rescue 14 on their way to 557. | | | |
| 6:09:42 | District 4 | 0:31:52 | "District 3 Note: first name used here" repeat that. | | | |
| 6:09:46 | District 3 | 0:31:56 | I've got Heavy Rescue 14 going to apartment 557. | | | |
| 6:09:54 | District 4 | 0:32:04 | Ok. "District 3- Note: used his first name here", thank you. | | | |
| 6:09:57 | District 4 | 0:32:07 | Dahlgren Command to Communications. | | | |
| 6:09:59 | DISPATCH | 0:32:09 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 6:10:03 | District 4 | 0:32:13 | Give me a second, uh third Medic Unit. Give me one more Medic above what you've already sent me. | | | |
| 6:10:09 | DISPATCH | 0:32:19 | Ok. | | | |
| 6:10:15 | District 3 | 0:32:25 | Search and Rescue to Command, we have 2 victims coming out we've got one baby and one female adult. | | | |
| 6:10:23 | District 4 | 0:32:33 | Command received. | | | |
| 6:10:27 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:32:37 | Rescue 9 to Command. | | | |
| 6:10:30 | District 4 | 0:32:40 | Go Rescue Company 9. | | | |
| 6:10:33 | HR9-OFF | 0:32:43 | Rescue 9 be advised the fire (<i>untelligable word</i>) is fine on the 3rd floor, the floor above the fire, where do you want us to go? | | | |
| 6:10:43 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:32:53 | Ok, tell you what, report to the 3rd District Chief "Note: last name was used here" assist with search and rescue throughout the building. He'll give you an assignment there. | | | |
| 6:10:53 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:33:03 | Rescue 9 to District 3, what do you need? | | | |
| 6:11:26 | District 4B | 0:33:36 | Command to Companies in Staging; Engine 23, Engine 7, Truck 19, I need you guys to come forward we don't need equipment, we need people. | | | |
| 6:11:36 | E23-OFF | 0:33:46 | 23 clear. | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|---|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 6:11:44 | District 4 | 0:33:54 | Command to Communications. | | | |
| 6:11:46 | DISPATCH | 0:33:56 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 6:11:49 | District 4 | 0:33:59 | Fire is out 2nd floor apartment no extensions. I need 1 additional Medic Unit. We're evaluating patients at this time, we're bringing 'em out of the building. We have minor injuries, we have smoke inhalation injuries, we have 1 injury to 1 firefighter so send me 1 additional Medic Unit. | | | |
| 6:12:11 | DISPATCH | 0:34:21 | Ok that's clear. Medic 19 is enroute. We'll send you another one. | | | |
| 6:12:22 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:34:32 | Engine 8 to Command, 4th floor is clear after checks by Truck 18. We're goin' to the 5th floor. | | | |
| 6:12:32 | District 4 | 0:34:42 | Ok, Identify your Company. | | | |
| 6:12:36 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:34:46 | Engine 8. | | | |
| 6:12:39 | District 4 | 0:34:49 | Ok Engine 8 that's (unintelligible) | | | |
| 6:13:27 | District 4 | 0:35:37 | Command to RAT19. | | | |
| 6:13:36 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:35:46 | Engine 8 to Command. Do you want all these doors open on the 5th floor? | | | |
| 6:13:41 | District 4 | 0:35:51 | If you can get them open without forcing them I would like that to occur. | | | |
| 6:13:50 | UNKNOWN | 0:36:00 | Truck 3 | | | |
| 6:13:50 | RAT19 OFFICER | 0:36:00 | RAT19 to Command. | | | |
| 6:13:54 | District 4 | 0:36:04 | Ok, I want you to come forward meet me at the Command Post which is right next to Truck 31. We need to do a PAR. | | | |
| 6:14:11 | RAT19 OFFICER | 0:36:21 | Truck 19 clear, we're just arriving. | | | |
| 6:14:16 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:36:26 | Engine 8 to Command; could you repeat that if you want us to force open the doors? | | | |
| 6:14:23 | District 4 | 0:36:33 | Engine 8, check the doors see if you can get in do not force doors. | | | |
| 6:14:33 | Engine 8 FAO | 0:36:43 | Engine 49 FAO to Command. | | | |
| 6:14:39 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:36:49 | Engine 49 FAO here. | | | |
| 6:14:46 | Engine 8 FAO | 0:36:56 | Correction, Engine 8 FAO to Command. | | | |
| 6:15:02 | District 3 | 0:37:12 | Search and Rescue to Command. I've got an all clear on floor 3, floor 4 still working floor 5. | | | |
| 6:15:13 | District 4 | 0:37:23 | Command received; 3,4,5 and your in the process of hitting 5 and 6 received. | | | |
| 6:15:20 | District 3 | 0:37:30 | Clear. | | | |
| 6:15:28 | Heavy Rescue 14 OFFICER | 0:37:38 | This is Rescue 14. | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 6:15:36 | Heavy Rescue 14 OFFICER | 0:37:46 | 5 floor is clear. | | | |
| 6:15:41 | District 4 | 0:37:51 | Ok floor 5 is clear. | | | |
| 6:15:45 | Truck 23 OFFICER | 0:37:55 | Truck 23 on the 2nd floor to Command. | | | |
| 6:15:50 | District 4 | 0:38:00 | Go ahead Truck 23. | | | |
| 6:15:53 | Truck 23 OFFICER | 0:38:03 | We can give you an all clear on the primary search on the fire floor, 2nd floor. All clear primary search on the 2nd floor. | | | |
| 6:16:02 | District 4 | 0:38:12 | Command received. Truck 23 reposition to floor number 3 give me a secondary on the 3rd floor. | | | |
| 6:16:15 | Truck 23 OFFICER | 0:38:25 | Truck 23 moving from 2nd floor to the 3rd floor copy. | | | |
| 6:16:20 | District 4 | 0:38:30 | Command to Truck 18, your status and location. | | | |
| 6:16:29 | Truck 32 OFFICER | 0:38:39 | Truck 32, we're complete on the 3rd floor moving up to floor number 4. (Banging in background) | | | |
| 6:16:37 | District 4 | 0:38:47 | Report to the 3rd District , Chief " <i>Note: used last name here</i> " he is the Search and Rescue Chief. | | | |
| 6:16:47 | Truck 18 OFFICER | 0:38:57 | Truck 18 we're on the 4th floor. | | | |
| 6:16:55 | Heavy Rescue 9 FF#3 | 0:39:05 | HR9 Officer " <i>Note: used full name here</i> " this is " <i>Heavy Rescue FF#3- Note: used first name here</i> " I'm outside in the front just exited the building from the second floor. | | | |
| 6:17:04 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:39:14 | Message received. | | | |
| 6:17:20 | Truck 23 OFFICER | 0:39:30 | Truck 23 on the 2nd floor to Command. | | | |
| 6:17:24 | District 4 | 0:39:34 | Go Truck 23. | | | |
| 6:17:27 | Truck 23 OFFICER | 0:39:37 | Advise Engine 49, that we have lost pressure in the red fire line we need it to be recharged we've got a small amount of active fire on the 2nd floor, we need it knocked down. | | | |
| 6:17:38 | District 4 | 0:39:48 | Command received. Engine 49. | | | |
| 6:17:50 | District 4 | 0:40:00 | Command to Engine 49 FAO " <i>Note: used last name here</i> " they need you to re-establish water to the fire apartment. | | | |
| 6:18:03 | District 3 | 0:40:13 | Search and Rescue to Command; we have an all clear on 5. | | | |
| 6:18:17 | Engine 49 OFFICER | 0:40:27 | Engine 49 to Engine 49 FireFighter " <i>Engine 49 FF#1- Note: used last name here</i> ". | | | |
| 6:18:46 | Engine 49 OFFICER | 0:40:56 | Engine 49 to Command. | | | |
| 6:18:49 | District 4 | 0:40:59 | "Engine 49 Officer- Note: first name used here." (very softly) | | | |
| 6:19:09 | Engine 8 FF#1 | 0:41:19 | Engine 8 to Command. Are you looking for Firefighter " <i>FF#1- Note: used first name here</i> " from E49. | | | |
| 6:19:18 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:41:28 | Engine 49 FAO what do you need? | | | |



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| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
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| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic |
|---------|-------------------------|--------------|---|
| 6:19:28 | Engine 8 FF#1 | 0:41:38 | Were you looking for Firefighter "Engine 49 FF#1- Note: used last name here"? |
| 6:19:34 | District 4 | 0:41:44 | Command to RAT 19. |
| 6:19:40 | RAT19-OFF | 0:41:50 | RAT 19. |
| 6:19:43 | District 4 | 0:41:53 | You guys get ready for a PAR. Get an active run down from Dispatch of everybody that is on the scene at work at this time. |
| 6:19:58 | RAT 19 OFFICER | 0:42:08 | RAT 19 to Command, we're not (Unintelligible) |
| 6:20:26 | District 3 | 0:42:36 | Search and Rescue to HR 9. |
| 6:20:35 | HR9-OFF | 0:42:45 | HR 9 go ahead. |
| 6:20:46 | Truck 23 OFFICER | 0:42:56 | Truck 23 Firefighter "FF #1- Note: used last name here", we need the rabbit tool on the 3rd floor. |
| 6:20:55 | Truck 23 FF#1 | 0:43:05 | Lieut. I'm just now coming back from taking that patient down, I have to change my bottle out, I'm out of air. |
| 6:21:12 | Truck 23 FF#1 | 0:43:22 | I do have the rabbit tool on the exterior, somebody can come and get it. |
| 6:21:50 | District 3 | 0:44:00 | Hey, HR 9 come down to the lobby and see if we can get this elevator door open. |
| 6:22:04 | Truck 23 FF#1 | 0:44:14 | Engine...Ladder 23 Firefighter to Truck 23 Officer, what floor do you need it on? |
| 6:22:15 | Truck 23 OFFICER | 0:44:25 | Truck 23 standby. We've got into all the apartments, stand by on the exterior. |
| 6:22:17 | Heavy Rescue 14 OFFICER | 0:44:27 | (Bonked) |
| 6:22:23 | Heavy Rescue 14 OFFICER | 0:44:33 | MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY. We have a Firefighter down. He went down the shaft; 5th floor. He went down the shaft on the 5th floor. |
| 6:22:34 | District 4 | 0:44:44 | Command received the Mayday. Is that a fall? |
| 6:22:38 | Heavy Rescue 14 OFFICER | 0:44:48 | (unintelligible) In the shaft. Yes! |
| 6:22:46 | District 4 | 0:44:56 | Ok Command received the Mayday. Anybody close to the location of the Company identifying with the Mayday? What floor on you on Mayday? |
| 6:22:55 | Heavy Rescue 14 OFFICER | 0:45:05 | Yes! Heavy Rescue 14 "Officer- Note: used last name here", Gordon has fell down to the first floor down the shaft. |
| 6:23:08 | District 4 | 0:45:18 | Repeat that I've got "Heavy Rescue 14 Officer- Note: used last name here", who's in the stairwell? What's the floor ID? |
| 6:23:18 | SOC | 0:45:28 | SOC to Command; he fell down the elevator shaft to the first floor. |
| 6:23:25 | Heavy Rescue 14 OFFICER | 0:45:35 | That is correct. |
| 6:23:29 | District 3 | 0:45:39 | All Companies, the first floor elevator door is open he is on floor two, floor two. Pop the door! |
| 6:23:41 | District 4 | 0:45:51 | Command copies. We're sending help your way, we're sending help your way. |
| 6:23:46 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:45:56 | Rescue 9 to Command, be advised we see the firefighter. We've got the elevator door open on four. He's down between the elevator and the shaft and he is probably on the second or third floor. |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|--|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 6:24:02 | District 4 | 0:46:12 | Command "Heavy Rescue 9 Officer- Note: used first name here", give me that one more time I understand he's in the elevator shaft. You can see him from the second floor is that correct? | | | |
| 6:24:11 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:46:21 | Uh, we saw him from the third floor, looking down the elevator shaft door. He's wedged in the elevator shaft. | | | |
| 6:24:20 | District 4 | 0:46:30 | Command that's clear. | | | |
| 6:24:23 | District 4 | 0:46:33 | Command to SOC. I need you to be Extrication. | | | |
| 6:24:29 | SOC | 0:46:39 | SOC I copy. We're on the 3rd floor, we are uh, accessing the elevator shaft now. | | | |
| 6:24:39 | District 4 | 0:46:49 | Command received, keep me informed. | | | |
| 6:24:48 | District 3 | 0:46:58 | Command go ahead get equipment ready we're gonna take him out? | | | |
| 6:24:56 | District 4 | 0:47:06 | That's clear. Command to a Medic Unit that is available, identify. | | | |
| 6:24:56 | ALS32 | 0:47:06 | ALS32, Medic Unit headed your way to Command, sir. | | | |
| 6:25:09 | District 4 | 0:47:19 | Ok, report to the front of Truck 31. They're going to bring the firefighter out the alpha side of the building. | | | |
| 6:25:22 | District 4 | 0:47:32 | Command to RAT 19, I need a PAR conducted on all members actively working at this incident. | | | |
| 6:25:33 | District 4B | 0:47:43 | That's clear. All members stand by for a PAR. Engine 31 give me a PAR and location. | | | |
| 6:25:44 | Engine 31 OFFICER | 0:47:54 | PAR, Ok, uh uh, 2nd floor rear. | | | |
| 6:25:48 | Engine 49 FF#2 | 0:47:58 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG B-5 (CFD B TAC 2). | | | |
| 6:25:51 | SOC | 0:48:01 | SOC Extrication to Command. | | | |
| 6:25:55 | District 4 | 0:48:05 | Go "SOC- Note: used first name here". | | | |
| 6:25:58 | SOC | 0:48:08 | We have located the firefighter. He is lying along side the car; he is not responsive. | | | |
| 6:26:08 | District 4 | 0:48:18 | Command received. | | | |
| 6:26:10 | District 3 | 0:48:20 | Command go ahead and get me a RAT pack up here. Some air, I'm gonna need uh, an extension ladder, portable ladder and we need that stat. | | | |
| 6:26:22 | District 4 | 0:48:32 | Command clear. | | | |
| 6:26:25 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:48:35 | Rescue 9 to Command. | | | |
| 6:26:28 | SOC | 0:48:38 | Rescue 9, I need you to breach the side of the elevator. I need you to bring tools up to breach the side of the elevator. Rescue 9, Rescue 14 now 3rd floor! | | | |
| 6:26:39 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:48:49 | Rescue 9 be advised we are on the floor below looking up, he's wedged between the wall. He's unconscious at this time and he's bleeding profusely. | | | |
| 6:26:55 | District 4 | 0:49:05 | Command to Communications. | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|--|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 6:26:56 | DISPATCH | 0:49:06 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 6:26:58 | SOC | 0:49:08 | SOC to Command. I need a fan, to pressurize this hallway we're still on air in here we need a fan to pressurize this hallway. | | | |
| 6:27:07 | District 4 | 0:49:17 | Ok that's clear. Engine 7 report to my location. Engine 7 report to my location. | | | |
| 6:27:16 | District 3 | 0:49:26 | Search and Rescue, I'm also going to need someone to get to the penthouse for the elevator and cut that power immediately. | | | |
| 6:27:24 | District 4 | 0:49:34 | Command, Rescue 9 you available to do that? You got one member that can go up with a Truck Company? | | | |
| 6:27:31 | SOC | 0:49:41 | SOC, Command negative I need Rescue 9 in the elevator to breach that elevator to get to the firefighter. | | | |
| 6:27:39 | District 4 | 0:49:49 | Ok "SOC- Note: used first name here". we got it. | | | |
| 6:27:42 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:49:52 | Rescue 9 to Command, be advised we're getting tools now from our Heavy Rescue. Can you send someone to the Heavy Rescue and assist (Heavy Rescue FF#1 and FF#2 Note: last names used here) for tools. | | | |
| 6:27:53 | Heavy Rescue 9 FF#3 | 0:50:03 | "Heavy Rescue Officer- Note: used first name here" I'm headed that way. | | | |
| 6:28:02 | District 4 | 0:50:12 | Ok "SOC- Note: used first name here" I received your information, you got a firefighter down between the, uh car. You're using Rescue 9. I'm sending Truck 23 your way with a RAT pack to assist. | | | |
| 6:28:16 | SOC | 0:50:26 | Copy that, I need, we need to breach the "D" the delta side of the elevator. | | | |
| 6:28:25 | District 4 | 0:50:35 | OK, the "D" delta side of the elevator I will get you a Company that way. We're in the process of getting ventilation set up for you through alpha. | | | |
| 6:28:36 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:50:46 | Rescue 9 to Command. | | | |
| 6:28:44 | District 4 | 0:50:54 | Go "Heavy Rescue 9 Officer- Note: used first name here". | | | |
| 6:28:48 | District 3 | 0:50:58 | Search and Rescue to Command. We're gonna need sawzalls, every fan that, uh, we can set up so that we can get this air moving. And we're gonna need air chisels. | | | |
| 6:29:03 | District 4 | 0:51:13 | Ok that's clear. Sawzalls, fan for ventilation. | | | |
| 6:29:10 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:51:20 | Rescue 9 to Command. | | | |
| 6:29:14 | District 4 | 0:51:24 | Go ahead Rescue 9. | | | |
| 6:29:18 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:51:28 | I need a couple of Companies, with extend upon or little giant ladders. I need them in the elevator shaft on the first floor, ladders leaning against the wall. If he comes loose he's gonna fall another story. We need ladder up to the bottom side of the elevator to try to catch him if he comes loose and falls. | | | |
| 6:29:39 | District 3 | 0:51:49 | Command received. Command to all the Companies on the scene right now that are not doing an assignment, report to the Command Post. | | | |
| 6:29:49 | Engine 9 | 0:51:59 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG B-2 (CMND B) | | | |
| 6:29:53 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:52:03 | FAO "Engine 8- Note: used last name here", report to the front of the building. | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|------------------------|----------------------|--|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 6:30:04 | Truck 32 OFFICER | 0:52:14 | Truck 32 Officer to Truck 32 FAO. I need you and "Truck 32 FF#1" on floor 2. Bring "Truck 32 FF#2" with you if you got 'em. (Note: used full names here). | | | |
| 6:30:16 | Truck 32 FF#1 | 0:52:26 | "Truck 32 FF#1- Note: used full name here" is fine I'm workin" | | | |
| 6:30:22 | Truck 32 FAO | 0:52:32 | TRUCK 32 FAO I'm getting a bottle I'll be up on the second floor in a sec. | | | |
| 6:30:30 | SOC | 0:52:40 | RAT to Accountability. | | | |
| 6:30:39 | SOC | 0:52:49 | RAT to Command. | | | |
| 6:30:45 | District 4 | 0:52:55 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 6:30:57 | SOC | 0:53:07 | RAT; you need to do a PAR, so we know who we're missing. | | | |
| 6:31:05 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:53:15 | We're missing "Heavy Rescue 14 Officer- Note: full name used here." | | | |
| 6:31:09 | District 4 | 0:53:19 | We are aware (cut off) | | | |
| 6:31:19 | District 3 | 0:53:29 | Rescue to Command, this is firefighter Daryl Gordon and this is not "Heavy Rescue 14 Officer- Note: used last name here." | | | |
| 6:31:28 | District 4 | 0:53:38 | Received. | | | |
| 6:31:41 | District 4 | 0:53:51 | Command to RAT 19 let's do a rundown. let's get a PAR established. | | | |
| 6:31:49 | RAT 19 OFFICER | 0:53:59 | RAT 19 clear. | | | |
| 6:32:01 | RAT 19 OFFICER | 0:54:11 | RAT 19 to Engine 49, PAR and location. | | | |
| 6:32:19 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:54:29 | "Engine 49 FF#1- Note: used last name here", what is your location? | | | |
| 6:32:34 | RAT 19 OFFICER | 0:54:44 | RAT 19, E49 PAR. | | | |
| 6:32:38 | Engine 49 FAO | 0:54:48 | "Engine 49 FF#2 and FAO- Note: used last names here", are at the apparatus. | | | |
| 6:32:45 | District 3 | 0:54:55 | Search and Rescue to Command. I need a stokes basket, 2nd floor. I still need that RAT pack, air chisels and sawzalls. | | | |
| 6:33:00 | District 4 | 0:55:10 | Ok "District 3- Note: used first name here", we are in the process of getting that for you. Chief "Car 301- Note: used last name here" 301 air chisels stokes baskets floor number 2, you've got that assignment received. | | | |
| 6:33:14 | CAR 301 | 0:55:24 | Received, 301 clear. | | | |
| 6:33:18 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 0:55:28 | Truck 31 has the (unintelligible) elevator on the third floor. | | | |
| 6:33:33 | SOC | 0:55:43 | SOC to District 3 Rescue. | | | |
| 6:33:50 | SOC | 0:56:00 | SOC to District 3 Rescue. | | | |
| 6:34:19 | District 4 | 0:56:29 | Command to Communications. | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 6:34:21 | DISPATCH | 0:56:31 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 6:34:23 | District 4 | 0:56:33 | Progress report #3. Fire's out. Uh, we're still evacuating people from the building. We have an active Mayday in progress. We're attempting to extricate the firefighter at this time. Send me an additional ALS Unit, have them report to the Command Post for work. | | | |
| 6:34:38 | Engine 49 FF#2 | 0:56:48 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG B-5 (CFD B TAC 2). | | | |
| 6:34:41 | DISPATCH | 0:56:51 | Ok that's clear fire is out, Mayday in progress, attempting to extricate the firefighter. We'll get you another ALS Unit. | | | |
| 6:34:52 | RAT 19 OFFICER | 0:57:02 | Accountability Engine 46, PAR. | | | |
| 6:34:58 | Engine 46 OFFICER | 0:57:08 | 46, we have a PAR on the second floor rear, fire, fire floor. | | | |
| 6:35:09 | RAT 19 OFFICER | 0:57:19 | Clear. Accountability Engine 18, PAR. | | | |
| 6:35:17 | Engine 18 OFFICER | 0:57:27 | Engine 18, one member on the 4th floor guarding the elevator shaft door. Still trying to account for 2 members "Engine 18 FF#1 and FAO- Note: used last names here." | | | |
| 6:35:27 | Engine 18 FF#1 | 0:57:37 | "Engine 18 FF#1 and FAO- Note: used last names here", are assisting (Unintelligible) | | | |
| 6:35:38 | Engine 8 OFFICER | 0:57:48 | FAO "FAO Engine 8- Note: used last name here", are you in the front of the building? | | | |
| 6:35:56 | Truck 32 FF#2 | 0:58:06 | This is Firefighter "Truck 32 FF #2- Note: used last name here" on the 4th floor, Ladder 32 "Truck 32 FF#2- Note: used last name here", FireFighter from Engine 49 air went out, went down to change his bottle. I am guarding the door on the 4th floor. | | | |
| 6:36:07 | Engine 49 FF#2 | 0:58:17 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG B-5 (CFD B TAC 2). | | | |
| 6:36:23 | SOC | 0:58:33 | RAT SOC to Command; 2nd floor, firefighter has been extricated, we'll be removing him out. I need a Rescue Unit in the lobby ASAP! | | | |
| 6:36:37 | District 4 | 0:58:47 | Ok "SOC- Note: addressed him by first name here", we got that, they're in the lobby awaiting your firefighter. Command to Communications. | | | |
| 6:36:45 | District 4 | 0:58:55 | Command to Communications | | | |
| 6:36:47 | DISPATCH | 0:58:57 | Go Ahead | | | |
| 6:36:50 | District 4 | 0:59:00 | Firefighter has been extricated, being treated, triaged and packaged right now. We're waiting to evacuate him out of the building. | | | |
| 6:36:54 | Engine 49 FF#2 | 0:59:04 | ** Note: Unknown content of this transmission on FG B-5 (CFD B TAC 2). | | | |
| 6:36:59 | DISPATCH | 0:59:09 | OK, Firefighter has been extricated. Being triaged and packaged at this time. | | | |
| 6:37:08 | Heavy Rescue 9 OFFICER | 0:59:18 | Rescue 9, be advised firefighter, is not breathing | | | |
| 6:37:14 | District 4 | 0:59:24 | Ok, radio silence at this time. Radio silence. I want face-to-face communications on the condition of this firefighter. | | | |
| 6:37:48 | District 4 | 0:59:58 | Hey "Heavy Rescue 14 Officer- Note: used full name here", get that cop up here | | | |
| 6:37:55 | Truck 31 OFFICER | 1:00:05 | Truck 31 we have a PAR, all four members, third floor "A" side. | | | |



| FG-D2 Command D | FG-B2 Command B | FG-B5 CFD B-Tac 2 | Main Dispatch | FG-C2 Command C | FG-A2 CFD EMS | Mayday Message |
|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Time | Company | Time Elapsed | ACTUAL Radio Traffic | | | |
| 6:38:23 | District 4 | 1:00:33 | Command to Communications. | | | |
| 6:38:25 | DISPATCH | 1:00:35 | Go ahead. | | | |
| 6:38:30 | District 4 | 1:00:40 | Can I have a CPD representative here, sergeant or lieutenant or | | | |
| 6:38:33 | DISPATCH | 1:00:43 | OK will do | | | |
| 6:38:39 | District 4 | 1:00:49 | I'll need that for a police escort. | | | |
| 6:38:41 | DISPATCH | 1:00:51 | I got that. | | | |
| 6:38:57 | SOC | 1:01:07 | RAT to Command, we're making our way down the hallway to the stairs now. | | | |
| 6:39:03 | District 4 | 1:01:13 | Received. We're ready. | | | |
| 6:39:10 | Car 3 | 1:01:20 | Car 3 we got the lobby cleared so we're ready for him when you come down. | | | |
| 6:39:15 | District 4 | 1:01:25 | Ok Chief. | | | |
| 6:41:29 | District 3 | 1:03:39 | We got the cot right to the front door. | | | |
| 6:41:35 | District 4 | 1:03:45 | Command to RAT 19 how far did we get through our PAR and who's left? | | | |
| 6:41:45 | RAT 19 OFFICER | 1:03:55 | Made it through the 1st Alarm Companies. | | | |
| 6:41:50 | District 4 | 1:04:00 | Ok, I need you to continue with the 2nd Alarm Companies. | | | |
| 6:42:07 | RAT 19 OFFICER | 1:04:17 | Accountability to Truck 32. | | | |
| 6:42:12 | Truck 32 OFFICER | 1:04:22 | Truck 32. | | | |



Appendix 2

MSA

**Self Contained
Breathing
Apparatus
ICM Data**





Cincinnati Fire Department
Mask Services Unit

Final Report, LODD Investigation
of
F.A.O. Daryl Eugene Gordon
at
6020 Dahlgren St
26March2015





CINCINNATI FIRE DEPARTMENT

Mask Services Unit/Car 209

Cincinnati, Ohio 21April2015

Richard Braun
Fire Chief

RE: LODD SCBA Preliminary Report

Sir:

MSU LODD Report No.001 04202015
26 March 2015
Dahlgren Fire
H 14 FAO SCBA

The SCBA was received from FIU on 04202015 at approximately 1010 Hrs. the SCBA was package in an open corrugated cardboard box with white evidence tape at the bottom of the box encompassing all four bottom edges. The members face piece was secured in a brown paper evidence bag; no detailed investigation of the face piece or Posi-Chek evaluation was performed at this time (delayed until NIOSH investigation). There were multiple points of damage noticeable on the SCBA prior to removing it from the cardboard box: (See Figure 1)

The visual inspection clearly points to this SCBA being removed from service as it is no longer suitable for active firefighter activities. The result of the impact shows stress fractures in addition to broken and/or missing structural portions of the SCBA:

1. Upper right Shoulder strap attachment point fractured and not found in box.
2. There are stress fractures in the structural web just below the missing upper right shoulder attachment point (in multiple places above and below the NIOSH label). See Figure 2
3. Left Grab Handle fractured/missing from SCBA not found in box.
4. Bottle retaining strap deformed on left side and dislodged from spring-loaded attachment point on right side.
5. 1st Stage Regulator Slide is broken off of the Back plate but remains attached to the 1st Stage Regulator.
6. The bottle rest point (top left) is missing a small piece.
7. The outer bottle wrap has separated based on position this would have been on the right rear side of the firefighter. See Figure 4
8. Face Piece removed from box

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9. Retaining ring from the retaining strap connection was found resting in the bottom of the box (Secured in evidence bag).
10. Control Module Inspection
11. On inspection the control module appears to have no power (installed (4) new batteries for the purpose of retrieving data).
12. There is an abrasion to the Telemetry/Battery Pack Cap.
13. After installing new batteries MSU made multiple attempts to retrieve any and all data contained within the Control Module to no avail, with that result the new batteries were remove from the Telemetry/Battery Pack (the original batteries remained in the sealed evidence bag). There is a visible twist in the Control Module cable which appears to be un-characteristic in comparison with other SCBA's which may indicate a possible fault or failure



Figure 1



Figure 2

"We make Breathing Easy"






Figure 3

Outer layer of
cylinder
wrapping



Figure 4

Although the SCBA sustained significant damage as a result of the incident within the elevator shaft at the Dahlgren fire building, it performed well within the parameters of its design and expectation.


- The primary items of concern would surround the failure or inconsistency of the electronic alarm emitting from the Telemetry Pack, located at the lower portion of the frame. There was intermittent sound witnessed at the scene of the incident, the inconsistent repeatability of this irregularity proved to be a challenge nevertheless the issue was reported to MSA as an issue needing resolution.

The wiring for the Control module was torn or pulled from its connection within the control module, while this caused challenges and concerns over retrieving information at the local level; MSA was able to retrieve said information. The separation of the wiring, though preventing local attempts, actually may have prevented damage to the internal storage device of the Control Module.

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HR 14 Fire Apparatus Operator



Sorted by person



| HR14 FAO | | Pass Device Serial No.: | 3174011 | Incident Name: | Danigren | Duration | Pressure consumption/PSI |
|-----------------|---------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|----------------|----------|----------|--------------------------|
| Incident start: | 3/26/2015 5:28:37AM | Incident end: | 3/26/2015 07:46:00 | | | | 0 |
| Date | Time | Message | | | | | Pressure/PSI |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:27:45 | Join Team: HR 14 | | | | | 0 |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:27:54 | Begin accountability | | | | | 0 |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:27:54 | Motion alarm | | | | | 0 |

- A. This point represents radio connection with the MSA Telemetry System which occurred at approximately 05:27.45 (06:27). Twenty minutes prior to radio connection HR 14 FAO opened his air cylinder 05:07 (06:07).
- B. Subsequently three minutes later (06:10) the Control Module recorded a Motion Alarm.
- C. Three minutes later the Control Module records an eight minute depletion of the remaining approximately 3850 PSI in the SCBA cylinder.

Calculations on Air Loss and Flow Rate

Members of the Heavy Rescues in the CFD wear a '1 Hour' (4500 PSI) SCBA bottle which holds 88 SCF. That translates to approximately .0196 cubic foot of air per pound per square inch.

3850 PSI is approximately 78 SCF of air remaining in the cylinder:

$$3850 / 8 = 481.25 \text{ PSI per minute loss}$$

$$78 \text{ SCF} = 2208.71 \text{ Liters}$$


$$2208.71 / 8 = 276.09 \text{ Liters per minute loss}$$

- a. The calculations illustrates the fire fighter experience a rate of flow more than twice (2.71) of the Maximum Work Rate used in the Posi-Chek testing of SCBA's which is set at 102 LPM.^{iv}

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HR 14 Fire Fighter 1



Sorted by person




| HR14 FF1 | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|
| Pass Device Serial No.: | 3174092 | Incident Name: | Dalhagan |
| Incident start: | 3/26/2015 8:25:37AM | Incident end: | 3/26/2015 07:48:00 |
| Date | Time | Message | Pressure/PSI |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:27:19 | Join Team: HR 14 | 0 |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:27:28 | Begin accountability | 2230 |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:42:15 | Remaining time alarm | 2220 |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:44:08 | Loss of radio link alarm | 1140 |

- A. This point represents radio connection with the MSA Telemetry System which occurred at approximately 05:27.19 (06:27). Twenty-two minutes prior to radio connection HR 14 FF 1 opened his air cylinder 05:05 (06:05).

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HR 14 Fire Fighter 2



Sorted by person



| HR14 FF2 | | Pass Device Serial No.: | 4174467 | Incident Name: | Dahlgren | Duration | Pressure consumption/PSI |
|-----------|----------|--------------------------|---------|----------------|----------|----------|--------------------------|
| 3/26/2015 | 05:27:30 | Join Team: HR 14 | | | | | 0 |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:27:36 | Begin accountability | | | | | 1930 |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:27:36 | Motion alarm | | | | | 1930 |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:28:34 | Motion alarm | | | | | 0 |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:29:57 | Loss of radio link alarm | | | | | 0 |

- A. This point represents radio connection with the MSA Telemetry System which occurred at approximately 05:27.30 (06:27). Twenty-three minutes prior to radio connection HR 14 FF 2 opened his air cylinder 05:04 (06:04).

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The face piece of Lt. Davis' was reported to have been exposed to a 'high heat' condition during the incident. There was no indication of a high heat alarms on the members SCBA Control Module that notwithstanding we did find physical evidence of 'crazing' on the actual face piece (see Figure 5). The 'crazing' while an indicator of high heat cannot be interpreted as a definitive statement of a high heat incident; the NFPA standard of testing for the SCBA face piece is as follows:

*NFPA 1981 AND 1982,
2013 EDITION STANDARDS UPDATE*

By John G. Dinning IV

The NFPA 1981 and 1982 Standards - Open-Circuit Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Services and Personal Alert Safety Systems (PASS) - are quickly approaching implementation. The information below specifies timelines and provides information about the changes. The current status of these NFPA Standards revisions is as follows:

- The standards will be marked as 2013 Edition.*
- The issuance date was November 27, 2012.*
- The standard will be published on March 2, 2013.*
- The last ship date for 2007 Edition SCBA will be August 30, 2013.*

Key points of the changes:

NFPA 1981:

The changes to the standard include increased lens integrity testing, new voice intelligibility requirements, end-of-service time indicator changes, requirements for emergency breathing support systems and updating the intrinsic safety standards.

- Increased facepiece lens durability requirements through two additional tests designed to challenge the integrity of the lens and facepiece.*

The 2007 standard does not have a specific test for the facepiece lens. The complete SCBA is tested by a 5 minute oven test at 200°F while breathing at a rate of 40 liters per minute (lpm), followed by a flame impingement exposure (approximately 1,800°F) for 10 seconds while breathing at a rate of 103 lpm, then survive a 6 inch drop test and should self-extinguish (no after flame) after 2.2 seconds. The facepiece must pass a visual acuity requirement and the SCBA must maintain positive pressure for 30 breaths after the low-pressure alarm activates following the heat and flame.

The proposed tests below will be incremental to the above test:

•A high heat and flame test – it is proposed that a test to evaluate convective heat loads be added to further evaluate the integrity of the lens and facepiece. The SCBA will be subjected to a 500°F oven for 5 minutes then followed by a flame impingement exposure at 1800°F for 10 seconds, while breathing at a rate of 40 lpm for each section of the test. Following the heat and flame exposures, the SCBA and Facepiece must survive a 6 inch drop test. There are no requirements for visual acuity and a garden sprayer is permitted to extinguish any after flame. The SCBA must maintain a positive pressure for a period of twenty-four minutes regardless of the cylinder's capacity.

•Radiant Heat –it is proposed that a test to evaluate radiant heat loads be added to further evaluate the integrity of the lens and facepiece. The SCBA's facepiece will be exposed to a radiant heat load of 15 kW/m² for 5 minutes while the SCBA is breathing at a rate of 40 lpm.

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The radiant heat panel is then removed and the SCBA must maintain a positive pressure for a period of twenty-four minutes regardless of the cylinder's capacity.

- New voice intelligibility requirements to eliminate the subjectivity of the testing and improve overall intelligibility

—
The Modified Rhyme Test (MRT) will no longer be used due to the subjectivity and lack of repeatability of the test protocol.

—
Introduction of the Speech Transmissibility Index (STI) to improve repeatability and reproducibility in the test results.

—
There are two test protocols: one for mechanical communication performance and another for amplified communication performance

NFPA 1981 AND 1982, 2013 EDITION STANDARDS UPDATE
- WHITEPAPER

- End-of-Service Time Indicator (EOSTI) will move from 25% to 33% (with a tolerance of -0%, +5% or 33% - 38%) of the cylinder's operating pressure

—
The chart below will demonstrate the differences in alarm set points after the standard promulgates

SCBA Cylinder Pressure - Alarm Point at 25% / Alarm Point at 33%

2216 - 550 / 730

3000 - 750 / 1000

4500 - 1125 / 1500

5500 - 1375 / 1825

- The NFPA committee has worked with NIOSH to establish minimum performance and approval requirements for Emergency Breathing Support Systems.

- For SCBA using a wired HUD system, the user may not be able to disconnect the HUD wire and still maintain the air connection.

- The SCBA must meet the Class I, Division I intrinsic safety requirements set forth in the 6th edition of UL 913 standard. The current NFPA standard calls out UL 913, 5th edition, containing very similar requirements for intrinsic safety standards.

NFPA 1982:

The key changes to the standard will be the introduction of a universal PASS sound and updating the intrinsic safety standards.

- Introducing a universal sounding alarm so that all PASS devices will have the same sound for both pre-alarm and full alarm.

-

The PASS device must meet the Class I, Division I intrinsic safety requirements set forth in the UL 913, 6th Edition standard. The current NFPA Standard calls out UL 913, 5th Edition, containing very similar requirements for intrinsic safety.^{vi}

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


MSU also retrieved, on 05262015, the Control Module information from the remaining HR 14 SCBA's involved in the Dahlgren incident in an effort to establish a timeline sequence. In downloading this data the one reoccurring issue stems from the inaccuracies or inconsistencies in the Control Module recorded time.

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HR 14 Officer



- **06:08:** All four members of HR-14 entered the building on the first floor through the A side entrance. According to ICM data, HR14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 turned on their SCBA cylinders and proceeded to the B-C Stairwell to ascend to the fifth floor. FAO Gordon did not turn on his SCBA cylinder at this time.

Sorted by person



| HR14 OFF | | | | | |
|-------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------------------|
| Pass Device Serial No.: | | 4175193 | | | |
| Incident Name: | | Dahlgren | | | |
| 3/26/2015 5:28:37AM | Incident start | 3/26/2015 07:46:00 | Incident end | Duration | Pressure consumption/PSI |
| | | | | 27 Min. | 2430 |
| Date | Time | Message | | Pressure/PSI | Pressure/PSI |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:27:21 | Join Team: HR 14 | | | 0 |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:27:28 | Begin accountability | | | 2430 |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:41:11 | Remaining time alarm | | | 2070 |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:54:44 | Pressure alarm | | | 560 |
| 3/26/2015 | 05:54:56 | Finish accountability | | | 560 |

- A. This point represents radio connection with the MSA Telemetry System which occurred at approximately 05:27.21 (06:27). Twenty-two minutes prior to radio connection HR 14 OFF opened his air cylinder 05:05 (06:05)

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


Figure 5
SCBA Face Piece of Lt. Davis



Typical fire-fighter breathing apparatus damaged in NIST tests shows facepiece warping under high heats.
Credit: NIST

This image used for a demonstration of 'warping and subsequent failure, neither of which is prevalent in the SCBA face piece of Lt. Davis.

vii

Figure 6

In addition to the crazing the SCBA face piece also showed signs of moderate staining from the smoke and product of combustion residue and soot as seen in Figure 7.



This area also show some sign of mild warping.

Each area demonstrates discoloration from high heat, high volume smoke and post fire products of combustion.

Figure 7

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Posi3 USB Test Results
Facepiece Test

12/21/2015 2:48:30 PM

MSA
UltraElite Medium
S/N: John Davis

CFD
424

Posi3 USB serial # U07078 - Calibration was up to date when the test was performed

| Auxiliary IDs | | Functional Tests | | |
|---------------------|------|---------------------|------|----------|
| Facepiece | | Exhalation Pressure | Pass | 1.6 "H2O |
| Second Stage | F424 | Facepiece Leakage | Pass | 0.3 "H2O |
| First Stage/Reducer | 1 | | | |
| Low Pressure Alarm | | | | |
| Cyl Connector | | | | |
| Airline Attachment | | | | |
| Harness | | | | |
| Visual Inspection | | | | |
| Facepiece | Pass | | | |

12/21/2015 2:55:55 PM - Melvin Walker: SCBA Face Piece in for post incident evaluation, face piece reported to be in a high heat event, unit passed all required test as tested. Recommended that the face piece lens be replaced and returned to service. MGWalker 12212015

Tested by : Melvin Walker
Cincinnati Fire Department
478 Wilmer

Page 1

EP
Version 4.1.1.98P

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Notes:

1. Subsequently, HR 14 FAO SCBA. Was delivered to NIOSH for evaluation/investigation (AC Dadosky, Lt. Lustenberger and F.F. M. G. Walker (MSU)) were present for the testing. The SCBA was proven to be operating well within the expected parameters.
2. L 31 FF1 SCBA Control Module time difference was drawn into question the major factor in this instance is the time change related to Day Light Savings. MSU evaluated the SCBA in question in order quantify the difference and found the following:
 - a. At 0830 hrs the SCBA in question showed 0737Hrs. translates to the time on the SCBA being 53 minutes slow. Therefore at 0513Hrs. the actual time would have been 0606 Hrs..
3. Footnotes 1 and 3 are consistent through the document.

Summary

Irrespective of the time differentials and inconsistencies, all Self Contained Breathing Apparatus performed well within the manufacturers expected parameters. During the investigation of HR 14 FAO SCBA there was a discovery that the Control Module was inoperable subsequently the issue was determine to be the internal wiring connection had been pulled from its mounting surface.

Recommended improvements pertaining to the SCBA and related items would consist of the following:

- a) Resetting the Control Module time twice per year to accommodate the time change.
- b) The set-up and operation of the MSA Telemetry System, having it up and running early in the event will help eliminate subsequent deliberations.

Respectfully Submitted,

Melvin G. Walker 12248
Car209/MSU Technician

ⁱ Control Module downloaded data, captured by MSU 05262015.

ⁱⁱ Excerpt from the "Dahlgren Preliminary LODD Report (9-11-15)" pg. 7.

ⁱⁱⁱ MSA Telemetry System Data, captured by MSU 041615

^{iv} Calculations on Air Loss and Flow Rate added 12222015

^v Lt. J. Davis SCBA Face Piece portion added 12212015

^{vi} Captured from – <http://nfpupdates.com/SCBA2013.html>

^{vii} Captured from NIST – http://www.nist.gov/el/fire_research/scuba-062513.cfm

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Appendix 3

**Cincinnati
Fire Department
Fire
Investigation
Report**





Cincinnati Fire Investigation Unit

INCIDENT REPORT

Official Law Enforcement Report - Unauthorized Dissemination is Prohibited



Incident Type: Fire / Accidental

Result Type:

Agency Incident ID: 150326000025

BATS ID: i- 375186

Narrative(s)

Title

Fire Investigation Report

Author

James Hutchings

5133521689

james.hutchings@cincinnati-oh.gov

Description

FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT

On 03/26/15, at 0531 hours, the Cincinnati Fire Department received a dispatch for a fire alarm at 6020 Dahlgren St, Cincinnati Ohio 45227. Before the first responding companies arrived on scene, the dispatch was upgraded to a one-alarm fire due to multiple calls of a working fire from residents of the apartment building. The fire progression and life hazard of this structure fire caused this incident to eventually be upgraded to a four-alarm fire. Per Fire Department procedures, the On Call Fire Investigator was dispatched on the third alarm to determine the origin and cause of the fire.

PARTICIPATING FIRE INVESTIGATORS

- C510 Captain Dave Johnson
- C511 Lieutenant Dan Wolf
- C513 Specialist Curtis Chandler
- C516 Specialist Donald Lewis
- C517 Specialist James Hutchings (On Call Investigator)

OWNER

The Community Builders
95 Berkeley Street #500
Boston, MA 02116

BUILDING MANAGEMENT

Wallick Properties Midwest LLC
5615 Madison Rd
Cincinnati, Ohio 45227

This report may not be disseminated outside your agency without permission from the originating agency.

Page: 1





Cincinnati Fire Investigation Unit

INCIDENT REPORT

Official Law Enforcement Report - Unauthorized Dissemination is Prohibited



Incident Type: Fire / Accidental

Result Type:

Agency Incident ID: 150326000025

BATS ID: i- 375186

INSURANCE

ACE Insurance North American Claims
Adjuster Tim Dunn
11575 Great Oaks Way
Alpharetta, Georgia 30022

WITNESS STATEMENTS

Witnesses were interviewed by the Fire Investigation Unit and the Cincinnati Police Department Homicide Unit. Multiple witness statements were added to the Fire Investigation Unit file.

BUILDING CONSTRUCTION

Five Story residential apartment building, with a centrally located lobby, a centrally located elevator shaft, and stairwells on the north and south ends of the building. This building is type two construction, brick on block with metal trusses supporting the floors and the roof structure.

SCENE PROCESSING

The scene was processed utilizing a systematic approach. Interviews were conducted of first responders, victims, property management, and the occupant of the apartment of fire origin. The scene was documented with photographs, a rough sketch, and laser scanning. Evidence was identified, photographed, and collected from the fire scene and the hospital.

FIRE PROGRESSION

The fire progressed from the stove top of apartment 27. Subsequently, nearby combustibles, including the kitchen cabinets ignited. As the fire continued to grow, the kitchen compartment became heavily involved in fire causing a build-up of a hot gas layer at the ceiling in the adjacent living room compartment. The hot gas layer at the ceiling of the living room compartment then progressed to flashover in the living room compartment. The fire growth and eventual flashover in the living room compartment of apartment 27 forced hot gases and flames through the open apartment door into the second floor hallway causing heavy fire damage to the second floor hallway and smoke damage throughout the apartment building.

FIRE SUPPRESSION

The fire was suppressed utilizing 1 3/4" hand lines with variable stream nozzles. Approximately 500-1000 gallons of water was used as the extinguishing agent for this fire.





Cincinnati Fire Investigation Unit

INCIDENT REPORT

Official Law Enforcement Report - Unauthorized Dissemination is Prohibited



Incident Type: Fire / Accidental

Result Type:

Agency Incident ID: 150326000025

BATS ID: i- 375186

ESTIMATED VALUE OF LOSS

\$350,000

EVIDENCE TAKEN

A sterile gauze swab was taken from the area of fire origin. Laboratory testing by the Hamilton County Coroners Lab indicated no ignitable liquids in this sample. Additional testing revealed a residue like that of vegetable oil or canola oil present in the sample.

Various items of PPE were received by the Fire Investigation Unit for storage with regard to the ongoing line of duty death investigation.

INJURIES AND FATALITIES

One Firefighter fatality occurred as a result of falling down the elevator shaft from the 5th floor while performing search and rescue operations. The medical examiners report indicated that the immediate cause of death was asphyxiation and compression of the chest with fractures.

A total of three Firefighters were treated for minor burn injuries and smoke inhalation as a result of this incident: One Firefighter was transported from the fire scene via Medic Unit for minor burn injuries to the face and hand. One Firefighter was transported to the hospital later that morning via Medic Unit for minor burns to her hands and smoke inhalation. One additional Firefighter self transported to Employee Health for a minor burn to the right ear.

The occupant of Apartment 27 was transported via Medic Unit with first and second degree burn injuries and smoke inhalation.

Three additional civilians were transported via Medic Unit for smoke inhalation and minor burn injuries.

One civilian was treated for minor burns at the scene and refused transport.

FINDINGS

The Fire Investigation Unit's investigation revealed that the area of origin for this fire is the kitchen area, specifically the stove top. The first fuels ignited were cooking materials, specifically food and vegetable oil on the stove. The circumstances which brought the first fuels to their ignition temperature were cooking materials left unattended on the stove top. The Fire Investigation Unit has classified the cause of this fire as Accidental.





Cincinnati Fire Investigation Unit

INCIDENT REPORT

Official Law Enforcement Report - Unauthorized Dissemination is Prohibited





Incident Type: Fire / Accidental

Result Type:

Agency Incident ID: 150326000025

BATS ID: i- 375186

This section intentionally left blank

| | |
|--|---------------|
|  _____ | <u>6/1/15</u> |
| Fire Specialist - Hutchings, James | Date |
|  _____ | <u>6/3/15</u> |
| FIU Commander/Captain Johnson, David | Date |



Appendix 4

**Cincinnati
Police Department
Homicide
Investigation
Report**



CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS SECTION
HOMICIDE UNIT

Summary of Investigation

CASE SUMMARY # 15-OD-15
DEATH OF FIRE APPARATUS OPERATOR DARYL GORDON

DATE OF DEATH: MARCH 26, 2015
LOCATION: 6020 DAHLGREN STREET
INCIDENT: FIRE DEPARTMENT L.O.D.D.
VICTIM: F.A.O. DARYL GORDON
INVESTIGATORS: P.S. GREG GEHRING
P.S. JENNIFER MITSCH

The following is the summary of the Cincinnati Police Homicide Unit's investigation into the death of F.A.O. Daryl Gordon:

On March 26, 2015 at 5:34 AM Clarence Mallory called 911 to report a fire in his building. Mr. Mallory lives in apartment D22 at the Kings Towers Apartments. The Kings Towers Apartment, located at 6020 Dahlgren Street, is a five story apartment complex in the Madisonville neighborhood. The Fire Department's Engine 49 and Truck 31 responded and discovered a working fire on the second floor of the building. Efforts were made to extinguish the fire and evacuate the building. At 5:47 AM a second alarm fire was confirmed. There were reports of fire on the second floor and smoke in the third and fifth floors. Heavy Rescue 14 was dispatched to assist at 5:48 AM. At 5:56 AM a three alarm fire was confirmed. Heavy Rescue 14 arrived at the scene at 6:04 AM. Heavy Rescue 14 was sent to the fifth floor to rescue a resident who was trapped in her apartment with her two month old child. At 6:09 AM it was reported the fire on the second floor had been "knocked down". At 6:24 AM a mayday call was announced for a fire fighter who had fallen into the elevator shaft from the fifth floor. That fire fighter was determined to be Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) Daryl Gordon who was assigned that day to Heavy Rescue 14. FAO Gordon was lodged between the back of the elevator and the shaft wall. The elevator was stopped between the first and second floor. Fire Department personnel extricated FAO Gordon at 6:37 AM and transported him to University Hospital where he was pronounced deceased at 7:08 AM by Dr. LoCasto.



The Fire Department's Arson Investigation Unit, led by Captain Dave Johnson, assumed the lead role in the investigation. Due to the nature of the incident, the Homicide Unit was also requested to assist in the investigation. Detectives Gehring and Mitsch responded as primary representatives the Police Department's Criminal Investigation Section. Detectives Ballman, Gregory, Witherell and Knecht responded to interview building residents on scene. Detective Sieving responded to University Hospital to interview residents who were transported by the Fire Department. Criminalists Horning and Odom photographed the scene. Criminalists Pham and Alexander scanned the scene using the Leica scanner. Sergeant Winslow supervised the investigation.

As stated, 6020 Dahlgren Street is a five story, multi-unit apartment building. It is serviced by a single hydraulic elevator. There was extensive fire and smoke damage to the second floor of the building. Apartment D27 was particularly damaged. The northern stairwell, second floor hallway, and first floor all contained a substantial amount of water. The elevator car was positioned between the first and second floors. There was debris in the car and the car's back wall had been damaged by the Fire Department when they extracted FAO Daryl Gordon. A metal conduit pipe ran horizontally along the far wall of the shaft on the first floor. FAO Daryl Gordon's air tank appeared to be wedged between the elevator car and that pipe, causing the pipe to bow down.

In order to prevent injury to anyone examining the elevator car, Fire Captain Johnson called for a city elevator inspector to respond to examine the elevator. Inspector Mike Mentz responded. The hallway doors for the elevator are not the typical sliding doors. Rather, the doors are hinged doors which swing open into the hallway. Detectives Gehring and Mitsch, Captain Johnson, and Mike Mentz walked floor to floor examining every elevator door. Upon inspection it was learned the doors to the first four floors were pried or forced open. The fifth floor door showed no signs of pry marks or forced entry. Written in black on the elevator door was "Do not enter Open shaft". Detective Gehring fully closed the door and then pulled on the handle. With minimal effort the door opened. The door was closed by several people and each time could be easily opened with a slight tug at the handle. It appeared the lock was not latching into the door slot to keep the door closed. On the far side of the shaft wall there appeared to be streak marks. Below the fifth floor there appeared to be scrape marks going down the wall.

Concerned by the apparent malfunctioning of the elevator door, Police and Fire Department personnel requested a full and official inspection be completed on the elevator and elevator doors the following morning. Scheduled for March 27, 2015, Captain Johnson, Detective Mitsch and other police and fire representatives responded to 6020 Dahlgren Street at the pre-arranged inspection time to meet with city elevator inspectors. No one from the city elevator department responded for the inspection. It was later learned the city had sent inspectors to Dahlgren Street on the evening of March 26, 2015 after arson and police investigators had left the scene.

On March 31, 2015 Detectives Gehring and Mitsch met with Captain Johnson at 6020 Dahlgren Street. Hamilton County Prosecutors Joe Deters and Mark Piepmeier also met at the apartment building. The building was already in the process of being rehabbed. The fifth floor elevator door was examined again by police detectives. Detective Gehring was able to open the door one time with a strong jerk at the handle. After it was closed again it was



unable to be re-opened. The latch appeared to be fixed as it was now functioning properly. At the request of Prosecutor Joe Deters, Mike Trimpe (Lab Director for the Hamilton County Coroner's Office) was asked to respond to examine the door and frame. Mike Trimpe concluded there were no pry marks or other signs of forced entry to the fifth floor elevator door.

Detective Sieving interviewed Karen Keeler at University Hospital on March 26, 2015. Karen lived in apartment D27. She stated she was frying a half chicken on a skillet that evening when she fell asleep. She woke up when she felt the heat of a fire in her kitchen. She put pans on top of the fire and ran into the hallway to alert neighbors. She ran to the first floor to get a fire extinguisher and went back to her apartment. The extinguisher only triggered twice. She then ran back into the hallway and yelled that her apartment was on fire.

Detective Gregory interviewed Clarence Mallory, the original 911 caller, on March 26, 2015 on Dahlgren Street. Clarence was sleeping when he heard screaming and banging on his door. The lady was yelling: "Somebody help me, I need a fire extinguisher". When he opened his door he saw smoke and fire so he quickly shut his door and called 911. He went out onto his balcony and jumped to safety.

Detective Gehring interviewed residents of the 6020 Dahlgren Street about the incident. Sandra Roberts stated she was getting ready to leave for work around 5:30 AM when she heard a woman yelling for help in the first floor hallway. The woman said her stove was on fire and asked her to call 911. The woman told her she came to the first floor to find a fire extinguisher as the second floor had none.

Many of the people interviewed knew of problems with people getting stuck on the elevator in the building. In the past, a few people had tried to open the elevator door when the elevator was not on their floor. Dicky Dixon tried to open the fourth floor door but was unable. Arrick Reeves tried to open the third floor door but was unable. Andre Whitehead tried to open the second floor door but was unable. David Cannon said he tried to open the fifth floor elevator door before but it wouldn't open.

Several other people, however, knew of problems with the elevator doors opening when the elevator was not on their floor. Jazmane Smith said the first floor elevator door would open when the elevator was not present. This happened to her as recently as January 2015. Wanda Locklayer had several incidents where her grandchildren ran down the fifth floor hallway and opened the fifth floor elevator door when the elevator was not present. She said the problem existed for several years. One time, her eight year old grandson was able to open the elevator door. She said she complained to management but nothing was done to fix it. Mahdi Mitchell is a former resident. He stated the elevator door had been malfunctioning on the fifth floor for years as it opened for him a few times with no elevator present. He told maintenance about the problem but it was never fixed.

Detectives Gehring and Mitsch went to the City's Elevator Inspection Office located at 3300 Central Parkway on April 17, 2015. Richard Schriewer is the supervisor of the unit. On the evening of the fire, March 26, 2015, Schriewer received a call from Assistant City Manager Scott Stiles. Stiles told him that he wanted the elevator inspectors to inspect the elevator at 6020 Dahlgren Street that night. Stiles told Schriewer he wanted to have it done so the Fire Department would no longer have to hold the building. Schriewer in turn told Steve Behrle and Bob Fenstermacher to inspect the elevator that night.



Fenstermacher and Behrle were interviewed separately by Detectives Gehring and Mitsch but gave consistent stories. They described the duties of the elevator inspectors as follows: every privately owned elevator in the city is inspected biannually. The city is broken into zones with each zone assigned to an individual inspector. There is one inspector, Mike Mentz, who is assigned all hydraulic elevators (hydraulic elevators have a maximum height of five floors) and escalators city-wide. Since the elevator at 6020 Dahlgren Street was hydraulic, it was inspected by Mike Mentz. His last examination of that elevator was November 14, 2014. The elevator inspections consist of, among other things, examining the electrical and hydraulic systems, the "pit", or bottom of the shaft, the car itself (both inside and outside), and the switches and buttons on the car and walls as well as an examination of all doors, both in the car and on every floor.

The day of the fire, Mike Mentz came back from Dahlgren Street visibly upset. He was so upset he left work early that day. He returned to work briefly the next day but left early again. He has not returned since. The night of the fire Fenstermacher and Behrle went to Dahlgren to inspect the elevator. Upon entry, they saw the first floor elevator door open and the car was between the first and second floor. The second floor door was also open. The third and fourth floor doors had been pried open. On the fifth floor, a sheet of plywood was bolted to the wall encasing the door. They had a worker remove the plywood so they could inspect the door. The door was closed, but with a pull it opened, something they both stated should not happen. Neither Fenstermacher nor Behrle noticed any pry marks on the door or door frame. They looked at the lock and it seemed to be working properly, though it did not fully latch within the door slot. They removed the cover plate to the lock and examined it. Again, they found that it seemed to be working properly. They did no further assembly or disassembly of the lock, replaced the cover, then had the plywood bolted back onto the wall. When told the lock seemed to be working much better after their visit, both seemed genuinely surprised. They said they tried to get the lock to work properly before they left but were unable. They had no explanation why it would now be latching properly.

Mike Mentz was interviewed at CIS on May 11, 2015 by Detective Gehring. He is an elevator inspector for the City of Cincinnati's building department. May 11, 2015 marks the first day he returned to work since this incident occurred. Mike inspects hydraulic elevators in the city. 6020 Dahlgren Street is one of the elevators he inspects. He said he did not remember the date he last inspected the elevator and did not remember in detail inspecting it. He did say that he checked the top of the elevator, the pit area, the car and the doors on every floor during his inspection. He said he checked the doors on each floor by walking floor to floor and pulling on the door (as opposed to pushing on them from the inside). Mike said the fifth floor door was strongly locked during his last inspection. He surmised the door was pulled open too forcefully the day of the incident. He also dismissed the residents' stories of the door opening as unreliable.

Respectfully,

Greg Gehring
Cincinnati Police Homicide Unit



Appendix 5

**Cincinnati Building
Department
Elevator
Inspection
Report**



Report of elevator failure at 6020 Dahlgren St.

March 27, 2015

Report by Robert Fenstermacher and Steven Behrle, Chief Elevator Inspector City of Cincinnati

We arrived at the fire scene at approximately 6:30pm. After signing in per Fire Department request, we began our observation. Starting at the first floor, we found the hoistway door open to the pit area. The first floor door had been pried open with evidence of pry marks on the door. Checking the interlock, it functioned properly mechanically. We did not try to close this door at this time. We were curious why the elevator was not parked at the first floor. This elevator has elevator recall and when the smoke at the second floor reached the elevator smoke detector, it should have put the elevator into Phase I recall and parked the elevator at the first floor with the car door open.

2nd floor - Upon arrival at the elevator, we noticed the car sitting approximately 18"-24" below the floor level. The rear and one side wall had been mostly removed to allow the firemen to extract the injured firefighter. While the release arm of the interlock was twisted, the interlock still operated properly. We also noticed the hoistway door had also been pried open. Evidence of the fire reached the elevator hoistway door. The smoke detector for the Phase I recall was completely gone with only wires hanging down from the ceiling.

3rd floor - we were able to open the hoistway door, as it had also been pried open. Again, checking the interlock, it appeared to be functioning properly.

4th floor - the hoistway door was also open with pry marks on the door. We found a different style of interlock at this floor. The 'keeper' attached to the hoistway door had been broken to allow access to the hoistway. Checking the operation of the interlock, it operated correctly.

5th floor - upon arrival we found this landing had been covered with a plywood panel. We went back down to the 1st floor and obtained permission to have this panel removed so we could check out the condition of the door and interlock. We received permission and proceed back up to the 5th floor and began our investigation. Once the plywood was removed, we pulled on the hoistway door handle. With some effort, we were able to pull the hoistway door open. This door did not have any pry marks, so our conclusion was that it was not forced open with any tool. We tried opening and closing the door with various amounts of force to see if that would affect the closing and latching of the interlock. There was little difference from our observation. The interlock cover was removed to inspect the inside of the lock. Mechanically, everything appeared to work as designed. We found no excessive wear, and the spring in the mechanism was intact and appeared to also function properly. The only problem we found was the slot in the hoistway door that the interlock pin slid into to lock the door was slightly rounded on the side that makes contact with the locking pin. This in turn allowed the pin to retract more easily



and may have led to the door being able to open with less force than it should have. Aside from the slight rounding, the hole didn't appear to be adversely deformed to cause any problems.



Appendix 6

**NIOSH
SCBA Testing
Report**



THE COMPLETE AND DETAILED NIOSH REPORT CAN BE OBTAINED FROM THE CINCINNATI FIRE DEPARTMENT



DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC)

National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH)
National Personal Protective
Technology Laboratory (NPPTL)
1095 Willowdale Rd., MS 2703
Morgantown, WV 26505
Phone: 304-285-5858
Fax: 304-285-5774

September 4, 2015

Assistant Chief Edward Dadosky
Cincinnati Fire and E.M.S.
430 Central Avenue
Cincinnati, OH 45202

Dear Chief Dadosky:

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has concluded its investigation conducted under NIOSH Task Number TN-20231. This investigation consisted of the inspection of a SCBA unit identified as Mine Safety Appliances (MSA) model Firehawk M7, 4500 psi, 60-minute, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). The SCBA unit was hand delivered to the NIOSH facility in Morgantown, WV on April 24, 2015. As delivered, the unit was contained within a paper bag inside a cardboard shipping container. The unit was taken to the lower floor of Lab H-1513 for secured storage. The SCBA unit was removed for inspection on May 18, 2015 and was returned to the locked evidence cage after inspection until it was tested on May 22, 2015.

SCBA Inspection:

A complete visual inspection of the SCBAs was conducted on May 1, 2015. The SCBA was identified as the Cincinnati Fire Department SCBA and was extensively examined, component by component, in the condition received to determine the conformance of the unit to the NIOSH-approved configuration. The unit was identified as the MSA model Firehawk M7, 60minute, 4500 psi unit, NIOSH approval numbers TC-13F-500CBRN. The visual inspection process was documented photographically.

The complete SCBA inspections are summarized in Appendix I of the enclosed Status Investigation Report. The condition of each major component was photographed with a digital camera. Images of the SCBA is contained in the Appendix III of the report.

The unit was in good condition as received. The cylinder was in good condition and had approximately 2900 psi in it. Once all the inspections were completed, the SCBA unit was repackaged and placed back in the locked evidence cage until it was removed for testing on June 11, 2015.



This SCBA was equipped with a data logging device that measures several performance parameters during a predetermined time period. This data was downloaded from the SCBA by the Mine Safety Appliances Company personnel and witnessed by members of the Cincinnati fire Department and NIOSH on May 22, 2015.

Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) Device

The PASS device did not function. However, the unit was not tested against the specific performance requirements of NFPA 1982, *Standard on Personal Alert Safety Systems, (PASS)*, 1998 Edition. Because NIOSH does not certify PASS devices, no further evaluation was performed.

SCBA Compressed Air Cylinder Contents

The cylinder provided had approximately 2,900 psi.

SCBA Testing

The purpose of the testing was to determine the SCBAs conformance to the approval performance requirements of Title 42, *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 84 (42 CFR 84). Further testing was conducted to provide an indication of the SCBAs conformance to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Air Flow Performance requirements of NFPA 1981, *Standard on Open-Circuit Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for the Fire Service*, 1997 Edition.

NIOSH SCBA Certification Tests (in accordance with the performance requirements of 42 CFR 84):

1. Positive Pressure Test [§ 84.70(a)(2)(ii)]
2. Rated Service Time Test (duration) [§ 84.95]
3. Static Pressure Test [§ 84.91(d)]
4. Gas Flow Test [§ 84.93]
5. Exhalation Resistance Test [§ 84.91(c)]
6. Remaining Service Life Indicator Test (low-air alarm) [§ 84.83(f)]

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Tests (in accordance with NFPA 1981, 1997 Edition):

7. Air Flow Performance Test [Chapter 5, 5-1.1]

All units were tested on June 11, 2015, and met all of the test requirements.

Appendix II of the Status Investigation Report contains complete NIOSH and NFPA test reports for the SCBA. Tables One and Two summarize the NIOSH and NFPA test results.



Summary and Conclusions

A SCBA unit was submitted to NIOSH/NPPTL by the NIOSH/DSR for the Cincinnati, OH Fire Department for evaluation. The SCBA unit was delivered to NIOSH on April 24, 2015 and extensively inspected on May 18, 2015. The unit was identified as a MSA model Firehawk M7, 4500 psi, 60-minute, SCBA (NIOSH approval numbers, TC-13F-500CBRN). The unit didn't show any signs of heat damage but exhibited signs of physical damage likely from the fall and/or extrication efforts. The cylinder valve, as received, was in the off position. The cylinder gauges showed that the tank was empty. The facepiece was included and the regulator housing was dislodged from the mask. The entire unit was in good overall condition. The NFPA approval label was present and readable. The personal alert safety system (PASS) did not function. The unit was then transported back to Mine Safety Appliances on May 29, 2015 to test to see why the PASS did not function. Upon internal inspection, it was noted that the power supply to the unit was broken during the recovery of the victim. When the power was restored to the unit, the PASS operated as designed.

The Cincinnati SCBA met the requirements of the NIOSH Positive Pressure Test, as the unit did maintain a positive pressure for the 60 minute minimum duration of the unit. The unit passed all of the other NIOSH tests. It failed the NFPA Air Flow Performance Test due to the PASS not operating and there wasn't a HUD.

In light of the information obtained during this investigation, NIOSH has proposed no further action on its part at this time. The SCBA unit was returned to storage pending return to the Cincinnati Fire Department.

If this unit is to be placed back in service, the SCBA must be repaired, tested, cleaned and any damaged components replaced and inspected by a qualified service technician, including such testing and other maintenance activities as prescribed by the schedule from the SCBA manufacturer. Typically a flow test is required on at least an annual basis.

The investigation under task number TN-20231 will be considered closed. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me at 304-285-5858.

Sincerely yours,

Jay Tarley
Physical Scientist
Evaluation and Testing Branch
National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory

Enclosures

cc: Tim Merinar, NIOSH
Ms. Heather L. Dannhardt, Mine Safety Appliances



Appendix 7

**Preliminary
Report
FAO Gordon LODD**

Released August 9, 2015



CINCINNATI FIRE DEPARTMENT
FAO DARYL GORDON LINE OF DUTY DEATH
PRELIMINARY REPORT



August 9, 2015

The following report is a product of the Dahlgren Investigative Work Group. The work group and the Dahlgren Investigative Committee were formed to ensure that all factors leading to the death of Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO) Daryl Gordon would be fully investigated so that appropriate actions may be taken to lessen the chance of a similar occurrence. The information contained in this report has been compiled using data obtained from members' SCBA Integrated Control Modules (ICM), Motorola radio transmission data, and interviews conducted in conjunction with the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), as well as the investigative efforts of work group members. This preliminary report contains the facts surrounding the LODD of FAO Gordon, and primarily focuses on the event timeline of the multiple alarm fire at 6020 Dahlgren Street on March 26, 2015.

Using the information formulated by the work group, the Dahlgren Investigative Committee will generate a second more comprehensive report. This second report will examine issues such as standard operating procedures, training and experience levels of personnel, equipment, technology and many other factors that may be relevant to the death of FAO Daryl Gordon as well as injuries sustained by the other fire fighters. Finally, this second report will also address factors that may prevent future fire fighter injuries and fatalities.

The Dahlgren Investigative Work Group

- **AC** **Ed Dadosky**
- **DC** **Marc Monahan**
- **DC** **Greg Potter**
- **DC** **Sherman Smith**
- **DC** **Anson Turley**
- **Capt** **Curt Goodman**
- **Lt** **Bill Lustenberger**



**SUBJECT: 6020 DAHLGREN STREET
MARCH 26, 2015
4 ALARM FIRE**

| | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|
| <u>FIRE ALARM</u> | Engine | E-49 |
| 0531 hours | Ladder | L-31 |
| | District | D-4 |
| <u>1st ALARM</u> | Engine | E-31 & E-46 (Safety) |
| 0534 hours | Ladder | L-18 & L-23 (RAT) |
| | Heavy Rescue | HR-9 |
| | Safety Officer | SO-2 |
| | District | D-1 |
| | Medic | M-46 |
| | ALS | ALS-32 |
| <u>WORKING FIRE</u> | Medic | M-23 |
| 0541 hours | | |
| <u>EXTRA COMPANIES</u> | Engine | E-18 |
| 0542 hours | Ladder | L-32 |
| <u>2nd ALARM</u> | Engine | E-8 |
| 0547 hours | Heavy Rescue | HR-14 |
| | District | D-3 |
| <u>3rd ALARM</u> | Engine | E-23 & E-7 |
| 0555 hours | Ladder | L-19 |
| | Command Staff | C-1; C-3; C-5; C-301; SO-1; SOC |
| <u>4th ALARM</u> | Engine | E-32 & E-9 |
| 0623 hours | | |



INCIDENT SUMMARY:

| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| REPORT OF FIRE | Automatic fire alarm-smoke detector activation followed by multiple telephone calls |
| DEATHS/INJURIES | 1 firefighter fatality- 3 firefighter injuries 3 civilians transported to hospital |
| INITIAL SIZE UP | “Nothing Showing” upon the arrival of the first fire companies |
| BUILDING DETAILS | 5 story brick and concrete block, built in 1962. Due to the grading around the building, ground level access is available on the A Side for the first floor, both C Side apartments on the second floor, and both stairwells (B-C and C-D Corners) on the landing between the first and second floor. Both stairwells provide access to all floors. |
| OCCUPANCY | Multi-family apartment building (38 Units) Floor 1 has six units, offices, and storage space. Floors 2-5 have eight units and a laundry room. |
| ELEVATOR | Manufacturer: Canton Elevator Company Date: 3/29/1993 Installed: 3/1996 Elevator Shaft Dimensions: 76.5” (A-C) X 67” (B-D) Elevator Car Dimensions: Exterior- 55.5” (A-C) X 51.25 (B-D) Interior- 52.5” (A-C) X 48” (B-D) |
| RESCUES | A total of 21 civilians were rescued from this building. |
| FALL | The distance from the floor level of 5 th floor to the top of the elevator was 22’ and 9.5”. The top of the elevator car was 3’ and 1” below the 3 rd floor level. The elevator car floor was 1’ and 3.5” below 2 nd floor level. Distance between rear (C) of elevator shaft and the back wall (C) side of the elevator car was 11.75” (Void) |
| FIRE CAUSE AND ORIGIN | Accidental-Cooking materials left unattended on the stove. This fire originated in Apartment 27. |



CRITICAL BENCHMARKS

- 05:37:39 E-49 on-scene reporting nothing showing in a 6-Story MD
- 05:41:41 D-4 reports a “working fire”
- 05:51:35 Command (D-4) requests E-49 FAO to start the water in E-49’s line.
- 05:51:45 HR-9 reports that the fire has extended into the 2nd floor hallway
- 05:52:56 Command (D-4) requests E-46 & E-18 to lay a line to the 2nd floor.
- 05:54:25 HR-9 reports that E-49’s line needs to be extended an additional 50-60’
- 06:00:16 HR-9 reports that water is being put on the fire.
- 06:01:00 SO-2 reports E-49 OIC is burned and is heading to building “A” side.
- 06:02:14 Command (D-4) reports that fire has been “knocked down ”but still has heavy smoke conditions on all floors.
- **06:04 HR-14 (FAO Gordon) arrives on the scene.**
- 06:09 HR-14 OIC, FF1, FF2 go on air in the “B” stairs between 4th & 5th floors.
- 06:09:32 Search & Rescue (D-3) reports HR-14 heading to Apt 557
- 06:10 FAO Gordon goes on air in the “B” stairs between 4th & 5th floors.
- **06:10 The members of HR14 search apts. 57, 51, & 52, and then find the 5th floor elevator door can be easily opened without needing to force it. FAO Gordon is not with the members when they find the door. HR-14 marks the outside of the elevator door, "Do Not Enter Open Shaft" [see Figure 9]**
- **06:12 FAO Gordon falls down the elevator shaft.**
- 06:15:36 HR-14 OIC reports “All Clear” on the 5th floor.
- 06:22:18 HR-14 OIC broadcasts “Mayday” over the radio.
- 06:36:17 Extrication (SOC) reports that FAO Gordon has been extricated.



INCIDENT DESCRIPTION [PRE] HR-14 ARRIVAL ON THE SCENE




At 0531 hours on Thursday March 26, 2015 Engine 49, Ladder 31, and District 4 were dispatched to 6020 Dahlgren Ave. for a smoke detector activation. At 0534 hours the Cincinnati Emergency Communications Center (Dispatch) upgraded the incident to a one alarm due to receiving multiple calls reporting smoke in the building. The balance of the first alarm complement was dispatched and the assigned fire ground channel was changed from D8 to D2. Engine 49 arrived at 0538 hours and reported a six story multi-dwelling with no fire showing. *[Building location on a hillside led to the initial size up error reporting 6 stories versus the actual 5 stories. This had no bearing on the fatality for this incident.]* District 4 arrived on the scene at 0540 hours and confirmed a working fire and assumed Dahlgren Command. At 0541 hours Dahlgren Command requested an additional Engine and Truck Company from Dispatch. Due to heavy fire conditions and the initial attack line becoming wedged in the D-C stairwell preventing it from reaching the fire, a second alarm was requested at 0547 hours, at which time Heavy Rescue 14 (FAO Gordon) responded. In an attempt to get an attack line in place and operating, Dahlgren Command assigned Safety Engine 46 and RAT 23 to advance an additional attack line from Engine 49 through the A Side of the building to the apartment on fire. RAT operations were reassigned to Ladder 19 when the third alarm was requested at 0555 hours. Dahlgren Command reported the fire under control at 0602 hours; however numerous occupants still required assistance to exit the building while heavy smoke conditions persisted throughout the building including moderate to heavy on the 5th floor.

HR-14 arrived on the scene at 0604 hours and received an assignment from Dahlgren Command to search the fifth floor.




INCIDENT TIMELINE [POST] HR-14 ARRIVAL ON THE SCENE



- **06:04:** HR-14 arrived on scene and all four members (including FAO Gordon) proceeded to the A side of the structure where HR-14 OIC reported to Command, and was ordered to search the fifth floor.
- **06:08:** All four members of HR-14 entered the building on the first floor through the A side entrance. According to ICM data, HR14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 turned on their SCBA cylinders and proceeded to the B-C Stairwell to ascend to the fifth floor. FAO Gordon did not turn on his SCBA cylinder at this time.
- **06:09:** HR-14 reaches the 4th/5th stairwell landing in the B-C stairwell. While HR-14 was ascending the stairwell, Dispatch informed Dahlgren Command of a report of victims trapped in apartment 557 (later confirmed to be apartment 57).
- **06:09:35:** D-3 (Search and Rescue Operations) radioed to Dahlgren Command that HR-14 was on the way to apartment 557. At this time all four members of HR-14 were reportedly on the 4th/5th stairwell landing with D-3 immediately behind them.
- **06:10:15:** D-3 reported two victims coming out, “we’ve got one baby and one adult.” HR-14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 reported that as they were donning their SCBA face pieces these victims passed them on the stairs escorted by L-18 FF#1, L-23 OIC, and L-23 FF#1. The order of HR-14 members on the 4th/5th stairwell landing at this time was OIC, FF#2, FF#1, and then FAO Gordon.
- **06:10:** While on the 4th/5th stairwell landing and according to ICM data, HR-14 FAO Gordon turned on his SCBA cylinder, donned his face piece, and went on air. The other members of HR-14 had already entered the fifth floor slightly ahead of FAO Gordon to search for victims. Smoke conditions were reported as moderate with visibility limited to 4-5 feet. HR-14 OIC and FF#2 entered apt. 57; HR-14 FF #1 entered apt. 51; and HR-14 FAO Gordon’s location was unknown at this time.



INCIDENT TIMELINE (CONTINUED)


- **06:11:** HR-14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 met at the door of apt. 52 where HR-14 OIC and FF#1 enter and search apt. 52. HR-14 FF#2 moved down the hallway and found the elevator door. The elevator door could be easily opened without needing to be forced. HR-14 OIC and FF#1 arrived at FF#2's location where they discussed how to mark the free-swinging elevator door which led to an open elevator shaft. FAO Gordon was not present when this discussion took place.
- **06:11-06:12:** While D-3 was on the fifth floor he encountered HR-14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 at the elevator door. HR-14 showed D-3 the open elevator shaft. HR-14 and D-3 looked into the shaft again at this time and saw nothing. HR-14 FF#2 marked the door with a black permanent marker, "**Do Not Enter Open Shaft**" [Figure 9]. D-3 moved toward the B-C stairwell while HR-14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 searched the laundry room and continued toward the D side of the building.
- **06:11-06:12:** L-32 OIC, FAO, and FF#1 arrive on the fifth floor and proceed to apt. 58 to rescue two victims from the balcony.
- **06:12:** At this time D-3 left the fifth floor. L-32 FF#1 escorted two occupants out of apt. 58 to the B-C stairwell while L-32 OIC and FAO continued down the hallway and kept searching. While on the 4th/5th floor stairwell landing, L-32 FF#1 saw FAO Gordon above him at the fifth floor door.
 - FAO Gordon asked him "Are you HR-14?"
 - L-32 FF#1 responded "No, I'm with Ladder 32. Who are you?"
 - FAO Gordon replied "I'm Daryl Gordon".

After this verbal exchange, FAO Gordon turned around and headed back to the fifth floor hallway as L-32 FF#1 continued down the stairs with the two occupants from apt. 58.



Note: This is the last reported contact with FAO Gordon prior to him falling into the elevator shaft

INCIDENT TIMELINE (CONTINUED)



- 06:13: According to the ICM data, FAO Gordon’s PASS device motion alarm activated at this time
- 06:13:36: HR-14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 met members of E-8 near apt. 55 and begin to discuss whether it is still necessary to force locked doors because the fire is under control.
- 06:14:16: L-32 OIC and FAO join the discussion with HR-14 and E-8 members. E-8 OIC requests verification from Command reference forcing doors. L-32 OIC and FAO force entry into apt. 54 and move back toward the B-C Stairwell. HR-14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 search apt. 54.
- 06:15:36: HR14 OIC radios an “all clear” to Dahlgren Command.
- 06:19:40: Dahlgren Command called for a PAR. At this time, HR-14 OIC conducts a PAR of HR-14 and realizes that FAO Gordon is not present. HR-14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 begin to search the fifth floor, starting near apt. 54 and moving through the hallway back toward the B-C stairwell.
- 06:22: HR-14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 were moving closer to the elevator door at which time HR-14 OIC heard an SCBA low pressure alarm bell ringing. The members of HR-14 then looked into the elevator shaft and saw a fire helmet on top of the elevator car.
- **06:22:23:** After two unsuccessful attempts to transmit a MAYDAY, HR-14 OIC activated the radio emergency button and broadcast the MAYDAY transmission.



MAYDAY OPERATIONS AND EXTRICATION EFFORTS

Extrication operations were set up and assigned to the Special Operations Chief (SOC) at 0624 hours. The exact elevator car location was determined to be at the second floor level, with FAO Gordon 'wedged' between the elevator car's exterior C side wall and the C side wall of the elevator shaft [Figure 11]. Available fire companies began to converge on both the second and third floor to begin the extrication process. As HR-9 FF#1, FF#2, and FF#3 exited the structure to obtain specialized extrication equipment from the HR-9 apparatus, members of E-23 forced entry from the second floor hallway into the elevator car and began to remove the elevator car's C side wall using a flat head axe. Members of various fire companies including HR-14 worked both on top of the elevator car and inside of the elevator car to extricate FAO Gordon. The extrication was completed in less than 14 minutes. FAO Gordon was then transported to University Hospital by several medics using Medic 19.

TREATMENT AND TRANSPORT

Once FAO Gordon was extricated CPR was initiated and he was transported to University Hospital by Medic 19. While enroute to University Hospital, seven Cincinnati Fire Department EMT's and Paramedics treated FAO Gordon using Southwest Ohio Pre-Hospital Care Protocol. Upon arrival at the University of Cincinnati Emergency Department treatment was transferred to the emergency department staff, where physicians pronounced FAO Gordon dead at 0708 hours.




GLOSSARY


- **A, B, C, D:** The Cincinnati Fire Department has adopted the method of using letters to designate the sides of a building, thus eliminating the need to know geographic locations on an emergency scene. The address side of the building is always the A side of the building with B, C, D etc., to follow sequentially, in a clockwise manner. This method allows members to respond to orders given on a scene without having to determine compass directional reference points such as north, south, etc.
- **Cross Lay:** A pre-connected bed of 1 3/4" hose, usually 250' in length that is mounted just behind the cab of the apparatus on an Engine Company. There are two cross lays on each Engine Company in the Cincinnati Fire Department, typically referred to as the front or rear cross lay.
- **District Chief:** The City of Cincinnati is divided into 4 fire districts. Each District is normally supervised by a District Chief and are numbered from 1 to 4. A district chief responds in an operationally equipped S.U.V. and is responsible for incident command at an emergency. The street on which an incident occurs is used to identify 'Command' for a respective incident, i.e. Dahlgren Command.
- **FF:** Fire Fighter. The members assigned to a company at the rank of fire fighter.
- **FAO:** Fire Apparatus Operator. The member responsible for operation of the apparatus on a given tour of duty. This person is tasked with driving the apparatus as well as operating the pumps or aerial ladder on the scene of an emergency.
- **ICM:** Integrated Control Module. This device houses the integrated PASS motion sensor and an analog and LCD display that records and provides information such as cylinder pressure, motion, thermal and low pressure alarm status. The ICM records data pertaining to battery status, cylinder pressure, and alarm status.
- **OIC:** Officer in Charge. The member responsible for daily and emergency fire company operations on a given tour of duty.
- **PAR:** Personnel Accountability Report. A process whereby the Incident Commander, or Accountability Officer, call all Company Officers by radio to confirm that all members are visually accounted for on an incident scene. The PAR is used at various times during an incident. For example, when changing tactics during an incident, at the 20-minute mark of an incident, and/or after any unexpected occurrence (building collapse, flashover, etc)
- **RAT:** Rapid Assistance Team. A company of members specially trained to rescue fire fighters in peril. A RAT Company is designated upon the dispatch of a one alarm fire.
- **Safety Engine:** The Engine Company responsible to establish accountability, to operate the SCBA Air Monitoring System, and to assist with RAT Operations. The Safety Engine is designated upon dispatch of a one alarm fire.



Figure 1: HR-14 Timeline




6:08: After receiving orders to search the 5th floor, members of HR-14 enter the A side of the building. According to ICM data, HR-14 OIC, FF#1 and FF#2 charge their SCBA cylinders. FAO Gordon does not charge his SCBA cylinder at this time. All members proceed to and ascend the B-C stairwell.




6:08 - 6:09: Members ascend B-C Stairwell to the landing between the fourth and fifth floor.






6:09:35: D-3 reports that he has HR-14 on their way to apartment 557. HR-14 is at the landing between the fourth and fifth floor. D-3 is below them on the stairs.




6:10:15: D-3 reports two victims coming out, "we've got one baby and one female adult." HR-14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 reported they were donning their SCBA face pieces when the victims passed them on the stairs escorted by L-18 FF#1, L-23 OIC, and L-23 FF#1. The order of HR-14 members on the stairs at this time was OIC, FF#2, FF#1, FAO Gordon.






6:10: According to data retrieved from his ICM, FAO Gordon turned on his SCBA, donned his face piece, and went on air while in the stairwell between the 4th and 5th floor. The other members of HR-14 entered the fifth floor slightly ahead of FAO Gordon and began to search for victims. Smoke conditions were reported as moderate with visibility limited to 4-5 feet. HR-14 OIC and FF#2 entered apt 57; HR-14 FF#1 entered apt 51; **FAO Gordon's location is unknown.**




6:11: HR-14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 meet at the door to apt 52 where HR-14 OIC and FF#1 enter and search apt 52. HR-14 FF#2 proceeded down the hallway and found the elevator door. The elevator door opened easily without needing to be forced. HR-14 OIC and FF#1 arrived at FF#2's location where they discussed how to mark the free-swinging elevator door which led to an open elevator shaft. **FAO Gordon was not present when this discussion took place, his location is unknown.**






6:11-06:12: While on the fifth floor D-3 encountered HR-14 OIC, FF# 1, and FF#2 at the elevator door. HR-14 showed D-3 the open elevator shaft. HR-14 and D-3 looked into the shaft again at this time and saw nothing. HR-14 FF#2 marked the door with a black permanent marker; **"Do Not Enter Open Shaft"** [Figure 9]. D-3 moved toward the B-C stairwell while HR-14 OIC, FF# 1, and FF#2 searched the laundry room and continued toward the D side of the building. **FAO Gordon's location is unknown.**



6:11-6:12: L-32 OIC, FAO and FF#1 arrive on the 5th floor and proceed into apt 58 to rescue two victims from the balcony. At this time D-3 left the fifth floor. **FAO Gordon's location is unknown.**






6:11-6:12: L-32 FF#1 escorted two occupants from apt 58 to the B-C stairwell while L-32 OIC and FAO continued down the hallway and continued to search. On the landing between the fourth and fifth floor, L-32 FF#1 saw FAO Gordon on the landing above him at the fifth floor door.


FAO Gordon asked L32 FF#1 "Are you HR-14"
 L-32 FF#1 responded "No, I'm with L-32. Who are you?"
 FAO Gordon replied "I'm Daryl Gordon."

After this verbal exchange, FAO Gordon turned around and headed back to the fifth floor hallway as L-32 FF#1 continued down the stairs with the two occupants from apt 58. *Note: This is the last reported contact with FAO Gordon prior to him falling into the elevator shaft.*




6:12:36: E-8 advises command, by radio, that they have completed their search of floor 4 and going to floor 5. **FAO Gordon's location is unknown.**






6:13: According to the ICM data, FAO Gordon's PASS device motion alarm is activated at this time.




6:13:36: HR-14 OIC, FF#1 and FF#2 reach the D side of the hallway and meet with the members of E-8, they discuss forcing apartment doors. E-8 contacts command, by radio, about forcing doors.






6:14:16: L-32 OIC and FAO join the discussion between HR-14 and E-8. E-8 OIC requests verification from Command reference forcing doors. L-32 OIC and FAO force entry into apt 54 and move back toward the B-C stairwell. HR-14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 search apt 54.




6:15:36: HR-14 radios an "all clear" to Dahlgren Command.





6:19:40: Dahlgren Command called for a PAR. At this time, HR-14 OIC conducts a PAR of HR-14 and realizes FAO Gordon is not present. HR-14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 begin to search the fifth floor, starting near apt 54 and moving through the hallway toward the B-C stairwell.



6:22: HR-14 OIC, FF#1, and FF#2 moved closer to the elevator door at which time HR-14 OIC heard an SCBA low pressure alarm bell ringing. The members of HR-14 looked into the elevator shaft and saw a fire helmet on top of the elevator car. After two unsuccessful attempts to transmit the MAYDAY, HR14 OIC activated the radio emergency button and broadcasts the MAYDAY transmission at **06:22:23**.



Figure 2: A side of 6020 Dahlgren St



Figure 3: B side of 6020 Dahlgren Street



Figure 4: C side of 6020 Dahlgren Street (Viewed from the B-C Corner)




Figure 5: D side of 6020 Dahlgren Street



Figure 6: Space between stair and wall where attack line became wedged






Figure 7: Hose deployment



NOTE: The second line off of Engine 49 [E49 2] was advanced through the first floor A side entrance and up the B-C stairwell to the second floor.

Figure 8: Apparatus position



Figures 9: Fifth floor elevator door



Figure 10: Fifth floor elevator door





Figure 11: View of elevator shaft and top of elevator car

Figure 12: Diagram of elevator shaft and top of elevator car




Figure 13: Second floor hallway (viewed from the D side looking toward the B side with the initial attack line)



Figure 14: Second floor hallway (the door to the fire apartment (apt 27) is on the right)



Figure 15: View of fire apartment from C side





FAO Daryl Gordon
1960-2015

NEVER FORGET

